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Abstract 
 
The foundation of any capital market is its infrastructure, including its arrangements for the 
“collateral ecosystem” (the regulatory, institutional and operational arrangements for collateral, 
custody, client assets and client money). Capital market infrastructure should work in an 
integrated fashion so parties can transact seamlessly on a level playing field instead of a 
patchwork.  
 
That is not the case today. In particular, no uniform single EU-wide collateral ecosystem exists. 
While EU Directives and Regulations have improved individual aspects of the ecosystem, they 
have been applied unevenly across the EU and often unintegrated with one another. As Member 
States transposed EU Directives into national law, they did so in national terms and national 
institutions. This is even the case with the UK and Ireland, despite closely linked markets and 
legal systems, divergences do exist.   
 
Such divergences create “conceptual gaps” and “conceptual translation risks” in protection market 
participants receive, especially where they document, transact and/or hold assets in different 
jurisdictions. This creates risk, including those specific to collateral assets, as well as transaction 
costs.  
 
This thesis proposes new metrics to identify measure and manage risks specific to the collateral 
ecosystem including those stemming from conceptual gaps and conceptual translation risks. A 
comparative law analysis between respective rules, and divergences, at the EU, Irish and UK level 
demonstrates some of these issues and proposes policy options.  
 
Economically, the most effective measure would involve harmonising the laws and regulations 
affecting the EU’s collateral ecosystem, ideally along the lines of the most commonly used regime 
adapted on a “jurisdiction-agnostic” basis. Politically, however, such an approach is likely to 
encounter severe challenges. The question is whether EU-27 policymakers, given the UK's 
changing relationship with the remaining bloc, will move the discussion on fixing the plumbing 
from "too big to reform" to "too important to miss". 
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GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS 
References in this thesis to legislation, rulemaking and policymaking instruments are references 
to consolidated versions of such instruments, including as re-enacted, and shall include all 
subordinate measures made under that provision, as in force in the respective jurisdictions as at 
14 December 2019  unless indicated to the contrary. References to websites are as “accessed on 
8 and 14 December 2019”.  
Unless the context otherwise in this thesis requires, words in the singular shall include the plural 
and in the plural shall include the singular.  
 
AIFMD/R Means the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (Directive 2011/61/EU) and 
relevant Commission Delegated Regulations.  
BUSI Banking Union supervised institution. 
Brexit The UK ceasing to be an EU-MS and ceasing to be subject to any transitional 
arrangements that substantively treat the UK as an EU-MS of the EU.  
CAR Refers to the “Client Assets Rules” that apply in Ireland comprised of the following 
legislative and (non-legislative) regulatory instruments: 
 Central bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 (Section 48(1) 
(Investment Firms) Regulations 2017;   
 Investor Money Requirements Guidance 2018, Central Bank of Ireland; and 
 Guidance on Client Asset Regulations for Investment Firms.  
CASS The Client Asset Sourcebook1 of the UK FCA’s Handbook2. 
CBI Central Bank of Ireland, as NCA in Ireland that also participates in the Banking Union.  
CCP An entity that interposes itself between the two sides of a transaction, using novation 
mechanics to become the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer.  CCPs are 
tasked with clearing transactions by netting offsetting contractual positions and 
corresponding collateral delivery obligations by taking both sides of a transaction and thus 
                                                     
 
1  Available, as at the version of 1 November 2019, here: https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/CASS.pdf [accessed 2 
November 2019] 
2  For a more general discussion on the missed opportunity of the EU, most recently in terms of CMU, to not itself adopt a similar 
approach taken by EU policymakers in terms of the UK’s Financial Services Handbook, please see  M.D: Huertas  “The Phasing 
Out of the UK’s Financial Services Handbook: a Missed Opportunity for the EU’s Single Rulebook and the Capital Markets Union 
Project?“ which first appeared in 2016 in Vol.31 Journal of International Banking Law & Regulation, Issue 1.  
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is in theory supposed to provide, assuming it has enough capital and a sizeable default 
fund to cover losses resulting from defaults of its users, a stability and liquidity buffer.    
CDD 2017/593 
 
Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593. 
CDR 2017/565 
 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565.  
Client Assets Means financial instruments belonging to a client of a regulated firm that a firm receives, 
holds or controls on behalf of the client in the course of carrying out MiFID business. NB 
these items may have specific meanings under CDD 2017/593 and CDR 2017/565 (and the 
MiFID II/MiFIR Regime more generally, which defines this as “client financial 
instruments” and together with Client Money as “assets”) as well as CASS and CAR and 
the meanings may be subject to divergences between those respective regimes.  
Client Money Means money of any currency i.e., cash, belonging to a client of a regulated firm which a 
firm receives, holds or controls on behalf of the client in the course of carrying out MiFID 
business.  NB these items may have specific meanings under CDD 2017/593 and CDR 
2017/565 (and the MiFID II/MiFIR Regime more, generally which defines this as “client 
funds” – and together with Client Assets as “assets”) as well as CASS and CAR and the 
meanings may be subject to divergences between those respective regimes. 
CMU The EU’s Capital Markets Union project originally launched in 2015, which was 
scheduled to be completed 2019 (i.e., CMU 1.0) and which, in the EC’s legislative cycle 
of 2019-2024 is supposed to be “relaunched” as CMU 2.0. 
Collateral 
Assets 
Means any Client Assets and/or Client Money, which belongs to a client of a regulated 
firm that is held and/or controlled under the terms of any security interest or any other 
security arrangement.  NB these items may have specific meanings under CDD 2017/593 
and CDR 2017/565 (and the MiFID II/MiFIR Regime more generally) as well as CASS 
and CAR and the meanings may be subject to divergences between those respective 
regimes. 
Collateral 
Ecosystem 
The regulatory, institutional and operational arrangements for collateral, Custody, client 
assets and client money that apply in the EU due to EU and national level legislative and 
non-legislative rulemaking instruments and supervisory expectations.  
Collateral 
Value 
Refers to the market terminology for the fair market value of a Collateral Asset determined 
either by appraisal or by estimation of a proxy.  It itself can be netted to account for 
aggregate gains on collateral assets held by it versus aggregate losses that have been 
provided by the calculating entity as collateral provider to other market participants.   
NB Collateral Value, when use more broadly herein, is separate to the concepts set out in 
the “Liquidity Coverage Ratio” (LCR) and the “Net Stable Funding Ratios” (NSFR), 
which apply to certain firms that qualify as “institutions” for purposes of the EU’s 
CRR/CRD IV regulatory regime, as amended.  It should be noted that the NSFR and LCR 
both recognise and value asset quality and liquidity value on the assumption that 
unencumbered, high-quality assets that can be securitised or traded, and thus can be 
readily used as collateral assets to secure additional funding or sold in the market, do not 
need to be wholly financed with stable funding.    
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CLS CLS, as a settlement method refers to the settlement system run by CLS Bank 
International (CLS Bank), which is a specialised U.S. headquartered credit institution set 
up to settle eligible FX transactions on a Payment versus Payment basis designed to 
eliminate settlement risk.   This operates on the premise that CLS acts as a central clearer, 
which allows multilateral netting but operates on the basic principle that funds on one leg 
of the transaction are not released to the recipient counterparty unless the other 
counterparty has paid funds to be deposited.  Settlement is intraday and with finality as 
payments are made using central bank money. Membership of CLS Bank and participation 
in the CLS system is split between settlement members who are shareholders of CLS 
Bank, these are mostly market makers or other financial institutions, and user-members 
who are sponsored by settlement members. Transactions flowing from user members must 
be routed through settlement members.  Clients and/or relevant settlement intermediaries 
of CLS Bank user or settlement members may use CLS through those members. 
CREST A UK based CSD that forms part of Euroclear and is regulated and operates in accordance 
with the UK’s Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/3755) as supplemented 
by the various CREST Rulebooks.  
CSD A Central Securities Depository is an entity that holds securities (i.e., financial 
instruments) and enables securities transactions to be cleared and settled.  Physical 
securities may be immobilised by the depositor or securities may be dematerialised i.e., 
they exist solely in electronic form/book entry records.  A CSD maintains accounts for the 
participating intermediaries to whose intermediary accounts the relevant securities are 
credited.  Intermediary accounts are maintained for market participants i.e. for both client 
investors or client intermediaries, who in turn may maintain further accounts.  This creates 
a chain of accounts from CSD level through intermediaries to ultimately the end user i.e., 
the investor. 
CSDR Central Securities Depository Regulation. 
CNS CNS is commonly meant to refer to settlement using a centralised automated system to 
settle “compared” transactions and maintain an efficient flow of security and money 
balances.  CNS merges a previous unsettled position into the next settlement period’s 
settling transactions.  This is subject to potential systemic risks due to the compounding 
contagion effect where incoming funds are relied upon to make onward payments to 
counterparties.   
Custody Means the safeguarding and administering of Collateral Assets. NB these items may have 
specific meanings under CDD 2017/593 and CDR 2017/565 (and the MiFID II/MiFIR 
Regime more generally) as well as CASS and CAR and the meanings may be subject to 
divergences between those respective regimes. 
Custodian/Dep
ository 
Means a provider of Custody and other safekeeping/depository services.  
Collateral 
Upgrade 
See definition at Para. 2.48. 
  
 
 
 
  
 11  
 
 
  
 
  
Transaction 
(CUTs) 
DLT Distributed Ledger Technology. 
DvP Delivery versus Payment means the simultaneous, final, irrevocable and immediately 
available exchange of securities and cash on a continuous basis throughout the day.   
EBA European Banking Authority. 
EBU The EU’s Banking Union, comprised of the SSM and the Single Resolution Mechanism 
which applies to participating EU-MS – at the time of writing the Eurozone-19. 
EC European Commission. 
ECB European Central Bank. 
ECB-SSM ECB acting in its role at the head of the SSM. 
ECJ Court of Justice of the European Union.  
EIOPA European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority. 
EMIR Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 on OTC derivatives, CCPs and trade repositories. 
ESA The European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, ESMA and EIOPA). 
ESFS ESAs plus NCAs. 
ESMA European Securities and Markets Authority. 
ETD Derivatives that are exchange-traded via what MiFID terms a trading venue.  
EU European Union. 
EU-27 EU-27 Member States. 
EU-FCD Directive 2007/47/EC as amended by Directive 2009/44/EC. 
EU-MS Means the EU Member States. 
Eurosystem Means the ECB and National Central Banks of those EU-MS that have adopted the euro.  
EU-SFD Directive 98/26/EC.   
FCA The Financial Conduct Authority, as NCA in the UK (which, in accordance with the UK’s 
Financial Services Act 2012, from 1 April 2013 replaced the Financial Services 
Authority).   
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Financial Risk Generally any type of risk associated with the financial performance of a financial 
transaction (not necessarily the Collateral Asset arrangements underpinning it) that may 
include (but is not limited to):  
 Credit risk; 
 Counterparty risk; 
 Funding (incl. interest rate risk; 
 Liquidity risk; 
 Market risk; 
 Model risk; and 
 Wrong-way risk3.   
FMI Financial Market Infrastructure. 
FMIP A provider of FMI services.  
G-20 
Pittsburgh 
Commitments  
A set of agreed reforms agreed between the G-20 in respect of various sectors, including 
financial services.4  
GFC Global Financial Crisis that started in 2008. 
Giovannini 
Barriers 
The Giovannini Barriers refers to those items that were flagged in the First Giovannini 
Group Report published in 20015 and the Second Giovannini Group  Report published in 
20036. The so-called “Giovannini barriers” describe the main obstacles to efficient cross-
border clearing and settlement in Europe, whether legal, fiscal, or linked to market 
practice.   
The ECB maintains a list on how it considers that the Giovannini Barriers are overcome by 
both T2S and CSDR.7 
The Giovannini Barriers are sometimes supplemented by the  “EPTF Barriers”, as first 
published in the EC’s European Post-Trade Forum Report dated May 20178 (See also 
figures in the Endnotes). 
Goldplating 
 
The EC defines this as "an excess of norms, guidelines and procedures accumulated at 
national, regional and local levels, which interfere with the expected policy goals to be 
                                                     
 
3  See: https://seekingalpha.com/article/246303-clearinghouses-and-wrong-way-risk for a good introduction of some of the issues.  
4  See: http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/commitments-09-pittsburgh.html 
5  See: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/clearing/first_giovannini_report_en.pdf 
6  See: see: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/clearing/second_giovannini_report_en.pdf) 
7  See: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/about/html/giovannini.en.html    
8  See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/170515-eptf-report_en.pdf     
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achieved by such regulation” see: Commission Communication: Review of the "Small 
Business Act" for Europe, COM(2011) 78 final, 23 February 2011.  
 
For information on what it has meant for the UK, see Library Standard Note 3328, “Gold 
plating” and EU Law in the UK”, 16 December 2004. Equally, see UK Government’s 
“General Principles” on incorporating EU law, as agreed in 2010, in the following Library 
of House of Commons Standard Note 5943.9 
Haircut/Overc
ollateralisation 
 
The terms “Haircut” and “Overcollateralisation” have no definitive legal meaning 
(unless defined in a given context) and in the market describe, in relation to valuation of 
collateral assets, the same concept.  They are also used interchangeably and concurrently10.  
 
Economically, they both address, in the case of the Haircut the difference between the 
market value of the Collateral Asset and the amount the Collateral Asset is supposed to 
secure. This reflects the perceived riskiness of the assets. Overcollateralisation reflects risk 
mostly in the collateral asset, but can also be used to gauge the amount of extra collateral 
(over the threshold – assume 100% for ease) that is required to cover the risks perceived 
by the collateral taker in respect of the overall exposure.  
 
Hence, a ‘risk free’ asset may have a lower Haircut value and thus have a lower 
Overcollateralisation level than for example a junk bond.  Historically these values have 
looked at market value, credit and liquidity risks of the collateral asset but not necessarily 
the other components that make up Coll-RR themselves.    
 
The degree of Overcollateralisation is important, as in some circumstances this extra might 
be at risk of loss to the collateral provider upon an insolvency (or an event with analogous 
effect) of the collateral taker.   
Herstatt Risk 
 
Also referred to a “principal risk” means the risk of loss of the full value of the asset 
delivered, as well as the mitigants. The closure of Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt on 26 June 1974 
led to the concept of settlement risk (related to FX trading) being refined to include the 
concept this risk and equally led to DvP becoming commonplace across a number of 
transaction types.  
HQLA  High-Quality-Liquid-Assets refers to Collateral Assets that are cash or near-cash, highly-
rated assets that can be converted into cash at little or no loss of value in private markets. 
The term HQLA while originally introduced as part of EU prudential requirements (LCR 
and NSFR – see definition of Collateral Value) is used in market terminology to describe 
such types of assets and HQLA may attract a market premium.  For the BCBS’ 
understanding of HQLA see para. 24 and seq. in BCBS 23811 and subsequent publications. 
ICSD International CSD. Whereas CSDs were primarily created to serve their domestic market, 
ICSDs were created in the 1970s to settle Eurobonds, i.e. international bonds denominated 
in a different currency from that of the country in which they are issued. Over the years, 
ICSDs have extended the scope of their services to cover all types of internationally traded 
financial instruments, including equities and investment funds. Currently, there are two 
ICSDs operating in the European Union: Clearstream Banking Luxembourg and Euroclear 
                                                     
 
9  See: http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN05943/SN05943.pdf 
10  And can, due to incorrect or imprecise use, also lead to CTR just in the same way as a non-legal use of ‘pledge’ can drive risk.  
11  See: https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf 
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Bank in Belgium. Both hold a banking license and provide settlement in different 
currencies. 
Ireland  Means the Republic of Ireland.  
Irish-FCARs Means S.I No. 626/2010 – European Communities (Financial Collateral Arrangements) 
Regulations 201012  
LEI Legal Entity Identifier. 
LBIE Lehman Brothers International Europe Limited, which filed for insolvency on 15 
September 2008 thus precipitating the credit crunch phase of the GFC.   
Mandatory 
Collateralisation 
Means the legal and/or regulatory requirement to provide but also accept Collateral Assets 
in respect of a counterparty either bilaterally or via a CCP.  
MiFID I Directive 2003/39/EC – repealed and replaced by MiFID II. 
MiFID II Directive 2014/65/EU. 
MiFIR Regulation (EU) No. 600/2014. 
The MiFID 
II/MiFIR 
Regime   
MiFID II and MiFIR as well as relevant delegated legislative and non-legislative 
instruments. 
NCA National Competent Authority in an EU-MS.  
Non-Financial 
Risk 
Generally taken to mean any risk type that is not a Financial Risk (despite NFRs being 
able to have financial loss outcomes) and may include, but is not limited to:  
 Conduct risk; 
 Cyber and IT-risk; 
 Documentation risk; 
 Legal risk; 
 Operational risk; 
 Regulatory risk;  
 Reputational risk; 
 Strategic risk; 
 Third-party risk;   
                                                     
 
12  Available here:  http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2010/si/626/made/en/print  
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OJ Means the Official Journal of the EU. 
OTC Over-the-counter – which refers, primarily to derivatives that are traded bilaterally not on 
an “execution venue” – as such term is defined in the MiFID II/MiFIR Regime.  
Regulation Means an EU legislative instrument in the form of a Regulation that are binding in their 
entirety and directly applicable in all EU-MS and self-executing and thus do not require 
EU-MS to undertake any implementing measures.  See also Art. 299 Treaty of Functioning 
of the EU.   
RTGS Real time gross settlement is commonly meant to mean settlement using transfer systems 
where transfer of money or financial instruments takes place between counterparties in real 
time and on a gross basis.  Settlement by this method has been a mainstay of modern 
financial markets and payment systems.  RTGS mitigates systemic risks by passing 
through obligations and typically requiring collateralisation of unsettled exposures.   
Securities 
Financing 
Transaction 
(SFT) 
 
SFTs, for purposes of the SFTR include:  
 a repurchase transaction (Repo) -  which is the sale of an asset(s) versus cash 
payment with the legal obligation to repurchase the fungible asset(s) from the 
second party at a different price at a future date or (in case of an open repo) on 
demand. If the seller defaults during the life of the repo, the buyer can sell the 
asset(s) to a third party to offset his loss. The asset therefore in effect acts as 
collateral and mitigates the credit risk that the buyer has to the seller; 
 
 securities lending (SecLend)  - which is a temporary exchange of securities for 
acceptable collateral between a lender and an approved borrower. The transaction 
is often facilitated by a lending agent;  
 
 a buy-sell back transaction or sell-buy back transaction; and 
 
 a margin lending transaction, which is intended primarily to capture the 
collateralisation of financial instruments in the context of prime brokerage 
activities.    
Segregation Segregation of Collateral Assets refers to the process whereby a regulated firm, whether as 
part of Custody, or holding (or arranging the holding of) such Collateral Assets separate to 
those of assets of that regulated firm. This may include ringfencing of Collateral Assets 
from their own assets by using separate (internal/external) accounts and/or the placing of 
Collateral Assets with an appropriately permitted third party.   
Segregation can also be on the basis of any combination of an: 
 Individual Segregated Client Account which contains Collateral Assets of a single 
client; or  
 an Omnibus Segregated Account where a single account holds Collateral Assets 
of a number of clients (usually of the FMIP or its member).  
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SFCA A Security Financial Collateral Arrangement pursuant to the EU-FCD whereby the 
collateral provider retains ownership rights in the Collateral Assets while establishing a 
security interest for the collateral taker. This approach provides for asset protection for the 
collateral provider as the Collateral Assets are still held in its name but is established under 
control rights for the collateral taker.   
SFTR Regulation (EU) No. 2015/2365 and delegated legislation.  
Single Market Means the EU’s single/internal market for financial services, which refers to the EU as one 
territory without any internal borders or other regulatory obstacles to the free movement of 
capital, and services.  
Single 
Rulebook  
Means the collection of EU legislative, regulatory and policymaking instruments, where 
these exist, that collectively, as a common framework of Directives and Regulations, 
govern the financial markets sectors (and thus the Collateral Ecosystem) across the entire 
EU and its Single Market.  
SLD Draft proposal for a Securities Law Directive.  
SPoR Means the collection of ESA and ECB-SSM’s Supervisory Principles on Relocations, 
originally aimed at firms relocating due to Brexit but increasingly used as a soft-law 
instrument to amend existing rules for all non-EEA firms.   
SRIs Settlement Relevant Intermediaries.  
SSM The Single Supervisory Mechanism of the Banking Union. 
SSS Securities Settlement Systems 
T2S  
As described by the ECB on its website:  
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/target/t2s/html/index.en.html:  
 
“When investors buy and sell securities the security and payment need to change hands – a 
process called securities settlement. TARGET2-Securities, or T2S, is a safe platform 
where the exchange can happen simultaneously, i.e. where delivery versus payment is 
possible. 
 
Safer and more efficient securities settlement: T2S revolutionised securities settlement in 
Europe because it brought an end to complex cross-border settlement procedures and the 
problems caused by different settlement practices among countries. Instead, with T2S we 
have a common platform on which securities and cash can be transferred between 
investors across Europe, using harmonised rules and practices. Currently 20 European 
countries use T2S. Banks pay for securities on the platform using the account they have 
with their central bank, so the money used to settle transactions is central bank money. As 
a result, transaction risk is greatly reduced.” 
T2S was crated inter alia  by Guideline ECB/2012/13 of 18 July 2012 on TARGET2-
Securities OJ L 215, 11.8.2012, p. 19, also available under 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/l_21520120811en00190029.pdf. ECB’s 
Governing Council decided to develop T2S to provide CSDs with a shared technical 
platform to settle securities transactions in euro and other currencies using ‘central bank 
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money’ (from accounts held at Eurosystem Central Banks). T2S is not a CSD. Hence, the 
CSDs, which may adhere to T2S on a voluntary basis in order to benefit from settlement in 
central bank money, will maintain contractual and commercial relations with their 
customers, to whom they will continue to directly provide all the CSD services, such as 
settlement services, corporate actions and Custody services. The creation of a common 
platform will lead to the full standardisation of processes, resulting in significant 
economies of scale, eliminating settlement risks and assisting credit institutions to optimise 
the management of their liquidity and securities. T2S acts as important catalyst for the 
single market for financial services, with a positive impact on European economic growth, 
thereby supporting the Lisbon strategy. In particular, T2S contributes to these goals by 
eliminating the risks still affecting the settlement of cross-border securities transactions, 
helping banks to optimise their collateral and liquidity management and promoting 
diversification and risk-sharing. See: 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/html/index.en.html  
TARGET2 
 
As described by the ECB on its website: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/target/target2/html/index.en.html:  
 
“TARGET2 is the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system owned and operated by the 
Eurosystem. Central banks and commercial banks can submit payment orders in euro to 
TARGET2, where they are processed and settled in central bank money, i.e. money held in 
an account with a central bank. 
 
TARGET2 settles payments related to the Eurosystem’s monetary policy operations, as 
well as bank-to-bank and commercial transactions. Every five days, TARGET2 processes 
a value close to the entire euro area GDP, which makes it one of the largest payment 
systems in the world. More than 1,000 banks use TARGET2 to initiate transactions in 
euro, either on their own behalf or on behalf of their customers. Taking into account 
branches and subsidiaries, more than 52,000 banks worldwide and all their customers can 
be reached via TARGET2. In response to changing market demands, the Eurosystem has 
launched a review of its RTGS services. The objective is to consolidate the technical and 
functional aspects of TARGET2 and T2S, with the aim of improving efficiency and 
reducing operating costs.” 
 
TTCA 
 
A Title Transfer Collateral Arrangement pursuant to the EU-FCD under which a collateral 
provider transfers full ownership of Collateral Assets to a collateral taker for the purpose 
of securing or otherwise covering the performance of relevant financial obligations. As the 
property of the collateral taker these Collateral Assets will be protected and segregated 
externally in the same way as any other assets belonging to the collateral taker.  
Two-Way 
Collateralisation  
 
Means the provision by Party 1 to Party 2 of Collateral Assets and the concurrent 
provision by Party 2 to Party 1 of Collateral Assets. Prior to the GFC, market practice was 
that the non-dealer entity was the only party providing Collateral Assets.  
UCC 
 
U.S. Uniform Commercial Code.  
UK 
 
Means the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
UK-FCARs 
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Means the UK Financial Collateral Arrangements Regulations (No. 2) Regulations 200313  
as amended by the Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement Finality and Financial 
Collateral Arrangements) (Amendment) Regulations 2010/2993 (UK 2010 FCAR 
Amendment)14.  
U.S.  
 
United States of America 
Working Paper 
 
Means the academic paper: Huertas, Michael, “Too big to reform or too important to miss? 
Why the EU needs more consistency on the rules on collateral and Custody of client assets 
and client money as part of CMU 2.0” (December 14, 2019).   
 
  
                                                     
 
13  Available here: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2003/3226/made  
14  Available here: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/2993/made 
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Preface 
The foundation of any capital market is its infrastructure, including its arrangements for 
the “Collateral Ecosystem”. Capital market infrastructure should work in an integrated 
fashion so parties, including issuers, investors and intermediaries can transact seamlessly 
on a level playing field instead of a patchwork.  
 
That is not the case today in the EU. In particular, no uniform single EU-wide Collateral 
Ecosystem exists. Although various EU Directives/Regulations have improved 
individual aspects of the Collateral Ecosystem, such instruments have neither been 
uniformly applied across the EU nor integrated with one another. Many of the legislative 
measures have also been minimum as opposed to maximum harmonisation texts, thus 
leaving EU-MS national options and discretions, contributing to fragmentation. Core 
pillars of the Collateral Ecosystem, specifically the EU-FCD and EU-SFD are Directives, 
some of which pre-date the FSAP, have not been fully updated to the post-FSAP and now 
post-GFC/CMU wave of new standards. Consequently, as each EU-MS transposed 
Directives into national law, they did so in national terms in the context of national 
institutions. Divergences exist. Goldplating adds further divergence. They also exist in 
relation to Regulations, as applied in EU-MS even where they are of a maximum 
harmonisation nature. Even between the UK and Ireland, despite their closely linked 
markets and legal systems, divergences do exist. 
 
These national divergences in those rules create, what this thesis terms “conceptual gaps” 
and “conceptual translation risks” (CTR) and thus costs as well as “Financial and non-
Financial Risks”15 that reduce the standards and protections those rules introduce. This 
affects almost all financial market participants, particularly where they document, 
transact and/or hold assets (including via Custody) in different jurisdictions. That in turn 
increases risk, including those specific to Collateral Assets, as well as transaction costs 
and hampers growth. This thesis assesses those risks as they apply to rulemaking but also 
in relation risks that are specific to the Collateral Ecosystem – notably, what this thesis 
proposes as Coll-RR and Cust-RR. 
                                                     
 
15  See Glossary. NB there is no agreed EU-wide nomenclature and/or taxonomy for specific risk types, and the author thus uses those 
that are suggested by the ECB and/or the respective ESAs unless indicated to the contrary, but ultimately each regulated firm will 
have (or ought to) their own risk taxonomy as it applies to its risk appetite framework.  
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These risks also apply even where institutional-led, often operational-focused and thus 
non-legal driven changes have provided solutions that are jurisdiction-neutral and 
interoperable across multiple jurisdictions, free from national influences (i.e. 
Jurisdiction-Agnostic). Such solutions, while transformative, are not, on their own, a 
panacea to plugging the (potential) problems in the plumbing. While the Eurosystem's 
work on the operational system known as TARGET2 Securities i.e. T2S is very much a 
step in the right direction in terms of operational-led cross-border functionality, more is 
needed. Some hope that new technologies (such as DLT) and/or new entrants (e.g. 
FinTech) will supply what is missing. They cannot. Legislative and regulatory changes 
will also be required and this thesis and related research in the Working Paper and 
evidence in the Annexes assesses and proposes what some of those steps might look like.  
 
Economically, the most effective measure would be the harmonisation across the EU of 
the laws and regulations affecting the Collateral Ecosystem, ideally along the lines of the 
most commonly used regime, i.e. that of the UK (CASS) and parts of the Irish (CAR) 
regime adapted on a “jurisdiction agnostic” basis. Politically, however, such an approach 
is likely to encounter severe challenges. The question is whether EU-27 policymakers, in 
light of the UK's changing relationship with the remaining bloc, will take the plunge and 
move the discussion on fixing the plumbing from "too rigid to reform" to "too important 
to ignore". 
The research in this thesis has been conducted at a seminal stage in the development of 
EU, English and Irish financial law and the regulatory regimes as well as the UK’s 
changing relationship with the Republic of Ireland and EU. Since the global financial 
crisis that started in 2008 (GFC), the relevant legal, regulatory and 
operational/technological framework has been radically reshaped and altered much 
beyond principles, which were, prior to the crisis, largely based on mercantile and 
property law principles rooted in the 19th century.  
Even if further regulations and technical standards may be required to implement and 
give further effect to a true Single Market for financial services and thus the Collateral 
Ecosystem in the EU (including the aspects proposed herein), the building blocks for this 
new “new normal” are now largely in place. They however are not free from risks 
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embedded in those reforms, often undertaken through a multitude of (well-intentioned) 
actions of policymakers who have tried to close some but may not have achieved in 
addressing all areas of fragmentation and connected risks, as evidenced by an abundance 
of divergences and jurisdiction-specific rules/Goldplating.   
In summary, financial services firms, market participants, clients and counterparties are 
increasingly more global and likely to continue so. The Single Market thrives when 
fragmentation and national barriers as well as options and discretions are eradicated. Does 
it, in 2019 and beyond, still make sense to have 28+ national regimes on Client Assets, 
Client Money, Collateral Assets and Custody as well as in respect of security interests 
and set-off? Specifically, do these 28+ regimes, parts of which derive from common 
principles set at EU law, reinforce rather than reduce fragmentation given that the 28+ 
regimes retain existing or have developed new jurisdiction-specific rules, concepts 
including some of which result from those very conceptual gaps and CTR, which seek to 
compete instead of interoperate with each other.   
Without a new approach, that level of fragmentation would not be closed anytime soon, 
not least ahead of the new revised impetus to complete Capital Markets Union (CMU) 
now transitioning from 1.0 to its revised 2.0 attempt of integration to be pressed ahead 
during the 2019-2024 EU legislative lifecycle.  
The law is stated as at 14 December 2019 unless indicated to the contrary and the Glossary 
of Key Terms are included to help readers navigate an area that is not free of legal and 
market jargon. This thesis is written primarily from the perspective of English, Irish and 
EU law (including, as applied in the UK and Ireland) and relevant regulatory regimes. It 
does not address issues on consumer protection or taxation.  
As the law (including the case law) concerning the subject matter remains developing, 
and the research and the principles advanced in this thesis  notably the proposed approach 
to identifying, mitigating and managing what are termed herein as new risk concepts and 
metrics, summarised in the Addendum to Chapter 1 as “conceptual gaps”, “CTR”, 
“Collateral Related Risk (Coll-RR)” and “Custody Related Risk (Cust-RR)” ought to 
develop in line with the changes of the law, this thesis aims to provide guidance on these 
issues in a pragmatic matter, notably given the analysis in the Annexes and Working 
Paper that should be read in conjunction with this thesis.  
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In many cases, the legal position may not be free of doubt as to the exact legal treatment, 
absent established case law (notably on the case of DLT as well as crypto-assets), and the 
views or propositions expressed herein are those of personal judgement on how such 
issues are likely to be decided if they were to come before the courts and/or competent 
authorities.  
Moreover, the views expressed by the author are not necessarily those of Dentons Europe 
LLP and professional bodies of which the author is a member. This thesis is intended to 
advance academic and practitioner debate on key legal, regulatory and non-financial risk 
issues in a non-quantitative analytical manner as they may affect the Collateral Ecosystem 
as well as areas of non-financial risk affecting financial markets, in particular where these 
may have largely been overlooked. This thesis is thus not intended to be a substitute for 
legal advice on a specific question or transaction. All errors and omissions are those of 
the author. 
Michael Huertas   
10 January 2020, Frankfurt am Main, Germany 
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Part I – why, what, where and how? 
1. Introduction to key issues and problem analysis  
1.1 The rationale for this thesis and related research16 was born out of practitioner experiences 
gained in-house, in private practice, as a lawyer qualified in multiple jurisdictions, as well 
as while working at the ECB17 across a wide spectrum of transactional and regulatory 
advisory work including on EU policymaking affecting capital markets and the Collateral 
Ecosystem.    
1.2 Collateral Assets and the financial market infrastructure are the two key components that 
make up the ‘Collateral Ecosystem’. This Collateral Ecosystem is core to the functioning 
of financial markets that have grown exponentially in the past 30 years concurrently with 
greater legal and market-driven integration of European markets. The Collateral 
Ecosystem underpins a wealth of financial, payment and ‘real economy’ transactions. As 
such, the Collateral Ecosystem is often referred to as the “plumbing of financial markets”.   
1.3 Financial market transactions, collateral and Custody arrangements take place across a 
multiple of types of direct and indirect relationships, across multiple pairings of 
counterparty types and across multiple jurisdictions. London and Dublin have, despite the 
GFC and Brexit, retained their role as leading global financial centres for ‘front-office’ 
trading (London) and middle and back-office functions (often in Dublin) of trade 
processing, settlement and post-trade services including Custody. Despite the 
interoperability of operational systems, market participants and FMIPs are required to 
comply with the laws and regulatory system of each jurisdiction, as they apply to them. 
This applies to trading but also post-trade issues, notably the Custody of Collateral Assets.  
Efficient, reliable, consistent application of laws relating to the trading, clearing, 
settlement and Custody is critical to investor protection, fair, efficient, safe and liquid 
markets. Conceptual gaps and CTR affecting the Collateral Ecosystem comes with a cost 
of compliance, administration and mobilisation efficiency. They also make it more 
difficult to gauge risk exposures to what remain, 10 years after the GFC, important 
                                                     
 
16  Please refer to various publications by M.D. Huertas in the Journal of International Banking Law & Regulation. 
17  Views expressed herein reflect solely the views based on the academic research of the author and not that of his current or previous 
employers.    
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questions of “Who does what with whom, when and how and where are my assets?”, 
“Where is my collateral and how much of it can I get back and how quickly?” along with 
“How much risk does this exposure to this person create?”  
1.4 This thesis, in three parts, aims to propose new thinking on risks that stem from 
conceptual gaps and CTR, as these arise due to divergences in rulemaking generally, and 
the Collateral Ecosystem specifically, as well as those stemming from Coll-RR and Cust-
RR and a range of related metrics. These metrics are defined in the Addendum to Chapter 
1. Each of these parts aim to highlight existing and new risks that exist in the Collateral 
Ecosystem post-GFC as they apply in the legal and regulatory systems of: 
(a) the EU; 
(b) the UK18; and  
(c) Ireland,  
given the shared legal/regulatory, linguistic and market-based heritage of the UK and 
Ireland, each, while they are EU-MS, as shaped by the EU-level rules that exist 
superordinate to the national level regimes. The “closeness” of English and Irish law as 
well as the regulatory regimes derives, from Ireland, for the period it was part of the UK, 
being the first extension of English common law outside of England and following Irish 
independence, judgments of British courts continuing to be of persuasive but non-binding 
nature in Irish courts. Moreover, the Irish financial services policymakers have emulated 
various British financial services regulatory frameworks and taken similar (but slightly 
different) supervisory expectations, as adopted to suit the jurisdiction-specifics of Ireland 
and those operating from and/or through the jurisdiction. Additionally, the fact that the 
Ireland is within the EBU and the Eurozone and that the UK has, following the outcome 
of the Brexit vote, begun to establish its path to its eventual exit from the EU provides 
another overlay of analysis that is relevant for EU, Eurozone and third-country 
jurisdictions and market participants in those jurisdictions.  
                                                     
 
18  Comprised, at the time of writing of England, Wales and Scotland as well as Northern Ireland as “home nations” and relevant 
jurisdictions.   
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1.5 Comparing these jurisdictions presents a useful case study. Specifically, as irrespective 
of the common principles, language and shared school of law that exist, there are various 
conceptual gaps and CTR that arise and present themselves between the EU level rules 
(in bullet point a) and the rules that are subsidiary to them that exist at the national level 
(in bullet points b & c) termed herein “Vertical CTR”. Divergences also exist between 
the rules that exist at the national levels (in bullet points b & c) termed herein “Horizontal 
CTR”.  
1.6 The greater the level of CTR, the greater the cost of compliance as well as doing business 
in or through that given jurisdiction.  CTR may equally increase risks in Coll-RR and 
Cust-RR exposures where market participants fail to take action of jurisdiction-specific 
differences. One such example are the differences between say the EU-FCD and that the 
UK-FCARs, which implement the EU-level laws, expanded conceptually through 
Goldplating, thereby also generating differences to the protections contained in the Irish-
FCARs. Given London’s dominance as the EU’s financial centre, there are good grounds 
to argue that the EU, after losing London, ought to use the CMU project19 as (1) means 
to remove fragmentation more generally from the Collateral Ecosystem and (2) to 
possibly adopt the best of British and Irish rules in the respective FCARs, UK CASS and 
Irish CAR frameworks and adopt these, on a Jurisdiction-Agnostic manner for the benefit 
of the EU-27 or at the very least the EU-MS in the European Banking Union (EBU). This 
would not be the first time the EU has been inspired and borrowed concepts from EU-
MS. Bosomworth’s suggestions, make sense and go to the heart of eliminating CTR, even 
                                                     
 
19  See Bosomworth, Andrew in “From Capital Markets Confederation to Capital Markets Union” in Dombret and Kenadjian where 
at page 60 Bosomworth (rightfully) concludes:  
 
“In theory the CMU already exists. Article 63 of the Treaty of Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) already allows for the 
free movement of capital across intra-union borders. And 19 member states share a currency union. In practice however, we do 
not observe the extent of integration of capital markets as we do in other CMUs with deeper federal structures, such as the United 
States. Europe has instead what I call a capital markets confederation. 
 
The question becomes are we content with the confederation structure or do we want to develop it further? And if we want to 
develop it further do we want to achieve the type of features we observe in the United States with deep, liquid markets and no intra-
state cross border impediments to the movement of capital? 
 
Assuming we want to achieve the latter then I see five prerequisites needed to realize it: 
1. Harmonization of the regulatory treatment of the financial sector (banking, insurance, asset management, pension funds), 
including taxation and capital standards. 
2. Harmonization of bankruptcy [i.e. insolvency] laws and wind-down and recovery procedures.  
3. Evolution of common financial infrastructure such as clearing houses for security and payment settlements. 
4. Evolution of common deposit insurance. 
5. Introduction of common credit, and regulatory, risk-free asset.  
 
A lot of progress towards realizing CMU can be achieved via steps one, two and three, which do not require TFEU changes.”    
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if he does not offer means, such as those suggested herein, to achieve that and where 
CMU could go even further.   
1.7 This comparative case study is likely to grow in importance as the UK’s relationship with 
the EU and Ireland changes following it ceasing to be an EU-MS i.e. the process 
commonly referred to as Brexit). Some of these Brexit considerations, as relevant to the 
Collateral Ecosystem and market participants, are described below and a line-by-line 
analysis of EU, UK and Irish rules of cornerstone legislation, EU-SFD, EU-FCD, UK-
FCARs, Irish-FCARs and CASS and CAR are set out, due to space reasons, in the 
Annexes. Annex 1 provides an original line-by-line analysis comparing EU, UK and Irish 
financial collateral arrangement rules. Annex 2 provides a similar original line-by-line 
comparison and map of divergences relation to Client Asset and Client Money rules. 
1.8 At the time of writing, this “testing environment” forms the largest concentration of 
trading, settlement and Custody of financial instruments within the EU by Collateral 
Ecosystem stakeholders. The conclusions drawn from this testing environment are likely 
to have pan-EU wide relevance, despite Brexit sparking a new relationship and 
divergence of the UK from the EU’s Single Rulebook20 and the Single Market.   
1.9 The new risk concepts proposed herein aim to empower policymakers but also market 
participants when assessing the EU’s current Collateral Ecosystem, its risks plus areas 
where reform is ripe and achievable, so as to strengthen the EU’s Single Market and the 
Single Rulebook upon which it is built. Due to regulatory reforms and economic 
pressures, the use of Collateral Assets will likely increase further as markets, which have 
grown exponentially over the past 30 years, continue to concentrate the clearing of 
transactions through CCPs and the processing through CSDs and require Mandatory as 
well as Two-Way Collateralisation.  This raises the question as to why policymakers have 
not paid as much attention on fragmented rules and the resilience of collateral 
mobilisation channels and Segregation? 
 
                                                     
 
20  For a more in depth discussion of the EU’s Single Rulebook project please refer to M.D.Huertas “The phasing out of the UK’s 
Financial Services Handbook: a missed opportunity for the EU’s Single Rulebook and the Capital Markets Union project”. 
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1.10 Collateralisation, mobilisation channels and Segregation 
1.11 Risk in financial markets is managed through contractual means (representations, 
warranties, covenants and a range of other information disclosures that are given by the 
relevant parties) but also, partly, given the saying that “possession is nine tenths of the 
law”, by one party taking Collateral Assets to secure against the risks of the other party. 
Collateral Assets are thus provided by one party, as collateral provider, to the other (or 
another), as collateral taker, so that in the event of the collateral provider defaulting on its 
obligations the collateral taker can recover some of its loss – assuming there are sufficient 
Collateral Assets present and readily available to enforce against. Using Collateral Assets 
that are sufficiently valuable/desirable, whether in the form of cash, cash-equivalent or 
financial instruments has long been used to mitigate risks, provide credit support for the 
collateral provider and stand as security for the risks that the collateral taker has vis-à-vis 
the risk exposures it faces in its dealings with the collateral provider. These concepts of 
collateralisation also exist beyond financial markets, whether as a deposit, secured loan, 
a pledge over receivables or a letter of credit for goods etc. Their origins, as with the legal 
principles, including the laws of security interests pre-date modern financial markets, and 
operate, partly due to dematerialisation of markets, with a given amount of “legal 
fiction”21.   
1.12 Market participants can at any given time be both a collateral provider and collateral taker 
to any multiple of counterparties. This applies to parties’ relationships with whom they 
trade but also with whom they maintain collateral relationships. These relationships can 
be in respect of and amount to any multitude, volume and quality of Collateral Assets, 
across various transaction chains and exposures. These relationships vary and like 
Collateral Assets’ valuation and quality (including parties’ perception of value/quality) 
will change over time. Consequently, collateral decisions and parties’ priorities both at 
the pre-contractual documentation stage and after execution of documentation are not 
static, they are subject to monitoring and often amendment to reflect the priorities, needs 
                                                     
 
21  ‘legal fiction’ as defined in Collins Dictionary of Law means “something assumed to be true for the sake of convenience whether 
true or false”. In contrast a ‘legal presumption’ for purposes of interpreting and applying non-contentious elements of applicable 
law is usually summarised as “a conclusion based upon a particular set of facts, combined with  established laws, logic or reasoning. 
It is a rule of law which allowing a court to assume a fact is true until it is rebutted by the greater weight (preponderance) of the 
evidence against it.”    
  
 
 
 
  
 28  
 
 
  
 
  
of and exposures between the relevant contractual parties. Equally, decisions are not 
isolated, rather they will have carry-on and spill-over effects to the wider market as 
Collateral Assets move, are custodied, supplemented, manufactured or removed. 
1.13 Prior to the GFC, prime brokers took collateral and rarely provided collateral. Collateral 
that was provided was safeguarded and custodied by the collateral taker, to the extent it 
was not taken on an absolute outright and/or title transfer basis and thus, upon receipt, 
becoming the property of the collateral taker. Collateral and Custody was perceived as a 
boring (often backward) back-office function and cost centre. Tri-party, let alone CCP 
arrangements were rare, margin calls infrequent, reporting to counterparties and 
regulators fairly limited and largely a manual process. The risk paradigm of those times 
placed greater focus on the failure of the collateral provider as opposed to the dealer entity 
as collateral taker, custodian or FMIP.  
1.14 The events that led to and which followed the insolvencies of the LBIE franchise in 2008 
and MF Global in 201122 would shed a spotlight on a Collateral Ecosystem having to 
                                                     
 
22  Summary adapted from relevant Wikipedia pages (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lehman_Brothers) and 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MF_Global): 
   
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. was a global financial services firm that was one of the largest victims of but also a catalyst in the 
GFC. It filed for Chapter 11 insolvency protection on 15 September 2008 triggering insolvency proceedings in other jurisdictions 
notably in respect of its UK subsidiary Lehman Brothers International (Europe). MF Global was a major global financial derivatives 
and commodities brokerage firm that became insolvent in 2011.  
 
LBIE had held money on behalf of many clients, including some affiliates of Lehman. The Client Money Rules of Financial 
Services Authority were in the Client Assets Sourcebook, chapter 7, issued under the FSMA 2000 section 138. FSMA 2000 section 
139 permitted FSA rulemaking for ‘clients’ money being held on trust in accordance with the rules’, and accordingly CASS 7.7.2R 
said that client money was to be held on trust for the purpose of the Client Money Rules. If a firm failed, the Client Money 
Distribution Rules in CASS 7.9 applied. But under CASS 7.4, a firm could either (1) pay money into a segregated account or (2) 
put the money into the firm's own house accounts and then segregate it into client accounts at the close of the preceding day's 
business. Lehman had done the alternative approach in (2). On 15 September 2008, Lehman went into administration, a ‘primary 
pooling event’ under CASS 7, so the funds in each ‘client money account’ were to be treated as pooled and then distributed so that 
each client received a sum rateable to their ‘client money entitlement’. The administrators asked the High Court for directions 
under the Insolvency Act 1986 Schedule B1, about how to apply CASS 7 to the client money that Lehman held. There was a lot of 
unsegregated client money in the firm's house accounts because of the operation of the alternative approach, and also significant 
non-compliance of Lehman with CASS 7 over a long time. 
A series of perceived liquidity problems and large fines and penalties dogged MF Global starting in 2008, and led to its bankruptcy 
in 2011. In 2011, MF Global faced major pressures to its liquidity over several months. Some analysts and financial commentators 
indicate that MF Global probably experienced a number of trading days in 2011 during which the firm's bets on sovereign debt 
would have required the use of customer funds to meet capital requirements, thereby maintaining operating funds and possibly 
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continue to operate in stressed conditions with excessive use of rehypothecation and 
exercise of other rights to use. Despite reforms that have aimed to make “banks safe to 
fail” and improve protection for buy-side participants, dealer counterparties will have the 
greater information and bargaining power versus buy-side and specifically non-financial 
counterparties. They thus set the terms of what Collateral Assets are provided and which 
are taken, when, how and where they are custodied.  
1.15 At its heart, Collateral Assets minimise the risk of financial loss to a collateral taker if the 
collateral provider, or another counterparty, fails to meet their obligations. Upon 
declaration of an event of default and the expiry of any grace period, (if applicable) the 
non-defaulting party can exercise its rights and equally do so as collateral taker with 
respect to the collateral (as determined by the contract governing the collateral 
relationship.) In such circumstances a collateral taker will typically have the right (or to 
direct others – such as a Custodian) to:  
(a) take possession of the Collateral Assets (to the extent the collateral taker does not 
already hold legal title); 
(b) sell or otherwise dispose of the Collateral Assets and keep the proceeds from 
some sale and/or disposition; and 
                                                     
 
overall solvency. A large part of these pressures on MF Global were a result of the firm's involvement in a significant number 
of repurchase agreements. Many of these repo agreements were conducted off their balance sheet. Failure of a number of 
investments by MF Global, and other, failure of repo positions contributed to the massive liquidity crisis at the firm. MF Global 
experienced a meltdown of its financial condition, caused by improper transfers of over $891 million from customer accounts to a 
MF broker-dealer account to cover losses created by trading losses. 
On October 31, 2011, MF Global executives admitted that transfer of $700 million from customer accounts to the broker-dealer 
and a loan of $175 million in customer funds to MF Global's U.K. subsidiary to cover (or mask) liquidity shortfalls at the company 
occurred on October 28, 2011. MF could not repay these monies with its own funds. Improper co-mingling, or mixing, of company 
and client funds took place for days before the illicit transfer and loans, and perhaps for many other days earlier in the year. 
According to the New York Times, "MF Global dipped again and again into customer funds to meet the demands", perhaps 
beginning as early as August 2011. 
MF Global declared bankruptcy on October 31, 2011, and the company was liquidated beginning in November 2011. The trustee 
liquidating the company said that the losses incurred by customers of MF Global stood at $1.6 billion at April 2012. In January 
2013, a judge approved a settlement that would return 93 percent of customers' investments, with the prospect of additional 
compensation from the company's general estate. In December 2014, MF Global Holdings settled a U.S. government lawsuit, 
agreeing to pay $1.2 billion in restitution and a $100 million fine for customer losses tied to the company's 2011 collapse. 
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(c) use the proceeds to satisfy the collateral provider’s obligation (e.g. interest, 
amortisation). In such circumstances, any:  
(i) excess of proceeds over the amount of the obligation is returned to the 
collateral provider; and 
(ii) deficiency becomes an unsecured claim of the collateral taker on the 
estate of the defaulting collateral provider.  
 However, this will not be the case, if the obligation is “non-recourse”. Moreover, while 
Collateral Assets are “held” in Custody in accordance with safekeeping arrangements, 
often by an affiliate of the collateral taker or, in particular since the GFC, by a third-party 
Custodian, the Collateral Assets are to be safeguarded. This means those Collateral 
Assets, like financial assets, are subject to, or ought to be subject to documented 
safekeeping arrangements that reflect and follow EU and EU-MS’ rules – including 
Segregation through the various holding/Custody levels.  
1.16 Discrepancies, divergences and CTR in those rules can lead to new or exacerbated 
financial and non-financial risks. So too can instances where the relevant documentation 
between the counterparties get compliance with the rules wrong, or, as in the case of 
Lehman Brothers (more specifically Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE) 
client facing documentation that was used (including sophisticated financial 
counterparties) stating that Client Assets and Client Money were being safeguarded with 
the then applicable rules in the UK. However, in reality an estimated 98% of those assets 
were transferred by LBIE to its US operations in order to take advantage of more 
favourable rehypothecation rules permitting a greater right of use and thus cheaper 
funding access23. This meant that many of those Collateral Assets were not protected as 
                                                     
 
23  See: Schwarcz, Steven in “Distorting Legal Principles” available at 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=2916&context=faculty_scholarship which at 
Footnote 14 cites  Huertas, Michael in  “Hedge Funds, Master Netting Arrangements and Rehypothecation: Limiting Systemic 
Risk Through Increased Transparency” 3 (Working Paper Series, Apr. 20, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411609 to 
build the bulk of the argument. Subsequently see further discussion of this issue by Derugyina, Mariya in “Standardization of 
Securities Regulation: Rehypothecation and Securities Commingling in the United States and United Kingdom” available here: 
https://www.bu.edu/rbfl/files/2013/09/Deryugina.pdf and discussion (including Footnote 57) in Chiu, Iris H-Y and MacNeil, Iain 
G. (eds) “Research Handbook on Shadow Banking: Legal and Regulatory Aspects”.   
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intended. This impacts not only the holding of Collateral Assets but also mobilisation 
channels. 
1.17 Types of mobilisation channels 
1.18 Collateral mobilisation channels using SFTs24 can be distinguished as follows: 
(a) “traditional SFT” operating between institutional investors (as beneficial owners 
of the securities) who lend their securities directly or via agents, such as custodial 
banks, asset managers or specialist firms, to prime brokers and other principal 
borrowers which could be split between: 
(i)  “traditional repo”;  
(ii) “traditional SecLending”; and 
(b) “central bank mobilisation” placing cash on deposit or engaging with repo and 
SecLending with the relevant central bank to place eligible collateral in exchange 
for cash funding. The funding obtained may be (and often is) to acquire higher-
yielding assets. 
 Market participants in the above SFTs would also (and still distinguish) between General 
Collateral or GC trades which are entered into where a general set of Collateral Assets 
are accepted and the nature of what is provided as a collateral asset is indifferent.  The 
GC trade market is seen to be more liquid when compared to those SFTs that are 
categorised as “Specials” in which a specific asset is identified as either the subject or 
concurrently the collateral asset underlying the transaction. Since the GFC, pressures on 
sourcing Collateral Assets has meant that market participants can and do create GC 
baskets i.e. of portfolios which can be used in automated trading systems, pooling systems 
or matching systems.     
1.19 Each of these SFT transaction types are built around legal and economic constructs that 
recognise a “collateral leg” also known as the “cash-leg” whereby cash or financial 
instruments  are delivered as Collateral Assets in exchange (and as security) for a 
                                                     
 
24  See Glossary. 
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“financial instrument leg”, with an obligation to unwind each of the legs of the 
transaction. The unwind occurs either at:  
(a) maturity of the transaction; or  
(b) prior to maturity due to the occurrence of an agreed event of pre-defined 
circumstances, including default triggers, which might arise at any time prior to 
or upon the scheduled maturity of these transactions and which the non-defaulting 
party opts to enact,  
 Consequently, financial instruments and/or cash are simultaneously the object of the 
collateralisation and the object of the contract.  
1.20 Collateralisation arrangements of these SFTs, as explored in further detail below, are split 
between those that are bilateral, i.e. the collateral taker receives Collateral Assets and 
holds it in a Custody account with a Custodian. Alternatively, the collateral provider and 
taker agree to use a tri-party arrangement, which might include using a CCP, in which the 
Collateral Assets do not flow bilaterally between the parties, but rather the flows are to 
the tri-party provider and/or CCP who in turn holds the assets in Custody accounts with 
a Custodian. In both instances, the safekeeping of those assets takes place in a Custody 
account. The degree and approach to safeguarding as well as the application of Client 
Money and Client Asset rules and respective Segregation requirements may differ from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and type of collateral provider.   
1.21 Historically, parties would look to these collateral mobilisation channels and SFTs to 
source financial instruments for investment purposes (i.e., for their own needs) or to meet 
their own trading and/or settlement requirements (sourcing to reuse as well as to 
meet/avoid settlement failures). Greater sophistication in financial markets but also 
greater pressure on financial instruments’ mobility has led to greater use and volume of 
transactions in these mobilisation channels.  
1.22 While financial instruments are purchased by institutional investors for investment and 
income, as well as possible strategic reasons, an owner of a financial instrument can 
mobilise these, or require FMIPs to do so, in order to generate extra income from the fees 
paid to the investor in return for mobilisation of such financial instruments (mobilisation 
fees). This thus can increase the yield on the financial instruments or a portfolio thereof 
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and/or can contribute to offsetting trading and holding costs. The flexibility that these 
channels permit allows market participants to benefit in both allowing financial 
instruments to “be worked to earn their keep” as well as to source financial instruments 
for periods of time without having to purchase them outright.  
1.23 Holders of such financial instruments, in particular those that are “near cash” and/or 
HQLA, which may attract a premium from willing parties, have several reasons to permit 
these financial instruments, often by instructing FMIPs to enter these into automated 
lending programmes to be mobilised to generate income. In other instances the FMIP 
and/or dealer entity/Custodian, may, where permitted either by the nature of the collateral 
arrangement or by exercising rehypothecation and/or rights of re-use (see discussion 
below) itself take the assets and mobilise these for its own purposes. This may seem at 
odds with the notion that Collateral Assets ought to stand mobilised for the benefit of a 
collateral taker but these approaches, irrespective of LBIE and MF Global, remain 
fundamental to efficient and functioning liquid financial markets as explored in Chapter 
2 given the (finite) inventory of Collateral Assets and firm-specific collateralisation 
needs. Intermediaries, who will act in multiple capacities, including as FMIPs, will play 
a vital role in the smooth working of any mobilisation channel but also in collateral 
manufacturing as well as CUT and other transformation transactions. This activity can 
also pose pitfalls.   
1.24 As discussed at para. 2.55, not all Collateral Assets are viewed equally. The post-GFC 
reforms (notably in the form of CRD IV/CRR in terms of prudential capital changes and 
focus on HQLA and EMIR in terms of mandatory collateralisation of OTC derivatives 
and mandatory clearing, as well as the SFTR, means market participants generally need 
more “good”/desirable collateral. Such collateral also needs to ideally be able to mobilise 
through channels, whether as a TTCA or SFCA for purposes of the EU-FCD, as applied 
in relevant jurisdictions. Equally, regulatory requirements stipulate what is eligible 
collateral (cash and other “liquid” assets) to be used for initial margin and variation 
margin (including for SFTR and EMIR activity as well as in accordance with MiFID 
II/MiFIR more generally), and what a collateral provider may do with it:  
(a) ‘initial margin’ (IM) refers to the minimum value in eligible Collateral Assets 
that a collateral taker requires the collateral provider deliver to it, or its designate, 
in order to engage in a financial market transaction or in relation to a portfolio of 
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transactions and covering the majority of non-market risk attributes relative to 
the collateral provider i.e., counterparty risk, credit risk, legal risk etc. as well as 
to cover losses that could arise in the period between the defaulting counterparty’s 
last VM payment and the point at which the surviving party can hedge or replace 
the transaction. IM is posted i.e. provided when the transaction is executed and is 
subsequently adjusted as necessary throughout the lifetime of the transaction. IM 
is required, mostly due to EMIR, to comply with the EMIR “Margin Rules”,  
setting out requirements  for collateral agreements, collateral eligibility criteria, 
collateral concentration limits, calculation methodologies and Segregation 
requirements25 restricting use of TTCAs; and   
(b) ‘variation margin’ (VM), often referred to as maintenance margin or mark-to-
market margin, is the additional amount of margin over the IM amount to account 
for the current market value of the financial instrument or a portfolio of financial 
instruments. It refers to the minimum value in eligible Collateral Assets that a 
collateral taker requires the collateral provider deliver to it, or its designate, in 
order to cover the market risk(s) arising during the life of a financial market 
transaction that extend, or could conceivably extend, beyond the initial margin 
provided.  In the EU, VM, for EMIR-relevant trades, is permitted to be provided 
using a TTCA and does not have a requirement to separate margin from collateral 
taker’s risks.  
1.25 The GFC’s regulatory and economic changes have put a greater pressure on ‘smart 
collateralisation’ techniques focusing mostly on optimising: 
(a) Two-Way Collateralisation;  
(b) enterprise-wide collateralisation i.e. centralised liquidity for HQLA driven 
transactions and non-HQLA driven transactions; and 
(c) structural optimisation using CUT and other upgrade transactions, 
                                                     
 
25  Notably initial margin must be:  
• valued daily using prescribed calculation and valuation methods;  
• collected on same-day basis without offsetting of initial-margin amounts;  
• segregated from the proprietary assets of the collateral taker or Custodian;  
• available in the collateral holding structure and equally in timely manner following default of provider;  
• cash must be held in segregated account of third-party credit institution or recognised equivalent; and 
• excluded from any rehypothecation, re-pledge or other reuse rights except for permitted reinvestments.      
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1.26 In light of policymakers asking more of the plumbing and given it fragmentation, this 
thesis argues that questioning the resilience of the plumbing and one's access to it remains 
very much relevant for all types of market participants regardless of whether they are: 
(a) financial counterparties (FCs), typically acting in their role as sell-side liquidity 
providers – also referred to as intermediaries or in their role as manufacturers of 
Collateral Assets; or 
(b) the various actors on the buy-side, which may include any array of non-financial 
counterparties (NFCs) and/or end-users, whether they act as long-term investors 
in financial instruments in assets or shorter-term traders therein;  or  
(c) even as financial market infrastructure providers (FMIPs), 
  (FCs, NFCs and FMIPs collectively Collateral Ecosystem stakeholders).  
1.27 In addition to the above, collateralisation’s reduction of risk primarily depends on the 
ability of the collateral taker to exercise its claim to the Collateral Asset be it in relation 
to the mobilisation of the Collateral Asset, the security interest (not harmonised across 
EU) and/or title transfer, as well as ability to net and set-off claims. The same is true in 
relation to the safeguarding and/or Custody of such Collateral Assets (not fully 
harmonised across EU) and the protections afforded by their Segregation (not fully 
harmonised across EU) in a consistent manner.26 These are questions of law – be it at EU-
27- or national-level of the individual EU-MS and they come with benefits for those 
receiving protection from the law and costs for those providing protection. They are also 
dependent on each party’s roles and motivations.  
                                                     
 
26  See exploratory work by the Association of Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) in available via  
https://www.esma.europa.eu/file/19804/download?token=uDcwhG_P., (AFME’s 2016 Paper) which noted (emphasis in bold):  
 
“Account segregation is one mechanism by which regulators, legislators and authorities seek to achieve client asset 
protection. The meaning of “account segregation” differs across regulations and the use of the term within the 
industry – segregation can be both an internal book keeping concept, and an external account concept. The concept 
of account segregation is considered in more detail on page 7. In addition, segregation can be required to different 
levels – between securities account holder and securities account provider assets, between the assets of particular 
types of securities account holders, or between the assets of each individual securities account holder.”   
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1.28 This is a complex matter within jurisdictions and even more so across jurisdictions, 
especially where the underlying financial market transaction (e.g. a SFT) and the 
collateralisation arrangements, including the Collateral Assets provided and the Custody 
of the Collateral Assets, are governed under the laws of two or more jurisdictions. In such 
cases, there is a heightened risk that the Collateral Assets will not afford the collateral 
taker the protection it has assumed, including the level of Segregation.27  
 
1.29 Spotlight on Segregation 
1.30 Segregation occurs at various levels of the holding/Custody chain, and may involve a 
number of different jurisdictions28 as well as documented and non-documented 
arrangements, consistency is crucial as to whether account structures run on an individual 
or an omnibus basis. EU-level measures are (currently) not consistent(i.e., MiFID 
II/MiFIR has slight differences to that of EMIR and national-level rules (UK’s CASS and 
Irish CAR) implementing EU-rules have additional differing requirements to each other 
but to the EU level.  Figure 1, taken from AFME’s 2016 Paper, highlights this issue in 
that an investor may not be fully aware of when “individual” Segregation switches to 
                                                     
 
27  AFME’s 2016 Paper, (worryingly) refuted the principle that increased levels of Segregation result in greater protection for a 
Collateral Asset provider upon the insolvency of the account provider i.e., Custodian/Depository. This argumentation, which rested 
on the premise that greater segregation is burdensome for costs and operational efforts and that holding/Custody chains are 
infallible, is flawed as LBIE and MF Global have demonstrated.  AFME represents the interests of major dealer entities and thus 
its “Principles” presented in the paper should be read with that context. While some are welcome, specifically the suggestion of 
greater use of industry legal opinions for each market, which are updated annually, covering the holding/Custody chain through to 
the (I)CSD, the cost of such opinions are ultimately to be carried by the buy-side and others are (or ought to be) common sense for 
sophisticated market participants.   
28  See Annex 2 to AFME’s 2016 Paper as well as Annexes to this thesis.  
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“omnibus” accounts and what the Cust-RR exposure is through the various 
holding/Custody chains.  
 
Figure 1 - Segregation types 
1.31 This can be further accentuated if the Collateral Assets are safeguarded or custodied (with 
a Custody provider or other qualified person) in a manner that is different to what the 
collateral provider assumes. These considerations, whether individually and/or taken 
together, can pose a danger not only to the collateral provider and/or taker, but potentially 
to the financial system at large given the interconnectedness of market participants via 
various transaction chains and individual relationships at different points along those 
chains, that themselves are not static. Consequently, market participants ought to be aware 
of the risk metrics this thesis introduces29 as CEPCR and Concentration Risk, Coll-RR 
and Cust-RR as well as Recoverability Rates to assist with answering the question “where 
is my collateral and how much of it can I get back?” Even, after the failures of LBIE 
and MF Global that caused London to shake global markets, the post-GFC responses this 
question still remains a risk for all types of market participants and more so as the UK’s 
relationship with the EU changes.   
                                                     
 
29  See Glossary.  
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1.32 Markets assume, including in relation to Collateral Assets the plumbing (i.e. the 
mobilisation and holding) works. They pay little to no attention, certainly not in 
developed European markets with dominant FMIP providers, to risks outlined herein 
despite some very recent shocks throughout the GFC. Although they are assuming such 
risks, they are not paid (certainly not always in terms of mobilisation fees) for doing so 
nor are they always provisioning against such risks. This is particularly the case where 
certain collateralisation channels, incorrect perceptions of risk and/or deficiencies as well 
as poor collateralisation and Custody practice as well as overuse of rehypothecation can 
compound such problems and be a catalyst, especially when the collateral mobilisation 
channels stop and collateral velocity slows.30 This can affect individual but more likely 
will affect a multitude of transactions and relevant relationships in those chains.  
 
1.33 Transaction chains 
1.34 As each counterparty can have multiple relationships with counterparties as well as in 
terms of roles as collateral provider and taker and different exposures, each interaction 
thus creates a ‘transaction chain’ in which Collateral Assets move through mobilisation 
channels. This overview of a relevant entity’s agreed terms with a given counterparty 
(primary relationship) as well as what impact any terms of its own connected party 
(secondary relationship) or the connected party of that counterparty (tertiary 
relationship) as well as the respective relationships with ancillary service providers and 
FMIPs (ancillary relationship) means that for the primary relationship is crucial in 
identifying, mitigating and managing financial and non-financial risk(s) proactively. This 
merits having a 360 degree view on the appropriateness, consistency of content, cross-
references and hierarchy of terms, the resilience of individual and interconnected terms, 
the degree of information asymmetry and what this means for financial and non-financial 
                                                     
 
30  The “velocity of collateral” is the ratio of the total pledged collateral received by the large banks divided by the primary collateral, 
the actual outstanding amount of securities in the primary collateral pool. Essentially, this ratio measures the reuse of collateral 
due to financial intermediation between banks and non-banks, also known as “collateral chains”.  See original work by Singh,  
Manmohan, “Collateral and Financial Plumbing”, (Singh) as supplemented by: 
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/07/10/1531202400000/Collateral-velocity-rebounds---recent-estimates-and-policy-
implications/#comments    
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risk management as well as the trigger and satisfaction of various monetary and non-
monetary obligations throughout the trading and collateral relationship (this is termed 
herein as a 360 degree risk assessment) as well as distort privity of contract as assets 
move through various holding/Custody chains and tiers of accounts.  
1.35 In order to achieve a full 360-degree risk assessment parties ought to adopt a look-
through approach to approximate/assess the degree of exposure that arises in each of 
the primary, secondary, tertiary and ancillary relationships.  This look-through approach 
may allow a more appropriate modelling of the documentation and legal risks that one 
faces in the documentation exposure. It may also help to model the financial risks that 
may arise in the relationship. It may provide a more refined approach to quantifying 
(assumed) values for the types of risks discussed herein, each, as adjusted for any effects 
of CTR.  In addition, this perhaps different approach to current risk management or legal 
documentation practice is one that needs constant refreshing as relationships and 
documented terms are not static but rather are fluid and evolve.   
1.36 The following diagram in Figure 2 below sets out the existence of primary, secondary and 
tertiary relationships as well as the ancillary relationships in the Collateral Ecosystem. It 
considers a 360-degree risk assessment from the perspective of Party A and a look-
through approach should be applied in respect of all known or anticipated chains and 
exposures where possible. It is important that the simplistic example below can be 
considerably more complex and interrelated, irrespective of the existence of any central 
nodes such as CCPs and execution venues that have been interposed since the GFC to 
pool the multitude of bilateral exposures into multilateral exposures.  
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Figure 2 – Transaction chains 
 
1.37 As an example, A trading with B may exchange Collateral Asset N1 and N2 with one 
another in addition to A receiving “F” (financial assets).  As soon as A uses F or the N2 
assets it has received with C, as may be permitted at law or by contractual agreement, the 
transaction chain, originally between A and B, has been extended. As a result, B may not 
even have notice that the transaction chain has been extended. Consequently, C may also 
have no notice that the assets it may receive may mean that Counterparty A is under an 
obligation to return these to C. The amount of possible combinations and lengths of chains 
are exponential.  
1.38 Where assets are fungible i.e., interchangeable and sufficiently liquid and/or available in 
the market i.e., can be acquired by the taker for delivery to the collateral provider, these 
risks may be less of an issue. Where however risks arise are when assets are less fungible, 
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replicable, liquid or, as was shown during the GFC, the plumbing stops flowing. Mapping 
these chains, or at the very least being cognisant of the Coll-RR and Cust-RR as they 
might arise or actually appear, or can by proxy be expected to appear in these chains, even 
in a centrally cleared and/or Blockchain enabled world, may allow those that map these 
risks to be able to better identify, mitigate and manage exposures and thus reduce potential 
or actual loss. It also helps answer the fundamental question of where Collateral Assets 
are and how quickly and how much can be recovered.      
1.39 The exposures and risks created in any part of a transaction chain may differ and a 
financial market transaction’s risks and exposures may be different (or develop 
differently) to the collateral asset transactions. Those factors may evolve independently 
and any correlation between the elements may be fluid and different evolution speeds. 
Thus, collateral correlation risk can move quickly and independently of relevant 
transaction chains. What this means in practice, is that in a given financial market 
transaction, the Collateral Assets that are supposed to secure that financial market 
transaction may not fully secure the exposure and risks of the financial market transaction.  
In such instances additional collateral, credit support or security is typically required. As 
indicated above, the fact that Collateral Assets, like financial market instruments, even 
non-fungible assets move through various transaction chains, might further complicate 
matters. The longer the transaction chain the more Collateral Ecosystem stakeholders are 
involved. If the degree of correlation and any risk exposures are increased by either the 
financial market transaction and/or the collateral asset transaction and this has adverse 
consequences then this causes problems for the market participants and FMIPs involved.   
1.40 Accurate capture and greater consistency is also paramount in being able to identify, 
mitigate and manage issues with respect to the concepts discussed further below on CTR, 
Coll-RR and Cust-RR and how that factors into VARINCA and VARIGCA. If parties 
can couple both an application of a 360 degree risk assessment with a look-through 
approach to drive identification, mitigation and management of the relevant financial, 
non-financial risks including the proposed items herein, as adjusted for CTR can yield a 
powerful fluid tool to create a ‘risk map’ of relevant exposures and obligations that 
accommodates the legal/regulatory items that traditional risk management may not 
capture fully or may have done predominantly on a fragmented, silo and/or reactive based 
context in terms of establishing exposure and establishing solutions.  
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1.41 Furthermore, in addition to the different risk perspectives proposed above, traditional risk 
approaches have since the GFC have only since 2012 and EMIR begun to fully consider 
the mitigation of adverse risk exposures that arise due to the interconnectivity between 
participants, as well as Concentration Risk(s) and the respective correlation amongst 
such market participants active in the Collateral Ecosystem (Collateral Ecosystem 
Participant Concentration Risk or CEPCR). Traditionally, the monitoring of such 
exposures on a proactive basis has been limited to counterparty credit risk monitoring. 
Whilst this may work fine in relation to monitoring bilateral, possibly individually 
documented exposures, it becomes a bit more complicated when one fails to account for 
the various roles in the relationship.  
1.42 It also poses problems, when one considers that, out of, say, 100 transactions, 70 of which 
are collateralised on a bilateral basis, that these may in each instance have different 
ratings-based triggers (if at all) that are relevant for triggering events of default, transfer 
and replacement mechanics to replacement counterparties or providers of services, the 
cessation of specific roles (such as calculation or valuation agent) on the one hand as 
opposed to looking at overall exposures. With EU reforms introducing a new prudential 
regime for investment firms, notably those Collateral Ecosystem stakeholders, based on 
various firm-specific risk factors (referred to as “K-Factors”)31 including a “risk to 
market” factor, CEPCR might provide a useful additional metric.   
1.43 Looking at CEPCR in the context of a simple example, suppose “Megabank” acts as a 
Custodian/Depository across a number of key transactions, collateral arrangements and 
relationship and each of these are documented by various agreements, with varying 
differences in terms as the relationship has evolved. Some may have mitigants 
(contractual and/or ratings based triggers)  which may insufficient in relation to a host of 
operational functions or the (prompt) replacement of Megabank as should any of the 
triggers have been activated.  CEPCR plays two important considerations here, namely 
firstly CEPCR in relation not having a greater diversification in providers of 
Custody/Depository services and secondly, in relation to not having more uniform 
terms/mitigants in documented exposures to Megabank to ensure that there is a greater 
                                                     
 
31  See:https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2019/january/11/consilium-agrees-position-on-ifr-and-ifd and 
https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2018/july/18/the-impact-of-the-european-commissions-proposals  
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ease in remedial action should any of the relevant triggers be breached. This would help 
participants regardless of how the EU-FCD is supposed to protect those “eligible financial 
collateral arrangements” from the impacts of Megabank’s failure, which LBIE and MF 
Global’s failures proved can still be subject to problems.  
1.44 An overconcentration to any counterparty in the Collateral Ecosystem, in particular those 
that provide material services directly or on an outsourced/delegated arrangement, are 
likely to have an adverse impact and be only of a temporary minor disruptive effect if 
there is disruption in continuity of services and no activation of a replacement mechanic. 
Any failing could have more far-reaching consequences and exacerbate financial and 
systemic risks.  Hence, any evaluation of service provider, counterparties, ought to build 
on a sound counterparty credit risk assessment and other due diligence that is conducted 
typically at on-boarding of the counterparty, but a periodic reassessment of those factors 
during the course of the relevant exposure.  CEPCR permits benchmarking as to whether 
any risk concentration is likely to become untenable or a systemic risk in its own right 
and the continuity of one’s own business.  In applying CEPCR correctly, one would add 
it to the on-boarding consideration and perhaps ask in relation to each role undertaken by 
Megabank:  
(a) how likely is a disruption or failure of Megabank, its affiliates and connected 
persons, going to adversely affect or impair my own business continuity efforts?;  
(b) how much exposure is too much before a disruption of failure of any of Megabank 
its affiliates and connected persons, would adversely affect or impair my own 
business continuity efforts;  
(c) am I sufficiently protected against a failure or disruption between any of 
Megabank its affiliates and connected persons and any of their counterparties and 
service providers?;  
(d) are there any other providers of a comparable service that I could readily use as 
an alternative or as a replacement to Megabank and would I be over-concentrated 
to such party, its affiliates and connected persons?; and  
(e) can the use of Haircuts/Overcollateralisation protect from those risks? 
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1.45 In arriving at finding a Haircut and setting the minimum levels of the amount of Collateral 
Assets to be taken, the collateral taker needs to assess the risk exposure of the collateral 
provider. Assuming it falls within the collateral taker’s overall risk appetite to the 
exposure, as well as the specific transaction, one will measure the variability of the risk 
factor over a set time horizon. One would set confidence intervals and calculate the 
default probability of the obligor i.e., the collateral provider (PD) the loss given default 
(LGD) of the obligor (with or without collateral) and the exposure at default (EAD) for 
single collateral asset types as well as overall the value at risk (VaR) and calculate a credit 
VaR for a portfolio of Collateral Assets exposure.  
1.46 Other Coll-RR and Cust-RR risks that are not adequately covered by 
Haircuts/Overcollateralisation and which are much more fundamental are those that stem 
from conceptual gaps and CTR that drive fragmentation of the EU’s Collateral 
Ecosystem. These new risk categories are complementary to the existing paradigm of 
risks that financial market participants and Collateral Ecosystem users are familiar with. 
These new categories are also relevant in the context of assessing the types, feasibility 
and efficiency of tools and principles employed relating to the identification, mitigation 
and management of the existing paradigm of risks that exist in financial markets.  
 
1.47 Differences remain and these matter – conceptual gaps and CTR 
1.48 The EU’s integration efforts have long, certainly, since the start of the first Single Market 
integration projects, notably the 1999 FSAP and since 2015, the CMU, acknowledged 
issues on fragmentation generally and specifically in relation to the Collateral Ecosystem. 
Despite efforts in overcoming them, divergences and thus barriers (including, after close 
to 30 years, the Giovannini Barriers) continue to exist. They, along with the EPTF 
Barriersi, apply as a result differences in concepts, linguistics and incorrect and/or 
differing implementation, including “Goldplating” of concepts by individual EU-MS 
and/or grandfathering (preservation) of national concepts and/or other means of 
preserving or differentiating competitive advantages of the jurisdiction or national 
champions.   
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1.49 These issues apply across the whole of the EU in various different forms and strengths of 
barriers as well as some being rooted or dependent on national law/regulatory originated 
concepts. Rules in this area are fragmented along national lines, subject to a “strong-form 
path dependence”32, irrespective of various jurisdictions having some conceptual 
similarities on overarching principles even where these are derived from EU legislative 
and/or national requirements.  
1.50 Crucially, unlike some of the existing headings in traditional risk management in financial 
services, the closing of conceptual gaps (see below) and elimination of CTR33 (see below) 
can lead to an upside34 of efficiency and harmonisation.  This is because addressing these 
issues improves comparability, convergence and ultimately standardisation of regulatory 
rules inasmuch as non-regulatory drafting such as contractual language. By contrast, if 
left to continue, conceptual gaps and CTR may exacerbate other risk exposures and cause 
an overall downside risk35 propagation.  
1.51 Language matters 
1.52 Language and law/rules co-exist autonomously but operate on structurally similar 
systems that rely on rules that are core to the construction itself, guide its evolution and 
guarantee its consistency.36 Both law (rulemaking instruments, contract and soft-law) and 
language are conditioned by the social dimension in which they are placed and where 
                                                     
 
32  Strong-form path dependence reflects, in economic theory, how a set of decisions that is faced in a given situation is limited by the 
decisions chosen or circumstances experienced in the past (similar to the legal doctrine of precedence) irrespective of their relevance 
to the present situation.  For a fuller discussion please see: Donald, David C., Regulatory Failures in the Design of Securities 
Settlement Infrastructure (August 15, 2010). Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1669208 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1669208 who on page 3 discusses, in same light of 
theories of Liebowitz and Margolis, notions of  “third-degree” path dependencies, which relate to situations where perceived 
switching gains are high but transition is (deemed) impractical, as it relates to improving financial market infrastructure providers 
involved in settlement processes.  
33  See inter alia usage of this term by Huertas in the following works: 
https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=%22conceptual+gap%22&sourceid=ie7&rls=com.microsoft:en-GB:IE-
Address&ie=&oe=&safe=active&gfe_rd=cr&ei=Qe4ZWNjBH-
TW8ge84Z7YAQ&gws_rd=ssl#safe=active&q=%22conceptual+translation+risk%22   
34  The market terminology of an ‘upside’ or ‘upside risk’ is used to denote that the impact of a risk has a positive and/or desired 
impact, as viewed from the perspective of the observer.   
35  The market terminology of a ‘downside’ or ‘downside risk’ is used to denote that the impact of a risk has a negative and/or adverse 
impact, as viewed from the perspective of the observer.   
36  See p96 in Francesconi, Enrio, Montemagni, Simonetta et al., which focuses more on natural language processing as applied to 
law as opposed to assessing the outcomes of linguistic differences in legal texts and effects on markets.  
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they dynamically define and fix their “object” in relation to a continually evolving social 
context i.e., law is reactive and judges interpret legal language in an operative sense. Law 
and rules are strictly dependent on linguistic expression and as communicated 
(written/oral) in a given context. Even in customary rules in markets (and also market 
terminology), there is an element of textualisation.  
1.53 Language plays a role in accentuating divergences, including when everyone making and 
everyone following the rules uses the same language – as demonstrated below in respect 
of English, the (primary) drafting language of EU, UK and Irish financial services 
rulemaking, but also across languages – see Glossary – Linguistic CTR.  
1.54 Legal and market terminology co-exist yet may have different meanings generally i.e. 
false cognates across jurisdictions but also for different stakeholders. This thesis 
distinguishes markedly between market and legal terminology. The market terminology 
use of “posting collateral”, which is used as an umbrella term that can explain any amount 
of transaction chains and security interests.  The body of EU supervisors uses a jumble of 
such market terminology as well as the misuse of the word pledge, often left undefined 
and used in a market terminology as opposed to legal terminology context, and mixes the 
terminology up with a more Jurisdiction-Agnostic term of “mobilising collateral”. That 
term does seem to be a good balance between including a wide body of legal and 
regulatory concepts and merging it with the needs of users of market terminology.  This 
is of course not welcome for market users and/or lawyers in the absence of a common 
term that is sufficiently Jurisdiction-Agnostic that still express with certainty the legal 
terminology while also reflecting the principles understood of users of market 
terminology.     
1.55 Taking the example of a security interest, the word “pledge”, whilst it has a legal meaning 
(certainly in common law jurisdictions), EU policymakers, including drafters of its 
legislative instruments, have used the word “pledge” in a non-legalistic manner. Thus, 
various security interests, albeit with differing degrees of commonalities and/or 
conceptual gaps to the English or Irish law pledge37, such as the German law security 
interest, a Pfand are summarised, in EU legislative instrument as a “pledge”. Yet, the 
national-law grounded concepts of security interests have jurisdiction-specific concepts 
                                                     
 
37  See Addendum to Chapter 2 for a high-level comparison of English and Irish law security interests.  
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that may not be (fully) intelligible to market participants outside of a respective 
jurisdiction.   
1.56 Put simply a German law security interest, regardless of how it is called, will not be fully 
equivalent to what English or Irish law understands a “pledge” to be within the context 
of its given legal system as the Pfand has different constituting features, including 
formalities under the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch). This is an example 
of CTR in the absence of, as discussed in Part III,:  
(a) greater comparability of security interests and their jurisdiction specifics; and/or 
(b) an EU-wide unitary security interest.  
1.57 The same degree of CTR will exist between what English law considers to be a pledge, 
and the requirements as a result of English case law in (Gray v G-T-P) and what Irish law, 
not being bound by that case clarifying the concept of “control”, considers to constitute a 
pledge.  Even if Irish and English law of security interests share certain common features, 
there are differences. This also applies irrespective, even where national laws are 
amended/influenced by EU-level rules, including in the form of the EU-FCD and EU-
SFD as the laws of security interests remain (regrettably) national in nature with a strong-
path dependence – The concepts are “similar but different” due to jurisdiction-specifics. 
See also discussion in Addendum to Chapter 2.  
1.58 This ultimately could present an issue, as enforcement of said pledge could, depending 
on facts specific to the counterparties, financial instruments and Custody relationship, 
differ. The 2017 EPTF Report notes38, in relation to EPTF Barrier 8 (Uncertainty as to 
the legal soundness of risk mitigation techniques used by intermediaries and of CCPs’ 
default management procedures) that:  
“Lack of clarity as to the “possession” or “control” test: Article 1(5) FCD states 
that the Directive applies to financial collateral, once “it has been provided”. 
However, FCD lacks rules on the “provision” of collateral. Recital 9 of the FCD 
merely provides that “the only perfection requirement which national law may 
impose in respect of financial collateral should be that the financial collateral is 
                                                     
 
38  On pages 75 and 76.  
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delivered, transferred, held, registered or otherwise designated so as to be in the 
possession or under the control [emphasis added] of the collateral taker […]”. 
Therefore, the FCD seems to rely on a “possession” or “control” test for the 
perfection of financial collateral arrangements. However, it does not specify what 
is involved in taking ‘possession’ of financial collateral (is it sufficient for the 
collateral to be in the collateral-taker’s account at the CSD? Is it sufficient to be 
“earmarked” in the collateral provider’s account?) or “control” (is it sufficient 
that the collateral-taker has a legal right to refuse a request from the collateral-
taker to withdraw collateral?). The CJEU ruling in the case Private Equity 
Insurance Group v Swedbank[39] does not provide sufficient clarity as regards 
the “possession” or “control” test under the FCD.  
Ambiguity in insolvency laws as to whether collateral provided after the opening 
of insolvency proceedings is covered by FCD protections: Article 8(2) FCD 
requires Member States to safeguard financial collateral that has been provided 
on the day of, but after the moment of the commencement of insolvency or 
reorganisation proceedings, is enforceable and binding on third parties if the 
collateral taker proves that he was not aware, nor should have been aware, of 
the commencement of such proceedings. However, it is not clear which steps and 
events are protected by Article 8(2) FCD: Is it sufficient that the collateral taker 
was unaware of the opening of insolvency proceedings at the time the collateral 
agreement is concluded (transaction)? Or must he be unaware of the opening of 
the proceedings at the moment of the delivery, transfer, holding, registering etc. 
of financial collateral so as to be in the “possession” or under the “control” of 
the collateral-taker?  
Legal uncertainty as to the applicable law to book entry security collateral. The 
conflict of laws rule of Article 9(1) FCD points to the law of the place of the 
“relevant account”. A fundamental problem is that an account itself, strictly 
speaking, has no location; their location is to be determined with reference to 
                                                     
 
39  “Judgment of 10 November 2016, Private Equity Insurance Group v Swedbank, C-156/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:851, paragraph 38-
44. In the UK, courts had to rule in two cases whether financial collateral in the sense of the UK-FCARs, has been “provided” 
(Gray and others v G-T-P Group Limited: Re F2G Realisations Limited (in liquidation) [2010] EWCH 1772 (Ch) and Lehman 
Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch)). 99 The CJEU reiterated the provision of Article 
8(2) FCD in its Judgment of 10 November 2016, Private Equity Insurance Group v Swedbank, C-156/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:851, 
paragraph 46.” 
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other factors. In any case, the connecting factor of Article 9(1) FCD is unclear 
and has not been interpreted uniformly across Member States. This can result in 
legal uncertainty in an important case, commonly encountered in post-trade 
collateral arrangements: where a financial intermediary, such as a clearing 
member or a custodian providing settlement services, receives securities from its 
client into an account provided by the intermediary. Depending on the 
jurisdiction, the question of the identification of the relevant account can lead to 
different possible answers: (i) the accounts of the collateral taker on the 
intermediary’s books; (ii) the account where the intermediary’s entitlement to the 
securities is recorded (such as the next intermediary in a custody chain or the 
CSD or another set of books) or (iii) the account of the collateral provider. The 
end investor needs to agree either in individual case or in generalised manner 
with the custodian as to the conditions under which the assets may be used as 
collateral.”    
1.59 Moreover, there is no single EU-approved resource that provides equivalence in terms of 
an English law governed pledge as a security interest with say a German-law Pfand. The 
same is true in indeed of the difficulty, even amongst shared neighbours, on the 
equivalence (or not in the case of the UK’s divergence following the Gray v G-T-P case) 
between and English and Irish law governed pledge generally but more specific for 
purposes of the pan-EU wide protections that are governed by the EU-FCD. That itself, 
as, a Directive creates conceptual gaps and CTR issues, which as assessed in Annex 2 has 
been implemented in individual EU jurisdictions with jurisdiction-specific rules, national 
options and discretions or differing views on interpretation, which has the possibility of 
raising/exacerbating Coll-RR or Cust-RR, even if the market does have some structural 
and documentation solutions.   
1.60 CTR also exists and propagates other risks, where a concept, principle or outcome, is set 
at the EU primary legislative instrument level, and at any subsequent subsidiary 
legislative instrument, level is different, whether refined further or simply incorrectly 
reflected. Legislative ‘Goldplating’ or incorrect transposition across the EU by EU-MS 
are examples of CTR. So too are issues where for example EU legislative instruments, 
for say the asset management sector ‘X’, for the insurance sector ‘Y’ and for regulated 
lending and taking of security ‘Z’ all cover a common concept but do so in different ways. 
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These divergences are evidence of both conceptual gaps as well as CTR.  In EU 
policymaker parlance, these issues, to the extent they are identified (which often they are 
not) are subject to “calibration” i.e., harmonisation/streamlining etc. as forms of 
convergence.   
1.61 In the absence of any EU-wide laws facilitating a mandatory and/or voluntary regime for 
full harmonisation of the Collateral Ecosystem, and even in areas where such EU-wide 
laws, regulations or concepts do exist, conceptual gaps and CTR exist. These contribute 
to the risk that the collateral taker will not actually receive the protection that it assumes 
the relevant rules will provide as well as the risk that the Custody arrangements will not 
provide the safeguarding for the Collateral Assets in the manner stipulated or the level of 
Segregation. Absent action, market failures that make apparent this divergence between 
the perception and reality might cause financial markets to suffer a severe disruption. The 
2008 failure of LBIE and the 2011 failure of MF Global UK Limited highlighted these 
issues and were accelerants to the GFC and the responses generally sought to make the 
banking sector safe to fail and centralise risk and collateralisation through CCPs and 
clearing houses.    
1.62 Equally, absent a definitive and fully uniform EU-wide regime, including unitary EU-
wide security interests, there are inconsistencies amongst EU jurisdictions on how 
national legal systems view of “ownership” of financial instruments. Notably, 
incompatibilities exist on negotiability and bona fide dealings on the one hand with the 
principle of absolute protection of holders of financial instruments. Despite common EU 
principles, domestic solutions differ on concepts and results. Some apply the ideas of 
“traditional” property/insolvency law doctrine while others apply sui generis. The degree 
of emphasis favouring the protection of the holder versus the negotiability of the 
instrument equally matter.  
1.63 These divergences matter in all types of financial market transactions and Collateral Asset 
arrangements both where standards, but also where concepts, differ and/or are 
interpreted/viewed differently between jurisdiction A versus B etc. Where counterparties 
and/or the jurisdictions they operate in have a different understanding of concepts and 
standards this undermines trust, raises costs. All of this divergence ultimately reinforces 
fragmentation. The conceptual gaps as well as the CTR exists between the two regimes 
(Horizontal CTR) due to existing measures that are super-equivalent in scope, design or 
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interpretation (including retaining measures that existed prior to an EU law instrument – 
See Annex 2 for examples) or which are jurisdiction-specific, whether by design of the 
legislative draftsman (such as the CASS rules – See Annex 1 for examples) or as a result 
of court driven divergence such as a result of Cukurova or Gray v G-T-P in the UK 
changing various concepts of EU law and common principles as well as English law 
fundamentals in the law of collateral, Client Assets and Client Money.  
1.64 This is the case even when using English law governed documents in Ireland in relation 
to Custody services and submitting to Irish courts, who would adjudicate on matters of 
English law, the regulatory regime that would apply to how those regulated activities of 
Custody are provided would be the Irish rules and would most likely also apply Irish-
FCARs as opposed to UK-FCARs, even if the parties may have attempted to agree this 
differently. Recognising these differences, the risks and the costs are thus important to 
identify, mitigate and manage. Increasing convergence (e.g., of legal systems, regulatory 
and supervisory approaches and/or requirements or contractual boilerplate) and 
increasing standardisation may narrow the ability for conceptual gaps to emerge.   
1.65 Divergences exist even with established hierarchy of laws 
1.66 Divergences exist even with EU law being superordinate to national law. This is the case 
even if the EU’s approach in interpreting concepts and terms is that these, in an EU 
legislative instrument are to be given “an autonomous or uniform meaning” across the 
EU.40 Consequently, terms are to be interpreted by the courts in each EU-MS when used 
in relation to the application of a rule under the Rome I Regulation41. That approach 
however does not mean that terms are mutually intelligible and interoperable as to 
concepts in other EU legislative instruments and those of national law nor that some 
persons holding the rulemaking pen at national level may apply Goldplating.   
1.67 While the ECJ is the ultimate arbiter of a meaning of a term or concept used in a given 
EU legislative instrument, an avenue for greater consistency and interoperability might 
come about in further EU efforts on promoting harmonisation especially if it uses more 
“Jurisdiction-Agnostic” drafting. Such drafting would thus seek to complement, overlay 
                                                     
 
40  See Chapter 1 in Briggs. A, “Private International Law in English Courts” (OUP, 2014) and Chapter 13 in Yeowart and Parsons.  
41  Regulation (EC) No 593/2008  
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but also supplement and/or replace existing domestic solutions that exist in private and 
commercial law underlying financial market transactions and the Collateral Ecosystem.  
1.68 These differences highlighted above, while posing problems also raise the question, as 
explored in Part III whether the EU should, either by way of using a 29th Regime, similar 
to the U.S. UCC, and creating a unitary security interest (that works across 
languages/schools of law) thus build an EU UCC. A 29th Regime refers to creating a 
parallel regime (that stands either above and/or as an alternative) to those of national 
jurisdictions rather than looking to harmonise those. An example of this would be say the 
FCD and SFD and more recently the BRRD, the SSM and SRM as the two pillars of the 
EBU which create an alternative in the form of a uniform set of measures that stand 
superior to the 28 plus insolvency regimes of individual EU-MS. Such a regime would 
be welcome in the EU Collateral Ecosystem and could complement the private 
transnational regulatory regimes that exist in the form of master agreement 
documentation suites in say the form of the ISDA, GMSLA and GMRA, which 
historically make up the bulk of the relevant Collateral Asset transactions. A 29th Regime 
could be used concurrently to using EU legislative means of maximum harmonisation 
and Jurisdiction-Agnostic drafting to close conceptual gaps and reduce CTR. It also raises 
questions whether EU policymakers ought to work with industry associations to 
standardise certain reporting and other disclosure requirements, and provide agreed 
clauses, that are documentation-neutral and Jurisdiction-Agnostic, and greater use of 
Industry Legal Opinions to improve greater legal certainty on some of the issues raised 
herein. This is especially the case in a Collateral Ecosystem and financial markets, where 
Jurisdiction-Agnostic rulemaking instruments, whether as a legislative “29th Regime” or 
targeted technical operating process can sidestep legal fiction and match market 
infrastructure systems’ practice with pragmatic approaches. FinTech and RegTech may 
play a contributing role in making this happen, but will still require a human hand in 
closing-out conceptual gaps and keeping CTR in check. Rather, FinTech’s disruption, 
may need to create entirely new concepts that reflect the specifics of the digital age 
displacing current processes as very much distinct to the dematerialised and certificated 
based trading and mobilisation of collateral that rapidly advanced during what is termed 
the ‘machine age’.  Those new concepts will need to, subject as proposed herein, fit in 
with the realisation of new risks.  In many ways, it is easier for lawyers and policymakers 
to define those risks concurrently whilst FinTech forges new solutions so as to have a 
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possible legislative, regulatory and operating framework that does not lag behind and is 
thus permissive as opposed to restrictive.   
1.69 The UK has been quick to expand the scope of EU protections to wider scope of persons 
and circumstances and the Irish rules have included rules, that the UK do not have, 
concerning Irish jurisdiction-specific matters, notably with respect to fund administration 
providers. This means the divergence, as discussed in Annexes II, demonstrate that the 
UK strength of divergence from that of the EU is stronger than it is to that of Ireland, and 
Irish divergence of its rules to that of the EU is less than its divergence from UK rules 
and II, demonstrate that the UK strength of divergence from that of the EU is stronger 
than it is to that of Ireland, and Irish divergence of its rules to that of the EU is less than 
its divergence from UK rules. While this expansion is welcome for market participants, 
indeed many of which consider this UK/Irish “jurisdiction-specific” Goldplating to be the 
gold-standard, the UK’s changing relationship with the EU-27 means the remaining bloc 
would be best pressed to amend and expand its own regime to borrow the best of the 
British and the Irish regimes.  
1.70 In summary, the language of legislation and rulemaking therefore matters, especially to 
the Collateral Ecosystem as the “plumbing” of financial markets, where, even 10 years 
after the GFC and key failures in the Collateral Ecosystem (LBIE, MF Global etc.), the 
question of “where are my Collateral Assets and how much of it can I get back?” 
remains unanswered. So too are core questions that matter, certainly in markets that since 
the GFC have, as part of legislative and/or market-led infrastructure reforms, become 
more connected and where collateralisation is more prevalent. The GFC, whilst a trigger 
for change in thinking on risk and compliance, also put the brakes on financial integration, 
financialisation and cross-border convergence of the EU’s financial markets and the 
Collateral Ecosystem which is only beginning to develop, albeit slowly. Part of this is 
down to a lack of confidence, but more importantly, there still being much to do in terms 
of rules and infrastructure to integrate 28 European markets in financial services into a 
true Single Market. 
1.71 The EU’s overarching aim in financial markets has been to build a Single Market for 
financial services (i.e. the internal market) built upon a “Single Rulebook”.  The GFC has 
meant that the EU has moved to using more Regulations, i.e., directly applicable EU 
legislative instruments rather than EU Directives i.e., legislative instruments that requires 
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transposition i.e., implementation into national laws. Surely if EU law aims to unite and 
eliminate conceptual gaps, then Horizontal CTR let alone Vertical CTR should not exist. 
Unfortunately, this is wishful thinking, despite the best efforts of the EU and many 
stakeholders at national levels.  
1.72 Part of this failing is due to errors made unwillingly/willingly at a national level and these 
not being corrected or these being incapable of being corrected. Moreover these failings 
exist (and thus risks for market participants) despite EU treaties and EU case law having 
established a general rule that EU-MS cannot legislate against or contrary to the aims of 
EU legislation. The Treaty on Functioning of the European Union designates the "internal 
market" and "consumer protection" as areas of "shared competence".  This means that 
EU-MS can only act where the EU has chosen not to or has explicitly ceased to do so.  The 
primacy of EU legislative and regulatory instruments in the event of conflict between the 
EU level instruments and the laws and regulatory instruments of EU-MS of the European 
Union is an established concept of the EU. This means that hierarchy is established as 
follows:  
(a) EU level instruments, comprised of: 
(i) EU treaties and general principles of EU law;  
(ii) EU legislative acts (EU Regulations, Directives and Decisions as well as 
non-binding Recommendations or Opinions); and 
(iii) EU secondary legislation (delegated acts and implementing acts); and 
(b) laws and regulatory instruments of EU-MS of the European Union. 
As Bosomworth, points out EU counterparties increasingly trade across intra-union 
borders whereas national-domiciled policymakers, regardless of their views on EU 
integration, serve their jurisdiction-specific interests. The creation of the EBU, the 
achievements of CMU 1.0 and Brexit have however begun to strengthen an 
Europeanisation of financial services rulemaking and supervision. Further work is 
required, as discussed below.  
1.73 Whilst much of the legal and regulatory regime applicable to authorized credit institutions 
and their regulated financial service activity is harmonized at the EU level including 
  
 
 
 
  
 55  
 
 
  
 
  
through the use of EU law in the form of "Regulations", which take direct effect in the 
EU-MS, there are a number of areas where either: 
(a) no harmonized EU law exists and thus national requirements may take 
precedence - unless in the case of certain instances national competent authorities 
(NCAs) or EU level authorities (such as the ECB-SSM) have exercised their own 
regulatory rulemaking or supervisory powers to introduce binding legal 
requirements (i.e. as EU law and/or national requirements) or have communicated 
their "supervisory expectations" (i.e. as "soft law") those measures take 
precedence over the national requirements;  
(b) EU law exists but it has been supplemented or subject to Goldplating;   
(c) EU law exists but it has, mostly in the case of EU law that is not a Regulation 
(i.e. with direct effect) but requires national implementation such as an EU 
Directive, yet to be implemented into national requirements; or  
(d) EU law exists but it has been incorrectly implemented into national requirements 
or incorrectly interpreted by competent authorities and/or stakeholders thus 
leading to the various types of CTR, 
 collectively these four issues form conceptual gaps that require, with assistance 
from counsel, navigation from both a compliance and a business strategy 
perspective. 
1.74 Some of the issues on hierarchy and relations to one another are explored in a standout 
study commissioned by the EP’s influential policymaking Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs (ECON), prepared by Professors Langenbucher & Tröger of the 
Frankfurt based Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe at the Goethe University 
of Frankfurt, where this author teaches, entitled “EU Mapping 2017: Systematic overview 
on economic and financial legislation”42, which provides graphic overview on core 
legislation in the area of economic and financial services within ECON’s mandate as at 
May 2017. While that study does not discuss conceptual gaps and conceptual translation 
                                                     
 
42  Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/607325/IPOL_STU(2017)607325_EN.pdf 
(Langenbucher & Tröger) 
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risks, readers may find it useful to refer back to some of the materials in the study to help 
them understand correlations between legislative and regulatory building blocks and this 
thesis highlights any changes in the law as to updates to the building blocks assessed in 
Langenbucher & Tröger.   
1.75 In summary, while conceptual gaps exist where there is an absence of a concept, a CTR 
can also arises when either rulemaking bodies or market participants incorrectly 
implement rules, principles and/or objectives of legislative and regulatory regimes or do 
so differently in a particular sector, asset class and/or jurisdiction. CTR also arises where 
any of the aforementioned actions or omissions are subject to judicial misinterpretation 
or inconsistent interpretation.  
1.76 The absence of an EU-wide regime for the Collateral Ecosystem, even if EU 
policymakers do not borrow what market participants consider to be the gold standard 
still means there is no uniform answer to “who owns what” but more importantly “who 
can do what, how and when” with Collateral Assets, client assets and client money and 
specifically segregation and rights of re-use. Instead, a patchwork with ample conceptual 
gaps and CTR exists. 
1.77 At the time of writing, despite the  ECB-SSM and the wider European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS) along with NCAs in certain EU-MS along with relevant legislative 
policymakers revising the fitness and suitability of rulemaking on a periodic basis, there 
is no sole gatekeeper of to monitor and mitigate CTR. This means that the improvements 
that are done are often done piecemeal to individual legislative instruments. Usually these 
are in the form of a Corrigendum’s to correct mistakes, or amendments to make 
improvement or even conducting a wholesale amendment and restatement – i.e., a recast 
in EU terminology. 
1.78 As there is no central office, despite proposals from commentators43 to task the EU 
Publications Office given its tasks44 to have a full clean read across what the EU terms a 
                                                     
 
43  Including Huertas in “The Phasing Out of the UK’s Financial Services Handbook: a Missed Opportunity for the EU’s Single 
Rulebook and the Capital Markets Union Project?“ first published in Vol. 31, Issue 1, 2016 Journal of International Bankign Law 
& Regulation.  
44  Pursuant to Decision 2009/496 on the organisation and operation of the Publications Office of the European Union [2009] OJ 
L168/49 art. 5 available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?qid=1425380943945&uri=CELEX:32009D0496 
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Single Rulebook (which is not really that single to begin with) and to check for conceptual 
gaps, national barriers and effectively conduct quality control on a periodic basis.  This 
could be a deliverable that CMU 2.0 could well achieve as this thesis proposes in Part III.  
1.79 In addition to those issues comes, ultimately the key fact that much of that EU legislation 
was conceived, drafted and implemented more than twenty years ago in what were then 
the White Paper on Financial Services and the Financial Services Action Plan 1999 
(FSAP) and thus well prior to the GFC and financial markets that were much less global, 
concentrated with key exposures to centralised or systemic market participants and 
certainly less electronified let alone less digitised.  
 
1.80 Brexit and opportunities for CMU 
1.81 Brexit heightens the importance of closing these conceptual gaps and mitigating CTR. 
Today, in the EU the issuance, trading, financing, clearing and settlement of capital 
market instruments such as securities and derivatives occurs largely, even predominantly 
in the UK under English law. Following Brexit, collateral arrangements under English 
law may no longer qualify as an “eligible financial collateral arrangement”. If so, 
arrangements documented under English law may expose counterparties to higher capital 
charges and/or more burdensome administrative requirements. For this reason, 
counterparties may wish to re-document their arrangements under the law of an EU-MS. 
Given the similarity between English and Irish law, many market participants are likely 
to use Irish law as the basis for the revised documentation. However, “similar” is not 
“identical”. There are important differences between English and Irish law as they pertain 
to the Collateral Ecosystem. These affect the risks that counterparties bear, particularly if 
there is an event of default in the collateral arrangement.   
1.82 EU policymakers face two choices. They can either leave participants to their own 
devices, and to continue to redocument arrangements (if they choose to do so) under 
existing EU-MS and EU law and thus operate in a patchwork of requirements. Or, 
policymakers can change law and regulation in a manner that harmonises and creates a 
level playing field by drafting, in a Jurisdiction-Agnostic manner, new as well as 
reforming existing laws/rules on:  
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 rights related to ownership in financial instruments (and Collateral Assets) as well as 
security interests or at least improve mutual understanding of security interests 
thereof – See Addendum to Chapter 2 for a comparison of UK and Irish law security 
interests;  
 netting and set-off so that these may apply uniformly across the EU ; 
 consistent treatment of Collateral Assets for purposes of: 
o the EU-FCD and EU-SFD; 
o safekeeping of Client Money and Client Assets as well as Custody 
arrangements and levels of (consistent) Segregation through the 
holding/Custody chain,  
and apply this to all collateral arrangements between market participants (i.e. non-
consumers) across the EU-27 or at least across the Eurozone-19 by borrowing the best of 
British and Irish rules (referred to herein as a CASS Rollout), including where these rules 
have Goldplated EU rules or developed their own concepts and also build an EU UCC 
building equally off the EU reform proposals that stalled in 2011 referred to as the draft 
Securities Law Directive (SLD) that was reinvigorated briefly in 2013 (SLL) referred to 
herein as a Draft SLL Rollout and discussed in Part III.  
1.83 From a public policy standpoint, adopting such a wholesale approach would be optimal, 
particularly if the EU-27 were to use English law as the basis for the new EU-27 standard. 
This would minimise transition costs associated with Brexit and preserve the protections 
that market participants have under English law and assume they will continue to have 
post-Brexit. It would also perhaps considerably limit the CTR impact on Coll-RR and 
Cust-RR (and possibly reduce those risks altogether) in a manner that, by looking to the 
EU’s favourite CMU benchmark, makes a transaction conducted between one party in 
Louisiana (which has a civil law character) with another in California  at no greater risk 
than any of the other 50 states that have completely adopted both the UCC to govern 
commercial transactions as well as a range of other federal level securities and markets 
laws. The same is true in respect of inter-jurisdictional financial transactions across 
Canada.  
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1.84 Equally, seizing the opportunity to reform and also reform thinking on EU rulemaking in 
this area, would put an end to the cycle of: 
(a) national-led development, including Goldplating; 
(b) EU dovetailing (at times copying and capping); and 
(c) national mirroring of other national-led Goldplating, 
that has led to fragmentation with a multitude of “similar but different” states of law with 
respect to the Collateral Ecosystem, with some jurisdictions trying to best each other. 
1.85 CMU offers EU policymakers an immediate opportunity to end such fragmentation, as 
the impending departure of the UK from the EU will force the EU-27 to set up an EU 
securities and capital markets regime on a basis other than English law. It allows 
policymakers to shape a canvass of consistency as opposed to a patchwork that has, as 
described in the following paragraphs, has been pieced together, often with certain needed 
reforms falling through the cracks due to national political interests at the expense of what 
would be prudent policymaking. That new capital markets regime should include 
provisions that provide issuers, investors and intermediaries the same or better protection 
than they currently enjoy under English law. That would foster both lower costs and 
greater resilience in financial markets, and therefore underpin growth in the EU’s ‘real 
economy’. 
1.86 Launched originally in September 2015, the “Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets 
Union”45, was updated notably in June 201746 and was supposed to have been finished in 
                                                     
 
45  Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital-markets-union/docs/building-cmu-action-plan_en.pdf. The CMU Plan was 
accompanied by the following two publications that should be read in conjunction with it:  
 Commission Staff Working Document on Economic Analysis SWD(2015) 183 final, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital-markets-union/docs/building-cmu-economic-analysis_en.pdf  which builds on the 
SWD which accompanied the CMU GP and the 2015 European Financial Stability and Integration Review; and  
 
 Commission Staff Wording Document on Feedback Statement on the Green Paper “Building a Capital Markets Union” 
SWD(2015) 184 final. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2015/capital-markets-
union/docs/summary-of-responses_en.pdf  
 
46  See here for an overview of documents published on or around 8 June 2017 relating to the “Mid-term review of the Capital Markets 
Union Action Plan”: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/mid-term-review-capital-markets-union-action-plan_en   
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2019. Brexit surely was one factor that delayed delivery of much of what was supposed 
to be finalised CMU legislative and regulatory rulemaking reforms. Other barriers 
included EU-level policymakers focussing considerably on consultation, often on known 
issues, rather than advancing (as much) action and putting in place legislative instruments. 
Despite these drawbacks, completing the CMU remains a work in progress and the 
original plan is ripe for its next step in delivering reform. Equally, the ECB, as central 
bank but also at the head of the SSM has also indicated its support for CMU as a catalyst 
to completing Single Market integration. That being said, the ECB has (rightfully and 
thankfully) been equally quick to point out certain “missed opportunities”47 that CMU 1.0 
fell short on.  
1.87 A new CMU 2.0, which, at the time of writing this thesis, despite some first broad strokes 
of policy proposals, is yet to formally launch, already has a lot of expectations from 
policymakers and market participants resting upon it. Regrettably, CMU 2.0 has yet to 
fully embrace the need, despite EU policymakers having spotted the problem over the 
past 30 years, to counteract fragmentation with reforms and harmonisation of rules on the 
Collateral Ecosystem. This begs the question of “why?” 
1.88 Surprisingly to date the answer to that question has been more along the lines of the adage 
“if it ain’t broke don’t fix it” as well as “if it’s broke don’t shout about it”. Deferrals and 
                                                     
 
47  See Speech Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the ECB Representative Office in Brussels, 3 December 
2019 available in full at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2019/html/ecb.sp191203~043847dfc1.en.html  and in 
particular the following remarks:  
 
“Of course, it would be naïve to assume that a capital markets union can be achieved without investing political capital. Improving 
and harmonising national insolvency laws, for example, goes to the very heart of our legal systems. But it is capital well invested. 
 
Risk sharing by private investors reduces the need for public risk sharing and for the protracted and acrimonious discussions that 
often ensue. 
 
A capital markets union can’t function without European-level supervision of systemic intermediaries and infrastructures. There 
are large cross-border spillovers and, if things go wrong, the banks that are directly supervised by the ECB would be left bearing 
most of the financial risk. Recent reforms of the European supervisory authorities and of the European market and infrastructure 
regulation (EMIR) were missed opportunities. 
 
The United Kingdom's departure from the EU will have a lasting impact on the architecture of European financial markets. This 
reinforces the need to react and complete the capital markets union.” 
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“other priority issues” have taken priority in the legislative and rulemaking agenda of the 
EU. Reforms to the financial and supervisory architecture affecting capital markets, the 
business of banking, fund management and insurance have been transformative despite 
differing degrees of change.  
1.89 However, these reforms focused on “front office” requirements first and very little on the 
“back office” aspects that relate to the Collateral Ecosystem as the “plumbing” of 
financial markets. If, as introduced above and in prior academic research48 on 
rehypothecation, itself a critical tool used to mobilise and re-use Collateral Assets, the 
laws, rules and concepts that serve as foundations to these new pillars of post-GFC 
policymaking are not harmonised beyond existing EU and national efforts then this 
hardwires risk into the financial system.  
1.90 This remains the case despite EU principles, including those that existed prior to the GFC, 
having been interpreted, expanded and improved on by the British regulators in the form 
of the UK’s Client Asset Sourcebook (CASS) of the UK Financial Conduct Authority’s 
(FCA) Handbook. Ireland’s regulator, now the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) mirrored 
those rules in the form of the Client Assets Rules (CAR) and supporting Irish legislative 
developments, which in turn were then subject to further EU reforms that dovetailed the 
national led efforts of the UK and Ireland.    
1.91 The most important of these EU efforts affecting specifically the Collateral Ecosystem, 
beyond expanding the eligibility of Collateral Assets to credit claims in 2009/10, included 
changes to principles introduced originally in MiFID I, which EU-MS had incorporated 
into their own regimes prior to the GFC. The post-GFC response at the EU level affecting 
the Collateral Ecosystem sought to implement relevant parts of the G-20 Pittsburgh 
Commitments. This culminated inter alia, in the EU, in the introduction of EMIR in 2009, 
the AIFMD/R in 2011 as well as in 2014, the MiFID II/MiFIR Regime as well as the 
Securities Financing Transaction Regulations (SFTR) and the Central Securities 
                                                     
 
48  See M.D. Huertas  in “Hedge Funds, Master Netting Arrangements and Rehypothecation: Limiting Systemic Risk Through 
Increased Transparency”  This LL.M. dissertation was completed during a period in the midst of the GFC, following the failure 
of LBIE and well prior to the fallout of MF Global where rehypothecation began receiving regulatory and academic interest, 
including through research of M. Singh et al.   
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Depository Regulation (CSDR) that entered into force with phased application dates from 
2014 to beyond 2019.  
1.92 Taken together these EU reform measures placed the need for greater collateralisation of 
transactions, whether on a bilateral basis or via the increased use of CCP clearing or tri-
party arrangements, at the forefront of what has become the new “new normal” of the 
current 2019 state of financial markets. Pre- and post-transaction transparency along with 
greater disclosure on rehypothecation rights and rights of re-use were introduced by the 
MiFID II/MiFIR Regime in 2014 but effectively followed changes the FCA introduced 
to CASS between 2009 and 2014.  
1.93 These EU reforms, even where they built off national-led efforts did, in part, cause CASS 
and CAR to be “updated” via CDR 2017/565 on organisational requirements and CDD 
2017/593 on safeguarding of financial instruments.  Despite these updates to some parts 
of the national rules, wider fragmentation still exists as do gaps. Some of this is also due 
to CDD 2017/593, as a legislative instrument, being a Delegated Directive as opposed to 
a Delegated Regulation i.e., use of the latter would not require national transposition and 
the ability for national-led efforts to create further fragmentation. 
1.94 Despite regulatory reforms, mostly forged out of the GFC and a certain degree of 
legislative and regulatory fatigue and institutional inertia since then, this has meant that 
these vital aspects of the Collateral Ecosystem have largely gone untouched, or where 
action has been advanced, it has not been by way of maximum harmonisation measures 
or otherwise eliminated fragmentation. Other measures simply “lost-out”, notably during 
2010/2011, where political pressures favoured the creation of the EBU, which, while 
welcome, left a lot of useful legislation and rulemaking to be delayed, stalled or cancelled 
altogether. This piecemeal approach in patching-up a patchwork accentuates Collateral 
Ecosystem related risks as well as firm-specific but systemic risk in the Collateral 
Ecosystem and CMU 2.0 could change that. CMU 2.0 draws parallels to the U.S.’ 
experiences in building a continental-wide integrated capital markets infrastructure.   
1.95 Lastly, properly documented and executed, collateral arrangements can reduce loss given 
default and therefore reduce credit and counterparty risk. However, improperly 
documented or poorly executed collateral provides no protection at all. In such 
circumstances, collateral will undermine rather than support financial stability. This is 
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further complicated when concepts used in the field diverge and/or differ or indeed when 
they have differences in their meaning but also their interpretation notably in the realm 
of legal interpretation, in particular in relation to security interests and (ownership) rights 
in respect of Collateral Assets. 
1.96 For reasons discussed above and in the comparative law analysis in the Annexes to the, 
which are summarised in this thesis, the cross-border comparison as well as the 
assessment of the level interoperability of the Irish and British regimes on CASS and 
CAR are highlight that CTR can exist and have quite real effects even where those 
jurisdictions are very similar but different. Surprisingly, the individual divergences 
between UK and Irish rules as well as those national rules and the EU regime on the same 
subject matter have not been conducted in academia or in practitioner texts.  
1.97 Given the degree of interdependence of the financial services markets between the UK 
and Ireland, this is an area where detailed study of principles and rules of two distinct, yet 
closely related, legislative and regulatory regimes merit investigation. The intended key 
outcome of this research is to assist market participants understand how best to comply 
with the regimes, aid domestic supervisory policymakers to calibrate rules where 
appropriate and assist EU policymakers in drafting a common set of rules beyond the 
comparably high-level principles in the CDR 2017/565 and CDD 2017/593.   
1.98 This research is also likely to be relevant for a Collateral Ecosystem that continues to be 
subject to ‘disruption’, of varying degrees and depth by FinTech challengers. The 
intended key outcome of this part of the research, which builds upon earlier findings of 
the author in respect of identifying, mitigating and managing documentary CTR,49  is to 
highlight the importance of conceptual gaps as factors that exacerbate fragmentation. The 
new proposed risk concept of CTR, including its sub-components of Documentary CTR 
and Legislative/Regulatory CTR, aim to assist market participants, legislators and 
supervisory policymakers on measuring and eliminating existing conceptual gaps and 
fragmentation as well as improving harmonisation of EU markets by using ‘Jurisdiction-
                                                     
 
49  In the context of how EMIR i.e. Regulation no. 648/2012/EU is transposed into derivatives documentation maintained by ISDA 
see M.D. Huertas in the chapter “ISDA 2013 EMIR Portfolio Reconciliation, Dispute Resolution and Disclosure Protocol (the 
ISDA PortRec Protocol) and other EMIR relevant ISDA Documentation Solutions” as part of the German language practitioner 
text “Handbuch EMIR – Europäische Regulierung der OTC-Derivate”.  ISBN 978-3-503-16386-1 published 26. November 2015.  
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Agnostic’ drafting going forward.  This is a priority that cannot continue to be ignored or 
delayed, especially if CMU, EBU and further Eurozone integration are to actually happen.  
1.99 The above paragraphs have introduced some of the key issues affecting the Collateral 
Ecosystem, the risk of inertia and some of the proposed solutions to reduce CTR and thus 
reduce Coll-RR and Cust-RR that exists as a result of the evolution of the ecosystem, as 
discussed in the next Chapters in Part I as well as due to market participants.     
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Addendum to Chapter 1  
 
 
Glossary of key new terms proposed  
 
29th Regime A 29th Regime refers to an EU legislative principle that creates an optional parallel regime 
structure that (crucially) does not displace existing national law of the EU-MS.  An example 
of such proposals in the past have been the European Contract Law.  From a legislative drafting 
approach, a 29th Regime’s appeal is that as a potential body of EU law (federal if one wishes) 
can deliver principles and obligations to its users (i.e., legislative destinations) that co-exist 
rather than displace national EU-MS law(s) and thus avoids being tied-up in the intricacies of 
EU-MS’ jurisdictions and having to be implemented as it co-exists even if superordinate to 
national laws.   
In many ways such a 29th Regime could act as a leapfrog to overcome otherwise difficult use 
of instruments of legal fiction trying to bring together multiple jurisdictions and schools of 
legal thought in an area where, despite pan-EU financial market infrastructure providers, the 
cornerstones underpinning the legal and market environment remain deeply entrenched along 
national lines. Such a regime would be welcome in the EU collateral ecosystem and could 
complement the private transnational regulatory regimes that exist in the form of master 
agreement documentation suites in say the form of the ISDA, GMSLA and GMRA which 
historically make up the bulk of the relevant transactions that mobilise and/or serve to monetise 
collateral assets in the collateral ecosystem. 
 
Collateral 
Ecosystem 
Participant 
Concentration 
Risk (CEPCR) 
 
CEPCR, building on the concept of Concentration Risk (especially N-CR and S-CR), aims to 
apply the thinking to the Collateral Ecosystem, including a recognition of the various roles 
that market participants play and the degree of interconnectedness of exposures (incl. N-CR) 
expressed as follows:  
 Concentration Risk Across all Custodian/Depository roles  (A);  
 As adjusted by: 
o Concentration across all other key roles (B); 
o as adjusted by ratings based triggers in A plus resilience of mitigants in A 
as adjusted by ratings based triggers in B as adjusted by resilience of 
mitigants in B and correlation to A; and 
 As globally adjusted to correlation to Concentration Risk amongst Affiliates and 
cross-default triggers (C).   
From a collateral exposure perspective, it also raises two key questions namely, whether an 
over-concentration can in fact adversely increase Coll-RR and Cust-RR and how that factors 
into VARINCA and VARIGCA calculations in light of limited Custodian/Depository 
providers meaning diversification is unlikely to be an affordable mitigant.   
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Collateral 
Related Risk 
(Coll-RR) 
Means the:  
 financial risks; and  
 non-financial risks that are specific to the Collateral Assets,  
including, as adjusted for Concentration Risk notably Coll-ACR. 
 
Concentration 
Risk 
Which, a traditional (and thus established) risk metric, that describes the level of (risk) 
exposure of one party to a concentration on:  
 a single counterparty (i.e., name concentration risk – N-CR);  
 sector (sector concentration risk – Sec-CR); and/or  
 jurisdiction (jurisdiction concentration risk Jur-CR); and  
 for purposes herein, would be extended to cover Collateral Asset concentration risk 
(Coll-ACR).   
Conceptual Gap Means a situation where a concept in one system of law/regulation exists (Jurisdiction A) but 
it does not exist in another system (Jurisdiction B) or does not exist as fully due to divergences 
or other changes to a concept.  
 
Conceptual 
Translation Risk 
(CTR) 
A CTR exists where a concept in one system of law or regulation (again, Jurisdiction A) sets 
out a requirement that another system of law/regulation (Jurisdiction B) is required to follow 
but either does not follow as fully or that system amends, supplements or otherwise causes 
divergences from the requirements of Jurisdiction A.  
CTR can occur at a couple of levels and in different degrees of strength. It can be represented 
as: 
 
 Vertical CTR in the case of differences, gaps or divergences between rules as drafted at 
the EU-level and those that exist at the national level of individual EU-MS. This Vertical 
CTR comes about even in the event of an EU Regulation, which requires no implementing 
measures, being supplemented by (existing or new) national legislative measures that do 
not give correct or otherwise limit the effect of the EU level measures (including by way 
of Goldplating); and  
 
 Horizontal CTR which can exist to reflect the divergences between the laws and rules 
at the national level of individual EU-MS including the laws of EU legislative instruments 
as applied in those individual EU-MS. Horizontal CTR can come about due to the EU 
rules not having been transposed, i.e., implemented in a manner giving correct effect or 
otherwise limiting the effect of the EU measures, whether by expanding and/or limiting 
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the scope of the concepts in the EU level legislative instrument(s) or because national law 
level instruments have not been amended or drafted to give such effect (including due to 
Goldplating).   
 
Equally, both Horizontal and/or Vertical CTR can exist in relation to divergences between:  
 
 the legislative/regulatory requirements, i.e., the requirements of CDD 2017/593 (see 
below) as set out at the EU level versus as transposed and how it operates in the Irish 
rules versus the UK rules, which go well beyond the EU and Irish rules and this 
divergence could be distinguished as Legislative/Regulatory CTR; and 
  
 divergences that exist in documentation, including master agreement documentation 
frameworks that market participants use for financial market and collateral asset related 
transactions. By way of an example, divergences may exist, however minimal, between, 
contractual terms based on Master Agreement documentation suite A (pro forma of a 
GMRA for example) versus B (pro forma of a GMSLA for example) etc. or where such 
master agreement documentation suite may have different governing law versions (2002 
ISDA Master Agreement governed under English law versus the Irish law governed 
version) this can be distinguished as Documentary CTR.   
 
Custody Related 
Risk (Cust-RR) 
 
Means the following risk types and attributes:  
 
 non-financial risks (both quantitative and qualitative) specific to:  
 
o the documentation; and  
 
o non-documentation, 
arrangements in place with the Custody provider (including any sub-custodians) and/or 
as they relate to the mobilisation channels, operational risks and legal, specifically risk of 
loss of title to Collateral Assets50; and/or  
 
 the financial risks (in particular credit/counterparty risk) specific to the provider of 
Custody provider, as adjusted for CEPCR. 
     
Jurisdiction-
Agnostic  
Refers to rulemaking that is jurisdiction-neutral and interoperable across multiple jurisdictions, 
free from national influences.  
                                                     
 
50  This is a very present (albeit unreported) issue that has affected a range of major dealer entities, including global 
Custodian/Depository businesses due to Collateral Assets not being appropriately recorded in books, or a UK significant branch of 
a German BUSI, that outsourced its Custody business to a London-based subsidiary of a U.S. headquartered Custody provider, 
failing to record Collateral Assets in line with German in addition UK CASS rules, thus meaning the title to the assets and the 
Segregation the BUSI had contractually agreed to provide to its clients, was not being complied with. Loss to title, while risky in 
solvent situations presents serious problems in the event of insolvency, notably as relevant rules remain local and contractually, 
the rules of the Custodian/Depository as opposed to the accountholder are likely to govern the relationship.   
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Linguistic CTR The following example, as supported by the extracts below demonstrate Linguistic CTR, i.e., 
CTR that results in a  “similar but different” outcome stemming from a common root concept 
being, due to differing use of language, yielding divergence and thus different obligations.   
Example: 
In English, certainly in legal drafting as used by EU policymakers, “should” is taken to mean 
“must”. While “should”, when used as an auxiliary verb does not denote a requirement that is 
absolutely mandatory, as with the auxiliary verb “shall” the use of “should” does still denote 
an absolute obligation with some degree of optionality and/or a strict supervisory expectation.  
Assessing this in the context of Linguistic CTR, one can look at Recital 12 CDD 2017/593 in 
the table below and that:  
 In French, the word used is “devraient” from the third-person conditional of “devoir” 
which is taken to mean “must”, however, as used herein reads “devraient agir” and thus 
is taken to mean “should act with” and while implying a stronger sense of urgency than 
in the German text (see below) implies a conditionality; and  
 In German, the word used is “sollte” from the third-person singular preterite of “sollen” 
which expresses a suggestion that something ought to be done but does not mean that it 
must be done as would be the case with the verb “müssen” which means “must”.  
Note also that in the French text extract below, the second reference where in the English 
“should” and in the German “sollte” appears is not included. Rather, the obligation in the 
French text is instead to consider.  
This in itself demonstrates CTR between the French to the English and German versions. The 
same type of confusion exists in relation to post-GFC legislative instruments continuing, even 
expanding, the use of recitals to legislation to introduce operative provisions/supervisory 
expectations rather than providing just interpretative measures, as text in recitals are often not 
subject to the same degree of interest during the legislative process.  
 
English text extract  French text extract German text extract 
“Where investment firms place 
client funds with a third party, 
the investment firm should 
exercise all due skill, care and 
diligence in the selection, 
appointment and periodic review 
of the third party and of the 
arrangements or holding and 
safekeeping client funds, and 
should consider the need for 
diversification and mitigation of 
risks, where appropriate, by 
placing client funds with more 
than one third party in order to 
safeguard clients' rights and 
minimise the risk of loss and 
misuse…” 
« Lorsqu'elles placent les 
fonds de clients auprès d'un 
tiers, les entreprises 
d'investissement devraient 
agir avec toute la 
compétence, tout le soin et 
toute la diligence requis 
pour la sélection et la 
désignation de ce tiers, ainsi 
que pour le réexamen 
périodique de cette décision 
et des dispositions régissant 
la détention et la 
conservation de ces fonds, 
et considérer la nécessité 
de diversifier et d'atténuer 
les risques, s'il y a lieu, en 
plaçant les fonds des clients 
„Platzieren Wertpapierfirmen 
Kundengelder bei einem 
Dritten, sollte die 
Wertpapierfirma bei der 
Auswahl, Bestellung und 
regelmäßigen Überprüfung 
dieses Dritten sowie bei den für 
das Halten und die Verwahrung 
der Kundengelder getroffenen 
Vereinbarungen mit der 
gebotenen Professionalität und 
Sorgfalt verfahren und prüfen, 
ob Risiken gestreut und 
gemindert werden müssen, 
gegebenenfalls indem die 
Kundengelder bei mehr als 
einem Dritten platziert werden, 
um die Kundenrechte zu wahren 
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auprès de plus d'un tiers 
afin de sauvegarder les 
droits des clients et de 
minimiser le risque de perte 
ou d'utilisation abusive… »  
und das Verlust- und 
Missbrauchsrisiko zu 
minimieren. Wertpapierfirmen 
sollten ihre Pflicht zur Prüfung 
einer Diversifizierung nicht 
umgehen, indem sie von ihren 
Kunden verlangen, dass diese 
auf den Schutz verzichten….“  
While a discussion on conceptual gaps and CTR arising from language differences on security 
interests are beyond the scope of this thesis, which would merit a study in its own right, a 
common example of linguistic divergences leading to confusion that EU regulated firms stems 
from the use of “should” in English-language legislative drafting (and/or in internal policies). 
This confusion has affected a number of BUSIs and led them to ban the use of “should” or its 
equivalent in other languages, including where English is the operating language of the BUSI 
in relation to internal policy and procedure documents.  
 
Recoverability 
Rate 
A Recoverability Rate, which aims to supplement Collateral Asset valuation techniques, may 
be calculated by taking:  
 the value of Collateral Assets provided by collateral provider to collateral taker plus 
the amount of income earned thereupon prior to maturity of the transaction; as 
adjusted for  
 the value of the Collateral Assets upon enforcement, less  enforcement costs incurred 
to recover those Collateral Assets and/or (in the alternative) any provision of 
equivalent Collateral Assets, as adjusted for value, in this context, “value” ought to 
be fair value and a value at risk calculation may also be helpful for a market 
participant to assess its risk exposures.  
It is worth assuming that Recoverability Rates on Collateral Assets provided may be lower in 
value returned than the value returned on Collateral Assets taken and forming part of collateral 
inventory under control of a collateral taker.  This is due to the assumption that it takes longer 
time for collateral provided to be returned than it does to enforce over collateral taken and 
under the control of the collateral provider who can enforce upon it.     
Individual Recoverability Rates, could also be assessed as an overall exposure in the form of 
a Net Collateral Asset Value at Risk, which:  
 aggregates a collateral provider’s exposure on its Collateral Assets in its collateral 
inventory (collateral provided less collateral taken which equals the INCA, assess 
the qualitative and quantitative Coll-RR and Cust-RR properties of the INCA and 
presents a net figure for the VARINCA; and   
 the same can be extended to assessing the aggregate of Coll-RR and Cust-RR, as 
adjusted for assumed Recoverability Rates for collateral provided and collateral 
taken, to yield a VARIGCA. 
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For the purposes of the above the following terms are defined as follows:  
 INCA means inventory of net Collateral Assets, which reflects the amount, type 
(incl. by relevant code such as ISIN or CUSIP) and location (by Legal Entity 
Identifier), on the date of determination by the collateral provider, of the Collateral 
Value of its net inventory (i.e. provided and taken i.e., under control and not reused) 
of Collateral Assets that would be realisable (assuming positions can be netted and 
set-off) upon closing out a transaction with one or multiple counterparties.   
 VARINCA means the Value at Risk of the INCA and assesses the value at risk as a 
measure of the risk of loss of the Collateral Assets over given “normal market” 
conditions in a set (time-)period – thereby being able to assess the amount that the 
calculating entity (collateral provider) might stand to recover.  
 VARIGCA means the Value at Risk of Inventory of Gross Collateral Assets which 
provides an estimated loss on Collateral Assets held by the calculating entity as 
collateral taker and the loss on Collateral Assets that have been provided by the 
calculating entity, as collateral provider, to other market participants (including 
those Collateral Assets that the calculating entity has received as collateral taker and 
rehypothecated or otherwise re-used as collateral provider) without factoring in a net 
position.   
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2. Why are reforms needed now? 
2.1 The expression of “never let a good crisis go to waste” rings true for areas of the post-
GFC regulatory reform to financial services. Whilst a lot of these reforms have been 
translated into market participants’ compliance objectives and relevant “change the 
business”, “run the business” and “business as usual” implementation workstreams, the 
Collateral Ecosystem has not (yet) had the full benefit of reforms as comprehensive as 
select parts of the financial markets environment (transaction types and asset classes) that 
rest upon the Collateral Ecosystem.  
2.2 Despite all the global and EU regulatory driven change has shaped how post-GFC 
transactions are structured, executed, cleared and collateralised, the opportunity to 
improve the Collateral Ecosystem has overall not improved. The impending loss of 
London for the EU-27 and the move away from a Collateral Ecosystem that has over-
relied, in parts, on UK’s Goldplating of EU rules, means that when those rules are gone, 
EU-27 policymakers and market participants would benefit from (1) more harmonised 
EU rules, which (2) may take the best of the UK’s and Irish concepts.  There are good 
grounds for this given, as introduced above, and as explored below in the context of a 
repo, an abundance of jurisdiction-specifics fuels fragmentation and costs.       
2.3 Prior to delving into the detail, it should be noted that most non-cash Collateral Assets 
are dematerialised when held and/or mobilised. When they become subject to security 
interests, they are held in FMIPs such as clearing systems, in the UK and Ireland, this 
would primarily be Euroclear (which includes CREST51 and for Irish securities these 
having been migrated to Belgian headquartered Euroclear Bank ahead of Brexit52). A full 
discussion on the operational mechanics of the Euroclear Rulebook and CREST is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, as is a full discussion on the differences between English and Irish 
law concepts of taking security interests over financial instruments in the common system 
of Euroclear. In summary, that process equates to taking security in respect to rights to or 
                                                     
 
51  See: https://www.euroclear.com/dam/PDFs/Settlement/EUI/MA2740-CREST-settlement.pdf  
52  See relevant information at the time of writing: https://www.euroclear.com/about/en/regulatorylandscape/Brexit/Irish-corporate-
securities-migration-update.html  
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proprietary interest in specific dematerialised financial instruments and/or depending on 
account structure (and use of nominees) in the interest in the pool of fungible financial 
instruments. All of this depends on the nature of the clearing system and the relevant 
parties including their roles and motivations.53  
2.4 It should be noted that the law governing those security interests are set in the respective 
rulebooks. Consequently, these may not be English and/or Irish law governed. Moreover, 
                                                     
 
53  Holding financial instruments in immobilised form, however, does raise complex legal issues for anyone taking security over those 
financial instruments. The nature of the owner's interest in the relevant financial instruments depends on the structure of the clearing 
system in which those financial instruments are held and the nature of the agreement between the parties. The different ways in 
which financial instruments may be held in a clearing system include the following: 
 
 Beneficial ownership of financial instruments remains with the depositor: if the owner deposits financial instruments with the 
system and requests that they be held in a separate account and only be dealt with in accordance with the owner's specific 
instructions, then beneficial ownership of those financial instruments remains with the depositor, even though the clearing system 
has possession of the financial instruments. If the clearing system then becomes insolvent, the financial instrument swill not be 
distributed to the system's creditors and the depositor will be entitled to recover them. As the beneficial ownership remains with 
the depositor, the depositor can grant a legal or equitable charge over those financial instruments. The CREST system is organised 
on this basis for customers that hold accounts in it. 
 
 Securities are held jointly in a pool by co-owners and each owner has an interest in the pool: in some cases, a clearing system 
may agree with the depositor not to acquire title to the financial instruments deposited. If, however, the financial instruments are 
mixed together and become indistinguishable from each other (fungible), the individual depositor loses its proprietary rights over 
the specific financial instruments. Under English law, where goods belonging to different owners are fungible, all the owners 
become co-owners (tenants in common) of the entire pool of goods. If the clearing system were to go into liquidation, the co-
owners could insist that the pool of financial instruments be shared between them pro rata. They would not rank as unsecured 
creditors, because they still hold a proprietary interest in the financial instruments, albeit jointly. A depositor can grant a legal or 
equitable charge over its interest in the pool of financial instruments. The Euroclear system operates on this basis. Owners of 
financial instruments (or shares) who do not have an account with CREST, and who deposit their financial instruments in an agent's 
account (usually a bank or stockbroker) hold their shares and financial instruments in CREST on this basis. 
 
 Securities are held in a communal account and a depositor has a contractual right to receive back an equivalent number of 
the same financial instruments: the final possibility is a situation where a depositor deposits financial instruments in a communal 
account and there is no agreement that the depositor will retain title to those financial instruments. The clearing system acquires 
title to the financial instruments when they are deposited, and the depositor acquires a contractual right against the clearing system 
to receive back an equivalent number of the same financial instruments that it deposited. This makes it impossible for the depositor 
to give security over its interest in the financial instruments because it no longer has a proprietary interest in them. The depositor 
can, however, give security over the contractual right that it has against the clearing system for return of an equivalent number of 
the same financial instruments that it deposited. In this case, the solvency and financial reliability of the clearing system would be 
important to the person taking security.  
In practice, the systems that operate on this basis (such as Clearstream) are not governed by English law. When taking security 
over assets in these systems, lenders would use documents governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the assets are held. 
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differences exist between how certain security interests relating to Collateral Assets 
operate in English when compared to Irish law – See Explanatory Notes to this Chapter. 
This matters where, as is often the case, the trading relationship, collateral and security 
interest arrangements are English law but the Custodian/Depository operates (and/or the 
arrangements are documented) under Irish law and the FMIP under different laws 
altogether.   
2.5 Assessing the need for reform by looking at who does what with whom, when and 
how 
2.6 As a result, in modern financial transactions (even the simplest forms of types of 
transactions and assets – and thus SFTs (in particular repo) for the purposes of the 
Collateral Ecosystem), assessing the legal and non-legal risks of who does what with 
whom, when and how is important in any given range or permutations of transaction 
exposures. This also applies to collateralisation and Custody relationships (including as 
they relate to Collateral Assets). Ideally, especially if EU-27 policymakers are pressuring 
to move away from the dominance of one system or access to that of the UK, having an 
understanding, of comparative law, as well as the harmonised concepts, where they do 
exist across legal systems, is likely to be paramount. This is the case as: 
(a) a single institution engaging in financial market transactions may have 
collateralised those tranasctions with mutliple counterparties from multiple 
jurisdictions, each of which may have differing strengths of (diametrically) 
different attitudes to security, collateral and Custody as well as differing national 
rules on and/or differing interpretations of EU rules on Collateral Assets and 
Custody; and 
(b) throughout a single transaction/collateralisation lifecycle of a given transaction 
various governing law of documentation/account or applicable laws to 
asset/counterparty/financial market infrastructure provider can have mutual 
application at any given stage. 
2.7 Market participants, even in the simplest of bilateral relationship exposures will have 
multiple roles. This applies to FCs certainly but also to NFCs as one can, in a bilateral 
relationship, be both collateral provider and taker. This is of course normal, but the point 
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to note is that these differing roles come on top of the differing priorities and motivation 
of market participants generally as well as within the specific roles and also depending 
on the transaction type and Collateral Assets provided or received. All of these 
considerations can also differ between depending on the position in a relevant transaction 
chain. Equally, for some roles these are: 
(a) ‘static’ over the lifetime of a transaction (including through the transaction chain) 
and are roles that are either innate due to the nature of the counterparty i.e. a 
dealer entity or which have been appointed, such as a security trustee;  
(b) ‘semi-static’ over the lifetime of a transaction and which change upon the 
determination of a trigger event including a default – this could include the role 
of calculation agent or valuation agent etc.; or  
(c) ‘fluid’ over the lifetime of a transaction and which are driven by the evolution of 
the risk associated with the actual transactions – this includes the roles of 
collateral provider and collateral taker.   
2.8 The evolution of these roles can change both in the context of individual components of 
the transaction(s) as well as across exposures and relationships. Market participants may 
act as collateral provider and/or collateral taker to one another and as the transaction 
develops, those roles may change. Importantly, a change in one role may not always 
correspond to the roles in the financial market transaction.  
2.9 The allocation of roles as well as the degree of stasis also changes across transaction types 
and asset classes. For derivative transactions executed OTC (irrespective of whether 
cleared or non-cleared) or for margin lending, some key roles typically remain static, as 
has historically been the case. Only since the worst of the GFC have some dealer entities, 
and only in relation to transactions with those smaller FC or sufficiently larger NFCs 
counterparties, with sufficient bargaining power, relented to accept contractual 
arrangements whereby their roles as say a calculation agent or the valuation agent are 
‘ported’ i.e. transferred to a replacement entity in the event of pre-defined circumstances 
or where the appointed party is incapacitated. In exchange traded transactions there is 
even less optionality and fluidity in some of the key roles.  
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2.10 So why do these roles matter? For one, they determine the amount and types of Collateral 
Assets to be provided and safeguarded and will often drive what happens with the 
Collateral Assets once they are received and whether these are applied for permitted 
onward mobilisation. Such permitted onward mobilisation may occur with or without the 
consent or knowledge of the original collateral provider and move assets received by the 
original collateral taker across and down further transaction chains to which the original 
collateral provider is not party.  
2.11 In turn, this collateral taker may be a party, in particular if it is a FC and specifically a 
dealer entity, to any multitude of transactions, each with their own collateralisation 
requirements. This means that, from its perspective, the incoming assets from the original 
collateral provider, can be mobilised, assuming it has the contractual right or receives 
absolute title to those assets for use in subsequent transactions and/or collateral 
arrangements. From the perspective of the original collateral provider there is thus a 
limited ability to look past its direct counterparty and ‘look through’ the subsequent 
transaction chains.  A look through down the various transaction chains would be helpful 
for not only tracking Collateral Assets but also in taking the veil off propagators driving 
idiosyncratic and/or systemic risk.  Arguably, as collateralisation arrangements and risks 
become more pronounced, the need for a “look through”, possibly through greater use of 
DLT or certainly instrument-identifiers to make that possible, ought to be beneficial to 
manage Coll-RR and Cust-RR without compromising rehypothecation and re-use that are 
necessary for collateral fluidity and thus wider liquidity. 
2.12 It is also important to note that aside from the importance of roles on the core questions 
of “who is doing what and where are my assets?” across one or multiple transaction 
chains may be shaped by specific risk appetite(s) in terms of exposure but also rights, 
including rights of use and rehypothecation granted and/or capable of being exercised 
over and in respect of (collateral/financial) assets in that specific transaction chain as well 
as subsequent chains. This risk appetite can be distinguished from a general risk appetite 
and is dependent on each relevant counterparty.  
2.13 Depending on the role and exposure at any given time, counterparties may also attribute 
different sensitivity and importance to the Collateral Assets employed in the transaction 
they secure. These differences may be driven by the aims of the transactions and this may 
influence the attitudes as to collateralisation and the way assets are exchanged, received 
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and secured. For some transaction types, the counterparty’s (actual or perceived) risk 
profile and perception of its systems, may all play a factor in how a counterparty reaches 
its decisions. Like with the mutability of roles, perceptions and priorities on one 
relationship may differ in another and may also differ along chains of relationships.   
2.14 These differing perceptions and priorities are relevant when (but not limited to): 
(a) Collateral Assets are provided and parties determine the degree of Haircut or the 
percentage of Overcollateralisation that is required for the collateral relationship; 
(b) Collateral Assets are received prompting issues on how they are to be held 
including custodied and what degree of Segregation is to be applied;  
(c) Collateral Assets are received and whether they can be ‘monetised’54 through 
contractual re-use or rehypothecated for re-use by the collateral taker; and  
(d) an obligation to return the Collateral Assets arises, and an assessment of which 
Collateral Assets are to be delivered including whether the originally received 
Collateral Assets can be returned, whether equivalent collateral would be 
‘cheapest to deliver’ and/or ‘best to deliver’ or whether instead the redelivery 
obligation should be dispensed with as discharge of obligations.     
2.15 Generally the legal ability to rehypothecate or exercise a right of re-use depends on:  
(a) whether the laws of the jurisdiction permit it;  
(b) whether the contractual relationship permits it and since the GFC, whether this 
activity is allowed when dealing with a type of counterparty – generally there are 
limits or outright restrictions on this activity when dealing with certain 
counterparties, in particular those that are categorised as MiFID Retail Clients; 
and  
(c) whether the parties have the operational capability to facilitate. 
                                                     
 
54  The market terminology use of “monetisation” refers to the process of employing assets, including collateral assets that are provided 
for specific purposes, for use in commercial transactions that would yield a return.    
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 The legal and regulatory regimes, as well as the operational capabilities of market 
participants engaging in activity in the UK and Ireland recognise, (and increasingly since 
the GFC) regulate and require reporting on this type of activity 
2.16 Importantly, differences exist between contractual rights of re-use and rehypothecation.  
These include that a contractual right of re-use is that the collateral asset can be re-used 
by the collateral taker once that right is acted upon.  
2.17 Rehypothecation for re-use is typically considered, albeit in market terminology absent a 
firm legal terminology, to mean the collateral asset can only be re-used for use by the 
collateral taker for its own “onward” collateral needs i.e., as collateral provider. The risks 
however are the same.  Rehypothecation and re-use in relation to financial assets and/or 
Collateral Assets are often used by market participants, policymakers and supervisors 
interchangeably given that economically the process of appropriation and use of the assets 
are the same. Both terms however have specific and different meanings.  
2.18 Rehypothecation is not defined in EU legislation, nor by the UK and Irish regulatory 
authorities but taken to mean the ‘process by which a party, usually the collateral taker, 
appropriates or otherwise uses financial collateral received as security for its own 
economic purposes including its own management of collateral obligations or delivery 
obligations. The term re-use often predicated by being ‘contractual re-use’ or ‘rights of 
re-use’ is equally not defined by EU legislation, nor by the UK and Irish regulatory 
authorities but taken to mean contractually agreed circumstances where the recipient may 
re-use the assets as if they were their own.  Whilst the semantics between the 
rehypothecation and re-use matter, absent harmonised definitions, the post-GFC 
legislative/regulatory response has focused on disclosure of rehypothecation and 
contractual re-use rights prior to entering into transactional documentation, disclosure 
prior or at the point such rights are exercised and equally at periodic times following the 
exercise of such rights.  
2.19 So why do parties enter into these arrangements to begin with? Rehypothecation lowers 
the rehypothecating party’s, usually a prime broker’s, costs of financing and some 
rehypothecating parties pass this cost saving collateral provider in terms of lower 
borrowing costs, therefore undercutting traditional lending channels. Rehypothecation 
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and re-use mechanics are also vital to ensuring collateral (to the extent it is a finite good) 
can be fluid and equally when mobilised move efficiently and thus contribute to liquidity 
2.20 Collateral Assets that have been rehypothecated or had a right of re-use exercised in 
respect of them may, when used in subsequent transaction/collateral relationship chains 
come into the possession of countless third-parties/creditors. Each may have superior or 
competing claims the further the relationship is removed from the original collateral 
provider, who only will retain a contractual claim vis-à-vis the immediate counterparty 
that was the collateral taker and which, on insolvency or failure of the rehypothecating 
party would place the rehypotehcated/re-used assets in the estate of the failed/insolvent 
rehypothecating party and the collateral provider’s claims would likely be limited to the 
mutual debts due and exclude any overcollateralised amounts.  Contrast this with the 
preferable situation, absent any other early mitigants, where the Collateral Assets are 
custodied in individually segregated accounts with a (tri-party) Custodian and the 
Collateral Assets as well as the collateralisation relationship is excluded from insolvency 
or regulatory recovery and resolution powers by the transacting parties having agreed the 
application of the EU-FCD and/or UK-FCARs and Irish-FCARs.   
2.21 Aside from regulatory concerns around credit leverage as well as recognition that it 
exposes Collateral Assets otherwise securing transactions to specific risks, primarily to 
Rehypothecation Risk, a term that is proposed herein and (hopefully) assists prudent 
risk management and which can be summarised that the collateral provider will become 
exposed, whether through the initial or subsequent transaction chains, the collateral 
provider would suffer an unacceptable loss of the specific Collateral Assets that have been 
provided or an inability by the rehypothecating party to provide suitably sufficient 
equivalent Collateral Assets to the collateral provider. 
2.22 Why do supervisors and regulatory policymakers care about rehypothecation and rights 
or re-use?  Aside from the risks of excessive, unpermitted or detrimental use of these 
methods undermining the actual security arrangements that the Collateral Assets are 
supposed to be used for or the loss that could occur, there is a general perception that 
rehypothecation and/or rights of re-use, when employed, cause leverage. This concern on 
credit leverage creation comes in addition to gripes that these tools are shadow bank 
tactics, that effectively encourage a process in which dealer entities, usually regulated 
credit institutions as opposed to ‘shadow banks’ (regardless of there being no legal 
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definition just a loose agreement amongst global supervisors) are in the business of 
“robbing Peter, in order to pay Paul”.   
2.23 The laws in the EU, the UK and Ireland, despite the LBIE insolvency, as they currently 
stand at the time hereof do not limit the amount that a collateral asset can be re-used or 
rehypothecated in multiple transaction chains. These rights may be easier to exercise 
under a TTCA as ownership of the Collateral Assets (including rights to and interests 
therein) actually changes. By contrast a SFCA requires if reuse/rehypothecation are 
explicitly permitted i.e., granted under the documented instrument of the mobilisation 
channel or other mutual agreement between collateral provider and collateral taker.  
2.24 The fact that the Financial Times’ Alphaville Blog very publically on 15 January 2008 
warned about the dangers of excessive rehypothecation, when traditional risk models 
focused on client as opposed prime-broker dealer failure and LBIE’s failure seven months 
later, on 15 September 2008, triggered the self-reinforcing cataclysmic market meltdown 
that has become known as the GFC catapulted concerns on resilience of collateral to the 
forefront of regulators and market participants. This also caused certain scrambles to 
unwind transactions, including where collateral had been rehypothecated and the very 
still pertinent question upon an adverse trigger occurring of “where is my collateral and 
how quickly can I get it?”  Frustration for many turned to outrage when it became clear 
that in LBIE (as well as with countless other GFC failures of prime brokers and 
counterparties that had rehypothecated, many excessively, illegally and/or unknowingly 
without implicit or explicit consent of their clients or clients not having  conducted 
sufficient due diligence. EU rules also began to focus on the risks and disclosure 
requirements in respect of: 
(a) multiple chains of rehypothecation and ensuring that a party exercising rights is 
doing so prudently; 
(b) trapped/lost assets; and 
(c) bona fide purchaser in exercising rights over an asset that may have been 
rehypothecated i.e., Barry comes to buy the assets that were robbed from Peter to 
pay Paul – does Peter have a claim against Barry? Are the assets traceable – and 
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this is where a DLT-empowered “look-through” solution could add value. DLT 
solutions are however not free from risk as discussed in Parts II and III.  
2.25 Applying the above to SFTs, parties have multiple roles, differing motivations and the 
elements of the transactions and post-trade processes are subject to multiple laws. As a 
simple example, one might consider a scenario in which:   
(a) a repurchase transaction’s (repo)55 contractual relationship (including netting and 
set-off) and trading terms are governed by English law56 (say a GMRA plus prime 
brokerage and custody terms), entered into between:  
(i) the German subsidiary of UK credit institution (Megabank AG); trading 
with a 
(ii) French domiciled Alternative Investment Fund Manager (AIFM) 
managing a Luxembourg domiciled Alternative Investment Fund (AIF),  
with settlement by (and on the assumption that the location (fictional or 
otherwise) is ascribed to the location of the relevant account in the place of the 
relevant person): 
                                                     
 
55  For a fuller discussion on issues arising from the use of financial collateral assets in securities financing transactions (repos and 
securities lending) and prime brokerage, including treatment of client assets and corresponding use under English law governed 
market standard documentation please refer to Chapter 18 of (Yeowart, 2016) (Yeowart and Parsons), which however does not 
consider the GMSLA Pledge Structure Documentation suite comprised of the GMSLA (Security Interest over Collateral – 2018 
Version); the Security Agreement for GMSLA (Security Interest over Collateral – 2018 version); and any Tri-Party Custody 
Documentation.  See also perspective from an economic and financial stability analysis, which however do not consider the legal 
and regulatory considerations discussed in the Working Paper, from the contribution from (Schaffner, December 2019) available 
via: https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1912k.pdf  
 
56  It is important to note that unlike ISDA, as gatekeeper of one of the leading documentation suites of OTC derivatives trading, 
ICMA for GMRA and ISLA for the GMSLA, have, at the time of writing, yet to produce a documentation suite that is subject to 
laws other than those of England & Wales. While parties might, at their own decision, may seek to take Brexit-driven precautions 
and move their dispute resolution venue to that in the EU-27, so as to avail of the continued mutual recognition of enforcement of 
judgments etc. provided for in the EU and its “judicial area”, the supervisory scrutiny aspect of not relying on English law governed 
documentation, as set-out by the ECB-SSM and the European Supervisory Authorities, in each of their “Supervisory Principles on 
Relocations” see selected works available here: https://www.dentons.com/en/issues-and-opportunities/eurozone-hub/eurozone-
hub-thought-leadership-selection  
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(A) a Belgian based (international) central securities depository (an 
I(CSD57) for example Euroclear SA/NV; and  
(B) custody provided for example with the Irish operations of a UK 
based AIFM depository. 
2.26 No single law governs all aspects of a cross-border financial markets transaction and 
corresponding collateral asset arrangement.58 The law that governs a particular aspect will 
depend upon the legal/regulatory question that arises and how that question is formulated. 
The answer is determined to a range of circumstances, as they exist to the relevant 
counterparties, assets and jurisdictions involved in a particular transaction exposure chain 
and any connecting factors.  
2.27 As a result, in a fairly standard and simple transactional exposure of a repo:  
(a) English law applies to transactional documentation and the counterparties 
obligations (including netting and set-off) and their enforceability;  
(b) French law applies to one counterparty’s capacity (as well as to its potential 
insolvency) and is thus a consideration for Megabank AG, who in turn is itself 
subject to German law considerations which are equally of relevance to the 
                                                     
 
57  For a further discussion on some of the issues relating to CSDs, notably in relation to use of securities held in the UK and Ireland’s 
CREST System, operated by Euroclear UK and Ireland please refer to Chapter 16 Part H in Yeowart and Parsons.  
 
58  It is important to note that, certainly in English law, and the landmark case of Cukurova Finance International Ltd. and Cukurova 
Holdings AS v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd [2009] UKPC 19, a mortgage created under English law over shares in a company 
incorporated in the British Virgin Islands was recognised as constituting a security financial collateral arrangement under the UK-
FCARs, i.e., implementing the EU-FCD in the UK, and thus reinforces the attraction of that approach under English law that there 
is no rule that requires the governing law of a security agreement to be the same as the law that governs the proprietary aspects of 
the security created.  However, complications arise in the EU-27 plus UK in that the proprietary aspects of a security over: 
 Cash and credit claims will be governed by the law governing the debt claim constituting the cash or credit claim collateral 
(Art. 14(2) Rome I Regulation);  
 Directly held financial instruments in the form of definitive securities in bearer form will be governed by their lex situs, 
determined by the reference to the location of the physical certificates;  
 Directly held registered securities will be governed by the lex situs determined by reference to the location of the register; 
and  
 Intermediated financial instruments are governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the account to which those securities 
are credited and maintained in accordance with the “Place of the Relevant Intermediary Approach” (PRIMA) set out in the 
EU-FCD.  
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AIFM’s evaluation of its counterparty exposure as well as on behalf of the 
Luxembourg governed AIF it manages;  
(c) The UK’s interpretation of the EU-FCD and EU-SFD (as defined below) apply 
to Megabank AG and AIFM as counterparties to the repo over which a title 
transfer collateral arrangement is agreed to extend to. The UK’s interpretation of 
key aspects of the EU-FCD and EU-SFD go beyond EU common principles 
including with respect to rights of use and the legal consequences of its exercise 
including issues of priority;  
(d) Belgian law is of relevance as it applies to the clearing settlement system;  
(e) Irish law as it applies to the custody operations and safekeeping arrangements for 
the AIF are of relevance;  
(f) English and German law apply to the custody arrangements offered by Megabank 
AG; and, lastly  
(g) both parties would have to consider whether there are any risks that are adverse 
in relation to the financial instruments that have been repo’d either for other 
financial instruments or cash.  
2.28 Importantly, the transaction chain relationships assessed above will also be based on a 
range of contractual documented relationships, many of which will not just apply to the 
specific repo but are applicable to, and thus interpreted also as applying to, future 
transactions. These contractual relationships may also be subject to differing (possibly 
inconsistent) documentation hierarchies, assuming these in turn have been agreed, 
between various market participants. As an example, a GMRA governing the repo may 
be agreed between the parties to be overridden by the terms of a prime brokerage 
agreement between the parties.  
2.29 In addition to the above, one has to consider relevant conflicts of laws. This is an area 
that EU law however does regulate in a fully harmonised fashion as supplemented by 
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various proposals, including as late of 2018/201959 as part of CMU 1.0, that relate to the 
a proposal for an EU Regulation on the law applicable to the third-party effects of 
assignment of claims (Assignment of Claims Disputes Regulation)60 which aims to 
“top-up” the fact that he EU’s Rome 1 Regulation61 does not cover the question of third-
party effects of assignment of claims. Even though the Assignment of Claims Disputes 
Regulation goes in the right direction, the legislative process is yet to be finalised. 
Conflicts of laws is also an area where relevant courts are sufficiently versed and thus a 
full discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. Absent a clear hierarchy of who has 
priority of claims in holding tiers, conflicts of laws may emerge unless conflicts of law 
rules are clear and/or harmonised as to who has the requisite interest in the financial 
instruments62 and this could impact Recoverability Rates as multiple parties across 
holding tiers may have competing claims to the same assets or interests in those same 
assets.  
2.30 Despite the EU legislative and regulatory framework providing workable conflicts of 
laws solutions, the enforcement of security interests, including the exercise of any 
contractual and/or statutory rights of netting and set-off63 can be complicated in enforcing 
the priority of which law applies when and to what - even if the commercial effect is often 
the same. Some of this down to participants not being familiar with the intricacies of 
other, what they consider “foreign”, jurisdictions and some of it is down to the absence 
of an EU-wide common approach on such matters.64  
                                                     
 
59  For a full(er) overview see also: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/financial-markets/post-
trade-services/securities-and-claims-ownership_en   
60  See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1520854606250&uri=COM:2018:96:FIN  
61  See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/593/oj    
62  Notably at 6-10 of Goode 4th ed.    
63  As a mitigant, parties typically agree any combination of security package and interests with respect to collateralisation incl. non-
monetary credit support, indemnification, guarantees and/or ratings trigger language, which may be particularly more relevant 
where either contractual or statutory set-off (particular with respect to a counterparty in insolvency (or analogous proceedings) to 
protect and compensate the other party’s position if set-off cannot be applied.      
64  Even if some concepts of harmonising common minimum standards of civil procedure, might show that there is appetite do the 
same in relation to enforcement issues in financial market and collateral asset transactions, as discussed in the “Common Minimum 
Standards of Civil Procedures: European Added Value Assessment” published 28 November 2019 available here: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/de/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2019)642804    
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2.31 All of these considerations can apply in a relationship with immediate exposure between 
counterparties (primary relationship) such as between Megabank and the AIFM or in any 
multitude of exposures along a transaction chain, i.e., where Megabank’s use of collateral 
assets it receives in the above mentioned repo are on-used with other parties. The longer 
the length of intermediaries or transmission channels extend the more complex and 
potentially risky the exposure becomes as the movement of dematerialised financial 
instruments and cash in settlements and payment systems requires the debiting and 
crediting of accounts.  
2.32 It is important to recall that dematerialised financial instruments means instead of 
providing the holder of the financial instrument with a (paper) certificate evidencing his 
holding, the holder and its rights are represented by an entry in a register maintained by 
the issuer or on the issuer’s behalf.  The register is the reason these types of financial 
instruments are called “book entry securities”.   
2.33 The majority of the legal and regulatory systems in which modern financial markets in 
the EU and North America operate are born out of transfer mechanics of financial 
instruments that were paper, bearer or certificate based, whether registered or 
unregistered.  This also extends to when, how and where possession of such financial 
instruments takes place i.e. the lex situs as opposed to lex contractus has a role as do 
issues on attitudes to security interests i.e., possessory security interests versus non-
possessory security interests. These attitudes and attributes have impacts on how transfer, 
perfection and other formalities (incl. re fungibility), holdings, substitution rights (and 
what that means for existing security interests) and enforcement of financial instruments 
as well as collateral takes place. This extends to the actual asset but equally to the 
accessory to the assets i.e., corporate actions but equally in relation to voting rights and 
most developed jurisdictions consider these to be covered by the original security, even 
if not so provided.  A number of industry standard trading documentation will typically 
have specific terms in manufacturing corporate actions back to the collateral provider as 
well as details of how voting rights are to be directed. In building CMU and in particular 
the collateral transfer mechanics that underpin a dynamic and integrated CMU, merits 
thinking that disrupts traditional thinking on these points. 
2.34 For (I)CSD and the various market participants’ and levels of accounts, this means 
multiple credits/debits across accounts and up/down through the levels, where 
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participants, in particular intermediaries, can be account holder and account provider 
depending on which perspective of a relevant counterparty the market participants’ role 
in the lifecycle is being viewed. (I)CSDs have a “double role” in that they provide issuers 
with services and those that hold financial instruments of the issuers.  The fragmentation 
however occurs in relation to the services offered.  In the UK for example an (I)CSD may 
typically hold part of the issuer’s register of securities holders (shareholder register).  The 
difference is how the held/immobilised securities are treated/entrusted by/to the (I)CSD.  
Under a trust model, such as that of CREST in the UK used in respect of equity securities, 
an issuer entrusts issued securities to CREST, which does not own the securities, but 
which issues entitlements in respect of the securities (CREST Entitlements) which are 
credited/debited to accounts of CREST (i.e. CSD) participants.  As the (I)CSD65 is not an 
account holder, but rather a depository that holds/keeps the securities, it is important to 
note that fragmentation exists across EU-MS as to how the financial instruments are 
held/immobilised by the (I)CSD. A discussion on those points is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Consequently, this is something where any future harmonising legislative initiative 
as part of the Draft SLL Rollout or other deliverable of any CMU 2.0, might be able to 
deliver tangible harmonisation through key principles that (I)CSDs’ need to adopt in 
relation to the securities holding, rather than focussing on harmonising national 
insolvency laws and laws on security interests.  
2.35 The discussion on (I)CSDs reinforces the argument for harmonising rules on consistent 
Segregation, as well as general Client Asset and Client Money protections, afforded by 
intermediaries to their counterparties through the various level between (I)CSD and the 
end investor. Intermediaries should offer the same level of segregation and client 
asset/client money protection when applying it through the ‘vertical exposure level’ of 
various holding levels as well as across transaction chains or borders i.e. through the 
‘horizontal exposure level’.   
2.36 Differences due to fragmentation of legal and regulatory systems including incorrect 
translation of concepts through either the vertical and/or horizontal exposure levels can 
cause propagation of risk and losses for clients as the protections are not applied in the 
                                                     
 
65  As noted inter alia by Paech, Philipp, “Market Needs as Paradigm: Breaking Up the Thinking on EU Securities Law” (14 September 
2012). LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 11/2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150156  (Paech 11/2012).  
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same way throughout. In summary, modern, integrated and dynamic markets ought not 
to be susceptible to such risks or exposed to such fault lines that could be prevented by 
consistency being catered for contractually but more importantly by common legislative 
and regulatory requirements being applied in the same uniform manner.  
2.37 In view of the above, and comments from Bosomworth and other commentators, if CMU 
2.0 is to make the Single Market more single then a greater degree of determination is 
required to displace national barriers and frame common EU-27 wide Jurisdiction-
Agnostic principles. Public sector-led efforts by the EC and other EU-level supervisory 
authorities66, using CMU 2.0 as a catalyst, could close and/or correct these gaps and bring 
this collateral ecosystem, as a key foundation of financial markets to a more single, 
integrated and holistic legal, regulatory and market infrastructure. Until then, the laws 
and regulations specific to individual EU jurisdictions, despite the areas that EU law does 
harmonise, will have the primary say over “who owns what” but more importantly “who 
can do what, how and when” with collateral, client assets and client money as well as 
specifically Segregation and rights of re-use.  
2.38 These issues, amongst introduced above and discussed in the following sections, are 
important to financial market participants when structuring, transacting, booking, 
executing as well as Custodying both financial instrument trade and equally the collateral 
asset transactions that support those trades. As explored below the items above impact 
also Coll-RRand Cust-RR and do so across multiple levels of transaction chains in 
particular with a view to the EU losing the London market.   
 
 
                                                     
 
66  Including the ECB’s Collateral Management Harmonisation Task Force (the ECB HTF), which explored some ideas of the topic, 
albeit in the context of the pan-EU system TARGET2 and TARGET2-Securities, in its 29 November 2017 dated “Report on 
Collateral Management Harmonisation”, which does not look at the legal/regulatory but rather instead focuses on  the operational 
barriers and places, on page 7, much of the regulatory and legal reform hopes on CMU in stating: “Other barriers to post-trade 
arrangements of financial markets in Europe also play a role, such as legal/regulatory barriers, but they are expected to be mainly 
covered by other initiatives, in particular in the context of the Commission’s Capital Markets Union effort.” See: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/initiatives/shared/docs/ea6ae-ami-seco-2017-12-07-item-1.3-collateral-management-
harmonisation-report.pdf   
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2.39 Losing London  
2.40 The transaction chains and the the trading relationships that drive the Collateral 
Ecosystem have mostly been dominated in Europe by London-based entities (including 
those headquartered in the EU-27) using English law governed documentation with a 
range of counterparties and equally in relation to transactions between non-UK domiciled 
counterparties. While the changing relationship of the UK with the EU is unlikely to cause 
an immediate reduction in the prominence of the choice of English law governed 
documentation, it will over time and has caused certainly ISDA to prepare both an Irish 
and French law governed set of master agreement documentation. ICMA and ISLA have 
yet to follow suit.  
2.41 With ESMA, along with its other ESA and the ECB in its central bank but equally SSM 
role  having each communicated to the NCAs as well as market participants, their 
supervisory principles on relocations (SPoRs)67 and what this might mean for the use of 
English law governed agreements, action by market participants, is only sluggishly 
gaining traction. Affected firms and their counterparties are not as enthusiastic about 
moving away from English law and thus all the protections that might be offered by the 
UK’s rules despite being told in an unequivocally clear manner that they must do so. 
Absent corrective actions taken by either policymakers or market participants, the risks 
highlighted herein are likely to increase. As a further step, EU policymakers, even if they 
do, as proposed, borrow from British and Irish rules, are likely to, over time, aim to reduce 
EU-27 market participants having reliance on exposures (contractual, counterparty or 
otherwise) to the UK when undertaking trading activity with a nexus to the EU, as doing 
so would also serve to increase an already fragmented EU-27’s Collateral Ecosystem. 
These issues also drive some of the more recent political inertia blocking reforms in this 
area but also building up risk.    
 
                                                     
 
67  For an overview of coverage on the SPoRs please refer to: https://www.dentons.com/en/issues-and-opportunities/eurozone-
hub/eurozone-hub-thought-leadership-selection  
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2.42 Too rigid to reform? Why size matters 
2.43 Put simply, the very concept of fragmentation is incompatible with the very nature of the 
European Union, notably the Economic and Monetary Union (the Eurozone) and it is 
costly.  However, it is important to recall that European capital markets and respective 
collateral markets developed historically across national lines.  Much of the EU’s 
legislative initiatives, whilst laying strong foundations, as well as in certain areas, strong 
pillars for cross-border business to flourish, integration or harmonisation has not entirely 
followed through or has not as pervasively as one might have hoped.  Put simply, the 
legislative and regulatory actions to date have come a very long way yet they have failed 
to fully debunk the heterogeneous nature of European markets in the same transformative 
manner that shaped North American capital markets and against which the EU, notably 
in terms of CMU, benchmarks itself against. With much of intra-European borders 
opened up, is it tenable that some key impediments relating to collateral, legal systems 
and governmental policy are still anchored on a 19th century closed-country model? 
2.44 While the EU’s Single Market and the Single Rulebook underpinning it remain a work in 
progress that started in the 1980s, the Collateral Ecosystem has been much an 
afterthought. So too are the intricacies of roles and relationships that shape, define and 
fluctuate to create that ecosystem, which for many has seemed to “too rigid to reform”. 
Part of this is due to regulatory inertia, but also by forbearance, Goldplating and/or 
grandfathering of national concepts and/or other means of preserving or differentiating 
competitive advantages of the jurisdiction or national champions. Part of it is also due to 
the sheer size of the Collateral Ecosystem, reliance on certain mobilisation channels and 
thus the risk that moves through them and their systemic importance generally but also 
various participants possibly being catalysts or risk propagators, and size matters as 
discussed in paragraphs 2.45 to 2.60.  
2.45 This is particularly the case when looking at the size of mobilisation channels of 
Collateral Assets, predominantly using SFT transactions, in particular the two primary 
avenues: repo and securities lending that assist in Collateral Assets moving either subject 
to a transfer of full title (title transfer) or a transfer by way of a security interest. The 
reliance on these channels, there documented and non-documentation related 
arrangements, given the size of financial markets and the increased cross-border nature 
of transactions coupled with the shift away, certainly from an EU perspective, from the 
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London market and English law friendly dispute resolution venues, makes these issues 
sizable. Moreover, “repo rates” i.e., the implied rate at which the financial instrument is 
leant are overnight funding rates that drive a range of commercial decisions with certain 
markets having favourable rates including whether repo trades are General Collateral or 
special i.e., for specific instruments and the impact of failure to deliver penalties68.  And 
size, as explored in the next paragraphs on collateral asset mobilisation channels matters, 
particularly as obtaining available inventory of Collateral Assets, specifically those that 
are HQLA or otherwise “eligible” collateral assets.   
2.46 Collateral eligibility will typically be described and documented between the market 
counterparties. It may also be set by FMIPs and/or central banks such as the ECB69. With 
certain collateral being more in demand than others, this poses problems if it is a finite 
good as some commentators (including Singh) describe. However, market participants 
engage in and combine collateral asset generation activity (CAGA) to: 
(a) access existing and new collateral mobilisation channels including post-GFC 
developments of so-called ‘collateral highways’ and access to liquidity pools 
and/or ‘collateral hubs’;  
(b) manufacture Collateral Assets; 
(c) source collateral from central banks – who in turn accept a greater range of 
eligible Collateral Assets including non-marketable assets such as credit claims;  
(d) engage in CUT and other collateral transformation transactions;  
(e) rehypothecate and engage in re-use of permitted assets,  
 and thus depending on the individual circumstances of a market participant (whether as 
collateral provider or collateral taker) the actions above are used to manage one’s own 
gross exposure to Collateral Assets and one’s Inventory of Net Collateral Assets (INCA). 
                                                     
 
68  See inter alia: https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2011/11/16/750541/bunds-get-junckered-and-other-repo-dysfunctions/ and 
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2011/11/24/762531/on-the-perils-of-plunging-repo-rates/    
69  See: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/coll/html/index.en.html notably the links headed “Key Publications”.  
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As the preface70 in Singh summarises the industry debate (which is continuing since the 
GFC)71: 
 “…is the quantum of eligible collateral in the system actually sufficient to meet 
the regulatory requirements, and is it even possible to quantify that amount? 
Industry calculations diverge widely. Public authorities have generally produced 
significantly lower calculations. A further area of debate is the extent to which 
collateral is “reused” in the system. This has given rise to misunderstanding in 
the market due to the loose use of terminology that should distinguish more 
clearly between collateral that has changed legal ownership under title transfer 
and that which has not.”   
2.47 The size of markets and activity further reinforce the need for eliminating borders as more 
participants transact in Collateral Assets across borders but also given the very hidden 
known risks that during the GFC and since various “collateral squeezes” since 2015 have 
caused these vital mobilisation channels and SFT trades to stop working. This is 
problematic as participants are increasingly, as a result of EMIR, SFTR, CSDR and the 
MiFID II/MiFIR Regime are required to move to mandatory as well as Two-Way 
Collateralisation during global macro-economic pressures (low interest rates, Brexit, 
trade-tensions, emerging economy corrections etc.) and sector-specific pressures (asset-
price corrections, volatility either from a glut or a run on safe-assets). These pressures 
have caused erratic behaviour in SFT markets, while overall and cross-border volumes 
continue to grow thus increasing the importance of Coll-RR. 
2.48 More fundamentally, market participants have increasingly shifted to using non-cash 
Collateral Assets and are expanding the use of collateral upgrade transactions (CUTs). 
CUTs. Involve Party 1 entering into a SFT with Party 2 to transform/exchange lower 
quality collateral (i.e., lower-rated/less-liquid bond or an equity) into higher quality 
collateral (with a preference for HQLA, such as highly-rated government bonds) for use 
by Party 1 with Party 3, putting a pressure on individual Coll-RR exposures but equally 
                                                     
 
70  Written at the time by Patrick Pearson a leading EU policymaker at the EU level  and then Acting Director of what was then the 
Financial Markets team at the EC.   
71  See Singh page xi. 
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on transaction chains, especially as a change in asset quality (risk) and/or an unwind of 
Party 1+2’s transaction can impact Party 1+3’s transaction.   
2.49 The International Capital Market Association’s (ICMA) European Repo Market Survey72 
for the period ending 5 June 2019 demonstrates how large the repo market is and how 
important it is for collateral mobilisation. ICMA’s study surveys market participants 
(primarily financial groups)73 and calculated a “total repo business” figure, which for the 
latest period stood at a record EUR 7.8 trillion representing a 5.6% year-on-year increase. 
Of that activity, 48.1% were repo transactions and 51.9% were reverse repo transactions, 
demonstrating overall market preference of respondents to the survey for a net in-sourcing 
of financial instruments for their (or their clients’) inventories. ICMA concludes this trend 
may be explained by central bank-led monetary policy activity and relevant asset 
purchase programmes – which reduces the stock of available collateral and floods the 
market with cash. ICMA also states that this shift is due to supervisory policymakers 
having, since the GFC, reinforced mandatory collateralisation of SFT and derivative 
transactions – so that market participants in-source financial instruments, with a 
preference for HQLA and other “risk-free” assets such as high-rated government bonds, 
while investing cash given the overall negative interest rate environment.   
2.50 The International Securities Lending Association’s (ISLA) 11th Securities Lending 
Market Report74, dated 30 June 2019, reported that global on-loan balances of euro 2.2 
trillion. Institutional investors, as holders of financial investors may offer their holdings 
to borrowers via lending programmes arranged by intermediaries. This allows investors 
to monetise their holdings without divesting of them. In keeping with ICMA’s reported 
rising trend of in-sourcing financial instruments, ISLA’s survey of respondents reported 
a rise of euro 16.6 trillion to euro 19.6 trillion for the period of 31 December 2018 to 30 
June in available instruments in lending programmes. Of that reported inventory, 43% of 
global on-loan securities balances related to government bond lending. ISLA concluded 
                                                     
 
72  https://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Regulatory/Repo/Surveys/ICMA-European-repo-market-survey-number-37-
conducted-June-2019-131119.pdf   
73  In the case of the 5 June 2019 ICMA Survey this included results from 55 offices of 51 financial groups (less than the preceding 
survey in December 2018) that completed a questionnaire about their business in terms of currency, type of counterparty, contract 
and repo rate, the remaining term to maturity, the method of settlement and the origin of collateral. In addition, institutions were 
asked about securities lending and borrowing conducted on their repo desks.   
74  See: https://www.isla.co.uk/assets/smart-pdfs/isla-securities-lending-market-report/index.html#p=1  
  
 
 
 
  
 92  
 
 
  
 
  
that these changes stem from pressures relating to sourcing (stockpiling) of HQLA75 for 
participants’ own collateralisation purposes coupled with the commencement in 2020 of 
the post-GFC rules on uncleared margin requirements for derivatives transactions. 
Equally, ISLA reported a rise in non-cash non-cash collateral standing at euro 1.4 trillion 
of which equity securities collateral made up 43% of the reported total.  
2.51 Meanwhile, ESMA estimated in its (at the time of comparison to the aforementioned 
reports) most recent and first statistical report on EU derivatives markets, published 18 
October 201876, that, summarising data reported to it pursuant to EMIR, at the end of 
2017, trade repositories reported a total of 74 million open OTC and ETD transactions 
(this does not include SFTs) amounting to a gross notional amount outstanding of around 
euro 660 trillion.  
2.52 All of these exposures are required to be collateralised with “acceptable” Collateral 
Assets. What is deemed acceptable has changed during and since the GFC. The same also 
applies to over-collateralisation, which puts more pressure on a short supply of Collateral 
Assets that are deemed eligible.  As Yeowart & Parsons states77, that at the time thereof 
(explanations in square brackets): 
“The global supply of high-quality collateral  [HQLA on a global level as 
opposed to all Collateral Assets in Europe (which would be less)] is estimated at 
around euro 41 trillion, out of which euro 31 trillion is available for use. 
                                                     
 
75  See also discussion on page 19 of 11th Securities Lending Market Report and drivers of evolution of trading behaviour in respect 
of “preferential treatment with HQLA” (emphasis added in bold and clarifications in square brackets):  
 
“The reasons behind this trend are now well understood, with banks often preferring to keep HQLA regulatory driven 
non-cash trades open over the reporting date, preferring to scale back equity positions. There is also a preference to 
return cash collateralised loans to avoid having to engage in reinvestment markets, at a point when liquidity and 
investment opportunities could be limited. Typically, borrowers want to maintain regulatory driven HQLA trades over 
the year-end, as part of an active balance sheet management strategy where the LCR [Liquidity Coverage Ratio] is the 
primary binding constraint.  These trades are in turn often collateralised with other securities which are themselves 
balance sheet efficient if pledged as collateral as part of a term HQLA trade structure. As we have already noted, 
there was something of an anomaly in fixed income markets just prior to the half year that saw increased levels of 
borrowing of government bonds. As Fig 3 highlights, the market perhaps off the back of a sudden change of sentiment 
or trading opportunity, seemed equally prepared to use both types of collateral over the turn in this particular case.”    
 
76  See: https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma50-165-639_esma-rae_asr-derivatives_2018.pdf  
77  See Preface of Yeowart & Parsons.  
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Collateral eligible to meet the market infrastructure requirements of EMIR is 
estimated at euro 28 trillion. Collateral eligible to meet the requirements of CCPs 
is estimated at between euro 3 trillion and euro 14 trillion for CCP-cleared repos 
and euro 5 trillion and euro 28 trillion of initial margin for CCPs”78.  
Even if these figures are likely to have grown since 2014, they still rely on Collateral 
Assets’ fluidity/velocity and thus mobilisation channels that are free from undue 
influences of Coll-RR and Cust-RR. It is thus worrisome, in particular given that the GFC 
put mandatory and two-way collateralisation as one of the key reforms, that policymakers 
have not focused on creating a more resilient and level playing field in this key foundation 
of financial markets.  
2.53 In contrast to the figures above, LBIE filed for insolvency proceedings on 15 September 
2008 with a 93% drop in its share price, USD 1 billion in available cash, USD 639 billion 
in assets and USD 619 billion in debt at what has become a watershed moment that would 
lead to the depths of the GFC, with USD trillions in market value, credit crunches and 
collateral squeezes and growth eradicated and a nearly 10 year fight by many market 
participants to recover collateral from counterparties or “trapped” in LBIE’s insolvency 
estate. That watershed moment also became the catalyst for post-GFC reforms, including 
cementing CCPs at the centre of the Collateral Ecosystem and policymakers and market 
participants cognisant that no prime broker or other financial institution is immune to 
failure let alone “too big to fail”.   
2.54 As financial markets have become more complex and global, increasingly since the 
1980s, the need for collateral, of sufficient quality, quantity and liquidity, i.e. readily 
realisable value has increased. Market participants may place a premium on HQLA and 
other types of Collateral Assets may be perceived to be more abundant, valuable or liquid, 
as follows. This perception is counterparty-specific but may be summarised as follows in 
that some collateral is more desirable than others:  
                                                     
 
78  Footnote 3 to this quote cross-refers to the ECB’s July 2014 publication “Collateral Eligibility” on pages 4 and 12 which state that 
“…the figure for collateral availabe for use is stated to take into account the fact that not all collateral is accessible to market 
participants as a certain portion is blocked on accountes with central securities depositories or custodians held in non-actively 
managed portfolios.”  
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 Collateral Asset type Cash 
Cash-equivalent 
collateral, typically 
includes:  
-High quality liquid 
assets (HQLA) 
-Money market funds 
with daily liquidity 
Highly-rated 
marketable 
assets79 
Marketab
le assets 
Non-
marketabl
e assets80 
Non-
acceptable 
Collateral 
Assets 
Perceived degree of quality 
degree of perceived quality 
pre-GFC was primarily driven 
by credit ratings, market 
liquidity and asset liquidity 
-degree of perceived quality 
post-GFC adds considerations 
of regulatory charges 
associated with the collateral 
asset type 
High – usually 
higher for G7 
currencies or 
those that trade 
as FX majors 
High  High Medium 
to high 
Depends Low 
Perceived availability of 
quantity  
-degree of perceived quantity 
is driven by what is available 
on collateral providers 
balance sheet or what can be 
readily sourced 
- degree of perceived quantity 
post-GFC adds considerations 
on what collateral asset is 
cheapest to deliver, can be 
readily manufactured and/or 
which has a higher re-use 
value.  Collateral Assets have 
thus an innate “tradeable” 
factor   
High – but 
also high in 
demand for 
other use 
High – but may be 
difficult to transfer as 
readily as other more 
readily negotiable 
instruments 
Low as in high 
demand 
High but 
in demand 
High to 
extensive 
High to 
extensive 
Perceived liquidity in ordinary 
markets  
degree of perceived liquidity is 
driven by typically the degree 
of market liquidity (ability to 
realise value) and ease of asset 
being subject to realisable 
value when marked-to-market   
High – but 
may become 
constrained 
depending on 
market 
pressures 
High – but may become 
constrained depending 
on market pressures 
High – but 
may become 
constrained 
depending on 
market 
pressures 
High – 
but may 
become 
constraine
d 
depending 
on market 
pressures 
Low to 
medium 
None to 
low 
Figure 3 – Collateral Asset types and their perception 
                                                     
 
79  The term “marketable assets” is used to describe mainly debt securities that are admitted to trading and are highly rated. 
80  The term “non-marketable assets” is used to describe mainly a range of non-traded assets that can be used as collateral, including 
credit claims, fixed term deposits  
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2.55 The figures in paragraphs 2.49 to 2.53 above demonstrate the sizable issues, even when 
limited to the European, rather than global operations of EU domiciled market 
participants. When the repo or sec-lending market slows or comes to a halt, as during the 
GFC and at times thereafter, then liquidity in assets and their fluidity suffers thus affecting 
HQLA and wider Collateral Assets, even when Haircutted/Overcollateralised.   
2.56 This thesis distinguishes between Financial Market Transactions, which may be 
secured by Collateral Assets and which may evolve separately to the Collateral Asset 
Transactions themselves or due to the relevant assets performing differently. Market 
participants refer to that difference itself as ‘collateral correlation risk’81.  A ‘no to low’ 
value of correlation means the Collateral Asset (and its value) is unaffected by the change 
in the transaction and the relevant specifics it secures.  In contrast, adverse collateral 
correlation can contribute to ‘wrong-way risk’82 i.e., which is the risk arising from 
exposure to a counterparty or issuer when the collateral provided by that counterparty or 
issued by that issuer is highly correlated with its credit risk. In other words, there is an 
interest in the Collateral Asset Transaction being able to perform sufficiently, resiliently 
and independently of the financial market transaction and the relevant counterparties.  
2.57 As evidenced dramatically in the GFC wrong-way risk can lead to general liquidity risks.  
As a result, and in order to be sure that the Collateral Assets’ value and the proceeds of 
sale/disposition are likely to be sufficient to satisfy the obligations, a (prudent) collateral 
taker ought to, in addition to monitoring the collateral provider’s financial health as well 
as exposures across various transaction chains (as discussed below) ensure that the value 
of the Collateral Assets provided exceeds or are sufficient to satisfy the obligations at the 
point of default and thus:  
(a) Value the Collateral Assets and assess their CAF (see below) frequently; 
(b) Impose a Haircut and/or Overcollateralise taking into account:  
                                                     
 
81  See Harding Mastering Collateral Management and Documentation: A Practical Guide For Negotiators. 
82  For a clear concise definition, in an EU rulemaking instrument on derivatives reform, see: Article 1(11) of Commission Delegated 
Regulation No 153/2013 of 19 December 2012 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on requirements for central counterparties. 
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(i) The decline in fair market value of the Collateral Assets that may occur 
in the interval between the default of the collateral provider and the sale 
of the Collateral Assets; 
(ii) The “market illiquidity discount that the collateral taker may incur, if the 
position to be sold is disproportionately large relative to normal market 
volumes;  
(iii) Any negative correlation (i.e. “wrong-way” risk) between the value of 
the Collateral Assets and the value of the obligation.  
2.58 To realise the economic and risk reducing benefits, collateral arrangements must be 
properly documented and executed. Briefly put, documentation used by collateral takers 
and providers but also by and with other Collateral Ecosystem stakeholders should (and 
most of the master agreement documentation provided by ISDA, ICMA and ISLA in their 
unamended form do):  
(a) Determine what constitutes an event of default, what opportunities, if any, the 
collateral provider may have to remedy such a default during a grace period, and 
what procedures the collateral taker must employ in order to exercise its right to 
use the collateral to satisfy the obligor’s obligation;  
(b) Demonstrate (or require confirmation) that the collateral provider mobilising 
Collateral Assets:  
(i) Has title to those Collateral Assets;  
(ii) Is entitled to mobilise those Collateral Assets free from encumbrances to 
the collateral taker in question;  
(c) Demonstrate that the collateral taker accepting the Collateral Assets: 
(i) Has the authority to accept such Collateral Assets from the collateral 
provider in question;  
(ii) Has the ability to take title and sell the Collateral Assets, in the event an 
event of default arises;  
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(d) Demonstrate that the collateral mobilisation method (either by title transfer or 
security interest arrangement) is valid, including without limitations imposed by 
any hardening periods (if relevant), does not represent a fraudulent conveyance 
and is intended to avail of the protections offered by the EU’s Financial Collateral 
Directive (see below);  
(e) Such documentation should take into account that: 
(i) Some or all of the assets may be held in Custody by a third party or any 
chain of intermediaries;  
(ii) The party to whom the collateral provider originally mobilised the 
Collateral Assets may have taken them by way of title transfer of absolute 
title or have otherwise re-hypothecated these Collateral Assets for use 
with a third party – thereby moving the Collateral Assets from the 
original transaction chain (and thus exposures) to additional chains and 
differing exposures which may not be readily identifiable to the original 
collateral provider;  
(iii) The Collateral Assets may be in dematerialised form in a CSD and/or 
may have any chain of intermediaries; and 
(iv) The Collateral Assets and/or counterparties to the collateral arrangements 
may be in two or more jurisdictions. 
 Market participants may seek, as collateral taker and as collateral provider to agree and 
then document the granting of security interests over the Collateral Assets as well as any 
rights to or interests in the Collateral Assets, or the entitlements thereto held in the CSD 
or the range of intermediaries in any multitude of documented relationships highlighted 
in the considerations set out in point (e). Regardless of any exercise of rehypothecation 
or any right of use highlighted in point (e)(ii), Collateral Assets can (and do) move 
through mobilisation and other channels to various parties thereby distorting existing but 
creating new relationships along any multitude of transaction chains (see below).  The 
longer the chain, the more difficult it becomes to answer that question with absolute 
certainty of “where is my collateral and how quickly and how much of it can I get 
back?” 
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2.59 Collateral Asset Fluidity (CAF) also generally refers to optimising the management and 
application of Collateral Assets. This typically includes: 
(a) balancing the collateral provided with the collateral received and managing the 
inventory that one receives favouring higher-grade collateral (including those 
with high collateral asset liquidity – see Para. 4.47) or those assets that are subject 
to corporate actions, possibly stockpiling these against future needs/risks and 
generally extends cheapest to deliver collateral to its counterparties; 
(b) ensuring that:  
(i) collateral transformation, including CUTs, are applied in a manner that 
identifies and mitigates risks relating to the original as well as 
transformed exposures;  
(ii) available “collateral inventory” is not static, i.e., all inventory of 
Collateral Assets generate a return; 
(iii) collateralisation levels provided are marked-to-market with sufficient 
frequency and that do not allocate over-collateralisation and that such 
excess (if permitted to subsist) is not susceptible to any additional 
unmitigated risk; and 
(iv) account arrangements specific to where the collateral is provided as well 
as received, what client asset or client money protections are available, 
what the applicable Cust-RR are and how robust the 
transmission/mobilisation channels are.   
 
For most sophisticated market participants, the above may already form the basis of an 
appropriate “collateral optimisation system”, which may be applied throughout the 
lifecycle of a transaction, however these may not be joined up across business units and 
jurisdictions, irrespective of whether they are automated or centrally tracked.    
2.60 Viewed through the economic lens there is consensus that fluidity drives liquidity, which 
drives efficiency of markets and permits the access to a universe of Collateral Assets to 
meet market participants’ collateralisation needs. However, when derivatives markets 
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adds jitters and cross-defaults occur across asset classes, parties re-assess and close 
exposures to their respective counterparties, including CCPs and FMIPs. This leads to 
self-reinforcing downward-spiralling pressures on asset prices and an absence of 
desirable collateral. This causes firm- and system-wide risks leading to the “music 
stopping and everyone scrambling for a chair”. In the absence of a true focus on 
reforming the Collateral Ecosystem, there is no certainty there would be enough chairs 
the next time the music stops and that it its own right merits new thinking.  
  
  
 
 
 
  
 100  
 
 
  
 
  
Addendum to Chapter 2 
 
Annex 1 does not provide a legal analysis of the differences between taking and enforcing security 
interests pursuant to English law versus Irish law. While there is available literature on the 
individual specifics including on matters of insolvency law, there is very limited literature on a 
comparative law based approach.  
 
The following table aims to summarise aspects as a matter of convenience for the reader in relation 
to the discussion herein in relation to security interests in respect of or over a portfolio of cash 
and/or financial instruments in the EU-FCD as transposed into the laws and regulatory regime of 
both the UK and Ireland:  
 
 England & Wales Ireland  
English and Irish law follow the approach of lex loci of the assets so that choice of law of the security interest will depend on where the 
asset is situated.  
 
It should be noted that confusion may often arise in that the types of relevant security interests available in both jurisdictions (a) 
mortgage, (b) charge, (c) pledge, and (d) lien are often muddled or bundled by policymakers inasmuch as market participants to use the 
term “pledge” synonymously with the word “charge” and “charge” to cover all of the four types rather than using the terms in accordance 
with their legal terminology.  An understanding of these items is necessary for discussion in relation to financial collateral arrangements 
laws.   
 
To recap: 
 
Mortgage refers to the transfer of title to an asset by way of security for particular obligations, on the express or implied condition that it 
will be re-transferred when the secured obligations are discharged. A mortgage can be a legal mortgage or an equitable mortgage. A legal 
mortgage can only be taken over existing property. Therefore, if a security document purports to create a mortgage over future dividends 
or interest in respect of the mortgaged shares or debt securities, that interest will be equitable rather than legal.  Mortgages are easy to 
enforce and the mortgagee (unless documented otherwise) will be entitled to receive all communications but also all dividends, 
distributions and other rights accruing in respect of those financial instruments.  
 
A legal mortgage is created by the mortgagor transferring legal title to an asset to the mortgage. The mortgagor will be prevented from 
dealing with that asset while it is subject to the mortgage unless the mortgagee agrees otherwise. It is possible to document and effect a 
legal mortgage over financial instruments (other than cash) in bearer and registered form. A party can create a legal mortgage over 
dematerialised shares or immobilised debt securities held in CREST by instructing the CREST system to transfer the relevant shares or 
debt securities to the CREST account of the mortgagee or, if the mortgagee does not have a CREST account, to the account of the 
mortgagee's nominee. The terms on which the mortgagee holds the shares or debt securities need to be agreed and documented separately. 
The CREST system is structured so that the mortgagor maintains a proprietary right to the shares or debt securities, so the mortgagee will 
be in exactly the same position that the mortgagor was in as owner of the shares or debt securities. 
 
Although not expressly stated, the English Court of Appeal decision in Enviroco Ltd v Farstad Supply A/S [2009] EWCA Civ 
1399 appears to apply equally with respect to legal mortgages over uncertificated shares. Mortgagors and mortgagees need to consider the 
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effect that perfecting the security over shares held within the CREST system (by instructing the CREST system to update the CREST 
register with the details of the transfer) may have on the treatment of the parent and subsidiary relationship under the UK’s Companies 
Act 2006, as amended.  
 
An equitable mortgage (will) arise where one of the following applies: 
 The formalities to create a legal mortgage have not been completed. 
 The interest being mortgaged is itself an equitable interest. 
 The parties have just entered into an agreement to create a legal mortgage over an asset at some time in the future. 
It is possible to document and effect a legal mortgage over financial instruments (other than cash) in bearer and registered form.  The 
CREST system has a facility that allows holders of shares and debt securities in its system to give an equitable mortgage (or charge) over 
those assets. CrestCo’s Guidance on this facility is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
Charge refers to an agreement in which an asset is appropriate for such period until the satisfaction of a liability or an obligation. A 
charge, in contrast to a mortgage does not transfer legal or equitable interest in the asset from the chargor in favour of the chargee. 
Instead, a charge creates an encumbrance in favour of the chargee. It is possible to document and effect a legal mortgage over financial 
instruments (other than cash) in bearer and registered form.  Charges may be fixed or floating depending on the control exercised by the 
chargeholder over the charged assets. If the chargeholder does not have sufficient control over the asset, the charge will be floating and 
not fixed. English case law, which Ireland has not followed, has set out certain criteria as to what must be fulfilled for “sufficient control”.  
 
Pledge  refers to the actual or constructive delivery of possession of an asset by way of security. A pledge may confer a power of sale. 
Since a key feature of a pledge is that the creditor takes possession of the asset, a pledge can only be taken over assets which are 
transferable by delivery of possession. Bearer shares and debt securities can be transferred by delivery of the document of title 
representing those shares or debt securities, so it is possible to take a pledge over bearer shares and debt securities. However, possession 
of registered shares and debt securities cannot be transferred simply by delivery of the certificate representing those shares or debt 
securities, so it is not possible to take a pledge over registered shares and debt securities but it might be possible over an account.  
 
Lien refers to the right to retain possession of an asset until discharge of an obligation owed by the owner of that asset. Liens can be 
created by contract but they may also arise by operation of law. 
In practice, a lender seeking to take security over shares or debt securities is very unlikely to do so by way of a lien. It is far more likely to 
do so by way of mortgage, charge or pledge.  
 
Main forms of 
security interests 
in respect of  
dematerialised 
financial 
instruments 
 
Main forms of security interests include a legal 
mortgage or an equitable mortgage. An equitable 
mortgage is often more desirable as legal title is 
not transferred. Normally with an equitable 
mortgage, a share certificate and undated stock 
transfer form is provided to the beneficiary of the 
security interest.  
Main forms of security interests include a legal mortgage or 
an equitable mortgage or pledge of bearer shares. Ancillary 
documentation should generally be sought in connection with 
any security over shares. This may include share transfer 
forms and the original share certificates. 
Main forms of 
security interest 
in respect of bank 
accounts, 
receivables and 
contractual rights 
 
Main forms of security interests are either a fixed 
charge or a floating charge. To be eligible as a 
fixed charge the security interest must establish 
control over the asset concerned whether present 
or future as long as the assets is identifiable and 
strict controls are in place as otherwise the 
Main forms of security interests are either a fixed charge or a 
floating charge. Where a fixed charge or assignment has 
been created by a company, a section 1001 notice in relation 
to book debts should also be filed with the Revenue 
Commissioners, under section 1001(3) of the Taxes 
Consolidation Act 1997. 
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security interest would be recharacterised as a 
floating charge.  
Simplified 
priority of claims 
in insolvency (or 
event with 
analogous effect) 
of domestic 
company. 
1. Holders of mortgages and fixed 
charges; 
2. The costs of the insolvency procedure 
(which require creditor or court 
approval before being paid) followed 
by preferential creditors (some 
employee claims a “Prescribed Part” 
payable to unsecured creditors (this is 
a maximum of £600,000 of the net 
floating charge realisations calculated 
on a sliding scale which must be set 
aside for the unsecured creditors); 
3. Floating chargeholders; and 
4. Unsecured creditors for the balance of 
their claims.  
1. Any claim under section 19(2) of the Social 
Welfare (Consolidation) Act 2005, that is any 
sum deducted by an employer from the 
remuneration of an employee in respect of an 
employment contribution due by the employer 
and unpaid by the employer does not form part of 
the assets of a limited company in a winding-up. 
A sum equal to that deducted must be paid into 
the Social Insurance Fund ahead of all 
preferential debts (super preferential claim);  
2. Remuneration, costs and expenses of an examiner 
that had been sanctioned by the court under 
section 554 of the Companies Act 2014; 
3. Secured creditors holding mortgages or fixed 
security rank in order of their registration; 
4. Expenses certified by an examiner under section 
529 of the Companies Act 2014; 
5. Costs and expenses of winding up (including 
liquidator’s legal costs); 
6. Liquidator’s remuneration; 
7. Preferential creditors (such as rates and taxes, 
wages and salaries); 
8. Floating charges (which have not crystallised 
prior to the date of the winding up of the 
Company) rank in order of their registration; 
9. Unsecured creditors; and 
10. Deferred or subordinated creditors 
 
In the case of an Examinership, the main form of 
proceedings in Ireland, all claims in one category in respect 
of each ranking, receive full payment before any remaining 
proceeds are distributed to creditors in the following 
category. When proceeds are insufficient to meet claims of 
one category in full, payments for that category are pro-
rated.  It is possible for the secured creditors to agree among 
themselves the order of application of the proceeds of the 
enforcement of their security so far as their secured claims 
are concerned. 
Recognition of a 
concept of a 
security trustee 
and/or agent? 
Yes Yes 
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3. Old problems in need of new thinking and how we got to the current system 
3.1 The question of “where is my collateral and how quickly and how much of it can I get 
back?” rush to the forefront of strategic priorities of market participants when things go 
wrong.  This question that is still relevant more than 10 years after the financial markets 
and the Collateral Ecosystem suffered seismic shocks during the GFC despite since 
undergoing reform.  
3.2 In getting to this new thinking, policymakers need to be clear that the law and regulation 
are not free from imperfection. Some imperfections have identifiable causes that can be 
cured and some derive from how the current Collateral Ecosystem was created by market 
participants and others from the reforms themselves. This applies even to those reforms 
that stem from targted but often-uncoordinated rulemaking and unintended measures 
prior to or after the GFC.  
3.3 Regrettably, significant fault lines in the legal, regulatory and market aspects remain. 
These affect existing and new players. Some of these pre-date GFC reforms, and/or have 
been overlooked irrespective of whether they are “hardwired” into the pre-GFC or 
because of GFC-reforms. In respect of the latter, this may extend to include issues 
introduced by mandatory clearing83 arrangements and new risk transmission channels that 
follow directly or via a clearing member84 to a CCP, an area that itself is prone to its own 
new risk channels and the “64 trillion euro question” of what happens when a CCP fails. 
This is only now, at the time of writing, benefitting from earnest action to finalise the 
EU’s CCP Recovery and Resolution Proposal85. In any event these fault lines are (or 
ought to be) known to policymakers, so too are the risks of inaction.  
3.4 Correspondingly, the issues are (at the very least ought to be) known. Some, such as the 
Giovannini Barriers, go back to the start of the Single Market. Others have come about 
due to the divergence between UK, Irish and EU rules on Client Assets and Client Money, 
                                                     
 
83  The process of establishing positions, including the calculation of net obligations, and ensuring that financial instruments, cash, or 
both, are available to secure the exposures arising from those positions. 
84  An undertaking that participates in a CCP and that is responsible for discharging the financial obligations arising from that 
participation. 
85  See: Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on a framework for the 
recovery and resolution of central counterparties and amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, and (EU) 
2015/2365 in its most recent form.   
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whether as a result of the EU-FCD, EU-SFD, CDD 2017/595 and others come from the 
absence of harmonised laws on security interests and ownership of financial instruments, 
including issues on Segregation. If EU policymakers are to progress CMU, then they need 
to truly map these issues, including prevalence of CTR and its impact on Coll-RR and 
Cust-RR and assess how to swap GFC-style “firefighting” for what the Collateral 
Ecosystem ought to look like if it were built from the bottom up free from national 
jurisdictional-specifics.  
3.5 This is an issue, especially the premise that “if collateral makes the financial world go 
round” policymakers need to ensure those channels, often termed “the plumbing of 
financial markets” can continue to allow collateral to flow. This is particularly the case 
when looking at those channels having seized up in the GFC and showing signs of similar 
behaviour during 2019. Moreover, this is despite the EU having implemented post-GFC 
“firefighting” reforms in the form of SFTR, CSDR, EMIR, AIFMD/R and the MIFID 
II/MiFIR Regime introduced in Chapter 9.   
3.6 Turning back to previous proposals and identified issues, also requires taking stock of 
both the historical, often piecemeal, evolution of the economic and legislative 
environment leading to the current patchwork and the degree of legal fiction applicable 
to how parties interact and their relevant roles. This allows for a legislative and non-
legislative priority list of what needs fixing, reinforcing or building and which silos need 
integrating or breaking as well as which “collateral highways86” need widening to work 
for the collateral market, its users and actors, its transmission channels and storage 
arrangements. Once that exercise is established by regulators, FMIPs and the clients that 
interface into them, the EU can focus on the establishment and/or reinforcing of such 
routes, including true collateral highways can be rolled out, to stretch across all vital 
points of the Collateral Ecosystem, thereby helping to close unwarranted and unhelpful 
fragmentation. 
                                                     
 
86 A collateral highway is a generic market term(although it is also used by Euroclear in its commercial service offering) used to 
describe collateral mobilisation channels that seeks to offer straight-through processing between various elements and be able to 
exchange collateral in different places, as opposed to a single collateral hub, amongst participants and thus deconstruct technical 
and legal barriers to connect collateral givers and collateral takers ((regardless of their or the asset jurisdiction(s)) in an 
automated/straight-through processing manner. For a (visual) presentation of Euroclear’s  Collateral Highway please refer to:  
Autheman, M.-A., 2013. "Collateral and new offers for an optimised management: an industrial revolution," Financial 
Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 17, pages 187-195, April. (Autheman 2013)   
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3.7 These post-GFC legislative reforms have also caused more market participants to become 
collateral providers and takers across a larger scope of transaction types87. They have also 
impacted new financial market infrastructure nodes such as central counterparties or the 
reinforced role of (I)CSDs. This change in the collateral landscape, and the need for 
harmonisation, also applies to banking business, the EBU and those credit institutions that 
are key intermediaries, liquidity and financing providers as well as safekeepers in the 
collateral market as well as those that are faced with collateral scarcity or imbalance from 
a regulatory perspective.  It also applies more generally to central banks role as collateral 
takers and their interaction with market participants, financial market infrastructure 
providers and the effects on stimulus and collateral availability88.   
3.8 While much of the GFC reforms have addressed mobilisation channels of collateral more 
as an afterthought, the private-sector, in particular FMIPs have taken action, some 
individually and some in consortia and some even coordinated with the ECB. A lot of this 
has involved building new infrastructure, such as T2S but also improving operational 
standards – greater use of straight-through processing in collateral processes and more 
rapid mobilisation and settlement.  
3.9 Regrettably, much of the EU’s rulemaking may not take full notice of some of the 
operational issues and interconnectedness that institutional systems and their respective 
private – but transnational rulebooks cater for. This also includes those led by the ECB. 
Failure to take account of those interconnections can, in itself, also increase 
fragmentation. In addition to legislative and regulatory rulemaking, some “voluntary”/ 
“soft law” instruments will be needed.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
87  See: Autheman 2013  
88  See also the contribution of Autehman, Marc-Antoine “Collateral and new offers for an optimised management: an industrial 
revolution” in the 2013 Banque de France’s Financial Stability Review No. 17 available at:  https://www.banque-
france.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/publications/Revue_de_la_stabilite_financiere/2013/rsf-avril-2013/19-
AUTHEMAN_Marc-Antoine.pdf  (Autheman 2013) 
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3.10 Debunking myths on the Draft SLD/Draft SLL 
3.11 The EU has used voluntary tools or best-practice operational standards to advance 
institutional as well as infrastructure reform. These are formally non-binding but (often) 
backed by supervisory expectations and/or a “comply or explain” requirement that (may) 
make these read like rules. The EU has also proposed using a “29th Regime” as a 
complementary measure to legislative instruments. Taking this approach can assist in 
some areas, some of which policymakers may consider “too big to (currently) reform”. 
The ECB’s work on T2S is a good example of institutional reform with a quasi-legal 
rulebook applicable to FMIPs and much of the Collateral Ecosystem. Similar efforts by 
(I)CSD service providers, such as Euroclear are also good examples of private-sector led 
reform, as are comparable used as “Model Codes” in the U.S. the UCC. The EU’s efforts 
on the SLD and the SLL are other examples and Part III proposes a Draft SLL Rollout 
that builds off what became a stalled workstream in 2011 and ultimately 2014 that never 
advanced beyond draft legislative principles to a possible EU Legislation on Legal 
Certainty of Securities Holdings and Dispositions a.k.a the Securities Law Directive 
(Draft SLD).   
3.12 The principles to the Draft SLD were first flagged in a consultation paper 201089 and 
which built off the recommendations of the first and second “Giovannini Reports” i.e. a 
workstream that dates back to before 2001 that identified the Giovannini Barriers and 
gave rise to the EU-FCD.  The Draft SLD was revised in 2012 and 2013 and public and 
private proposals were made inter alia amending the original concepts of the Draft SLD 
into a more wholesome Securities Law Legislation (Draft SLL).  While that legislative 
project stalled and at the time of its creation was not all encompassing it may not be futile 
if adapted and built upon including revisions to principles to reflect existing and 
forthcoming EU legislative and regulatory developments and market developments.   
3.13 In many ways the  EP’s Directorate General Economic and Monetary Affairs’ 2011 
Report on cross-border issues of securities law: European efforts to support securities 
markets with a coherent legal framework (2011 EP Report)90 – should be read with the 
                                                     
 
89  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/securities/consultation_paper_en.pdf  
 
90  see:  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201106/20110606ATT20781/20110606ATT20781EN.pdf 
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caveat that the report is now outdated and terminology used therein not compliant with a 
number of EU legislative instruments that have followed.  It is important to take note that 
the EC/EP interchangeably refers in various coverage on harmonisation of securities law 
as to what the exact scope is.  One school of thought voiced in the EP 2011 Report, and 
which is a sensible summary, is that:   
“Securities law is a broad term used to describe all relevant laws in a given 
jurisdiction that govern the various legal aspects of securities. Depending on the 
context, these laws are typically property law, commercial law, the law 
governing security interests like pledges and charges, insolvency law, corporate 
law, and, in some countries, dedicated laws governing the Custody/safekeeping 
of securities. Regulatory rules can also belong to ‘securities law’, depending on 
the context.”   
3.14 In this context one should note that “securities” ought to be considered to be extended 
conceptually to include all MiFID Financial Instruments and equally cash as it is intended 
to also apply to collateral transactions and if it is to interlink with settlement system 
legislation such as the CSDR, it should be noted that Art. 1(2) of CSDR is clear that it 
applies to the settlement of all financial instruments.  It should be noted that Footnote 12 
of the EP 2011 Report raises a valid point (albeit somewhat crudely/simplistic) that 
remains ever present even with MiFID II/MiFIR namely that:  
“…each jurisdiction has its proper legal understanding of ‘security’.  Where EU 
law is concerned, for example, the MiFID, defines the term, it does not harmonise 
the national definitions of what a security is but merely defines which type of 
financial asset falls within the scope of the directive or regulation.  Even 
Derivatives might be exceptionally treated as securities under national law, 
t[h]ough they are usually outside the securities definition.” 
3.15  This misalignment of terminology at policymaker level causes a risk, unless mitigated in 
any revised setting of scope for an updated Draft SLD as part of CMU in increased CTR 
and stagnation.  The same applies to the EC/EP’s disregard for differences in terminology 
amongst security interests subject to national laws i.e., using the term pledge without 
definition or the fact that a pledge under Irish law and English law differ (as they need to 
be viewed through the ‘respective national lens’ i.e. in the context of the national laws 
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creating/governing security interests) and the fact that the EU typically (incorrectly) 
refers to say a German law created and governed Pfandrecht as a pledge, without 
clarification that there is no equality to say an English or Irish law governed pledge.   
3.16 Accordingly, the  key findings from the 2011 EP Report still hold true:  
(a) “The legal landscape of securities holding and disposition as well as of assisting 
investors in the exercise of their rights attached to their securities is fragmented. 
The international nature of securities transactions leads to situations where the 
law of more than one country can influence the legal situation of securities 
holding. This is a consequence of the fragmentation of the law and widely 
acknowledged conflict of-laws principles.”   
(b) “The result of the public consultation on the prospected Securities Law Directive 
is positive on the need for action in this field.”  Yet little has taken place (both 
within the private and public domain) since the Draft SLD was consulted on.  In 
fact, the EC and the SLL Working Group published two non-public working 
papers overhauling the Draft SLD as well as public minutes. The legislative 
project i.e. Draft SLD/Draft SLL presently is little more than a collection of 
principles that are not finalised i.e. a “phantom directive/regulation”) has stalled 
since discussion and would need to first have the principles updated to meet 
current requirements and driven forward for political agreement. It is worrying 
that without revision and commitment this phantom legislation would fail to 
achieve its and policymakers’ intended goals yet some of its aims are core to 
some of the reforms the CMU project itself aspires to deliver.  As noted on page 
5 of Paech 11/2012:  
“The term ‘Securities Law Directive – SLD’ became a household name 
even before the instrument was officially proposed. Over the past three 
years, however, there has been a growing tendency within the European 
institutions to embark—as far as its financial services are concerned—
on legislative projects in the form of regulations, i.e., directly applicable 
law, rather than directives. Hence—and given that the Commission still 
seems to be looking at the fundamentals of the future securities law—it 
is now probably safer to refer to ‘securities legislation’ so as to leave the 
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ultimate form of the future instrument open, whether it turn out to be a 
directive or a regulation.” 
(c) “The existence of the legal uncertainty in this area is uncontested. However, 
Member States have an interest to defend their current domestic concept 
underlying securities holding and dispositions; therefore, the solutions envisaged 
deviate.”  Without the EU being committed to delivering short-term actions, 
including a 29th Regime that may be more politically palatable as opposed to a 
legislative instrument, the Draft SLD/Draft SLL will not advance and closing the 
conceptual gap in this area, in a similar manner as the U.S. UCC achieved will 
mean fragmentation will continue.   
3.17 One way that could actually serve to increase comparability, harmonisation and 
standardisation of security interests across national laws, would be to use neutral wording, 
in the case of a the non-legal use of the word pledge to instead use non-legal wording to 
establish a common definition Jurisdiction-Agnostic Definition such as:  
“a possessory security interest in respect of an asset through the creation or 
delivery of the (actual or constructive) possession of an asset until the secured 
obligation is discharged.”    
3.18 Voluntary regimes should complement mandatory rules 
3.19 While such operational and “voluntary” regime-based approaches are good measures they 
cannot deliver results on their own without legislative/regulatory rulemaking, as the ECB 
HTF Report91 suggests given that: 
(a) the commitments are voluntary undertakings of major financial infrastructure 
providers and do not permeate through the whole market nor is compliance with 
those commitments measured with de facto certainty; and  
                                                     
 
 
91  See: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/initiatives/shared/docs/ea6ae-ami-seco-2017-12-07-item-1.3-collateral-management-
harmonisation-report.pdf   
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(b) the focus, to move securities settlement, for T2S users, and cash settlement, for 
TARGET2 users, to standardisation of messaging based on the global ISO 
2002292 standard93, greater interoperability and straight-through processing as 
well as meeting those Collateral Management Harmonisation Activitiesii that are 
identified as either  “Priority 1” and “Priority 2” business processes does not close 
all gaps.  
3.20 This realisation by EU policymakers ought to be crucial as the EU moves to CMU 2.0 as, 
while these operational workstreams are certainly welcome, they do not close the 
conceptual gaps and CTR that already exist within and as a result of the legal and 
regulatory environment in the EU. Equally, some of the harmonisation proposals are 
taking place in thematic areas which have not (currently) been fully covered by legal 
and/or regulatory requirements (see Endnote to the Thesis). EU policymakers may want 
to use a 29th or voluntary regime as flanking as opposed to primary measures to receive 
those policy goals. 
3.21 In addition to new thinking on rulemaking, policymakers ought to push market 
participants to focus, instead of trying to leapfrog the current Collateral Ecosystem using 
untested (legal, operational, regulatory and FinTech-specific risks) DLT systems, on 
developing common operational risk taxonomy (often confused – willingly – with the 
wider term “non-financial risk)94, including with respect to Coll-RR and Cust-RR and, 
equally, use technology as an enabler to identify such risks as opposed to pushing untested 
systems as a panacea.    
3.22 Other areas where a combined legislative rulemaking and supervisory expectation setting 
at the EU-level has usefully used legislative and non-legislative means has been the EU’s 
EBU, notably the ECB at the SSM’s helm. Launched in 2014, the EBU marks a 
(welcome) “Europeanisation” of financial services policymaking, rulemaking and 
supervision. Use of maximum harmonisation tools, including through ECB legislative 
                                                     
 
92  For further information, please see: https://www.iso20022.org/.  
93  The secretariat responsible for ISO 20022, i.e., its administration is currently headquartered in the UK.   
94  See efforts of the Swiss Based: Operational Riskdata eXchange Association (ORX) available: 
https://managingrisktogether.orx.org/search?text=collateral&run-search=true which has (worryingly) nothing on collateral – 
despite the majority of pre- and post-GFC operational risk failures and regulatory fines of highest impact (proprietary data sourced 
from Corlytics) being  
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instruments and non-binding guidelines that read like rules, have impacted across a range 
of areas, some of which are beyond the traditional understanding of the ECB-SSM’s 
mandate of lead prudential regulatory authority. Collateral quality and resilience of 
mobilisation channels in the EBU has however, despite the ECB’s central banking and 
monetary policy role as one of the largest collateral takers and liquidity providers, has 
been limited to its “Jurisdiction-Agnostic” rulebook “the General Documentation”95.  
3.23 However, more fundamentally the ECB, acting at the head of the EBU’s SSM, has 
demonstrated that it can reduce fragmentation and do so in targeted, efficient and rapid 
means. Its own actions to eliminate national options and discretions96 by using a 
combination of its own rulemaking powers and non-binding Guidelines, which reads like 
rules and set supervisory expectations that addresses are required to follow on a comply 
and explain approach for BUSIs within its SSM- supervisory mandate, but addressed to 
SSM-NCAs, and thus the BUSIs within its supervisory mandate, was novel. It took the 
market by surprise but laid the path for the EC’s own action to reduce national options 
and discretions across a range of key areas in the banking sector’s prudential regulatory 
capital rules through the CRR II/CRD V reforms97.  
3.24 These successes demonstrate that this streamlining can be done, without much detriment 
and pushback from national stakeholders and lead to a much more unified market. 
Moreover, the ECB-SSM’s approach on reducing non-performing loans and exposures, 
through adopting a comply or explain approach to its “Guidelines”, while officially non-
binding, makes these read like rules that BUSIs are required to follow – even where there 
is confusion on the use of the word “should”.  This goes to demonstrate that similar 
approaches are possible to tackle fragmentation in the Collateral Ecosystem in particular 
given its sizeable importance. 
                                                     
 
95  As amended: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/1002/1014/html/index-tabs.en.html   
96  See (Huertas M. , August 2017) and (Huertas M. , “Further Streamlining of the Single Rulebook as It Applies in the Banking 
Union: The European Central Bank’s Guide on National Options and Discretions Available in Union Law (the NODE Guide) and 
the Likely Impact on Credit Institutions” , May 2017) as well as (Huertas M. , Co-author, “Regulation 2016/445 of the European 
Central Bank on the exercise of options and discretions available in Union law (NODE Regulation): a milestone towards a Single 
Rulebook for all banks in the EU?", August 2016) 
97  See selected contributions from Huertas, via Dentons Eurozone Hub, including 
https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2019/july/24/publication-of-the-eus-banking-package-in-the-official-journal 
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3.25 Consequently, if, this time could be different, and if the supervisory and regulatory tone 
is (hopefully) changing due to the Europeanisation of financial services rulemaking and 
supervisory action this could encourage greater EU-institutional (such as ECB) led as 
opposed to legislative action. The ECB-SSM has itself become more confident in its role 
in the EBU, and market participants seeing benefits from a more Single Rulebook in the 
EBU-19 EU-MS as opposed to 19+ interpretations, is translating into approaches of other 
authorities with differing but sometimes overlapping mandates. The ECB has equally 
delivered on some of the key operational changes that led to TARGET2 and T2S breaking 
down some of the Giovannini Barriers (but not all EPTF Barriers) and thus achieving 
some of points 1, 2 and 3 that Bosomworth points to.  
3.26 Another argument that market participants have put forward for the 2019-2024 legislative 
cycle is the rising force of digitalisation and FinTech. This however may be more of a 
misnomer as there are risks that lurk in rushing to technical solutions that may not have 
been fully tested let alone may not be compatible with the legacy technology and laws 
underpinning the Collateral Ecosystem.  Part of that relates also to assessing how much 
use there actually is in DLT-enabled Collateral Asset use cases.  
3.27 Since 2017, roughly the time when DLT (including virtual currencies) moved out of the 
shadows of financial markets and regulatory policymakers to take centre-stage, the 
concept of tokenisation, i.e., bringing assets on to DLT transaction platforms to assist in 
collateral transparency, liquidity and fluidity gathered pace. In relation to DLT, this thesis 
concludes that regardless of some solutions having tangible use-cases, notably those that 
are able to assist in tokenizing assets and thus creating mobilisation avenues of difficult 
to transfer assets, creates liquidity. This is welcome and the Daimler DLT-Schuldschein 
transaction is feted as a pathfinder98. However, problems with DLT-represented assets 
not being recognised as “eligible” for protections in the EU-FCD, EU-SFD nor capable 
of netting and set-off or becoming subject to a security interest nor Custody, let alone not 
being treated uniformly across the EU, even where ESA-led EU-wide guidance exists, as 
a financial instrument is a barrier and drives fragmentation. Moreover, it raises the 
concept of FinTech-specific risks, in addition to heavy reliance on “legal fiction”. Despite 
                                                     
 
98  See: https://www.lbbw.de/articlepage/experience-banking/pilot-project-blockchain-daimler-lbbw_661e61yw9_e.html   
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this, DLT’s lure has led to multiple competing projects (some of which have failed) 
aiming to facilitate DLT adoption in the Collateral Ecosystem.  
3.28 All of this DLT-driven change ought to be viewed against the larger picture in that the 
EU’s fragmented Collateral Ecosystem is, at the time of writing, still (only) getting 
comfortable with the shift from dematerialisation of financial services in the early 1980’s 
to digitised financial services and electronified trading from 2007 to DLT-empowered 
trading from (roughly) 2017. DLT-solutions, will also struggle unless policymakers and 
market participants get serious about eradicating conceptual gaps, CTR and 
fragmentation in respect of the EU’s Collateral Ecosystem.  
3.29 Chapters 1-3, having set the scene of the problems, introduced certain proposed solutions 
and risk metrics, as explored in detail in Part III and also demonstrates that even in the 
simplest of repo transactions, many competing issues arise that impact Coll-RR and Cust-
RR, which is accentuated by CTR affecting market participants and the market more 
widely. Chapter 4 discusses the evolution of the market before turning to the questions of 
the current legal framework and then in Part II looking at grounds for standardisation and 
FinTech Related Risks before turning to Part III assessing other changes that might serve 
to make the Collateral Ecosystem more harmonised.   
  
 
 
 
  
 114  
 
 
  
 
  
4. The evolution of the “modern” Collateral Ecosystem prior to the GFC 
4.1 The following subsections provide an overview of the main roles in Irish and UK financial 
markets that are relevant to the post-trade processes liked to the Collateral Ecosystem and 
that support the “modern” i.e., post-dematerialisation-based financial markets. The 
discussion below also assesses how these roles contribute to known/unknown risks as 
well as those relevant. The following subsections also draw on reference texts putting the 
evolution of the legal and market specificities of the Collateral Ecosystem into further 
context.  Surprisingly, for such a vital, often jumbled and certainly complex part of the 
financial market and the risks specific to these roles, there are only a handful of texts, 
notably Marek and Yeowart & Parsons99 (Relevant Texts) that dissect the complexity of 
relationships and the different roles played (concurrently) by market participants.   
                                                     
 
99  See Bibliography notably:  
 Brummer, Chris “Soft Law and the Global Financial System” (Cambridge University Press 2015). 
 Busch, Danny and Ferrarini, Guido (eds) “Regulation of the EU Financial Markets: MiFID II and MiFIR” (Oxford University 
Press 2017).  
 Chiu, Iris H-Y and MacNeil, Iain G., Edward (eds) “Research Handbook on Shadow Banking: Legal and Regulatory 
Aspects” (Elgar Publishing Limited, 2018).   
 Conac, Pierre-Henri, Segna, Ulrich and Thevenoz, Luc “Intermediated Securities – The Impact of the Geneva Securities 
Convention and the Future of European Legislation”. (Cambridge University Press 2013).  
 Donnelly, “The Law of Credit and Security” (2nd Edition) (Round Hall Thomson Reuters 2015).  
 Dubovec, Marek, “The Law of Securities, Commodities and Bank Accounts: The Rights of Account Holders” (Elgar 
Financial Law 2014).  
 Fabbrini, Federico and Ventoruzzo, Marco (eds.) “Research Handbook on EU Economic Law”. (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2019).  
 Francesconi, Enrico, Montemagni, Simonetta, Peters, Wim and Tiscornia, Daniela (eds) in their contribution to “Integrating 
a Bottom-Up and Top-Down Methodology for Building Semantic Resources for the Multilingual Legal Domain” in 
“Semantic Processing of Legal Texts: Where the Language of Law meets the Law of Language” (Springer 2010). 
 Gullifer, Louise and Akseli, Orkun “Secured Transactions Law Reform: Principles, Policies and Practice” (Hart Publishing 
2016, 2019) 
 Herbst, Jonathan and Lovegrove, Simon (eds.) “A Practitioner’s Guide to MiFID II” (3rd Edition) (Sweet & Maxwell 2018). 
 Johnston, William, Werlen, Thomas and Link, Frederick (eds) “Set-Off Law and Practice: An International Handbook” (3rd 
Edition) (Oxford University Press 2018).  
 Lehmann, Matthias and Kumpan, Christoph (eds) “European Financial Services Law: Article-by-Article Commentary” 
(Hart, Beck, Nomos 2019. 
 Lo Schiavo, Gianni (ed), “The European Banking Union and the Role of Law“ (Elgar Financial Law 2019). 
 Madir, Jelena, “FinTech Law and Regulation” (Edward Elgar 2019). 
 Singh, Manmohan “Collateral and Financial Plumbing” (Risk Books – Incisive Media 2014). 
 Norman, Peter “Plumbers and Visionaries: Securities Settlement and Europe’s Financial Market” (John Wiley & Sons 2007).  
 Turing, Dermot “Clearing and Settlement in Europe” (Bloomsbury Professional 2012). 
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4.2 To the author’s knowledge (at the time of publication), the qualification and 
quantification of risks arising in the Collateral Ecosystem due to CTR has not been 
addressed by market participants in their operational systems and risk controls, nor by 
commentators (economists, risk professionals or lawyers)) or regulators.  
4.3 Moreover, academic and professional discussion, including in the Relevant Texts, 
whether before the GFC or to present does not specifically assess the nature of risks 
related to Collateral and Custody relationships/exposures or the impact on collateral 
takers or providers and what this may mean for Collateral Assets’ 
recovery/Recoverability Rates. These are items that are considered in greater depth in the 
following Chapters herein, but they build upon an understanding of the complex, 
multifaceted nature of the Collateral Ecosystem and market participants’ roles as markets 
have evolved. 
4.4 A number of these roles have evolved over time, or were established in certain 
jurisdictions, with certain legal concepts introduced to facilitate the role such as EMIR’s 
introduction increasing CCP’s systemic role. Other roles have had to respond to 
regulatory and/or market-led changes, including reinventing themselves. Dealer entities 
and settlement relevant intermediaries (SRIs) have had to deal with the technological 
transformation from open-outcry to dematerialised and now slowly digitised straight-
through processing all the while having to react to regulatory reform such as MiFID 
II/MiFIR, SFTR, EMIR, CSDR etc. SRI is a generic term, often shortened (confusingly) 
to just “intermediary” and is intended to capture other commercial organisations, such as 
credit institutions, equally when acting in an agency role and as (global) Custodians, 
which in turn interact with FMIPs.  
                                                     
 
 Wood QC, Philip R. “The Law and Practice of International Finance” (Sweet & Maxwell 2019) notably the “Comparative 
Law of Security Interests and Title Finance (3rd Edition) (Sweet & Maxwell 2019) and “Set-Off and Netting, Derivatives and 
Clearing Systems (3rd Edition) (Sweet & Maxwell 2019).  
 Wymeersch, Eddy, Hopt, Klaus and Ferrarini, Guido (eds), “Financial Regulation and Supervision: A Post-Crisis Analysis 
(Oxford University Press 2012).  
 Yates, Madeleine and Montagu, Gerald (4th ed.) “The Law of Global Custody: Legal Risk Management in Securities 
Investment and Collateral” (Bloombsbury Professional 2013).  
 Yeowart, Geoffrey and Parsons, Robert, “Yeowart and Parsons on the Law of Financial Collateral” (Edward Elgar Financial 
Law and Practice Series 2016)   
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4.5 All of this change means equally dealing with new but also addressing hardwired risks. 
Yet, even after the most recent spark of crisis, the GFC, many market participants 
currently take the operation of the modern Collateral Ecosystem and financial markets for 
granted. To a lesser degree, such change has also sought to generally upgrade the 
collateral and transaction transmission channels of financial markets, by de-risking them 
and reinforcing the role FMIPs, including custodians/depositaries play in the Collateral 
Ecosystem.  It has not, as discussed in Chapters 1-3, put the Collateral Ecosystem at the 
forefront of improvements. This is the case despite such reforms requiring the ecosystem 
to do more. It has not also necessarily promoted greater transparency in terms of clarity 
and oversight of risk exposures in the ecosystem which are necessary to deal with 
systemic and idiosyncratic risks, nor has anything been done by regulatory policymakers 
to increase robustness and resilience of documented relationships to those risks given 
pressures pushing deregulation.   
4.6 Despite some successes in application of re-regulation, the regulatory agenda is taking 
place against a (currently still) fragmented EU Collateral Ecosystem, with disparate 
financial market integration and sophistication. It is also taking place during a period of 
national and intra-national tension with respect to the future and political commitment to 
further EU/Eurozone integration and reform.  As a result, more profound and far-reaching 
work is necessary to avoid regulatory drift i.e., straying into areas outside a specific 
mandate of a rulemaking/supervisory body. Unless opposed, such a drift could undermine 
the necessary implementation and essential further reforms to improve comparability, 
standardisation, convergence and harmonisation across the EU Collateral Ecosystem and 
its financial markets generally.  
4.7 Hindrances caused by, as set out in Part III, political unwillingness, domestic 
bias/protectionism as opposed to technical inability need to be overcome. This is a fact 
that has plagued historical integration of contemporary EU financial markets and 
collateral since the birth of the European project and the (so-called) Single Market. That 
too is a constant as the following sections explain and also part of the lingering problems, 
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including as some of what is describer overleaf remains at the forefront of those presently 
shaping regulatory policy in the EU100.        
 
4.8 Piecemeal evolution of the patchwork 
4.9 Peter Norman’s enjoyable, easily accessible practitioner text “Plumbers and Visionaries: 
Securities Settlement and Europe’s Financial Market101”, written with a fair degree of 
wit, provides further background reading on market practice and its evolution102, 
including the people103 that shaped it generally. Norman also provides the context 
necessary to understand the often colourful historical market infrastructure that has 
evolved piecemeal since the creation of ‘modern’ finance and Eurodollars104, the birth of 
Euroclear and how that cemented a market infrastructure that has continued to evolve 
rapidly from paper-based to dematerialisation. The advent of increased digitisation 
generally or computerisation of market and collateral transactions specifically, in turn 
lead (and continues to lead) to increased innovation of financial services, transaction types 
and market infrastructure that sought (and continues to seek) to overcome operational and 
legal barriers. Which notably led to greater efficiencies for FMIs, their users and their 
clients.  This change in turn contributes to not only greater liquidity generation in respect 
of financial instruments and cash transactions, but also allows greater efficiency of 
                                                     
 
100  While a discussion of the role of concious and unconcious bias as well as groupthink and the “old white male effect” on risk 
perception is beyond the scope of this thesis, it ought to be recalled that much of those policymakers that led the EU in, through 
and out of the GFC, began their careers in finanical markets during the birth of what is considered to be “modern financial markets” 
in the UK and Europe.   
101  Norman, Peter, “Plumbers and Visionaries: Securities Settlement and Europe’s Financial Market”, 2007, John Wiley & Sons 
(referred to herein as Norman) 
102  See Appendix B to Norman for Key Dates for the Securities Settlement Industry in Europe from 1963 until 2008.   
103  See Appendix C to Norman for a Who’s Who in the History of European Securities Settlement until 2007.   
104  Not to be confused with Eurobond.  Eurodollar bonds refer to bonds or other forms of ‘vanilla’ debt securities issued in USD issued 
by a foreign undertaken outside the U.S. and possibly the issuer’s jurisdiction of incorporation.  A Eurobond in market terms refers 
to a bond or other ‘vanilla’ debt securities issued in the currency of another jurisdiction of market in which it is issued.  Eurodollar 
bonds and Eurobonds can be issued as corporate, sovereign or supranational bonds.  The term, Eurobond as used in political terms 
since the GFC refers to the proposal for EU Member States of the euro area to issue sovereign debt in a joint issuance.  The proposal 
received support from the Commission in a 2011 Green Paper on Stability Bonds as a method to alleviate persisting funding issues 
in the European sovereign debt crisis that spanned the period from 2010-2012.   The official term Stability Bonds was quickly 
muddled by the market (and a number of lawyers) as “Eurobond”.  Irrespective of the issues on terminology, no such Stability 
Bond has been issued to date.    
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allocation and management of Collateral Asset inventory by market participants seeking 
to invest, or those seeking to monetise holdings in their inventory. In each of this 
situations, achieving critical mass and capitalising on economies of scale becomes more 
realisable.    
4.10 The emergence of accepted methods of SFTs in the early 1990’s, strengthened by the 
publication of Master Agreements and standardised legal opinions, assisted in 
standardising repo documentation across previously fragmented markets and eliminated 
the need for extensive legal scrutiny of elements related to counterparty, contractual terms 
and jurisdiction.  The advent of SFT, being collateralised was perceived as minimising 
counterparty risks. As discussed herein such further standardisation across a number of 
other markets, including collateral would assist in eliminating wastage of costs and thus 
increase efficiencies.  As Norman notes on page 99: standardisation of market practice, 
systems and documentation allowed greater liquidity as well as fluidity. Cash from repo 
trading was reinvested and financial instruments reloaned.    
4.11 The European experience in dematerialisation, digitisation and creation of rules, were 
self-reinforcing contributors to greater depth of liquidity and volumes transacted. They 
were however by and large predominantly market-led. Put simply, these developments 
were flanked (albeit with degrees of delay) with respective regulatory policymakers 
incorporating market practices/mitigants as formal rules. This process of transformation 
into rules, is a good example of operational changes spreading through to the wider 
market across asset classes and forming the basis of a regulatory framework as opposed 
to a regulatory/legal framework evolving from existing legal concepts, as may be the case 
in relation to certain concepts of ownership of financial instruments and types of security 
interests.  
4.12 These market driven concepts, including the regulatory frameworks, are now very much 
established and fundamental building blocks of contemporary market infrastructure. As 
explored by Norman and as highlighted herein, different regulators have however taken 
common concepts in post-trade processes and implemented them, in part differently. Such 
implementation has and continues to occur with differing depths and widths of conceptual 
gaps, thus potentially causing fragmentation and CTR.  Norman eloquently draws all of 
this historical evolution of market developments, regulatory influences and their 
evolution into a concise explanation of how the two dominant backbones of EU financial 
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and collateral markets and leading FMIP, Euroclear and Clearstream, came about and 
how their corporate cultural evolution and relevant individuals have shaped development 
of the Collateral Ecosystem or reacted to external pressures. Norman concludes with an 
optimistic description of future financial reform programmes of the EU.  This conclusion, 
while written prior to the outburst of the GFC, remains very current in distinguishing 
items that had failed previously and the personal or political stories of why they did so.  
4.13 Whilst Norman may be pre-GFC literature, the thinking expressed therein including the 
lessons of how certain parts of the Collateral Ecosystem, market practice and market 
participants came to be as well as the stories of what was never built, completed or 
harmonised, remain for very much current and relevant for contemporary market 
participants. It also forms essential contextual background for any participant wishing to 
have an understanding of why components of Coll-RR and/or Cust-RR, including 
national divergences and any possible mitigants are the way they are.   
4.14 In addition to an overview of security interests under English and Irish law highlighted 
herein, readers may also wish to consult leading practitioner text Goode 4th ed.105 in 
relation to security interests and financial instruments. Whilst Goode 4th ed. is concerned 
with issues in English law security interests in the domestic perspective, it provides good 
background as to some of the core issues explored in the topics herein, both domestically 
and on a cross-border perspective.   
4.15 The leading legal practitioner text, “Clearing and Settlement in Europe”106 provides the 
necessary legal and regulatory introduction to much of clearing and settlement practice 
with a UK focus.  In many ways this inspirational and timely publication prompted the 
need for a more refined focus on collateral, its risks and risks to FMIP as expressed in the 
thinking herein, in particular in light of changes to markets since 2012. The propositions 
made in this publication aim to draw new light on considerations voiced by Turing 2012.       
4.16 Taking a step back from the aforementioned literature, understanding “who does what 
and when for whom and more importantly why?”, is one of the key questions relevant 
                                                     
 
105  Goode, Sir Roy “Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security”, 4th Edition, reprinted 2012, Sweet & Maxwell (Goode 4th 
ed.).  Readers are encouraged to consult the 5th Edition or successors.  The 5th edition contains a number of updates. For details 
of the updates please consult: http://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/Catalogue/ProductDetails.aspx?recordid=5485   
106  Turing, Dermot “Clearing and Settlement in Europe”, 2012, Bloomsbury Professional (referred to herein as Turing 2012) 
  
 
 
 
  
 120  
 
 
  
 
  
for assessing collateral relationships as well as risk exposures in increasingly standardised 
but equally sophisticated and interconnected markets.  It is also an ancillary question that 
helps answer the fundamental issue that collateral providers and takers have when things 
go wrong namely: “where is my collateral and how much of it can I get back and how 
quickly?”   
4.17 These two questions remain relevant in light of increased restructuring and 
consolidation107 of market participants and FMIPs more specifically.  In the same spirit 
the who does, what question above is fundamental in assessing “how much risk does this 
exposure to this person create?” In other words, each exposure will have different 
degrees of mitigation of characteristics of Coll-RR and Cust-RR.  It is also an important 
question for the more wider-reaching need in modern EU collateral and financial markets 
to have greater comparability, standardisation, convergence and ultimately harmonisation 
in a manner that overcomes or side-steps the continuing or residual fragmentation that 
exists as a result of evolution to date. To some extent, market participants following 
dominant FMIPs and adopting such an approach in their documentation, operational 
arrangements and post-trade processes would go hand in hand with the continuing, and 
recently reinvigorated regulatory end-goal of EU policymakers, which is and remains, 
especially due to CMU, a simple and shared objective, namely “…to make cross-border 
activity as easy, efficient and cheap for client’s as domestic activity already is in most 
European markets.”108 
4.18 Yet, whilst a number of the legal and operational barriers that became apparent in 
financial markets’ evolution since the 1960’s have been overcome, fragmentation remains 
either residual or continuing i.e. worsening at the technical/operational as well as the 
legal/regulatory level. Regulatory intent and objectives have at times met with confusion 
as well as national and multinational obstinate reaction from EU-MS and market 
participants operating therein. Consequently, a number of the differences in the EU 
legislative and regulatory framework removing said barriers and affecting the Collateral 
Ecosystem both pre- and post-GFC have either been lacking, stalled, non-existent or 
where they have advanced, they have failed to be completed or have had mixed success. 
                                                     
 
107  whether as a result of economic pressures or out of regulatory necessity. 
108  Quote from Pierre Francotte, Professor, as then CEO of Euroclear, in a Euroclear thought leadership publication “Taking Stock”, 
June 2005 and quoted by Norman on page 233.   
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The Giovannini Barriers are still stubbornly present.  As Turing 2012 observes109 in 
respect of the legislative and regulatory initiatives and the effect of the GFC:  
“And so the cacophony of national rules and practices identified by Prof. 
Giovannini is still, obstinately in place.     
The financial crisis of 2008 has brought the spotlight to bear on central 
counterparties and clearing, and that crisis has also catalysed a revival of the 
European legislative effort.  Some 20 years after the first comprehensive EU 
directives relating to financial services, harmonised legislation is coming into 
force on the essential post-trade services which underpin systemic and economic 
stability.” 
4.19 Much of the legal principles that continue to regulate clearing, settlement and Custody 
were shaped in the 1960’s.  The barriers that emerged as a result of increased cross-border 
trading in Europe and the transatlantic trade also manifested themselves in frequent 
settlement failures110. Those failures, exacerbated by operational and legal barriers often 
developed into full-blown crises, notably the “paper crisis” of the late 1960’s.  However 
such events, once resolved lead to not only advances in risk management theory, but to 
operational change. One crucial change, which is now a well-anchored mitigant and 
cornerstone of post-trade process, but that emerged out of this settlement crisis, is 
Delivery versus Payment (DvP111).  DvP is common practice or pre-requisite across a 
number of transactions as is the greater use of netting and set-off.  
4.20 DvP and the greater fungibility of financial instruments, as well as the resulting 
operational solutions of dematerialisation or immobilisation of financial instruments 
contributed to the increased digitisation of financial markets and post-trade processes. 
The implementation of real time gross settlement (RTGS112) and, in other markets, 
continuous net settlement (CNS113) or continuous linked settlement (CLS114) each 
                                                     
 
109  Turing 2012 page vii.   
110  See Herstatt Risk.    
111  See Glossary.  
112  See Glossary.  
113  See Glossary.   
114  See Glossary.  
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contributed to greater intraday settlement finality, which in turn led to the need for the 
EU-SFD and EU-FCD. Greater legal and operational certainty provided the springboard 
to generating the depth of liquidity that many market participants take for granted across 
jurisdictions, asset classes and transaction types. The same also applies to market but also 
policymakers’ misperception that set-off is a readily available tool and that it operates 
free from jurisdiction-specifics across the EU.    
4.21 The concept of fungibility refers to the financial instrument or cash’s interchangeability 
with other assets or cash of the same type.  Alternatively, as Goode 4th ed.  sets out at 2-
05, 6-09 and 6-10 in the context of identifiability of the subject matter in relation to 
attachment and perfection of security interests under English law, sets out that fungibles 
are two or more units that, in terms of the delivery or transfer obligation are legally 
interchangeable. Interchangeability is a necessity to ensure greater collateral fluidity and 
was a pre-requisite to establishing dematerialised markets.  As Goode 4th ed. explains, 
the principle of fungibility in English law, long pre-dates laws on financial  instruments 
but finds its root in English law security interests attaching over commodity produce and 
need to specify identification of a certain type, i.e., certain amount, quality and quantity 
of potatoes, or an ISIN or other identifier or contents of a specified account. At 6-09 and 
6-10, the issue of identification and fungibility with respect to financial instruments 
explains that with dematerialisation and unnumbering of shares, i.e., making them more 
indistinguishable between each other in the same ISIN the more fungible they are.     
 
4.22 Spotlight on set-off 
4.23 Set-off follows on after the process of netting and is a key means of risk and/or loss 
reduction (operational i.e., Herstatt Risk and counterparty as well as credit risk) in 
financial contracts (including Collateral Asset arrangements) between domestic but more 
importantly cross-border domiciled counterparties. While set-off mechanics are present 
in the majority of financial contracts used in the EU, the respective laws of set-off were 
not developed with financial markets in mind but instead have their origins in commercial 
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mercantilist principles refined mostly during the 19th century and shaped by each EU-MS 
and thus with resulting divergences.  
4.24 Absent an EU-wide definitive definition (and in view of jurisdiction-specifics), the 
market terminology used in the leading text by Johnston, Werlen and Link115 describes 
“set-off” “…as a right to reduce or fully discharge a monetary obligation owed by a debtor 
to a creditor against a claim owed to the debtor by the (same) creditor such that only the 
balance remains”. Set-off may be used as a self-help remedy or as a defence to a 
counterclaim.  
4.25 Generally, set-off, unless amended in a permitted manner by contract, may only be 
applied in respect of claims between counterparties that evidence: 
(a) Mutuality of claims – owed between same two parties, acting in the same 
capacity;  
(b) Matured claims – mutual claims must have same maturity; 
(c) Same type of claim – i.e., an obligation to pay money (presumption is same 
currency) may generally not be set-off against obligations to deliver 
goods/services;  
(d) Amount of claim must be determined – i.e. set-off is not possible until claim is 
determined (including after netting) regardless of the point in time that set-off is 
to be exercised; and 
(e) Exclusion of certain obligations – tax obligations, personal injury compensation 
claims etc. may be excluded.  
4.26 Yet, what may be agreed contractually can only be exercised in accordance with the 
national laws that apply to the relevant counterparties. This applies to a simple set of 
contractual relationships between market participants using an ISDA or a GMRA (i.e. 
transaction-specific documentation) for one or more transactions governed under such 
                                                     
 
115  See 1.04.  
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master agreements. It also applies however to any other general (trading) terms and 
conditions that govern the relationship between the parties.  
4.27 Consequently, even if set-off is set out in a manner in a transaction-specific document 
(presumably, English law governed), parties need to consider the effect of the “other” 
terms, which may be subject to other governing laws than those of England. While 
generally best practice in documenting trading relationships, not all counterparties may 
have agreed a documentation hierarchy116, i.e., which documentation and which terms 
take precedence over each other. Agreeing a hierarchy assists in determining which 
mechanics apply when and under what law. In most instances, trading relationships are 
documented over time, with various differing documentation across asset-classes and 
transaction types and such hierarchy may not exist. Therefore, multiple laws of set-off 
may exist as a result of the documentation but also where the claims and counterparties 
are based. This merits counterparties carefully assessing the impact this has on Coll-RR 
exposure(s) to solvent and possibly insolvent parties across a multitude of transaction 
chains and relationship levels.    
4.28 The rules of set-off against solvent parties generally follow applicable choice-of-law rules 
and in most EU-MS share common principles. Contractual set-off is generally, 
recognised, permitted and enforceable. Set-off by operation of law (statute and/or 
common law precedent) between solvent parties may also apply as a self-help remedy or 
defence to a counterclaim.  
4.29 Set-off against insolvent parties, is comparably more complicated. Firstly, it is not 
dependent on the existence of a pre-insolvency right (or contract) and secondly, it is 
subject to the operation of insolvency laws of the jurisdiction of the insolvent 
counterparty. These insolvency laws have a number of jurisdiction-specific 
considerations. This applies even where most EU-MS insolvency laws include the 
application of automatic stays and look-back/clawback periods as well as respective 
national, and where applicable EU, insolvency law influenced requirements that affect 
obligations, whether unmatured and/or contingent or otherwise where different (i.e., non-
mutual) obligations may be set-off. 
                                                     
 
116  See Para. 8.  
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4.30 In more practical terms, set-off between insolvent parties may also, particularly where 
Collateral Assets are outside the counterparties relevant jurisdiction(s) may require the 
opening of ancillary/secondary proceeding(s) in the jurisdiction of where that asset is 
located. This may add a further jurisdiction to the mix.  
4.31 Unsurprisingly, English and Irish law, despite common origins, evidence certain 
jurisdiction-specific divergences that affect the law of set-off between solvent and 
insolvent parties. For set-off against solvent parties English case law has established 
principles that, while persuasive in Ireland, are not binding. Moreover, statutory-led 
divergences exist such as Irish law not having a concept of third party rights in contracts. 
For set-off against insolvent parties other differences exist as a result of UK and Irish 
insolvency law themselves having developed differently, with Irish law having undergone 
a number of amendments in 2012. These differences exist, notwithstanding both EU-MS 
and their insolvency laws being subject to and complying with EU-level provisions of 
insolvency law, even if the EU does not have a uniform EU-wide “Insolvency Code” – 
an issue that has long been highlighted in the Giovannini Barriers and again as a (much) 
longer-term CMU priority and a full discussion on these issues would merit a thesis in its 
own right.  
4.32 Notwithstanding the above, Art. 8 of the EU-FCD, as transposed in the UK- and Irish-
FCARs117, provides a common EU-level measure that disapplies certain insolvency law 
provisions to “eligible financial collateral arrangements”. This removes relevant 
Collateral Assets, provided they are subject to a TTCA or SFCA, from application of 
insolvency law and thus protects the collateralisation arrangement and permits set-off to 
be applied. As evidenced by the LBIE and MF Global insolvencies, where Collateral 
Assets are rehypothecated and/or subject to a right of use, they may cease to benefit from 
being subject to a TTCA or SFCA and thus may lose the Art. 8 EU-FCD protections, and 
would, in the event of insolvency of the party exercising such right, become subject to 
the insolvency estate. This raises a number of questions of law but equally skews the 
                                                     
 
117  See also Ireland’s Netting of Financial Contracts Act 1995, which while the Irish-FCARs “update” the Act, as discussed in Annex 
1, Act states that notwithstanding any provision of Irish law relating to bankruptcy, insolvency or receivership the provisions 
relating to netting, the set-off of money provided by way of security, the enforcement of a guarantee and the enforcement and 
realisation of collateral (thus Collateral Assets) and the set-off of proceeds therefrom, as contained within a (master) netting 
agreement or guarantee, provided it is legally enforceable against the counterparty and/or other person providing security.  The 
issue is that this exclusion/protection only applies to those items that qualify as “financial contracts” (see Section 1 of the Act) and 
these do not equate to all types of what the MiFID II/MiFIR Regime terms “financial instruments”. The Act misses for example 
derivatives on futures or options along with contracts for differences as well as (derivatives on) emissions allowances.   
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Recoverability Rate calculations that aim to help solve the question of “where is my 
collateral and how much of it can I get back and when?”.   
4.33 As evidenced in Annex 1, the divergences between EU-FCD (and EU-SFD) to that of the 
Irish-FCARs, but more importantly the UK-FCARs present a risk in their own right, even 
where the UK-FCAR’s Goldplating of what arrangements it covers, who is protected and 
what can be done with Collateral Assets goes beyond what EU-law originally designed 
and where the UK’s expanded rules are seen by many market participants as the gold 
standard and thus, as proposed, the EU ought to amend its own rules to bring them up to 
this standard.  
4.34 The Draft SLL was supposed to harmonise some of the issues above and create a more 
homogenous EU-wide law on set-off. A Draft SLL Rollout, whether as a 29th Regime or 
binding Regulation ought to do that. This matters, in particular where divergences are 
greater between other EU-MS’ laws of set-off for solvent and insolvent parties than those 
of England and Ireland.  Absent that action, these divergences are strongly “path 
dependent” and matter in the absence of an all-encompassing EU-wide law of set-off118, 
compared for example to the U.S.’ UCC applying across the constituent jurisdictions, 
means that counterparties’ exercise and enforceability of set-off against solvent and 
insolvent parties, includes obtaining comfort from legal counsel.  
4.35 Some of this comfort is provided by “industry legal opinions” (ILO), notably the ISDA 
Opinions (see Bibliography). These provide counterparties with explanations on the legal 
treatment (of say and English law governed ISDA in Ireland for netting and collateral 
purposes) concerning the use of relevant pro formas of master agreement documentation 
covered by the relevant industry opinion.  
4.36 Comfort does not however exclude the existence of conceptual gaps nor minimise CTR 
nor does such comfort typically extend to non-master agreement documentation i.e., ILOs 
would not extend to consider Megabank’s General Terms and Conditions (or other 
specific terms) that Bancogrande has agreed to and which therein state that these are 
super-ordinate and thus take precedence over ISDA documented relationships. This 
                                                     
 
118  Other than the impact of BRRD (II), as transposed into the UK and Ireland as well as relevant conflicts of law EU legislative 
instruments –notably Rome 1 Regulation – which sets out common EU-wide rules (excl. Denmark) that determine the applicable 
law., that are beyond the scope of discussion in this thesis.  
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means that even where an ILO provides comfort for an ISDA-documented trade and 
exercise of contractual set-off pursuant to that ISDA, it will not cover the right of set-off 
under the super-ordinate terms. The ILO will also not cover any terms on set-off, where 
it exists, in respect of relevant Custodian/Depositories – and thus Custody Related Risk.  
4.37 The following Figure 4, which expands on work in Johnston, Werlen and Link119, presents 
an overview of some core differences between English and Irish law of set-off: 
 England  Ireland  
General 
Principles 
Where a person is able to set-off a claim owing to 
it against a claim of another, even where that other 
is insolvent, the claim is in substance “secured” 
(although this does not create a security interest) to 
the extent of the set-off and the claiming party need 
not prove for its claim nor wait for the 
representative of the other (including the insolvent 
estate) against it.  
Further, contractual set-off falls outside the 
provisions of the Companies Act 2006, as amended 
ss. 859A to 859Q requiring registration of charges 
created by companies registered or having a 
registered establishment in England & Wales.  
The need for specific agreement to apply set-off 
outside bankruptcy is required.120  
With the introduction of the Companies Act 2014 (ss 
599 and 600) and   from 1 June 2015, security over 
cash or monies in an account with a financial 
institution does not require registration with the 
Companies Registration Office.  
Is non-
insolvency set-
off provided for 
by statute? 
No (other than in court proceedings), but 
contractual set-off is enforceable. 
Yes, and mandatory where judgment is made for 
plaintiff in a claim and a defendant in a 
counterclaim. 
Banker’s Right 
of set-off 
Yes, English law recognises money held by an 
entity as a “bank” may exercise a right to combine 
accounts and set-off mutual claims owing between 
the bank and the customer in respect of debit and 
credit balances held with the bank (but not 
necessarily different branches).  
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust 
Company [1987] 2 FTLR 509, which also discusses 
the treatment of branches as separate to that of 
head-office, also discusses that such rights may 
also be afforded to the customer.  
Yes but subject to specific agreement. Courts, will 
in principle, generally give effect to banker’s right 
of set-off save for special protections that may exist 
under Consumer Protection Codes and/or the 
European Communities (Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts) Regulations 1995 and 200, the Consumer 
Credit Act 1995. 
Is set-off 
mandatory 
Yes, in accordance with Insolvency Rules 
(England & Wales) 2016121 and, where applicable 
UK Banking Act 2009. 
No, but set-off is freely permitted between mutual 
parties 
                                                     
 
119  Johnston, William, Werlen, Thomas and Link, Frederick (eds) “Set-Off Law and Practice: An International Handbook” (3rd Edition) 
(Oxford University Press 2018).  
120  The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland v Martin and Martin [1937 IR 189 as well as Murphy J in Re Euro Travel Ltd, 
Dempsey v Bank of Ireland unreported 28 May 1984 p 9.  
121  For a fuller discussion see Johnston, William, Werlen at page 179 to (incl.) 188.  
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within 
insolvency? 
Are there any 
look-back 
periods or 
clawbacks of 
pre-insolvency 
set-offs 
 
Yes, there is a clawback period of six months for 
unconnected preferential transactions and two 
years for undervalued or connected preferential 
transactions 
Yes, there is a six-month look back period from 
wind-up (two years for connected parties) with 
certain limitations including rights of set-off. 
If there is a 
conflict of law 
does Rome I 
apply? 
Yes, Rome I may be relevant for determining the 
governing law of a set-off agreement, but the 
potential conflicts of law analysis in the context of 
set-off are broad and complex. 
Yes, where counterparty is operating from an EU-
MS. 
 
Figure 4 – Comparative analysis of set-off in England and Ireland 
4.38 As a result of the above, even jurisdictions with a common heritage do have some 
fundamental instances of CTR. This merits care when documenting but also exercising 
set-off with solvent and insolvent parties.  
4.39 As described herein, that response, which continues to evolve, is in itself fragmented and 
not all encompassing in both breadth and depth. The tapestry of trade and post-trade rules 
and the stability it is supposed to provide makes more of a disjointed and erratic Jackson 
Pollock than any structured, balanced and harmonious landscape that has had a uniform 
brushstroke applied. Moreover, while DvP exists, this applies equally to fundamental risk 
mitigants such as the law of set-off across the EU, which despite the GFC and its impact 
on Collateral Assets and liquidity, which is explored in the next Chapter, remain 
fragmented along jurisdiction-specific lines.  
 
 
4.40 1987 and the GFC - lessons learned for Collateral Ecosystem resilience? 
4.41 The GFC’s fallout started in select corners of financial markets. It then spilled-over and 
transformed into self-reinforcing pressures that were difficult to contain. As these 
propagated they subsequently caused a general malaise. In some areas, the GFC’s impact 
killed markets and asset classes altogether, in others it transformed them. Stressed market 
conditions highlighted the need for more Collateral Assets and resilience of mobilisation 
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channels across all markets and the “real economy” 122 – echoes of the 1987 crash were 
surpassed and that raises questions about whether lessons had been learned since then.  
4.42 As Norman notes on page 79, the October 1987 market crash was a wake-up call for top 
policymakers and senior bankers on risks arising from post-trade arrangements for the 
first time. As the Bank of England’s 1993 Report from the “Task Force on Securities 
Settlement” set out “The events of 1987 moved settlement issues out of the back office and 
into the boardroom.”  Whilst this crash took place after the passing of the Financial 
Services Act 1986 in the UK, which set out the then regulatory framework for financial 
transactions, plus a number of informal codes relating to collateral, it would be quite some 
time before the first steps at European harmonisation would begin. They have only been 
addressed, at a high-level in CDD 2017/593 as part of the MiFID II/MiFIR Regime.  
4.43 Even if Norman predates the LBIE Insolvency, he makes the valid point that it is also 
worth recalling that the brushing off of this risk by IOSCO, which was only formed in 
1984 and only received a permanent secretary in 1986, did not stop the Group of 30 
chaired by the then former governor of the Bank of England, Gordon Richardson to 
identify and tackle deficiencies in settlement that had become apparent out of the 1987 
crash and put forward the “G30 Recommendations”, which focused on “friction costs of 
cross-border clearance, settlement and custody. It also identified “pipeline liquidity risk” 
i.e., the likelihood that cross-border settlement was made more expensive and complex 
by a lack of coordination in processing cycles amongst CSDs and payments systems123. 
Whilst non-binding, the recommendations helped shape both market practice and 
regulatory response since then and not just in a manner limited to making DvP de rigeur 
across transaction types and thus evidence of a voluntary regime perhaps achieving action 
where legislative rulemaking did not dare to tread. That being said, Norman points out, is 
that these global efforts failed to break through the national silos of the FMIP landscape 
and proffered that international comparability must grow out of the national landscape, a 
fact that has not taken route to date as prominently as some might hope for. The European 
efforts came through the World Exchange of Federations focussing on the cross-border 
                                                     
 
122  This view, despite taking aspects of systems theory, which along with contract theory, has some real application to the collateral 
ecosystem, fails to account for transmission channels spilling over or self-replicating themselves due to perception of fear or such 
fears actually manifesting themselves in a global financial system.   
123  See page 93 Norman.  
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links between (I)CSDs and CSDs. Both of these responses pre-dated the Giovannini 
Barriers and workstreams that have largely stalled, save for T2S since then. Radical 
initiatives voiced by the G30 to create a global CSD or common shared processing have 
stalled in delivery, even though it assisted in advancing EU thinking, notably ultimately 
in shaping, but not breaking, the Giovannini Barriers. 
4.44 Nearly 20 years later, as 2007 turned to 2008, the GFC’s full eruption of risk propagation 
tested the Collateral Ecosystem, notably by adversely affecting security arrangements, 
Custody arrangements and various types of Collateral Assets from functioning as 
intended or being correctly valued. This even applied to those collateral arrangements 
backed by cash and high-quality liquid financial instruments, such as government bonds, 
which were considered to be highly resilient to stress and thus quasi ‘risk free’124. In short, 
the GFC did not spare the Collateral Ecosystem; rather it subjected it to selective as well 
as system-wide stresses and raising “shadow banking” questions.  Singh describes this as:  
“The market mechanisms in this area have given rise to a new area of attention, 
often pejoratively dubbed “shadow banking”. Often misunderstood, this system 
of intermediation provides important liquidity to the market and has a vital role 
to play.  Of course, greater transparency[125] is required as a minimum, of only 
to increase the understanding of the “shadow banking” sector and to identify 
any risks that it may harbour. The link between collateral used by “shadow 
banking” entities and monetary policy is another area that has seldom been 
explored in great depth.[126] The repo market is directly affected by monetary 
policy measures and can have implications for the connection between regulated 
firms and activities of the “shadow banking” sector.”   
4.45 The GFC’s systemic seizure rapidly accelerated, driving weary market participants to 
greater risk aversion in terms of new and existing business. In the EU, this slowdown 
                                                     
 
124  A risk free asset has no legal definition, but is generally accepted in the market that the financial asset or collateral asset has limited 
risk susceptibility and/or high risk resilience that it is equivalent to the prevailing interest rate. G-8 Sovereign Bonds are typically 
considered to be risk-free assets.    
125  Measures such as a “look-through” concept and establishing proxies of risk exposure in transaction chains, as advocated herein, 
would be one step beyond the regulatory measures taken in 2016 in the form of SFTR which introduces regulatory reporting to 
Trade Repositories starting in January 2018.   
126  Until now! At least in a non-mathematical analytical sense.  
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began with a reluctance to engage in cross-border activity and rapidly accelerated, 
certainly after LBIE’s  failure in September 2008, to even domestic markets and activity 
seizing-up. The resulting wide-scale retrenchment impacted a breadth of financial 
instruments, including perceived ‘safe haven’127 assets in terms of their marketability and 
liquidity. What constitutes ‘liquidity’ is often debated by regulatory and supervisory 
policymakers as well as market participants.   
4.46 This thesis prefers to expand the definition of “liquidity”, as summarised in Saguato 
2015128,  
“…is a central concept for the study of financial market[s]. Scholars identify 
three main dimensions of liquidity (1) ‘market liquidity’ indicates the ability to 
trade a security quickly at a price close to its consensus value; (2) ‘funding 
liquidity’ refers to the access of sufficient cash reserves or the ability to obtain 
credit at acceptable terms; and (3) ‘monetary liquidity’ describes “broader 
monetary aggregates” as explored in 2014 by Thierry Foucault, Marco Pagano 
Alisa Röell in “Market Liquidity – Theory, Evidence and Policy.”   
4.47 This thesis would also propose that a specific fourth dimension of liquidity exists, 
“collateral asset liquidity”. This is different to CAF (see Para. 2.56) and the market 
liquidity/fungibility of those Collateral Assets, rather it focuses on how the collateral asset 
can be mobilised along transaction chains and across relationship exposures (concepts 
defined below). Applying this to a hypothetical practical example, a government bond, 
mobilised as a collateral asset by way of a repo, using English law documentation and 
principles so that title transfers absolutely, is comparably more liquid for the collateral 
taker than if the collateral asset is mobilised by way of a security interest that does not 
transfer title absolutely. One reason for this is because a title transfer will, without 
limitation, permits the reuse of the collateral asset by the collateral taker as it takes 
absolute ownership with a contractual obligation to return the collateral asset or an agreed 
                                                     
 
127  A term that has no precise legal meaning is used in the market to describe financial instrument, which may include those used as 
collateral assets that are expected in times of heightened risk/uncertainty to substantially retain (gain in) their value despite 
prevailing adverse conditions.   
128  Paolo Saguato in Working Paper 21/2015 entitled “The Liquidity Dilemma and the Repo Market: A Two-Step Policy Option To 
Address the Regulatory Void” - Law Society Economy Working Papers series of the London School of Economics and Political 
Science Law Department available at: www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm (Saguato 2015) 
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equivalent. The higher the degree of collateral asset liquidity, the higher the fluidity of 
the collateral asset and their collateral velocity.   
4.48 The GFC’s lack of liquidity also put strain on the very availability and functioning of 
mobilisation channels in the Collateral Ecosystem. This adversely affected the 
functioning of core components of how money, financial instruments and other Collateral 
Assets move in payment systems, financial markets and the very liquidity of the Collateral 
Ecosystem. In particular in relation to the Collateral Ecosystem, the GFC inter alia 
caused: 
(a) rapid closing-out of transactions in financial instruments and/or Collateral Assets;   
(b) a general squeeze on collateral asset in terms of their availability, liquidity, 
mobility and pricing; 
(c) loss of confidence and blockages to key mobilisation and funding channels of and 
for Collateral Assets, notably SFTs; 
(d) increase in asset Haircut/Overcollateralisation requirements;  
(e) pressure to either supplement, or in some instances, replace transactional 
relationships, including across transaction chains that were historically 
undertaken solely by TTCAs with SFCAs and/or separate credit support;  
(f) pressure from market participants, regulators and central banks to accept ‘higher 
quality collateral’ despite central bank-led supporting measures to shore-up 
confidence;  
(g) sudden or wide-spread ‘withdrawals’ from repo, SecLend and SFT exposures; 
and 
(h) failure of a number of market participants as well changes to FMIPs and their 
processes. 
4.49 A “withdrawal” in this context, is a market terminology term that refers to a financial 
services provider previously providing a given liquidity in an asset class in a set of 
transaction chains, and/or a service/product, and then ceasing to do so. Such withdrawals 
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occur when a party to relevant transactions whether as collateral taker or provider, asks 
for differing (often higher) Haircuts and/or refuses to enter into new or continue (roll-
over/refinance) existing transactions thereby removing financing and/or stock of 
Collateral Assets.  
4.50 Upon a withdrawal, if there is no readily available replacement or alternative this leaves 
a void in either liquidity in the given asset class or the service.  In the context of 
origination of collateral asset channels or more pressingly in the case of mobilisation 
channels in the collateral ecosystem, withdrawals not only pressure valuations in asset 
classes, cause pressures to find suitable collateral assets but, especially when withdrawing 
completely from asset classes, can bring the system to stress, sometimes even a halt, and 
may cause certain channels to dry up completely.  In the case of distressed or depressed 
markets, a withdrawal from a relevant transaction can have knock-on effects.  
4.51 As an example, in the case of a repo a withdrawal might prompt the collateral provider to 
need to ensure it has sufficient funding liquidity. This will be a priority in order for it to 
complete its obligations to return cash, and, in exchange, for the other party to perform is 
obligations to return the collateral asset or alternatively, the collateral provider with the 
repayment obligation, may elect, rather than sourcing the cash, that it will part with the 
Collateral Assets instead as settlement and discharge of its obligations. A withdrawal can 
cause blockages and stops in these arrangements. Equally, on the other side of this deal, 
a withdrawal may raise questions on the suitability or resilience of the collateral asset 
itself, both when taken and in terms of re-delivery. It may put pressure on other collateral 
relationships as well. 
4.52 As introduced in Chapters 1 and 2, the GFC caused EU policymakers but equally those 
in individual jurisdictions to take individual actions. Whilst these different levels sought 
to coordinate with one another, full calibration i.e., harmonisation across all levels and 
jurisdictions to drive convergence, including by eliminating conceptual gaps and CTR, to 
move to a true “level playing field” remains a work in progress. That work is complicated 
by a number of EU-MS and Eurozone members often, as in prior to the GFC, failing to 
implement EU legislation fully or by the relevant timelines.  
4.53 This is the case despite the 2009 G-20 Pittsburgh Commitments setting goals for each of 
the various levels of decision takers and policymakers to implement a progress review 
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and reporting period. From increased regulatory capital standards, to de-risking OTC 
derivatives, a range of the regulatory actions of the EU have differed (in various degrees) 
from their global peers, including notably the U.S.   
4.54 Along the way, a number of items diverged between jurisdictions (primarily EU v USA). 
Thinking and priorities changed as set out in the Financial Markets Law Committee 
Discussion Paper: “Coordination in the Reform of International Financial Regulation: 
Addressing the Causes of Legal Uncertainty” published for comment in February 2015129 
(2015 FMLC Paper) in particular that:  
“Overlaps, inconsistencies and conflicts have emerged between respective 
national rules contributing at times to the impression that the regulatory and 
legal framework which supports the financial markets is beset of legal 
uncertainty.”   
4.55 In other words, the legislative and regulatory rush to push the global reform project along, 
has possibly led to propagation of regulatory fatigue that contributed to CTR and thus 
legal uncertainty and a general weariness on suitability and ability to comply130. This is 
quite the contrary of what was supposed to happen or indeed would be prudent to happen. 
Examples of publically disclosed inconsistences and the legal uncertainties to which they 
give rise are set out in the 2015 FMLC Paper’s annex. A lot of the work on finalising 
implementation may be nearing completion but as Part III points out, policymakers, now 
with CMU and the Collateral Ecosystem, need to overcome challenges that derail from 
delivering the actual reforms and thus harmonisation. This includes focusing and 
committing institutional resources to convergence, an area that each of the ESAs, ECB-
SSM and members of the ESFS have on their work agenda and deliver with various 
degrees of success131 and which Part III assess whether a dedicated function in the EU 
Publications Office might be better placed to deliver that even if the aforementioned 
                                                     
 
129  See: http://www.fmlc.org/uploads/2/6/5/8/26584807/fmlc_g20_discussion_paper.pdf  
130  And this consensus is shared by a number of financial services regulatory professionals that have, according to a range of estimates 
including that of the Financial Times on 5 December 2016 (see: https://www.ft.com/content/78f0a48e-b886-11e6-961e-
a1acd97f622d)    benefitted, at least from U.S. retail banks surveyed, from ca. USD 200 billion in consultancy fees since the onset 
of the GFC.   
131  See discussion by M.D. Huertas in Dentons’ Eurozone Hub’s “Navigating 2019” which is available: 
https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/guides-reports-and-whitepapers/2019/january/31/financial-regulatory-outlook-2019 
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institutions, notably the ESFS, which has undergone further reform to its founding 
legislative provisions, has “come of age”, with the ESAs being seen to be capable and 
pragmatic technocrats in discharging their rulemaking and supervisory powers in relation 
to their respective mandates.  
4.56 Part of this lack of progress may be excused by the GFC’s economic problems still driving 
a firefighting mentality and ultimately Brexit driving political questions about the EU, its 
identity, goals, political integrity, the lack of full political union, fiscal union or at the 
very least a  coordinated fiscal policy being tested, before driving the EU-27 to greater 
unity. Concerns remain on the competencies and abilities of various EU-MS and their 
national authorities to deal with fiscal and financial market issues, especially given that 
these, despite receiving greater powers, partly in response to the GFC and partly in 
response to the Europeanisation, have not received, aside from the SSM, much in the way 
of additional institutional resources allowing them to conduct comprehensive regulatory 
stocktakes to “level the playing field”. Nor have they, aside from regulatory data 
collection, quantitative driven stress-testing, the impact of current post-GFC reforms from 
a true qualitative manner, possibly considering that some reforms such as CCPs and 
interconnectedness, may hardwire risks, absent solutions that could contribute to the next 
financial crisis in CCPs and cause risk propagation through various channels.   
4.57 Ironically, the fallout of the GFC was caused and driven by the too-big to fail institutions 
and Concentration Risk, and the post GFC reforms, have largely driven market 
participants to concentrate more risk with these institutions and FMIPs, where the largest 
members and often shareholders are the same systemically important institutions thus 
increasing Concentration Risk and CEPCR. This is further complicated by a range of 
post-trade post-GFC FMIPs offering or reliant upon services offered by non-EU 
headquartered credit institutions acting as FMIPs (specifically Bank of New York Mellon 
and J.P Morgan) or Concentration Risks relating to EU headquartered FMIPs themselves 
including Euroclear and Clearstream – which often go un-fined in the event of regulatory 
breaches. If market participants and other stakeholders thought the GFC was costly, then 
risk failings in the Collateral Ecosystem, including as a result of the new and largely 
untested scenarios of resolving market infrastructure systems and/or systemically 
important FMIPs – specifically CCPs and CSDs would be ever so much more.  
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4.58 In addition, some of the GFC reforms that have tackled the Collateral Ecosystem, such as 
SFTR focus more on transparency and regulatory reporting rather than resilience. 
Surprisingly, as Saguato 2015 summarises, action on reforms to fix the Collateral 
Ecosystem’s structural vulnerabilities and externalities, specifically in relation to repo 
and SFT, have caused these transaction types to be labelled incorrectly as part of the 
“shadow banking” system. It should be noted that these transaction types and mobilisation 
channels are in fact the lifeblood of liquidity for both credit institutions and their clients 
they engage with in capital markets and banking business.  
4.59 The possible explanation for this political label is that a number of policymakers have 
historically barely engaged with technical experts let alone explored132 or fully 
understood the specifics, principles and/or terminology used in the Collateral Ecosystem. 
Instead, given that these transactions are largely concluded and executed on an OTC basis, 
and prior to the GFC, were largely unreported and thus considered opaque. The pejorative 
term of “shadow banking” has attracted stigma from supervisors despite these items being 
so very crucial to the functioning of the markets including the parts of what would be the 
“transparent” part of the banking system. This has remained the case despite increased 
regulatory pressures from individual EU reforms: 
(a) driving market participants to collateralise transactions and relationships that may 
previously not have been collateralised including centralising multilateral and 
bilateral exposures into central counterparties (CCPs) or trading venues i.e. 
execution venues; 
(b) leading certain market participants to engage in CUT practices or extend 
collateral transaction chains to source higher quality collateral; 
                                                     
 
132  See however original work and subsequent publications and policy decisions building off the Financial Stability Board paper 
“Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking Policy Framework for Address Shadow Banking Risks in Securities 
Lending and Repos” (published 29 August 2013) available from 
Http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130829b.pdf or a somewhat earlier yet still exceptionally influential driver 
of policy thinking, including in the EU, despite its U.S. context on tri-party reforms and benefits available from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York’s “White Paper on Tri-Party Repurchase Agreement (Repo) Reform” (published 17 May 2010) both of which 
were considered and assisted in the protracted journey to a much-critiqued EC ‘Communication’ and ‘Green Paper’ on ‘shadow 
banking’ (available: http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/shadow-banking/index_en.htm ) leading ultimately to legislative 
proposals that would become the SFTR a piece of legislation that copies much of the principles that were developed for EMIR and 
applies them (with some would argue little consideration) for repos, SecLends and SFTs.  
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(c) pushing certain market participants to manufacture Collateral Assets and 
instruments specifically for collateral purposes;  
(d) changing how SFTs, CCPs and other FMIPs are regulated and how market 
participants interact with each other and FMIPs; and 
(e) central bank-led action to step-in and support confidence in the Collateral 
Ecosystem through new mobilisation channels (including expanding the range of 
eligible Collateral Assets) as well as the outright purchases of asset classes for 
both monetary policy transmission purposes but equally to encourage commercial 
market participants (by way of a trickle-down effect) to mobilise broader sets of 
Collateral Assets, notably credit claims133. Nevertheless, mobilising credit claims 
as Collateral Assets remains a challenge and one that is of differing degrees134 
across the EU and the Eurosystem.  
4.60 However, despite all the progress in sophisticating financial markets to trade more 
volume, integration still is reliant on reforming principles affecting collateralisation 
techniques, transactions in and security interests in respect of accounts, cash, 
commodities and financial instruments notably the impact on post-trade processes 
discussed in Chapter 6 and which still cause issues that lead to the Giovannini Barriers 
and EPTF Barriers stubbornly being in place. This merits looking at the roughly 150 plus 
years of evolution of laws, regulations and supervisory engagement as well as expectation 
– which would be beyond the scope of this thesis. These in turn are based on, and driven 
by, legal principles and concepts as well as jurisprudence that have evolved in the 
                                                     
 
133  In 2007, the Eurosystem began accepting credit claims as eligible collateral for its MonPol operations. This meant that a credit 
claim granted by a creditor (i.e. the loan originator) to the debtor could be mobilised, whether on a standalone or pooled basis, to 
provide security for a loan granted by the Eurosystem to the loan originator. Repayments from the underlying debtor flow through 
the loan originator. If the loan originator fails to comply with its repayment obligations to the Eurosystem, then the Eurosystem, 
as security taker in respect of the mobilised collateral assets (i.e. the credit claim) could enforce on that loan. Changes to the EU-
FCD in 2009 expanded the regime and insolvency safeguards to credit claims and thus make these attractive collateral assets.  
134  Both in terms of reduction of the legal obstacles as well as the operational issues including mobilisation/communication interfaces. 
As an example an Irish law credit claim might use an Irish law floating charge to mobilise the credit claim, thus not requiring any 
notification under Irish law to the debtor of the credit claim and use an e-filing process with the Central Bank of Ireland as collateral 
taker. A Greek law governed loan, for example, might use a Greek law pledge (enechiro) notification to the debtor and use a paper-
based filing format with the National Bank of Greece. This divergence in mobilisation techniques, notification formalities (both 
issues of law of the Member States) as well as unharmonised systems in Eurosystem National Central Banks have historically 
posed a problem since non-marketable assets began to be mobilised. 
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(current) EU-MS plus UK, independently of each and in keeping with various schools of 
legal thought – while Irish courts might look to British courts it may not do so actively. 
Equally, the absence of an EU Financial Markets court (see Part III) means a German, 
French, Italian etc. court or other dispute resolution venue might not look to others.135    
4.61 This divergence and difference makes harmonisation potentially, if viewed through a 
perspective of limitations as opposed to opportunity, a difficult challenge, that post-GFC 
integration projects, including CMU will require decisive action as opposed to “just” 
consultation as was mostly the case in CMU 1.0 and which hopefully will not be the case 
for CMU 2.0. As discussed above, security interests, concepts of ownership and 
insolvency laws remain national-law driven and thus trapped within national boundaries. 
This hardwires conceptual gaps and CTR even where EU-level action seeks to harmonise. 
Paech 2015136, drawing similar conclusions as Bosomworth on preserving national-
interests, an area the 2015 FMLC Paper also flags as in need of tackling, summarises 
causes, continuing challenges and constrictions in that (emphasis added in bold):  
“…Courts and statutes over time have supported three subsequent developments in the 
mercantile practice, all of which aim at increased efficiency and liquidity: first, the 
concept of easy and safe transfer on the basis of negotiability or register entries; second, 
the centralisation of settlement through account structures involving multiple layers of 
intermediaries [, holding structures and legal interests therein] and, last, the globalisation 
of finance and capital flows, allowing for assets being traded and collateralised in much 
wider and deeper markets. However, the development of the law became heavily path 
dependent and idiosyncratic, as legislators in many countries tried to uphold the ideas 
of chattel-like rights even though there were no paper certificates any more.”     
4.62 National barriers, fragmented markets, differing legal and operational systems and lack 
of support for on-going work to develop greater standardised documentation all restrict 
more efficient mobilisation of Collateral Assets. This failure to fix fragmentation in 
market and legislative elements allows conceptual gaps and CTR to add to barriers to 
                                                     
 
135  See also M.D. Huertas and K.A. Schaffelhuber in “Resolving English Law Financial Disputes Post-Brexit: Is Now the Time for 
the EU-27 to Create Its Own Specialist Financial Court?,” Journal of International Banking Law & Regulation. 
136  See work by Dr. Philipp Paech (Paech), Assistant Professor, Law Department, The London School of Economics and Political 
Science in Working paper 20/2015 entitled “Capital Markets Union, Investment Securities and the Tradition of Casting Liquidity 
into the Law” of the Law Society Economy Working Papers series of the London School of Economics and Political Science Law 
Department available at: www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm (Paech 2015) 
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building a true Single Market. Moreover, a major school of thought, both for 
policymakers, including those engaged with the resolution of the Giovannini Barriers as 
well as academics, including Paech 2015 and contemporaries, concentrate their focus on 
resolving barriers by looking to resolve clarity on conflicts of laws issues, which in itself 
has been cemented by this concern into a key challenge, as opposed to bypassing this as 
some FMIPS and market participants have done.  
4.63 For transactions shaped by English law or laws based on common law, any concern with 
conflicts of laws are typically resolved pragmatically, including by contractual agreement 
or by looking through to the governing law chosen by the given FMIP. This pragmatic 
approach drives certainty. Looking at the substance of how transactions work as opposed 
to overtly resting on preserving various degrees of legal fiction that frustrates free 
movement of collateral, has contributed to ensuring that the majority of financial market 
participants, certainly those transacting across borders, use English law governed 
documentation for their Financial Market Transactions as well as their Collateral Asset 
arrangements. Similarly, operational and infrastructure improvements such as TARGET 
and T2S, have assisted, certainly in the Eurozone, to bring the constituent markets closer 
together as its operating rules provide consistency and certainty based on a relatively 
‘Jurisdiction-Agnostic’ and pragmatic set of rules.   
4.64 While the preceding paragraphs provide an overall demonstration of how the GFC 
impacted the Collateral Ecosystem, its mobilisation channels and some of the changes it 
is also important to understand, market participants’ roles and their bargaining power that 
shape arrangements in the Collateral Ecosystem. These issues are discussed in the next 
Chapters.    
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5. After the trade 
5.1 This Chapter sets out an overview of the role(s) that market participants play in the 
Collateral Ecosystem and what this may mean for the identification, mitigation and 
management of the range of risks discussed herein. Where applicable, specific 
considerations that are relevant for financial counterparties and non-financial 
counterparties are distinguished.  In addition, differences in terminology used in the legal 
and non-legal operational sense as well as issues relevant for quantification of CTR are 
addressed here. The risks discussed herein arise not only in the actual 
relationship/arrangements but in the documentation that aims to (accurately) capture, 
reflect and document the agreed relationship. As a result, having an understanding of the 
roles of market participants, how these roles have evolved and been shaped, and how the 
roles and relationships are documented is important in framing the risks that arise. This 
also means having an assessment of the provisions and gaps between the legal and 
regulatory framework in which these roles, relationships and the risks arise, exist and 
operate.   
5.2 Historically the market has been dominated by prime brokerage businesses, which may 
have a Custody servicing offering that is provided by the prime broker itself or an affiliate 
of the prime broker entity. That business has been dominated by around 20 market 
participants (dealer entities and/or FMIP including custodians/depositaries) who operate 
on a global scale in USD trillions worth of business on a daily basis. Changes in the 
regulatory environment and market practice since the GFC, have changed the Collateral 
Ecosystem and what, where and how market participants undertake the breadth of 
activities in their business model or strategy.  
5.3 These changes, even where risk and chains of bilateral exposures are being replaced with 
multilateral or centralised exposures, still merit a shift to a more sophisticated approach 
to traditional schools of risk identification, mitigation and management, but an 
appreciation of Coll-RR, Cust-RR and CTR as new elements of risk or, in the case of 
CTR as a subset to legal and documentation risk. Just as the Collateral Ecosystem and 
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market participants’ roles therein are changing, the methods and metrics used to identify, 
mitigate and manage relevant risks need to adapt and this is explored in Parts II and III.      
5.4 Prudent risk management therefore merits having a clear overview not just on one’s own 
terms/exposure, but equally system-wide plus individual exposures to market participants 
and with whom one may have direct and/or indirect exposures. This also means assessing 
and estimating exposures in relationships between counterparties of one’s own 
counterparty and assessing whether an event occurring in that relationship might have an 
adverse impact on one’s own primary relationships and collateral exposures or ability to 
recover collateral and/or mitigate financial loss.  
5.5 For all market participants, including collateral takers, collateral providers and collateral 
centres (FMIPs and non-FMIPs), this consideration is important not only at inception, but 
throughout the transaction lifecycle as well as across the value chain. This is also 
important, as the Collateral Assets that these market participants deal in will change 
hands, including change ownership or control multiple times. Equally, these changes 
occur in different forms.  They also occur across and in various tiers of accounts that 
facilitate the transfer of ownership and payment. These changes are motivated in relation 
to, and/or in order to satisfy, the range of often very different needs and objectives of the 
respective market participants. These differing needs and objectives may also be 
influenced by, and reflected in contractual exposures, information asymmetry. These 
objectives, motivations, information asymmetries and bargaining power, including (if 
contract theory applies) in differing states of dynamic contracts, apply not only between 
market participants in their different roles vis-à-vis one another, but equally in respect of 
direct or indirect interaction/use of FMIPs.    
5.6 Equally, as multifaceted as each of the market participants’ roles in the Collateral 
Ecosystem might be, it is important to not lose sight of the fact that respective business 
models might in some transactions/products be complementary to one another but that 
they could also be in competition with one another. This fact applies irrespective of asset 
class, transaction type or jurisdiction. These business models are not only drivers of 
motivations, but equally barriers or opportunities to documenting relationships, exposures 
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and arrangements (including with respect to collateral) in a manner that appropriately 
identifies, mitigates and manages risk.   
5.7 The way relationships evolve is also influenced by the degree of information asymmetry 
at formation and during evolution of the relationship as well as more generally the legal 
and regulatory culture in which the relevant parties and stakeholders to a documented 
relationship operate in that relationship as well as across the other multifaceted roles they 
may perform. Documented relationships are likely to have different degrees of fluidity. 
Consequently, change across the different tiers of relationships may also be subject to a 
ripple effect. This means that a change in one agreement or market practice, including in 
unconnected relationships, can affect one’s own exposure.   
5.8 The same can arise due to technological advances that change systems, operations and 
thus documented terms. As much as technology shapes relationships and 
trading/collateral arrangements and can assist in accurate capture and documentation 
management, people, their cultural bias, their preferences, and the framework, they and 
their business operate in shape the complexity of relationships and the documentation 
evidencing that.  The deciding factor, and the question of how clear or how muddled, 
these documented and operational relationships are, as well as the degree of exposures 
and transactions created within that relationship framework, will also be shaped by how 
a particular relationship has evolved over time.   
5.9 At a basic level, the majority transactions, whether they are spot or a derivative, whether 
traded on a Regulated Market or a non-regulated market or other  execution venue, 
whether documented by a bilateral agreement, standard terms and conditions or a master 
agreement, they will all involve the following processes that occur after a transaction has 
been “traded”.    
5.10 The following paragraphs describe those core processes. The relevant concepts are rooted 
in market terminology, some of which have been adopted or influenced by legal 
terminology. Some of this terminology finds its origin in the trading of physical 
instruments or mercantile trade with a legal principle of direct holdings and physical 
location accounts, have, irrespective of dematerialisation and book-entry i.e. the indirect 
holding of financial instruments and cash, only slowly become more of a pre-trade 
consideration.   
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5.11 Whilst there are of course common elements to EU post-trade processes, and these are 
partly shaped by FMIPs or EU regulation (where it exists), historically the plumbing of 
each EU-MS evolved differently in types of operational and legal issues. These processes 
are crucial to ensuring parties get paid137 and ownership or control over the relevant asset 
(financial instruments or cash) moves to where it is intended by the parties to move.  
5.12 With “traded” one refers to the execution of a trade, i.e., the binding commercial 
agreement between counterparties has been concluded to exchange one or more financial 
instruments for value at a specific date. Once that trade is concluded, the post-trade 
processes that affect the transaction chain and the holding tiers over the course of the 
trade lifecycle begin.  
5.13 A trade is only finalised once the post-trade processes that follow the exchange of a trade 
confirmation are completed and the trade is cleared and settled.  The respective back and 
middle office of counterparties to that trade are involved in those post-trade processes, 
which in turn involve a number of FMIPs including CSDs and (I)CSDs as well as 
Custodians/Depositaries and SRIs. These typically occur in tandem to the generation, 
exchange and receipt of trade confirmations138 and its “booking”. Care should be drawn 
to differences in terminology and concepts or the incorrect use of terminology driving 
market practice used in relation to these post-trade processes. One example is the concept 
of where a transaction is ‘booked’.   
5.14 The concept of booking a transaction was historically important as it also determined 
where a financial instrument was booked i.e., the office that executed the trade and where 
the financial instruments/collateral was located i.e., custodied or held with a Depository 
commonly referred to as the location accounts.   
                                                     
 
137  Reliable, interoperable and safe payment systems are a sine qua non for the majority of economic interactions and for financial 
market transactions and collateral transactions much is built upon the context of no payment, no trade. 
138  A trade confirmation is effectively a receipt of the commercial, and in some instances, additional legal terms applicable to a trade.  
In a number of transaction types as well as asset classes, specific rules apply in relation to the content and timely exchange of 
confirmations.  These rules stem either out of efforts of industry associations or from regulatory policymakers or their amendments 
of the industry associations previous efforts.  The impact of the timely trade confirmation obligation imposed by EMIR on 
derivatives documentation, including ISDA Master Agreements is a prime example of regulatory change requiring documentation 
change and gaps and CTR occurring between the two.    
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5.15 With a move to dematerialisation of trading and holding of financial 
instruments/collateral, the notion of booking or location accounts has become blurred.  
This has occurred in part due to tiering of accounts, but equally the breadth of where 
information technology might be based and whether EUR denominated financial 
instruments traded by a London office can actually be attributed to being held by a precise 
server of Euroclear that is physically located in Belgium.   
5.16 Euroclear has sidestepped this issue, by making it clear in its Rulebooks that Belgian law 
applies to its EUR business and the accounts offered by it.  This does not mean that other 
governing laws may apply to different tiers and chains of ownership/entitlement (see 
below), irrespective of the notion of where the transaction was booked at execution and 
the equivalent of a location account along the different tiers/chains of entitlement. The 
absence of a choice of applicable law, the booking and location of where an account is 
maintained may have a determining factor in establishing the applicable law to a given 
account and the financial instruments held therein.  
5.17 In certain trading documentation, including ISDA documentation, the concept of booking 
is still reflected in the concept of Offices, Multibranch parties in Section 10 of the ISDA 
Master Agreement. For purposes, thereof counterparties may elect in the Schedule to the 
ISDA Master Agreement to add other Offices as parties that assume the same obligations 
as the head office entering into the agreement.  The decision on which Offices apply or 
whether a party is a Multibranch Party in respect of Transactions sets out that it can enter 
into Transactions and make payments and deliveries to any respective listed Office. By 
way of a simple example, this has some follow on effects in relation to when and how 
contractual netting and set-off may be applied as well as any transfer mechanics in 
relation to events of default or termination events in the ISDA Master Agreement. One 
reason this concept still exists is to support the legal fiction of when what laws apply but 
also because the documentation suite predates the full electronic era of trading.  
5.18 More generally, and for the sake of assessing Coll-RR, the legal fiction/concept of where 
transactions are booked may also have a determining factor on which applicable law is 
applied in certain insolvency proceedings (or proceedings of analogous effect) in respect 
of certain accounts and relevant holding chains.   
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6. Holding chains and tiering 
6.1 Irrespective of some differences between how post-trade processes operate for direct held 
financial instruments and those of indirectly held financial instruments and cash, the 
processes have common features in relation to categorising types of financial instruments 
and post-trade processes and one can distinguish between: 
(a) Certificated financial instruments circulated as:  
(i) a direct holding: legal entitlement in financial instrument is recorded in, 
and derived from, registration in the issuer’s books and is evidenced by 
a certificate, and the respective securities are transferred by execution of 
a transfer instrument and registration of the transfer139. A direct holding 
therefore has limits if any holding tiers exist;  
(ii) in bearer form: legal entitlement vests in the holder of the certificate and 
is transferred by delivery, as the title is not recorded on the issuer’s 
register. A direct holding therefore has limits if any holding tiers exist 
even when bearer form securities are entrusted to a custodian/Depository;   
(b) Immobilised140 and/or dematerialised141 142 financial instruments:  
                                                     
 
139  As Goode 4th ed. notes in Footnote 4 of 6-02 a legal principle that is of relevance both for English and Irish law, as well as to the 
(I)CSD for the UK and Ireland. “Though registration is necessary to confer or transfer the legal title, it is only prima facie evidence 
of ownership, and a person with a superior right to the securities may apply to the court for an order directing that he be placed 
on the register in place of the existing registrant.” (Re Bahia and San Francisco Rly Co (1868) L.R. 3 QB 584.   
 
140  To recap, immobilised securities refer to financial instruments, typically debt securities or equity securities in which a physical 
certificate has been placed in, historically, a vault or with a depositary, often from 1980 onwards such certificate taking the form 
of a global instrument that represents the entire amount of the issuance.  This approach is taken so that subsequent transfers can be 
made by book-entry.  Immobilised financial instruments are typically held in such a manner if the relevant settlement system, 
usually due to legal/regulatory requirements, requires that financial instruments are held this way.   
141  Financial instruments will take a dematerialised form when physical securities or documents of title representing ownership are 
eliminated and replaced by accounting records or book-entry.   
142  In principle, as Goode 4th ed. describes in relation to CREST (now Euroclear UK & Ireland) and the Uncertificated Securities 
Regulations 2001 (see: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2001/3755/contents/made), which is relevant for the operation of 
Euroclear in the UK and for Ireland is that a person that holds dematerialised/uncertificated securities may, to the extent not 
prohibited, present them for reconversion into certificated securities.   
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(i) indirect holding: rights in and to the relevant financial instruments are 
derived from credits to a respective account held with a nominee, 
custodian/Depository or settlement relevant intermediary (as defined 
below), with transfers made by book-entry.  Indirect holdings, require 
holding through different tiers, each of which only extend privity143 
between the tiers.  As a result tiers (C) below has no privity to tier (A) 
but only to tier (B), irrespective of any duties imposed at law or 
regulation:   
(A) the first tier-intermediary: whose nominee, usually a CSD or 
(I)CSD, holds the financial instrument direct from the issuer.  An 
example might be a global note, which is immobilised with the 
CSD or (I)CSD and represents the entire issue of financial 
instrument held with the CSD/(I)CSD.  In the UK and Ireland, 
dematerialised financial instruments may be held directly by an 
investor as a member of the CRESTCo, whilst a Recognised 
Clearing House despite providing clearing and settlement 
functions of a CSD;  
(B) the second-tier intermediary: as participants of the CSD or 
(I)CSD and thus first-time beneficiaries of the global note, who 
will then either issue definitive certificates to the third and 
subsequent holding tiers granting a direct relationship with the 
issuer (either through delivery of bearer securities or more 
commonly, registration), which whilst negotiable are more 
commonly referenced in entitlements that are transferred by 
book-entry when cleared and settled; and  
(C) third and subsequent holding tiers: who hold, or arrange 
holding of either definitive certificates or the more common 
entitlements with a custodian/Depository, which in turn may 
have further chains of holdings as described below.   
                                                     
 
143  Granting one party rights and interests to a direct exposure.  
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6.2 Tiering allows the issuer to deal with a limited number of counterparties, who hold 
accounts for a greater number of participants who in turn hold further accounts and so on.  
As Goode 4th ed. Notes at 6-10, the effect of tiering, indirect holdings and book-entry 
securities is:  
  “…substantially to reduce both the volume and the movement of paper involved 
in the issue and transfer of securities and holdings in undesignated pools of 
intangibles held by a securities intermediary in an omnibus account facilitates 
book-entry transfers of those securities from one customer of the intermediary to 
another, thus enabling a substantial volume of transfers to be effected in-house144.  
A transfer need be executed and registered only if and when a customer exercised 
his right to require delivery or redelivery of the securities credited to his 
account.”    
6.3 Tiering also should be considered in light of conflicts of laws where differences in degrees 
of account structures and segregation as this affects fungibility of assets as well as who 
has a claim against whom and when in the various holding tiers as well as across 
respective transaction chains. As a general rule as pointed out by Goode 4th ed. at 6-10, 
English and Irish law, as in most EU jurisdictions recognises that privity of contract exists 
only between the respective tiers as introduced above. However, absent a clear hierarchy 
of who has priority of claims in holding tiers, conflicts of laws can emerge unless conflicts 
of law rules are clear and/or harmonised as to who has the requisite interest in the financial 
instruments145 and this could impact Recoverability Rates as multiple parties across 
holding tiers may have competing claims to the same assets or interests in those same 
assets.      
6.4 The post-GFC focus on asset Segregation also means that market participants need to 
ensure that the type of Segregation and levels of protection are the same throughout the 
                                                     
 
144  Goode 4th ed. elaborates in relation to an omnibus account that “Where the transferee holds its account with a different 
intermediary, it is necessary to effect the transfer through the books of a higher-tier intermediary common to the intermediaries of 
transferor and transferee, if there is one, or if not, to go up the chain until a common intermediary is reached.”  This is a 
consideration that is important when assessing how multiple transaction chains and complexity of holding tiers, may absent client 
asset or client money protections, affect a party’s Recoverability Rate in relation to a particular instrument.  In financial instruments 
with sufficient liquidity and principles of fungibility, this is less of a problem. 
145  Notably at 6-10 of Goode 4th ed.    
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holding tiers.  If not, then Segregation offered at one tier may not be mapped through the 
entire holding chain. This has an impact on fungibility but equally on CAF. As a result, 
the resilience of Recoverability Rate in respect of Collateral Assets is impacted by the 
degree of fungibility of the financial instruments and/or cash and the level of Segregation 
of the relevant accounts. 
6.5 Despite market-led initiatives of best-practice and increased use technology to assist with 
the execution, management and confirmation of trading and the post-trade processes, the 
necessary convergence and harmonisation has (regrettably) not occurred (as of yet).  
Alternatively, where it has occurred it may only be confined to certain asset classes and 
transaction types.   
6.6 A large part of that depends not solely on the regulatory regime applicable in a respective 
jurisdiction, but due to the absence of the trading documentation or relationship 
documentation of market participants being upgraded to focus on these new realities146.  
It also depends on the relevant systems being able to interoperate with another as well as 
documentation to naturally interlink and be harmonised across the breadth of 
relationships.  
  
                                                     
 
146  For a study of these issues in practice in relation to EMIR driven legislative/regulatory changes, what this means for operational 
practice of trading and relationship documentation, including ISDA documentation and susceptibility to CTR please refer to 
Huertas [2015] EMIR Handbuch   
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7. Core-post-trade processes 
7.1 These processes can be summarised, in a non-legal manner as below147 and usually 
involve back-office systems of trade counterparties including brokers interfacing with 
FMIPs such as an (I)CSD, SSS and/or custodian/Depository.  It is important to note that 
post-trade processes (inter)operate concurrently so that financial instruments moving in 
one direction usually have a cash or other financial instruments moving in the other 
direction.  These post-trade processes, which are not subject to EU-wide rules or accepted 
voluntary standards (although the could be) include:  
(a) Verification: the process of comparing and if necessary reconciling discrepancies 
in the transaction or settlement details.  Verification is a pre-requisite to clearing 
and settlement;  
(b) Clearing148:  the process of establishing settlement positions, possibly including 
the calculation of net positions and the process of checking that financial 
instruments, cash or both are available and establishing the respective obligations 
of each of the counterparties to the trade;  
(c) Settlement (whether in central bank money or commercial bank money):  
(i) of financial assets (other than cash or non-cash payment instrument149):  
which the EC termed150 in simplistic fashion as “…the act of crediting 
                                                     
 
147  Irrespective of EU policymakers having attempted to do this as early as Commission Service Working Document on Definitions 
of Post-Trading Activities, Working Document/MARKT/SLG/G2(2005)D15283 (the 2005 EC Report) and subsequent legislative 
initiatives since and probably a key necessity going forward in building a common functional market language (see below).   
148  Clearing and settlement are often referred to in both technical language and legal/regulatory language by some as one process, 
whereas they are in fact two separate processes and FMIs and market participants engaged in those services are often referred to 
indiscriminately and interchangeably.  Clearing is a pre-requisite to settlement.   
149  A non-cash payment instrument is typically a means, irrespective of payment type or whether in durable medium (i.e. paper based) 
or electronic form, of authorising and submitting a payment (the authorisation from payer to its payment services provider or credit 
institution for funds to be transferred or the means by which the payee gives instructions to its payment services provider or credit 
institution for funds to be collected from the payer.   It should be distinguished, using market as opposed to legal terminology that 
payment types, depending on the payer/payee relationship can be distinguished between wholesale payments and retail payments.  
Wholesale payments tend to be time-critical high-value payments that are settled between financial institutions and possibly during 
set settlement periods.  Retail payments can include payments from NFCs and the rest of the market and are typically lower value.   
150  In its 2005 EC Report 
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and debiting the transferee’s and transferor’s accounts respectively with 
the aim of completing a transaction in securities.”;  
(ii) of cash or non-cash payment instrument;  
(d) Reconciliation:  
(i) between counterparties;  
(ii) between respective counterparty and Custodian/Depository;  
(e) Compression: of trades (also referred to “tear-up”) usually this applies to 
derivatives transactions but can apply elsewhere and is a means to reduce, using 
netting and set-off, the number of outstanding contracts (and the corresponding 
notional amounts) but keep the same economic exposure between the parties. 
Compression may be conducted bilaterally between counterparties netting, 
setting-off and cancelling offsetting contracts in a portfolio (of exposures) or may 
be conducted multilaterally between an agreed group of counterparties with 
relevant multilateral exposures;  
(f) Asset servicing,  corporate actions and/or event driven processing: which 
includes the servicing and processing of operational procedures related to the 
financial instruments on an on-going basis or in relation to a periodic or event 
driven action in respect of additional payments or corporate actions 
(dividends/coupons/interest), exercise of options, conversion or process of 
maturity/expiry, voting, valuations, tax related items and the accurate 
maintenance of actual trading and collateral positions;   
(g) Post-trade remedial action: which includes ensuring that counterparties that are 
delinquent with relevant orders151 agreed processes, such as settlement or delivery 
                                                     
 
151  See inter alia Chapter III of Weiss, David “After the Trade is Made: Processing Securities Transactions”, 2nd edition, Penguin 
Group 2006 (Weiss 2006).  Whilst now dated and more reflective of the Northern American market and infrastructure/practice of 
the time in relation to predominantly products on execution venues, Weiss 2006 provides a very helpful insight into the most 
common forms orders for certain financial products traded on an execution venue.  Transaction orders, once filled and executed 
will trigger the obligation to fulfil or deliver in relation to the collateral arrangement or security position.   
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failures or meeting maintenance calls for additional collateral (i.e. margin call) 
perform their obligations in a timely manner.  Remedial action may include 
closing-out and netting other open positions, enforcing collateral held by the 
collateral taker or other forms of legal action;  
(h) Monetisation services: which includes automatized or client directed securities 
financing transactions including repo or stock-lending of financial instruments 
for users.  Typically an (I)CSD, whilst it may be permitted to within agreed 
guidelines, engage in securities financing transactions between users of such 
monetisation services, it would engage in such transactional activity in the open 
market for own purposes unless it is permitted.  Such permitted transactions in 
offering financial instruments of consenting users to wider market participants is 
referred to in market terms as Street Lending and should be contrasted with 
broker to client margin financing.  The purpose of Street Lending monetises 
Collateral Assets, increases collateral fluidity as well as nodes of liquidity and for 
the manager of Street Lending as well as the relevant user as lender, generates 
fees.  Put otherwise, unchecked Street Lending may lower the actual 
Recoverability Rate for Collateral Assets specifically and may be unfavourable 
for Collateral Assets where a return of specific assets is necessary;  
(i) Margin financing: which includes the provision of short term lending (margin 
loans) secured i.e. collateralised against the portfolio of assets.  This may include 
any combination of collateralised loans, letters of credit and/or unsecured lending 
which, depending on the borrower’s risk profile may be used for the purposes of 
financing margin requirements. Typically this type of activity only takes place 
between the broker and its client counterparty;   
(j) Market and regulatory event driven and/or periodic reporting services: various 
EU legislation requires that market participants, or where permitted, their brokers 
or counterparties, make market based trade reporting or regulatory reporting to 
various recipients either due to event driven circumstances or on a periodic basis.  
Whilst there is (regrettably) some remaining fragmentation between the scope 
and breadth of reporting required in relevant EU jurisdictions depending on 
transaction type, even after MiFID II/MiFIR tried to fix this, this reporting 
extends in circumstances (notably derivatives in scope of EMIR) to not only the 
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transaction traded, but the collateralisation arrangements, collateral asset values, 
rehypothecation/contractual right of reuse and netting arrangements.  In the UK 
CASS 11 (See Annex 1)  also imposes obligations on regulated firms providing 
prime brokerage services to report a number of items in respect of the use and 
location of their collateral to their client counterparty.  This information, unless 
accounted for contractually, however does not apply to a counterparty or 
regulated firm that is not a provider of prime brokerage services.  Consequently, 
if an AIFM, managing an AIF engages in a transaction with an IORP, the UK 
rules do not, and the Irish rules certainly do not, require similar information to be 
exchanged or reported unless this contractually catered for;  
(k) Accounting and recordkeeping:  which can be differentiated between on the one 
hand internal operational accounting related to the recording and treatment of 
transactions (including fail to delivers and/or breaks/illogical positions ), 
exposures and collateral operations, fees and commissions etc., for internal use 
as well as, to the extent applicable, for regulatory reporting purposes and on the 
other hand financial accounting relevant for the preparation of public financial 
statements and reports. Accounting in this sense, forms two purposes: control and 
presentation. Recordkeeping can equally be segmented in relation to internal 
recordkeeping, conducted either on an ad-hoc basis or in accordance with a policy 
or periodic requirement or regulatory driven recordkeeping.  Recordkeeping 
obligations apply to generally all client files as well as all relevant material and 
information related or connected to a given transaction and/or collateral 
arrangement.  The UK and Irish legislative and regulatory framework in relation 
to recordkeeping has specific rules that apply predominantly to regulated entities 
and to a lesser extent non-regulated entities; and     
(l) Ancillary services provided by brokers: as described in para. 7.22.   
 
7.2 CCPs, clearing and settlement 
7.3 Whilst settlement and clearing, and respective FMIPs that perform/operate those 
functions, have long been established and have been necessary for the functioning of 
financial markets for as these have existed, the importance around the concept of clearing 
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has however evolved since the GFC and notably since the 2009 G-20 Pittsburgh 
Commitments.  As Norman sets out152 the EU uses the following terms, often, rather 
confusingly, interchangeably:  
(a) Counterparty clearing: the process by which a third-party interposes itself 
directly or indirectly between the transaction counterparties in order to assume 
their rights and obligations, thereby assuming the credit risk of the respective 
transaction counterparties and possibly guaranteeing the payment obligations due 
on the transaction; and  
(b) Central counterparty clearing (i.e. CCP clearing): is distinguished from 
counterparty clearing in that the CCP in CCP clearing also acts as the direct or 
indirect buyer to every seller and the direct or indirect seller to every buyer 
through novation of trades or analogous means, 
Correspondingly Party A and Party B engaging in counterparty clearing using a clearing 
house (CH1) will have their counterparty risk exposures taken on by CH1 but will still 
have a bilateral relationship between Party A and Party B (and equally between their 
corresponding custodians/depositaries).  By contrast in CCP clearing CCP1 will be the 
counterparty to Party A and equally the counterparty to Party B as well as the counterparty 
to each of Party A and B’s respective Custodian/Depository. 
7.4 Counterparty clearing, and more importantly CCP clearing have existed in certain asset 
classes and have been used by certain market participants prior to the GFC.  Nevertheless, 
as a result of the GFC and the 2009 G-20 Pittsburgh Commitments they have become a 
centrepiece for EU regulatory policymakers as a save all to unwinding a web of 
multilateral risk exposures in multiple transactions and replacing these with mutualising 
risk in bilateral exposures of each counterparty to the CCP. Aside from the CCP 
concentrated with system-wide risk, initial transaction chains and holding tiers are 
compressed in that risk node, without any greater transparency of the mobilisation and 
transaction channels emanating or feeding into that risk node – See para. 3.3.   
                                                     
 
152  Norman page 10.  
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7.5 Moving markets to and letting CCP take centre stage reinforces that clearing and 
settlement are the backbone of the plumbing of financial markets.  As Norman describes, 
this area of the financial markets is the least glamorous in that they sit in the post-trade 
part of the transaction value chain, ensuring the transmission channels (the pipes) allow 
the relevant financial instruments, cash and other assets to travel through those pipes and 
reach the storage tanks of the respective account holders.  Clearing and settlement is the 
process whereby the transfer of assets from seller to buyer and/or between collateral 
provider to collateral taker takes place as well as the process that ensures payment flows 
occur between the respective parties.  These processes are facilitated by providers of 
settlement services that include a CSD and/or a (I)CSD,  SSS and payment systems and 
any relevant settlement relevant intermediaries. When counterparties to a trade transact 
in a financial instrument that is cleared and settled, say the purchase of an equity security, 
the counterparties may interact with settlement relevant intermediaries, who in turn 
interact with the execution venue and the (I)CSD.  As explored below, even a simple 
transaction can have multiple touchpoints with differing legal and regulatory systems 
throughout the transaction value chain including the roles exercised by the (I)CSD.     
7.6 A CSD performs the key role in modern settlement infrastructure by moving financial 
instruments from one party to another, without the need, as for centuries of mercantile 
trade, for movement of physical securities to move between the parties.  Since CSDs 
evolved along national lines, in the confines of respective national law, they perform 
different functions in different legal systems.  In some, they act as public notaries due to 
the requirements in certain legal systems that account holders’ identity in the relevant 
electronic systems are the definitive record of title in that respective financial instrument.  
CSDs carry out a number of differing services relevant across the transaction value chain.  
Whilst EU harmonisation on rules applicable to CSDs, their conduct of business and 
capital requirements in the CSDR, are a relatively new development that followed the 
GFC, fragmentation on the rules, operation procedures and account models exist across a 
number of FMIPs generally and CSDs and (I)CSDs specifically.  This makes 
comparability of services and thus competitive factors more difficult for users to assess, 
irrespective of the dominance of a number of operational functions by a handful of service 
providers.  This absence of comparability however does not mean that competition is not 
present, in fact it is fierce amongst FMIPs generally and (I)CSDs specifically.   
  
 
 
 
  
 155  
 
 
  
 
  
7.7 The fragmentation of post-trade service providers in the EU, owes much to the neglect 
that it has historically received from EU policymakers in their attempts to create a Single 
Market. These service providers have historically operated with a domestic bias and most 
post-trade tasks of clearing and settlement operate efficiently and with lower cost within 
national borders.  Much of cost in post-trade services still lies with clearing and 
settlement153.  In order to service the nascent Eurodollar market that emerged in the 
economic boom of the 1960’s, U.S. credit institutions154 set up (I)CSDs with credit 
institution licences to service this stateless market and facilitate cross-border trading, 
clearing and settlement. Euroclear and Clearstream then divided the Eurodollar markets 
by jurisdiction, thus fostering integration respectively, the role of these dominant (I)CSDs 
also expanded its product range to become the cornerstones of post-trade operations 
across EU financial markets and collateralisation arrangements.   
7.8 Whilst the rise of Euroclear and Clearstream has served to integrate certain markets due 
to the respective business needs of the (I)CSDs and its user-owners, this has occurred in 
the domain of the technical working around the legal/regulatory fragmentation, which 
was not eliminated by virtue of rise of these (I)CSDs.  As the preparatory engagement to 
the work that culminated to the Giovannini Barriers noted specifically found155  
describing the root of a problem common to mobilisation of collateral inasmuch as it also 
applies to transactions in financial instruments more broadly:  
“Clearing and settlement are at the core of any financial system, inefficiencies in 
these processes have serious consequences.  When clearing and settlement are too 
costly, or complex, financial transactions are discouraged.  In the context of the 
                                                     
 
153  As Turing 2012 correctly sets out on page vii, the issue of costs and its components as well as possible solutions deserves a more 
thorough and coherent study than it has received in legal literature.   
 
154  As explored in further detail in below,  the core of U.S. rules in respect of collateral, FMIP and provision of margin had long been 
harmonised since legislation that arose in the aftermath of the Great Depression and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.  
Much of these rules, the culture and the ethos of market practice or as a very stark contrast thereto directly shaped the evolution of 
modern EU financial markets.   
 
155  Giovannini Group: ‘Second report on EU clearing and settlement arrangements’, Brussels, April 2003.  Notably, Mr. Giovannini, 
as Norman reminds readers at the time of his publication in 2007, and sadly absent further EU reform at the time hereof, including 
full delivery of the goals of Banking Union and CMU, the ‘EU financial market cannot be considered an integrated entity but 
remains a juxtaposition of domestic markets.”   
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EU, the result it that national market have remained isolated: resources are not 
pooled efficiently, the allocation of economic resources across time and space is 
sub-optimal, the techniques that allow the trading of risk are too expensive and 
financial asset prices fail to convey all information that is available to market 
participants.”   
7.9 As Norman succinctly summarises156 domestic bias and thus by extension continuing 
fragmentation, the aforementioned general barriers and the more specific Giovannini 
Barriers remain susceptible to persisting domestic bias where:  
“…vested interests at all levels of the securities business, increase the cost of 
clearing and settling of securities across Europe’s internal political borders to 
several times the cost of a domestic trade. The EU’s fragmentation of financial 
infrastructure amounts to a significant impediment to the creation of a competitive 
continent-wide capital market for Europe.”   
And as Giovannini notes in the foreword to Turing 2012157:   
“In recent years the structure of effecting financial market transactions, often 
referred to as the financial markets infrastructure, has become an area of growing 
interest for practitioners, policy makers and researchers.  Such interest has 
stemmed from the structural changes in global finance – greater volumes of cross-
border transactions, as well as the creation of integrated financial areas like the 
Eurozone.   
Such is the importance of financial markets infrastructure that the latest (failed) 
attempt by the European Commission to deeply reform the system to make it more 
efficient, given the freedom to trade, the presence of a single currency and the 
development of a uniform set of rules, has arguably been blocked by political 
opposition fearing [that] such reform would have created a large and very 
competitive financial system in the continent of Europe.”    
                                                     
 
156  Norman page 6. 
157  Turing 2012 page v, which was published close to the Draft SLD workstream stalling 
.    
  
 
 
 
  
 157  
 
 
  
 
  
7.10 In the EU, only two major champions have succeeded in, absent regulatory action, to 
draw the strands of fragmented post-trade services, notably in securities settlement 
together across national European borders, regulations and historical traditions.  And 
these two FMIPs continue to dominate in the EU, namely, Euroclear and Clearstream.  
Their origin and as a result their historical origins, evolving ethos and culture could, 
however, not be more different158.  So too in relation to each of these behemoth’s 
supporters, split between competitors to each other and the buy side and sell side split159.  
This split, may have eroded in modern financial institutions maintaining membership 
across multiple FMIPs, and certainly as a globally active provider, membership of 
Clearstream and Euroclear is paramount (so too is the cooperation between the two as 
well as links with other FMIP and (I)CSDs160) in servicing one’s clients’ interests as well 
as operating as a market maker, custodian/Depository and asset manager.   
                                                     
 
158  Which Norman describes as follows (explanations in square brackets and background/conclusions, as provided): 
 
 At page 37: “Euroclear was created to deal with the practical problem of a market [the Eurodollar bond market] in 
crisis and sought answers in efficiency, and gradually in automation. Cedel [the forerunner to Clearstream] was the 
answer to a second order problem of European banks not wishing to see a new financial activity monopolised by a US 
institution.”  
 at page 38 quoting Stanislas Yassukovich, CBE, who amongst a number of chairmanships and directorships was 
Chairman of Merrill Lynch in EMEA and Deputy Chairman of the London Stock Exchange in the UK’s big bang of 
deregulation in the City of London and the general boom years of 1986 to 1989: “It’s philosophical, it’s cultural .  It’s 
based on the respective histories of financial intermediation in the two different worlds.  It’s based on different legal 
systems, between common law and prescribed Napoleonic systems…”  As well as the general anti-American sentiment 
of the time.  In many ways, this split in the legal/regulatory language of contemporary policymakers in the post-GFC 
responses is still present, if not now more deeply entrenched than during the late 1960’s. 
 at page 38: “Whatever the reasons, continental banks were drawn to Cedel.  Banks from France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands were prominent among its early backers.  The case of Switzerland was somewhat 
different.  There banks divided along ancient fault lines, reflecting their domestic priorities and rivalries.  UBS was a 
major supporter of Cedel from the beginning.  Credit Suisse and Swiss Bank Corporation [merged with Union bank 
of Switzerland to form UBS in 1998], which had stronger business interests in the securities markets, backed 
Euroclear.” 
  
159  Which Norman summarises the cultural split between the sell and buy sides of the market in the quote on page 37 of Herschel Post, 
who in 1974 joined Euroclear as then head of operations: “You have a cultural difference that still is reflected in the Anglo-Saxon 
trading community and the continental European buying community.  The big difference has always been traders versus custodians.  
Basically, the European institutions were representing the investors, and London participants in Euroclear were the people who 
were selling securities to those investors.  So you might say it is a sell side versus buy side cultural split.” 
 
160  Norman at page 38 remarks, in the context of historical evolution of Euroclear and Clearstream  “But the market would have 
benefitted more had the two settlement organisations been able to work together more constructively.  There was a need for 
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7.11 Equally, these difference are to a certain extent is core in understanding how certain items 
of rules on collateral, settlement and Custody operate within those FMIPs, notably when 
acting as SSS, but equally how Coll-RR and Cust-RR arise and propagate, or, what and 
how appropriate mitigants may be structured and remaining barriers, silos or pockets of 
fragmentation overcome.  Their development from the 1990’s, like most of the FMIP 
industry however evolved similarly to one another, albeit competitively.  They, like other 
FMIPs also evolved in, as Norman suggests161, in relative obscurity and “…in an almost 
tribal environment, where the members of the tribe are a coterie of experts versed in the 
intricacies of securities markets.”  This statement applies more generally to financial 
instruments and mobilisation of collateral and in particular, where there are a handful of 
key service providers and decision-makers and no standardised terminology amongst 
industry.  And whilst much of this might be attributable to EU policymakers having taken 
the note of needing to do something fundamental to ensure the vital plumbing of the 
Single Market flows efficiently, without a disproportionate use of intermediaries across 
the relevant value chain and/or holding tiers162, the market terminology or “technical 
language” spoken at expert level within FMIPs and their users is often, and sadly in many 
points, remains distinct to and possibly in some areas unwarrantedly unintelligible or at 
odds to the regulatory and legislative language i.e., the legal terminology of policymakers 
and legislators – this itself can cause CTR and conceptual gaps to arise or be hardwired.  
7.12 However, even amongst the speakers of market terminology, like to a degree the legal 
terminology, Norman makes the point163 specifically with respect to FMIPs, that “…such 
schisms amongst infrastructure providers can be a cloak for vested interests.” and thus 
contribute to regulatory capture.  Furthermore, the gaps between the market terminology 
                                                     
 
business to flow efficiently between Euroclear’s ‘sell side’ traders and Cedel’s ‘buy side’ bankers, which was impeded by 
commercial rivalry between the two organisations.”     
161  Norman page 6. 
 
162  When compared to U.S. capital markets, it is important to note that fragmented EU capital markets puts cross-border transactions 
at a competitive disadvantage due to additional generation of costs, irrespective of these costs having come down over the years, 
from the additional intermediaries required along the transaction chain and through the holding tiers in respect of financial market 
transactions or mobilising collateral across jurisdictions, legal systems and traditions, in which assets, notably collateral assets are 
not efficiently pooled in their availability, mobilisation and their liquidity. This also incurs higher costs of economic and regulatory 
capital for FMIP and the market participant users.    
163  Norman page 6. 
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and the EU policymakers shaping of the legal terminology means, as Norman puts it,164 
that “Different words mean different things to different people. That makes it difficult for 
outsiders, such as policy makers, to master the intricacies of trade. In so far as 
practitioners have interacted with a growing EU public policy agenda on clearing and 
settlement, the result has been perplexity on both sides.” and thus points to other forms 
of Linguistic CTR.  
7.13 The reason this language disconnect exists is as a result of failed or stalled integration, 
and more needs to be done to overcome it.  The route to making that reality lies with 
policymakers engaging with industry and doing so using language that is clear, succinct, 
mutually intelligible and moreover functional to build a Jurisdiction-Agnostic common 
functional market language for use in the EU for legislative/regulatory stakeholders as 
well as market participants.  As Norman likens165, integration for FMIPs and market 
infrastructure occurs piecemeal, even where the language or interests of stakeholders is 
not mutually intelligible, between smaller clusters of markets and stakeholders.   
7.14 As discussed  Norman further expands this with an analogy of U.S. political and capital 
integration on a continent wide-basis where the respective railway companies each started 
from individual points, different standardisation of rail track gauges to only come to 
fruition “…once the final piece of track was hammered into place in the middle.”   Like 
Norman and subsequent CMU benchmarking of the EU with the U.S., such integration 
does not happen overnight and does not come without challenge.  In the case of the U.S., 
this standardisation and completion of transcontinental infrastructure facilitating 
commerce occurred with a 24-year delay and after a Civil War.  In the case of FMIP and 
notably clearing, standardisation, whether driven by market and/or regulatory pressures 
needs to balance against innovation of FMIP and changes in the Collateral Ecosystem.   
7.15 The European integration project was born out of a direct result of devastating conflict 
and tragedy.  So too the first efforts at creating Single Markets and economic growth.  As 
Norman points out more recent integration prior to the GFC only began to be a late 
priority for FMIP and had only done so:  
                                                     
 
164  Norman page 6. 
165  Norman page 7.  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 160  
 
 
  
 
  
“…long after technological advance, financial innovation and market 
liberalisation had wrought changes in structures that served national markets in 
Europe.”166   
Whilst the advent of the euro is acknowledged as having transformational effects on 
financial integration in Europe and certainly the Eurozone, cross-border integration was 
lacking, even for a number of (I)CSDs with cross-border expertise as well as ingrained 
cultural domestic bias irrespective of vertical integration or attempts at linkages167 
amongst FMIPs and notably CSDs. Vertical integration however did not preclude 
horizontal activities. Sparse horizontal integration however remained silo’ed through only 
specific asset classes168. As Norman notes169 that trends that were favoured in respect of 
FMIP, and which pose issues for collateral fluidity, as well as Cust-RR exist in part due 
to historical evolution of operational set-up but moreover the cultural attitudes of FMIPs, 
their users as well as an absence of a consensus of what integration should look like:  
“Vertically integrated structures linking activities across the value chain from 
trading to clearing and settlement developed in most [EU] member states because 
this was judged the best way of securing fast and efficient straight-through 
processing of securities transactions.  Also in vogue was demutualisation which 
turned securities exchanges and infrastructure providers into for-profit businesses.  
Although most at that stage still worked in the interest of their users, the link 
between user and owner was eroded in the 21st century when some of the 
demutualised exchanges obtained stock exchange listings.”    
7.16 Norman’s concern170 on demutualisation remains valid, including for users of FMIPs who 
now interact with entities that were conceived as utilities, evolved with limited regulation, 
                                                     
 
166  Norman page 5. 
167  A model that would become to be known as “spaghetti model” of horizontal integration i.e., individual bilateral links amongst 
national CSDs.  An alternative to a business model that rested on bilateral chains, and one that might be the first collateral highway 
or a precursor to T2S, was a blueprint for a Central Securities Settlement Institution (see Norman page 182) as well as the following 
Discussion Paper: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/cesame/hwwa_discussion_paper_en.pdf.   
168  FMIs tended to specialise and only do so in certain jurisdictions.  In certain instances, the roll-out to other asset classes and 
jurisdictions, absent economic considerations, may have been constrained due to EU competition concerns and lack of transparency 
in costs.     
169  Norman pages 5 and 6. 
170  Norman Page 13.   
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have become systemically important pan-EU for profit institutions and now have CSDR 
attempting to regulate these key components of financial markets in a utility like fashion.   
A key question for policymakers going forward as well as for the non-dealer entities in 
the Collateral Ecosystem that are end-users of FMIPs, is whether it is equitable that a 
number of FMIPs, including (I)CSDs have ownership models that irrespective of conflicts 
of interest policies being in place, have ownership resting with a number of the clearing 
members who in turn offer services to users.  This means that conflicts of interest are 
inherent in the competing needs of users, owners and managers of the respective systems.  
This is an issue that comes to fruit when assessing the degree of custodian specific risks 
in the Cust-RR assessment of a Custodian/Depository as set out below.    
 
7.17 Custodians/Depositories – their role as FMIPs 
7.18 A Custodian/Depository in its core proposition provides the safekeeping of financial 
instruments and/or cash on behalf of clients or settlement relevant intermediaries. Whilst 
(I)CSDs offer a number of these services and often the range of post-trade processes 
involve a range of custodian/depositaries that perform such services globally, but who are 
not (I)CSDs.  These entities are referred to as global custodians.  Some global custodians 
service all types of market participants across all asset classes, whereas others specialise.  
Equally, some global custodians perform settlement, others merely provide users a single 
point of contact and facilitate settlement with national CSDs and settlement relevant 
intermediaries and others offer a hybrid offering171. There are certain jurisdictions in 
which say a global custodian does not operate, or where tax, legal, regulatory or 
operational requirements dictate that a local entity must provide custodial services.  These 
entities are typically referred to as sub-custodians or agent banks and often themselves 
post Cust-RR that differs to that of the global custodian, either due jurisdiction-specifics 
relating to the Custody rules or equally Coll-RR. In some instances a client may not have 
                                                     
 
171  This hybrid offering depends on volumes in certain jurisdictions.  For some jurisdictions, due to volumes settled economics 
typically dictate how a global custodian’s coverage is offered to its users in that jurisdiction.   
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conducted due diligence on where its Collateral Assets are actually being custodied and 
whether at global or sub-custodian level.   
7.19 It should be noted that increasingly, even prior to the building of collateral highways, that 
a number of the core propositions of custodians/depositaries have meant that (I)CSDs are 
competing172 with custodians/depositaries, many of whom are also direct users and 
owners of such (I)CSDs.  Global custodians had in the lead-up to the GFC increasingly 
begun to focus on high-margin services, thus establishing a hierarchy between 
sophisticated services and breadth of liquidity/execution offered by global custodians and 
basic core post-trade services offered by (I)CSDs.  Since the GFC, (I)CSDs, have also 
begun to steeplechase the provision of more sophisticated services and challenge the 
global custodians.   
 
7.20 The role of Brokers in the post-trade process 
7.21 Brokers remain involved in the post-trade process.  They are also typically providers of 
ancillary services relating to the traded transaction or collateral.  These ancillary services 
are either provided by the broker in relation to its role under the relationship 
documentation (prime brokerage or standard terms and conditions), the trading 
documentation (GMRA, ISDA or master netting arrangement).  Irrespective of whether a 
broker may be a direct clearing member, they are likely to interoperate directly and 
indirectly with the whole palette of FMIP, payment and settlement systems irrespective 
of asset class or transaction type they deal in.  That being said, not all brokers deal in all 
asset classes or transaction types.  Historically, in the European use of market 
terminology, Brokers have been categorised as follows and this has an impact on 
collateral fluidity:  
                                                     
 
172  As Norman recalls on page 13 from a conversation held in 2006 with Pierre Francotte, the then Chief Executive of Euroclear, 
“Things that global custodians were doing 10 years ago have become commoditised.  They used to make margins of 30% or 40% 
and then everybody copied what they were doing, and they make margins of perhaps 10% on these services now.  That’s when they 
push it to Euroclear.  Proxy voting is an example.  When I arrived at Euroclear in the early 1990’s, proxy voting was the most 
sophisticated thing.  Within five years, people were saying why doesn’t CREST [the UK CSD in the Euroclear group] do it? And 
now CREST does it.  That’s a cycle of things being very exciting, making a lot of money at the beginning, becoming commodities, 
and being put into CSDs.”  As set out below standardisation and harmonisation is a pre-requisite to fostering harmonisation and 
actions of FMIs are welcome (if not necessary) to assist in pushing this journey along. 
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(a) Market makers: i.e. prime brokers and in the EU’s legal/regulatory language 
referred to in MiFID II legal terminology as “systematic interalisers”. They are 
often also clearing brokers and/or global custodians;   
(b) Clearing broker: i.e. a broker that is a clearing member and who clears and settles 
its clients’ as well as their clients’ transactions;  
(c) Commodity broker: broker specialised in commodities;  
(d) Correspondent brokers: firms that use the services of another firm, such as a 
clearing broker to clear and settle transactions entered on behalf of their clients 
or themselves; 
7.22 From an EU regulatory perspective brokers are typically MiFID investment firms or 
credit institutions or EEA or non-EEA entities regulated in the respective EU jurisdictions 
as respective equivalents. Their regulatory permissions in the UK and Ireland dictate what 
transaction types and asset classes may be offered or in which they might engage with 
and with which client types they can do this.  In both the UK and Ireland, this distinction 
is differentiated between what is MiFID business and non-MiFID business. A number of 
ancillary services offered by brokers may be fully or partially a regulated activity in the 
eyes of the UK and/or Irish NCAs.  Viewed through a market lens, the ancillary services 
they might undertake include those in listed in paragraph 6.5 but may also include: 
(a) arranging CCP clearing; 
(b) acting as valuation agent or calculation agent in respect of financial market 
transaction or collateral; and 
(c) providing periodic and event driven regulatory reporting. 
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7.23 CCPs versus tri-party arrangements and conflicts  
7.24 The GFC demonstrated conflicts of interest in bilateral and tri-party SFT markets. As 
Saguato 2015 summarises, some of this is due to false assumptions by policymakers 
including that: 
(a) clearing banks are simple agents (they are desks or affiliates of dealer entities as 
opposed to FMIPs that are utilities i.e., they have different interests/motivations);  
(b) tri-party runs are unlikely (they are likely); and 
(c) secured funding is durable and stable and that collateral is an effective risk 
mitigant (which can deteriorate rapidly),  
These assumptions, as they applied to tri-party clearing agents, are still relevant and still 
might be false in relation to how they apply to transactions using CCPs or execution 
venues, which, even as utilities take multilateral and bilateral exposures and compound 
and centralise the risks.  
7.25 Whilst the concepts are used often interchangeably, including by regulatory 
policymakers, some key differences are worth noting between how CCPs and tri-party 
clearing differ, namely in that:   
(a) tri-party clearing agents, typically clear and settle transactions on their own 
balance sheets and those balance sheets may be closely connected, affiliated or 
otherwise the same as relevant dealer entities operating in the relevant market;  
(b) a tri-party clearing arrangement does not necessarily partition liquidity by 
segregating client assets, client money or transactions in the same way a CCP or 
clearing house does;  
(c) a tri-party clearing arrangement does not necessarily qualify as a system for EU-
SFD purposes; 
7.26 Conclusions in Saguato 2015 focus on reducing conflicts of interest and improving repo 
resilience by reducing opacity through increased reporting and a general move of 
standardise repo transactions to execution and clearing using CCPs. This is also coupled 
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with a suggestion to move more generally to ‘narrow banking’. Each of these proposals 
are regulatory workstreams that are underway at the EU level, in the form of SFTR, which 
inter alia obliges reporting of repos, SecLends and SFTs to trade repositories.   
7.27 However, SFTR and other EU reforms also do not create, as proposed herein, an ability 
for market participants to use actual risk metrics or proxy values to apply a direct and 
‘look through’ risk assessment through and across various collateral relationships. Other 
areas to alleviate issues include reforms in terms of collateral, at the UK and Irish national 
level through improvements to CASS and CAR and various narrow banking structural 
reform efforts.  In relation to reporting to trade repositories, Saguato 2015’s conclusions, 
many of which are sensible and are already underway in the EU, whilst focusing on the 
US repo market, being possibly overtly optimistic on the resilience of CCPs, makes the 
valid point (see page 39) that (subject to emphasis added):  
“…much like derivatives expanded in the OTC world, a marketplace dominated 
by private information in which public information and transparency cowered in 
the background.  Repo [, SecLend and SFT] market opacity is not only a  threat, 
at a macroprudential level, to financial stability – posing a risk to authorities 
trying to effectively oversee the market – but also represents a market inefficiency 
at a transactional level vis-à-vis market participants, preventing them from 
effectively assessing and pricing the risks underlying the repo [, SecLend and 
SFT] transactions – namely [but should not, as proposed herein, be limited to] 
counterparty risk and liquidation risk.” 
7.28 The above paragraphs have introduced some of the key roles that market participants 
undertake as well as fragmentation they face. These issues impact Coll-RR and Cust-RR 
and are accentuated by CTR. Adopting a prudent approach to existing and new 
documentation may assist in reducing the adverse impacts of these risks, but also, for 
existing documented relationships, brings challenges that are discussed in the next 
Chapter.   
  
  
 
 
 
  
 166  
 
 
  
 
  
   
8. Documentation architecture and bargaining power 
8.1 From a documentation architecture perspective, trading/Custody relationships are usually 
comprised of multiple components (any multitude of combination of standalone 
agreements, master agreements, general terms and conditions etc.) and these typically 
evolve over time as the relationship changes. Each of these components will also have 
legal, operational, administrative and commercial characteristics reflecting differing as 
well as common interests of the parties to the relevant component.  In turn, these 
components are shaped by any multiple of jurisdictional, product- and party-specific 
considerations or variations. This is the case irrespective of any regulatory or industry 
(both market- and association-led driven) standardisation of documentation for trading 
product documentation and certain collateral arrangements.  Not all of these may have an 
established hierarchy173.  
8.2 Equally, this is also the case irrespective of certain parties possibly having a ‘house style’ 
or preferred drafting position. This is important both in the context of standardised 
financial market transaction and/or collateral asset documentation inasmuch as it is for 
bespoke documentation.  The choice of documentation, including how any regulatory 
upgrades are to be made to such documentation, in light of much of the financial market 
and collateral asset transaction documentation pre-dating the GFC’s reforms, lies on a 
combination of solutions that are dependent on each party’s circumstances and possibly 
also the (differing) aims of the parties.   
8.3 These choices may also be influenced by whether a party has an active compliance 
obligation to maintain operational procedures or specific preferences in how it generally 
amends documentation. These issues were explored by the author in part 4 “Overview of 
EMIR’s Risk mitigation techniques and the impacts on ISDA documentation” in 
“Handbuch EMIR”. As noted therein174 the following point on bargaining power and 
contract theory (if applicable) also applies in addition to the aforementioned points on 
                                                     
 
173  See Para. 4.27. 
174  See footnote 41 on page 407.   
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style, preferred position and of course on the aims and objectives of the transactions and 
thus this includes necessary consideration that: 
(a) in many instances, the documentation decisions may be dictated whether 
correctly or incorrectly by the dealer entity to its client counterparty to whom it 
is offering the trading relationship to and where typically the client, especially if 
a non-dealer entity has lesser bargaining power. This can still be the case where 
a client has a multi-dealer relationship and/or where may have lower information 
asymmetry scale thus have higher bargaining power but given that the dealer 
entity is in the driving seat by offering the transaction capabilities means that any 
bargaining power is kept in check;  
(b) if contract theory applies then irrespective of a number of efforts by gatekeepers 
and their efforts in relation to master agreement documentation suites, the client 
is still left with a set of “dynamic contracts” that remain “incomplete” both in 
terms of obligations and state-contingent, but when constituted together may be 
reasonably viewed as “complete”. A distinction should be made in how the 
individual agreements are categorised from a contract theory perspective within 
and across master agreement documentation suites as well as when compared 
with relevant collateral and Custody agreements that sit outside the master 
agreement documentation suite but are required to interrelate and interoperate 
with that documentation; and  
(c) from a legal risk management perspective, non-dealer entities may wish to 
ascertain their position(s) across the contractual relationship with the relevant 
counterparty to gauge compliance, resilience against regulatory and legal risks, 
CTR and remedies ex ante and ex post counterparty default (including cross-
default) its contractual/statutory enforcement speed (and thus Recoverability 
Rates) and whether, on the basis of these considerations this merits arguments for 
a change in pricing for services/obligations and collateral to be taken as 
envisioned in the given relationship.          
8.4 Whilst the aforementioned standardisation efforts have helped shape markets or expand 
liquidity in them, as for example as the GMRA has done for repo transactions, the 
GMSLA has done for securities lending and the ISDA has done for OTC derivatives or 
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to a lesser uniform degree as user agreements and rulebooks have for certain FMIPs and 
execution venues, there are still a host of other key components forming the 
trading/collateral relationships, as well as interaction with FMIPs, where standardisation 
does not exist as fully and adverse effects or barriers due to fragmentation persists.    
8.5 Equally, there is also a continuing lack of standardisation of interoperability across 
documentation suites and/or solutions. This lack of standardisation also may compounded 
by the existence of CTR between the legislative and regulatory framework and what 
standardised or individual documented arrangements provide. Moreover, the number as 
well as the nature of documentation used to capture those (multifaceted) relationships can 
have varying degrees of complexity in design as well as content. These legal and 
operational issues, when viewed through an economic lens in connection with collateral 
liquidity and fluidity of Collateral Assets means that one can in a number of instances 
draw a correlation between a lack of collateral liquidity and fluidity that stems from not 
just the barriers that exist between a fragmented financial market and Collateral 
Ecosystem across EU jurisdictions, but bottlenecks in operational and legal terms in and 
across the documented relationships.    
8.6 The degree of complexity of these (multiple) exposures and transactions is also 
(potentially) complicated by the fact that trading/Custody relationships and the 
documentation architecture used may differ from provider to provider. It may also differ 
from when one provider is dealing with entities in the same corporate group. Some 
providers may prefer uniform global terms whereas others may document agreements on 
a standalone basis. These choices and preferences evolve over time, often piecemeal and 
not always a mutual decision of the contracting parties. Much of how documentation 
architecture options are chosen by respective parties and whether to use global terms may 
also be influenced by the degree of complexity and number of parties that need 
documenting and how that might be done in bilateral175 and/or multilateral designed 
documentation suites.  
                                                     
 
175  It should be noted that a number of documentation suites, such as the GMRA, GMSLA and ISDA master agreements are designed 
to reflect bilateral relationships notwithstanding the ability to have collateral obligations and/or credit support provided by a third-
party on behalf of one of the bilateral counterparties or for event of default or credit based triggers to reference parties (including 
affiliates) connected to the relevant bilateral counterparties.   
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8.7 Part of this complexity may be driven by multiple trading vehicles, each being affiliates 
of one another, having trading relationships with their respective counterparties, who in 
turn are also affiliates of one another.  Hence, having a clear oversight of which entity is 
documented under which relationship and what the differences of terms are across the 
relevant affiliates of the various entities is quite useful in establishing a global view of 
terms. As described below, there is merit in having a detailed and periodic update of this 
information in order to proactively approach risk management in respect of the issues 
discussed herein.   
8.8 Following on from the need to have an oversight of the nature and exposures relevant to 
transactions and collateral arrangements, these relationships could all have obligations 
(including with respect to collateral fluidity) that are capable of being netted and have 
cross-acceleration/default terms. There are also situations where interdependence across 
connected entities is set out in the documentation by way of a cross-default provision for 
example, but where there is no cross-affiliate netting or contractual set-off permitted or 
contemplated across documented relationships. Consequently, in addition to establishing 
who and what is documented where, the degree of interdependence of the documented 
arrangements on another is an important element that merits periodic and accurate capture 
and monitoring in the form of a versatile and sufficiently granular documentation risk 
management framework. Moreover, in assessing such interdependence, it is crucial to 
map any divergences or discrepancies between terms as well as hierarchy thereof as well 
as to document and, where possible, rectify Documentary CTR and relevant legislative 
as well as regulatory obligations.   
8.9 Care should equally be drawn in benchmarking how restrictive, permissive or ‘friendly’ 
documented terms are. In most instances, dealer entities or the custodian/Depository will 
have the greater bargaining power and its counterparty greater information asymmetry so 
that documented terms are, even with negotiation and accommodation of the clients’ 
needs, effectively favour the dealer entity. This bias may also exist in certain pro forma 
trading/product documentation. Consideration may also be warranted when discussing 
with a counterparty, that documented terms, even where these are taken to be ‘market 
standard’, may not be client friendly but disproportionately favour the dealer.   
8.10 Equally, what is market standard changes over time and thus, non-dealer as well as dealer 
entities have a vested interest to ensure that the terms they are receiving are appropriate 
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to their needs and any legacy terms are updated to reflect market standards. This review 
should not wait until a regulatory change prompts an update to documentation, as has 
been the experience with EMIR affecting derivatives trading and collateral 
documentation.   
8.11 Put simply, what was considered as ‘market’ before the GFC is certainly no longer market 
standard now and unless such legacy documentation is amended, those terms will apply. 
Adopting this proactive type of approach means having a sophisticated documentation 
management system both in terms of capture and analytical storage of key terms, but 
suitably qualified professional advisers that assess the material importance of each 
documented relationship and periodically schedule reviews of appropriateness of terms. 
In that regard, market participants should appreciate that some counterparties may have 
more advanced documentation management systems that set out the granularity of agreed 
terms whereas others may have executed trading/collateral documentation without having 
captured the terms as accurately as might be necessary to accommodate required changes 
or suitability review, or may even have done so on a “file and forget” basis.   
8.12 As an example, the individual affiliates of Multinational Widgets plc may all have 
separately documented arrangements that have evolved separately or piecemeal over time 
when interacting with Bancogrande. This may have occurred either on an individual basis 
or through Multinational’s treasury office. In contrast, when dealing with Megabank, 
Multinational Widgets’ trading vehicles and collateral centres may benefit from having 
uniform global terms, with jurisdiction, business or product specific terms supplemented 
where appropriate. In other words, the documentation approach with Megabank means 
having a global set of, possibly framework terms, with a set hierarchy trailing down to 
the individual jurisdiction and product specific arrangements. Unfortunately, the reality 
for most market participants is more likely that the documented relationship and the 
documentation architecture used, is a jumble of legacy arrangements, global terms and 
conditions with product and jurisdiction-specific terms plus any bespoke arrangements.  
All of this potentially weighs in on the Documentary CTR and thus also Coll-RR and 
Cust-RR that Multinational Widgets plc faces in its overall exposure with Bancogrande 
(differing terms may restrict ability to recall or enforce on collateral) as opposed to 
Megabank, where the terms may be clearer with specifics and agreed optionality being 
modular in design.   
  
 
 
 
  
 171  
 
 
  
 
  
8.13 Whilst it is perhaps (sadly at present) utopian for the majority of market participants, 
running complex businesses, to adopt some of the aforementioned considerations and 
establish full oversight and uniformity of all their contractual and non-contractual 
arrangements relevant to their framework, trading and collateral arrangements there is 
merit in certainly starting to do this with relationships that are considered material and do 
proactively instead of reactively.  These material relationships may be those that are a 
primary relationship or other relationships that have a material impact if something occurs 
within that relationship.    
8.14 From a documentation risk perspective and in facilitating the reviews suggested above, 
this proactive approach merits identifying, mitigating and managing not only the 
suitability and appropriateness of terms per documented relationship, but rectifying any 
inconsistency in terms and terminology or content, any cross-references to such items 
across the entirety of  documentation and those of its affiliates and establishing a 
hierarchy as to what applies when, how and to whom.  From a resource perspective, this 
this means investing in documentation management systems and moving largely paper-
based or word-processed based archiving and capturing of terms to more sophisticated 
technological solutions.  
8.15 This process may have already begun to build some traction with more sophisticated 
financial market participants, but one area that may not be as advanced, remains dealing 
with CTR and ensuring consistency in and across relevant documented relationships. A 
concentrated investment in that direction should enable financial counterparties and non-
financial counterparties an ability to more proactively and efficiently manage both their 
financial and non-financial risks, in a changing market and FMIP interface affecting the 
range of financial market transactions and the Collateral Ecosystem underpinning them.  
All of this effort leads to building a map of one’s risk exposures and interconnectedness 
with the risk exposures of others as well as resilience to those risks. Having greater 
transparency on risk exposure means more efficient allocation of economic and/or 
regulatory capital.  
8.16 The above paragraphs have introduced some of the key considerations that market 
participants face in documentation of trading and Collateral Asset arrangements. These 
impact Coll-RR and Cust-RR and are are accentuated by CTR including Documentary 
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CTR and the EU, UK and Irish legal framework in which these arrangements operate in. 
The next Chapters provide an overview of this legal framework and its interaction.    
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9. The current pillars of EU financial collateral legislation and interaction 
between EU and EU-MS national laws 
9.1 As introduced above, the globally agreed reforms, most of which build off the 2009 G-20 
Pittsburgh Commitments176 that marked the first globally coordinated response that have 
followed the GFC, have not named collateralisation specifically but have emphasised 
central clearing through CCPs as a key priority. This focus on CCPs was seen as the 
structural solution to place a risk absorber in the middle and have market participants’ 
financial market transactions subject to new rules. These together would de-risk the 
opaque interconnectedness that precipitated, certainly in policymakers’ planning the core 
risk propagators that exploded in the GFC.  
9.2 While such reforms and a move to new super-centralisation and concentration of risk have 
put the need for mandatory collateralisation of transactions as a priority and request much 
more of it, these reforms have done little to look at the resilience of Collateral Assets 
themselves until the emergence of the concept of HQLA. Moreover, while making these 
changes and since, aside from some studies, legislative and regulatory policymakers on 
the global stage nor the EU stage have not put much in the way of a concentrated view 
on the adequacy and abundance of Collateral Assets, the  ease of mobility or the very 
mobilisation channels themselves as well as the Custody, Client Asset and Client Money 
as well as financial collateral considerations, beyond say the following laws that predate 
the commencement of the first part of the CMU project, which is being reborn, even if 
these do deliver on some parts of the 2009 G-20 Pittsburgh Commitments:  
(a) Regulation (EU) 648/2012177, as amended (including by EMIR REFIT178 that 
entered into force on 17 June 2019), (collectively EMIR)179 which first entered 
into force on 16 August 2012;  
                                                     
 
176  See: https://www.oecd.org/g20/summits/pittsburgh/G20-Pittsburgh-Leaders-Declaration.pdf 
177  See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32012R0648  
178  See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32019R0834  
179  See: consolidated version available here: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02012R0648-20190617  
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(b) MiFID II180 and MiFIR181 (the MiFID II/MiFIR Regime)), which entered into 
force across the European Union on 3 January 2018, which updates the former 
MiFID regime that was born out of the EU’s FSAP;  and  
(c) Regulation (EU) 2015/2365  (SFTR)182, which entered into force across the EU 
on 12 January 2016 along with a number of delegated acts, implementing acts 
and technical standards relating to SFTR that entered into force on 11 April 2019.  
9.3 The MiFID II/MiFIR Regime and SFTR are each accompanied by a framework of 
delegated acts and secondary legislation as explored in Annex 1. This includes in 
particular directly applicable EU legislative acts (such as in particular Regulatory and 
Implementing Technical Standards and Delegated Regulations), national legislation and 
regulation implementing and/or further specifying MiFID II requirements as well as 
interpretative guidance issued both on EU level (in particular by the European Markets 
Supervisory Authority (ESMA)) and national level (in particular published by the 
relevant national competent authorities).    
9.4 Despite all of this, there are also regional divergences between the U.S. and the EU, and 
in the case of the EU, often across EU-MS, in how each bloc has already or plans to 
implement the 2009 G-20 Pittsburgh Commitments. Moreover, much has changed both 
in market practice, technology and how transactions in financial and Collateral Assets are 
sourced, structured, priced, provisioned, resourced, collateralised, executed, custodied, 
booked, compliance and risk management brought in as a control function to identify, 
mitigate and manage and ultimately how firms are ultimately supervised and what they 
report. Much of what was agreed in 2009 has both been supplemented and expanded upon 
through successive and combination of various instruments of a legislative, regulatory 
and/or soft law nature. Documentation has changed and with Brexit and the SPoRs 
causing a shift away for a Collateral Ecosystem centred on London and Dublin, this too 
                                                     
 
180  Directive 2014/65/EU  (MIFID II) available in its consolidated form: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02014L0065-20181001. 
181  Regulation (EU) No. 600/2014 (MiFIR) available in its consolidated form : https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02014R0600-20160701. 
182  Regulation (EU) 2015/2365 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on transparency of securities 
financing transactions and of reuse and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. See:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R2365&from=en  
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ought to be a wake-up call for EU policymakers to act, notably since the core components 
of Collateral Ecosystem legislation, the EU-SFD and EU-FCD have not changed since 
1998 and 2009, even where SFTR as well as MiFID II have made changes how these EU 
Directives that were conceived with a much simpler Collateral Ecosystem in place than 
is the case at the time of writing, operate. These core Directives include:   
(a) Directive 98/26/EC (Settlement Finality Directive – EU-SFD)183, as amended, 
aims at reducing the systemic risk associated with participation in payment and 
securities settlement systems, and in particular the risk linked to the insolvency 
of a participant in such a system, and the scope of the protection coverage applies 
to those payment and securities settlement systems duly notified to ESMA184 as 
well as any participant in such a system, and to collateral security provided in 
connection with the participation in a system, or operations of the central banks 
of the EU-MS in their functions as central banks.  
(b) Directive 2002/47/EC (Financial Collateral Directive – EU-FCD)185, as 
amended, notably by Directive 2009/44/EC on settlement finality in payment and 
securities settlement systems and Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral 
arrangements as regards linked systems and credit claims186 and subsequent 
amendments, which applies to collateral takers and collateral providers in respect 
of eligible financial collateral arrangements.187  
9.5 The objective of the EU-FCD is to establish a minimum EU-wide regime for the provision 
of Collateral Assets service to contribute towards the integration and cost-efficiency of 
the financial markets as well as their stability in the European Union. The EU-FCD 
provides a simple, speedy, effective in uniform means of influence security overcast, 
                                                     
 
183  See the latest consolidated version available here (NB does not include BRRD II amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU i.e. BRRD 
I): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01998L0026-20140917 
184  As at 25 July 2019 this included the following: 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/designated_payment_and_securities_settlement_systems.pdf  
185  See the latest consolidated version available here (NB does not include BRRD II amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU i.e. BRRD 
I): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02002L0047-20140702  
186  See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32009L0044  
187  For further background please consult “Yeowart and Parsons”. 
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financial instruments and credit claims188 throughout the European Union. The SFD aims 
to provide certainty on transfer in the event of a failing of a FMIP.   
9.6 In order to achieve these aims, both the SFD and EU-FCD require EU-MS to disapply 
certain provisions of nationalism and “their” systems of law, in order to:  
(a) remove those elements which inhibit the realisation of financial collateral and 
events of the insolvency of the collateral provider (Art. 8 EU-FCD);  
(b) eliminate formality requirements on the creation (Art. 3 EU-FCD) or enforcement 
(Art. 4 EU-FCD) of collateral imposed that are subject to the EU-FCD by national 
law; and  
(c) disapply with any requirement of national law that notice of intention to realise 
the collateral should be given to the collateral provider or that the terms of the 
realisation should be approved by a competent court exercising jurisdiction (Art. 
4.4 (a) and (b) EU-FCD).  
9.7 The EU-FCD is expressed to apply to financial collateral arrangements where both the 
collateral-provider and the collateral-taker fall within one of the categories set out in 
                                                     
 
188  A credit claim is defined in the EU-FCD Art. 1(o) as: "credit claims' means pecuniary claims arising out of an agreement whereby 
a credit institution, as defined in Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/48/EC, including the institutions listed in Article 2 of that Directive, 
grants credit in the form of a loan”.    
Importantly, unlike marketable securities, credit claims are normally tailored to the debtor’s needs. Consequently, in case the credit 
claim, as the collateral asset, needs to be realised, they are usually not convertible into cash quickly but rather the debtor needs to 
be contacted as to repayment – to the extent this is even possible. A crucial factor determining the value of credit claims as collateral 
assets also rests on their enforceability against the debtor – which thus contributes to Coll-RR.  Moreover, in addition to their 
limited liquidity, credit claims differ from marketable securities generally but notably as collateral assets, as they are not generally 
recorded in electronic accounts, but “only” evidenced only by a credit agreement. As such, there is higher risk that the same credit 
claim could be posted as a collateral asset to a third party i.e. the notion of double counting. The idea behind a notification 
requirement is that if the debtor is required to know about the collateral arrangement, they can function as a possible information 
source regarding the existence of the credit claim collateral. As shown by stricter rules on formal requirements in some jurisdictions, 
if a (Eurosystem) central bank takes credit claims as collateral taker, formal acts protect the collateral taker from exposure to 
potential disputes with third parties on the enforceability and priority. 
 
For further reading on the use of credit claims as collateral assets as well as the issues around multiple transaction chains please 
refer to: COM (2016) 430 Final: dated 29 June 2016 in the form of a “Report from the Commission to the Council and the EP on 
the appropriateness of Article 3(1) of Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral arrangements.” available here: 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-430-EN-F1-1.PDF  
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Article 1(2)(a)-(e). Articles 1(2)(a)-(d) include specified types of public sector body, 
central banks, financial institutions subject to prudential supervision, central 
counterparties, settlement agents and clearing houses. Article 1(2)(e) covers a person 
other than a non-natural person, and specifically includes an unincorporated form or 
partnership. 
9.8 The EU-FCD includes an option to permit an EU-MS to implement the EU-FCD more 
narrowly by providing that both the collateral-provider and the collateral-taker must fall 
within one of the categories set out in article 1(2)(a)-(d), and excluding (e).189 This would 
have the broad effect of confining the protections available under the EU-FCD to 
participants in the wholesale financial markets. EU-MS have adopted differing 
approaches when implementing the EU-FCD into national law. The scope of the regime 
applicable in each EU-MS requires careful attention in cross-border transactions. Only 
one EU-MS (Austria) exercised the full opt out. Five other EU-MS (the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, Sweden, France and Germany) applied a partial opt out. Ten EU-MS (Belgium, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Spain and the UK) 
widened the personal scope of the EU-FCD to cover also entities not mentioned in the 
EU-FCD.190 Ireland kept aligned to transactions roughly between one financial institution 
with another or with a public authority and thus in keeping with the original EU text.  
9.9 The EU-FCD has also been integral in setting clear rules on the validity of a collateral 
arrangement in the context of conflict of laws in the treatment of book entry securities. 
Prior to the introduction of the EU-FCD, the law relating to financial collateral differed 
considerably across the different domestic jurisdictions of the EU, with differing 
consequences and uncertainties. This complex “patchwork” created a fragmented set of 
financial market and collateral transactions and problems for cross-border business, 
which was becoming increasingly necessary with various pressures on the financial 
markets and its participants. As this thesis argues, this patchwork may have been patched 
                                                     
 
189   EU-FCD, Art. 1(3). 
Evaluation Report on the EU-FCD issued by the EC, 20 December 2006, COM (2006) 833 final, p. 8. A useful summary of the 
scope of national implementation measures is also contained in K. Löber and E. Klima (members of Legal Services of the European 
Central Bank), ‘The implementation of Directive 2002/47 on Financial Collateral Arrangements’ (2006) 21(4) JIBÖR 203-12. 
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up, and in some placed better than others and less so with regards to credit claims191, still 
is subject to the risks of differences between how the EU-FCD and SFD were 
implemented in individual EU-MS nor the very risks as they apply to the Collateral Assets 
as well as market participants themselves.  
9.10 Prior to the EU-FCD the validity of the collateral arrangement was generally governed 
by the law chosen by the parties party to the collateral agreement and this may not have 
reflected all interests in or applicable to the Collateral Assets either from say FMIPs such 
as custodians or other transactional parties including where Collateral Assets moved in 
chains. In addition, in cross-border arrangements, it was much less easy to identify with 
sufficient certainty prior to a transaction being entered into whether the collateral taker 
had obtained and mobilised the collateral asset legally and whether the title was good 
                                                     
 
191  See Pages 8 and 9 of COM (2016) 430 Final, which correctly concludes, including by reference to materials provided by DG-Legal 
of the ECB at the time in a related project, to which the author contributed, that the following problems as they apply to credit 
claims still exist:  
 
“As the overview of implementation showed, differences in the formalities and techniques available to collateralise 
credit claims still persist between Member States. Nevertheless, even when credit claim collateral remains subjected 
to national formal requirements, once they are complied with, the collateral benefits from the ease of enforcement 
introduced by the FCD (e.g. credit claims collateral can be realised by sale or appropriation and set-off and no 
formalities as to prior notice or prescribed manner of realisation or the elapsing of a period of time will apply).  
 
In terms of the extent to which the objective has been achieved, it cannot be concluded that all legal obstacles to the 
use of credit claims as collateral within the EU have been removed. In particular, the cross-border use of credit claims 
collateral is still subject to legal uncertainty due to the effect of different national requirements and the incomplete 
harmonisation of conflict of laws rules at EU level.  
 
Although harmonised conflict of laws rules exist for the law applicable to the relationship between the debtor and the 
creditor of a credit claim (relationship 1 in Figure 1), the collateral provider and the collateral taker (relationship 2 
in Figure 1) and the collateral taker and the debtor (relationship 3 in Figure 1), the law applicable to the effectiveness 
of the provision of a credit claim as collateral against third parties, e.g. which formal acts are required to ensure 
enforceability against other claimants and the order of priority between multiple transfers of the same credit claim 
(relationship 4 in Figure 1), is still determined by national conflict of laws rules in the Member States. As such, the 
collateral taker may assume he has priority because formal requirements of Member State A have been complied with, 
while the third party relies on formal requirements of Member State B and also believes that it has priority over the 
rights of the other.”    
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against third parties. In particular, there were difficulties determining the location of 
intangible securities, in particular where there were one or more intermediaries involved.  
9.11 This situation could also (still as of the date hereof) apply in certain circumstances and 
even where relevant contractual agreements or rulebooks were (or still remain) in place 
regulating conflicts of laws. Whilst the policymakers behind the EU-FCD had considered 
amending substantive law by creating a new type of interest in securities, which was to 
be driven by the location of the account and thus the law in force there, this was found to 
be too radical of an approach and ultimately would have favoured certain jurisdictions 
over others. There may be merits in doing so.  
9.12 EU policymakers, working then on the EU-FCD as well as now on the CMU often draw 
parallels to the U.S. capital markets as the desired state of integration. Whilst the focus 
of this thesis does not, and could not within the constraints of this narrowly focused 
research, extend to the fascinating transatlantic study of how convergence and integration 
in the U.S. yielded standardisation, harmonisation and uniformity, and how the EU seeks 
to emulate this, it remains sufficient to say, that capital markets and the Collateral 
Ecosystem in the U.S. constituent jurisdictions had more time (ca. 90 years of integration) 
and narrower gaps to close.  
9.13 The work on harmonising security interest reform relating to Article 9 of the U.S.’ 
Uniform Commercial Code192- UCC started in 1951 and was only “completed” in its 
current state ca. 60 years later in 2010. Article 9 of the UCC in the U.S. is based on a 
                                                     
 
192  For a detailed overview of the evolution of the United States‘ Uniform Commercial Code please see contribution by Winship, Peter 
in  Chapter 3 in “Secured Transactions Law Reform – Principles, Policies and Practice” edited by Gullifer, Louise and Akseli, 
Orkun, Hart Publishing, 2019 (Gullifer & Akseli). Winship assesses the evolution of Article 9 (Secured Transactions) of the UCC 
by stating:  
 
“If Article 9 of the Uniform Commerical Code (UCC) were a computer code the present text of the article would be 
identified as version 3.1 [the latest official edition of Art. 9 was published Sept. 2014 in Uniform Commercial Code: 
Official Text and Comments (2014-2015 edn) (Thomson Reuters, 2014)]. First adopted by its co-sponsors – the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute in 1951 (version 1.0) 
and modified significantly in 1972 (version 2.0), the official text was thoroughly overhauled in 1998 and promulgated 
in 1999 (version 3.0). Since 1999 there have been several patches, most importantly in 2010 (version 3.1). As of July 
2015, all States have enacted the official text as modified in 2010, albeit with a number of relatively minor non-uniform 
amendments introduced by individual States.”    
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functional concept of security. This is in contrast and in place of the traditional approach 
in other Common Law jurisdictions whereby a security interest is by reference to its 
nominal form. Instead, UCC 1-201(35) defines a security interest as any interest in 
personal property that functions in substance to secure the performance of an obligation 
thereby creating a unitary security interest.  
9.14 During that journey193, the U.S. had narrower conceptual gaps to close and thus less CTR 
between individual member constituent states of the U.S. The UCC’s first export of 
Article 9 to inspire the Canadian Personal Property Security Acts (PPSA) to harmonise 
the approach of Canada’s nine common law provinces and three federal territories was its 
first success story. Since then various other Common Law jurisdictions have emulated 
some form of PPSA. Despite that change, back at the heart of the Common Law, the law 
of credit and security in England and Ireland are largely similar. Both jurisdictions at law, 
                                                     
 
193           And in closing these gaps between national Member States and their differing legal cultures, one cannot forget that certain national 
EU Member States may have differing agendas.  In many ways this is no different to what the U.S. and Canada faced during the 
18th and 19th Century and the squabbles between individual territories or the primacy of federal versus subordinated legislation, 
the integration of the nations, their legal systems and their capital markets were built on pragmatism.  The commodities trader from 
Chicago, Illinois seeking fortunes in San Francisco, California knew he needed the (dis)intermediated financing out of New York 
City, New York just as much a Montreal, Quebec based institutional investor would look beyond its own provincial borders to 
seek investment returns in the tar sands out of Calgary, Alberta and secure that investment with securities admitted to the Vancouver 
Stock Exchange, British Colombia.  
Free movement of capital, as in the EU, was the driving force of pushing financial and political integration ahead. Whilst individual 
territories retain legislative power both the U.S. and Canada’s elimination of state borders for financial services and much else is 
delivered through federal legislation that is perhaps more unifying, perhaps because arguably individual gaps are smaller, execution 
venues and settlement systems merged continent wide or facilitated interoperation across the U.S. and Canada and more so because 
the constituent legislatures/governments are less obstructive to the benefits, economic growth and value add to be delivered when 
joining together as a union to get things done. The euro, MiFID and diverse other financial reforms to date, SEPA, TARGET 2 for 
payments and T2S for securities and the Banking Union is a step in making that happen.  Yet those initiatives are not as all-
encompassing as CMU intends to be.   
Equally, standardisation and harmonisation in North America, took place through strong and Federal centralised legislative 
measures built on assertion as well as consensus.  In comparison EU financial integration over the past 30 years has seen certain 
key deliverables implemented by way of harmonising directives and regulations.  And whilst these have overall seen significant 
benefit, the authorities have tried to fix remaining and emerging deficits by responding through legislative and regulatory measures 
in a reactive fashion as they go along rather than setting far-reaching objectives that are reasonably achievable and deliverable.  
The EU’s use of regulations (as opposed to directives) and increasingly regulatory and/or implementing technical standards post-
crisis to build a more resilient financial market may attempt to achieve that approach.   
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and in regulation, lack a unitary security interest. Instead they retain194 the traditional 
distinctions (at law) between mortgages, charges, pledges and liens while equally 
recognising a range of quasi-security interests while struggling with the difficulties in the 
characterisation of a transaction and often complex issued on the application of priority 
rules195 and in Ireland, the issue that the overhauls of Irish company law, culminating in 
the Companies Act 2014, causes continuing confusion, as evidenced in Annexes 1 and 2.  
9.15 Instead of creating a new type of security interest (similar to the UCC/PPSA reforms), in 
a manner that would harmonise such concepts across national laws and schools of 
thought, EU policymakers drafting the EU-FCD decided to instead forgo that missed 
opportunity and focus their approach strictly on the conflict of laws treatment. This would 
involve the creation of a legal concept and a provision in EU legislation that, where 
securities were held through the chain of intermediaries, the law applicable to the creation 
and protection of the security interest in respect of the Collateral Assets that were the 
subject of the EU-FCD, would be the law of the intermediary through which the collateral 
taker of held its interest. This approach, known as the “place of the relevant intermediary 
approach” (PRIMA), introduced in the EU-FCD was the one already adopted by Art. 
9(2) SFD – for a discussion on how this applies in the UK-FCARs and Irish-FCARs 
please see Annex 1. The approach taken in PRIMA means that a relevant market 
participant need “only” satisfy, with certain exceptions, the requirements of one law for 
validity and priority, even if the securities provided as Collateral Assets are held through 
a multi-tiered system and originated in many jurisdictions.  
9.16 PRIMA was considered to be not only desirable from a practical standpoint but to have a 
sound technical basis as the only place it which there is this evidence of the collateral take 
his interest is on the books of the immediate intermediary. This was important 
conceptually, as the further one went up the collateral asset chain of intermediaries, 
particularly in the case of Collateral Assets held by way of a security interest of a pledge 
(or analogous nature), there was often no record of the collateral taker so it made sense to 
refer to the location of the immediate intermediary to determine the rights of the collateral 
taker. As this thesis argues, digitisation of the financial markets means that some of that 
                                                     
 
194  Despite some interest in the UK and the Company Law Review Steering Group’s work – see pages 272 and 273 of Gullifer & 
Akseli.  
195  Notably as evidenced in the Irish case of Re JD Brian Ltd [2015] IESC 62. 
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approach may now be antiquated and that the risk exposure between collateral provider 
and collateral taker might not “just” be limited to the immediate intermediary.  
9.17 When drafting of the EU-FCD began almost 20 years ago, the EC concluded that there 
were different ways of achieving greater certainty and respect of collateralisation so as to 
protect Collateral Assets from the application of the insolvency laws of EU-MS. One 
possibility that was open to and certainly considered by policymakers was to create a new 
type of security interest (as under the UCC) or in a similar fashion as 29th Regimeto create 
a new model collateral law – which could be more encompassing and far reaching, 
whether for collateral specifically or markets more generally would an ‘EU UCC’ be that 
quantum leap?  
9.18 As a practical example of how this might be applied: Megabank trading in Frankfurt, 
Germany and BigFund sitting in Dublin, Ireland, managed by BigBucks LLP, in Jersey, 
with Custody, clearing and settlement conducted through Euroclear UK & Ireland sat in 
London, England, could either choose to have various transaction documentation 
governed by laws of the jurisdictions of their domicile, or as is more typically the case 
for those contractual relationships where there is no explicit rule or market practice to 
have a particular law govern the relationship could elect to choose to apply (as is typically 
the case) English law to govern their relationship.  This may still have the factual issue 
that multiple laws across jurisdictions nevertheless interact with the English law governed 
relationship and the stakeholders.  Whilst conflict of laws may be less of an issue, if the 
parties were to agree to apply a 29th Regime, not only would transaction costs (process 
agents etc.) likely be reduced, but there might be greater legal certainty and ease of doing 
business.  Whilst this is largely based on the assumption that any 29th Regime would be 
all-encompassing and well drafted, comparisons to the transformational effects that the 
U.S. UCC had are certainly tempting and thus something which EU policymakers may 
wish to take into account.   
9.19 Irrespective of those efforts, the disproportionate costs, in particular between domestic 
and cross-border trading, clearing and settlement  have remained196, including those costs 
                                                     
 
196  Whilst costs have sunk between 2001 and 2011 according to Paech 11/2012, one area where there has been absolutely no 
development is in improving consumer and wholesale market participants’ access to clear, transparent and not misleading 
information on how execution, clearing and settlement as well as Custody costs compare in a cross-border arrangement compared 
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that are directly as a result of legal risk from the cost of uncertainty in security interests 
and enforceability197, fragmentation of rules that restrict or disproportionately restrict the 
efficient mobilisation of collateral on a cross-border basis, as well as the general lack of 
competitiveness across national borders in EU capital markets.   
9.20 Will CMU 2.0 be any different in what CMU 1.0 could not deliver for collateral?  Whilst 
delivering on short(er) term goals, medium term and long(er) term goals are desirable to 
ensure the project is built, the EC should not lose sight of what it considers a blueprint 
for what CMU would look like if built from the bottom-up198. Once that blueprint is 
established, policymakers can decide whether it makes sense to ensure certain pillars are 
implemented in the market (from a collateral perspective such as Draft SLL, a CASS 
Rollout as well as a host of convergence or improvement measures as suggested herein) 
                                                     
 
to domestic arrangements.  Paech summarises the following cost differences for equity securities in relating to cross-border clearing 
and settlement versus domestic transactions with the following factors as a result of cross-border legal and technical discrepancies, 
economies of scale, variations of cost models by financial centre and services provided: 
  
For fund managers For custodians CSDs Brokers 
2.0 3.4 3.8 4.1 
 Source from Paech 11/2012:  Oxera Report “Monitoring prices, cost and volumes of trading and post-trading services”, Report 
prepared for the EC, London and Brussels (2011)”. 
197  Certain jurisdictions with more established rules and user-friendly trading, collateral and Custody practices and documentation, 
such as the UK, Ireland, Luxembourg or Germany and the general “ease of doing business” in those jurisdictions make these more 
favourable and cost-efficient venue for various transactions and financial market infrastructure providers.  Paech 11/2012 focuses 
in part three on cost being driven primarily by legal fees as opposed to other transactional fees although in 3.1 he concludes that 
there “…would be no way of extrapolating excess cost due exclusively to legal uncertainty.” Whilst clients may always query their 
professional advisors’ fees, without any meaningful substantiation in particular as weighted against the reward aspects, this may 
be an over exaggeration, especially when compared against legal costs incurred in U.S. domestic or cross-border transactions.  
Whilst Paech proffers in 3.1 that “…the circumstances that produce legal risk differ just as, for instance, holding arrangements 
differ, including the length of the holding chain and the involvement of foreign law.”  In the absence of using a Coll-RR, Cust-RR 
and CTR model and weighting the components to generate a quantitative view of one’s risk, then one might be able to support 
Paech’s conclusions with conviction, in the alternative, using the risk models proposed herein could assist in quantifying and better 
preparing for risk. 
198  See private contribution of a leading commentator on transatlantic regulatory reform, Patrick Kenadjian, Attorney in the State of 
New York and a Japanese Bengoshi then Senior Counsel at Davis Polk Wardwell which was presented in connection with the 
ILF’s May 2015 CMU conference in Frankfurt.  Please refer to: http://www.ilf-
frankfurt.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Article_Kenadjian.pdf  
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or whether political will, means that a 29th Regime may be more capable of delivering the 
principles.  
9.21 The likely result, as recent EU legislative has shown is that there may be an unhelpful 
muddled middle ground between the two approaches, which, unless carefully steered by 
the ESFS could lead to more fragmentation. Political will by EU-MS’ governments199 and 
competent functional drafting by the EC, assisted by the ESAs and the ECB (and 
institutional improvements in addition to reforming TARGET2 and T2S), will hopefully 
allow CMU 2.0 to get serious on collateral and ensure that the ecosystem can expand and 
operate without fragmentation and minimal adverse friction.  The European project and 
appetite for integration in (perhaps simpler) financial services over 20 years ago was a 
different one when compared to the current 2019-2024 legislative cycle.  
9.22 Given the US’s path to the UCC was far from easy, and that where each of the 50 federal 
states share a similar school of law, the EC of then may have been compelled to focus on 
a more achievable goal in ensuring the EU-FCD could deliver the transformative effect it 
was designed to do. As an exception, it was recognised that certain rules of insolvency 
law would need to be modified and protections created to meet the aims of this new 
legislation that became the EU-FCD.   
9.23 Turning back to the rationale at the time, the legislative policymakers behind the EU-
FCD decided to not seek it to change the laws of EU-MS relating to fraud, dishonesty, 
breach of trust as well as the tracing of assets into the hands of third-parties. Those 
                                                     
 
199  Building a consensus with the EP might prove difficult – see own-initiative procedure 2015/2106(INI) “Stocktaking and challenges 
of the EU Financial Services Regulation: impact and the way forward towards a more efficient and effective EU framework for 
Financial Regulation and a Capital Markets Union”- more information available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2015/2106(INI)&l=en  
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(national) laws would be left untouched, thus leaving these open to continued 
fragmentation.  
9.24 Responsibility also lies with national-level stakeholders as the EU-SFD200 and EU-
FCD201, are each transposed into the legal and regulatory regimes of EU EU-MS, each 
themselves as amended or expanded by statutory measures or rules of the relevant 
national competent authority (NCA) as explored in Annex 1 or relevant case law of 
competent courts exercising jurisdiction, as highlighted in this thesis.  
9.25 EU-MS, thus the UK (until Brexit) and Ireland, have an obligation to implement EU 
Directives into their national laws and take note of the binding nature of the outcomes so 
as to achieve the result envisaged by the legislative instrument while being free as to form 
and method of implementation.  
9.26 In applying national law, UK (currently) and Irish courts are required, as far as possible, 
to do so in light of the wording and purpose of the relevant EU Directive (Marleasing SA 
v LA Commercial Internacional de Alimentation SA Case C-106/89, European Court of 
Justice [1990].   
9.27 EU-MS’ courts accept as authoritative rulings of the ECJ on matters of EU law, including 
how Directives should be interpreted. While there is no definite statement of principles 
of interpreting EU legislation, the basic approach at the EU level of interpreting a 
legislative instrument is: 
(a) to start with its terms of the legislative instrument, including the preamble (which 
may often have operative measures “hidden” in it);  
(b) where necessary to turn to the travaux préparatoires (literally preparatory works 
i.e., the materials used in preparing the ultimate form of law – in the case of the 
                                                     
 
200  For an overview of the national (statutory) transposition measures communicated by the EU Member States for the SFD please 
see: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/NIM/?uri=CELEX:31998L0026 and the latest available report on the study into the 
transposition, last dated 19 February 2003 and available per: https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/main-report-sfd-
transposition_en.pdf as well as the list of designated payment and securities settlement systems for the purpose of the SFD 
discussed in 9.4.   
201  For an overview of the national (statutory) transposition measures communicated by the EU Member States for the EU-FCD please 
see:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/NIM/?uri=CELEX:32002L0047 
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EC this might include Impact Assessments or Staff Working Documents – which 
are measures that are much more common now than were the case then);  
(c) where necessary, to consider the usual meaning (non-legal but also possibly non-
market terminology) of expressions used, including comparing the different 
language versions of the instrument; and  
(d) if this does not resolve matters, to consider the purpose and general objectives of 
the legislative instrument.  
  
9.28 As discussed in para. 9.25 et seq. above, for periods that any jurisdiction, such as Ireland 
and the UK, remain EU-MS, they are required to comply with the “Lamfalussy 
Process”202 and implement measures set out in “Level 1” i.e., primary EU legislation 
(Regulations i.e., which have direct effect and require no transposition or Directives i.e., 
which have indirect effect and require transposition into national law) or “Level 2” i.e., 
secondary legislation (Commission Delegated Regulations,  Regulations of the ECB in 
its central banking capacity or in its SSM role or regulatory and/or implementing technical 
standards (RTS/ITS), or ultimately “Level 3” i.e., tertiary level instruments that are either 
binding such as Level 1 and 2 instruments or non-binding but persuasive or part of 
“supervisory expectations” and thus quasi-binding that are set by the ESAs, the ECB-
SSM and/or the national competent authorities of the ESFS. Level 4 effectively refers to 
ensuring that other levels are correctly enforced.  
9.29 The Lamfalussy process has acted as a catalyst for delivering wide-ranging and, on the 
whole, effective financial markets legislation and supervisory instruments. It aims to 
foster integration of the EU’s Single Market for financial services and to make a more 
level playing field across the EU as well as the Economic and Monetary Union i.e., the 
Eurozone. The Lamfalussy process was significantly strengthened by the creation of the 
ESAs with EU-wide responsibilities and powers and the “EBU” with a core Eurozone 
focus.  
                                                     
 
202  See:https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/financial-reforms-and-their-progress/regulatory-
process-financial-services/regulatory-process-financial-services_en  
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9.30 Even if the UK’s relationship is changing, given that it will continue to apply the UK-
FCARs and presumably, even if its rulemaking, as is expected203 diverges, wishes to have 
some interaction with the EU- and Irish-rules. It stands to reason that EU policymakers 
might be persuaded to bring EU-level rules up to the standard of where the UK has 
expanded scope of protections prior to Brexit and before losing London and the likelihood 
that the EU may not grant UK “equivalence” decisions.     
9.31 Legislative equivalence is a matter that is assessed by the EC and is subject to specific 
rules, which at the time of writing are being reformed and are thus beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Equivalence can only be granted by the EC, provided the relevant EU 
legislation allows for it, and this may be only in relation to specific provisions as opposed 
to all provisions. That being said in the absence of a third-country regime being assessed 
as equivalent the access to and interoperation between various jurisdictions becomes 
difficult. As pointed out in Langenbucher & Tröger, the EU-SFD does not contemplate 
an equivalence mechanism and (clarifications added in parentheses):  
 “… a third-country settlement system [such as that of the UK] may become a 
‘designated system’ under the SFD [and thus benefit from the SFD protections] 
provided that the system is governed by the law of an EU Member State as chosen 
by its participants. This requires that the participants choose the law of a 
Member State in which at least one of them is headquartered. [The] UK 
transposed the SFD though the Financial Markets and Insolvency Settlement 
Finality Regulations. However it might be necessary to amend the UK regulation, 
otherwise it is possible that the finality protections afforded in the UK would 
cease to operate. UK-based designated systems might be required to change the 
governing law of the rules of their system to an EU Member State law in order 
to maintain the existing SFD designation and thus protection.”  
  
                                                     
 
203  See inter alia comments on the FCA’s future model of its rules: https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/future-financial-services-
regulation-uk 
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10. The UK’s and Ireland’s approach to interpreting EU legislation affecting 
collateral 
10.1 The ECJ has adopted a more liberal policy to the use of background materials in the 
interpretation of EU legislation than UK courts apply in the interpretation of purely 
domestic legislation. However, where UK national legislation implements a Directive, 
UK courts may follow the same interpretative approach as the ECJ and take into account 
the travaux préparatoires as in an aid to interpretation204. Where a clear literal 
interpretation of the relevant wording is not possible, the travaux préparatoires may be 
relevant in considering the purpose of the EU Directive concerned and the context in 
which the relevant wording is used.205 The travaux préparatoires relating to the EU-FCD 
and the SFD as regards linked systems and credit claims (SFD/EU-FCD Amendment 
Directive) and were examined in detail by Briggs J in the English courts’ consideration 
of the Lehman Extended Liens case206.  
10.2 Whereas the EU-FCD has been implemented into Irish law in S.I. No. 1/2004 - European 
Communities (Financial Collateral Arrangements) Regulations 2004207, as amended, inter 
alia by the S.I. No. 626/2010 - European Communities (Financial Collateral 
Arrangements) Regulations 2010, (collectively the Irish-FCAR) almost verbatim, the 
rules of the Irish NCA, the Central Bank of Ireland, may have supplementary measures.  
10.3 Where an EU Directive such as the EU-FCD has been implemented more widely into UK 
national legislation i.e. the Financial Collateral Agreements (No. 2) Regulations 2003 (SI 
                                                     
 
204  For a fuller discussion, see: S. Schonberg and K. Frick, ‘Finishing, refining, polishing: on the use of travaux préparatoires as an 
aid to the use of Community Legislation’, (2003) 28 E.L. Rev. 149. 
205  Although the UK courts have the discretion to consider the travaux préparatoires if necessary, it appears that these will not be used 
so as to cast doubt upon a clear literal interpretation. The circumstances of the case may also be relevant. In A and others v National 
Blood Authority and another [2001] All ER (D) 298 (Mar), Burton J stated: ‘that it is proper to look at travaux préparatoires to 
glean such [legislative] purpose, but with caution, always chary of early discussions or disputations which may have been overtaken 
by later events, or of documents which may always have been internal or confidential and not reflected in the decisions’ (para. 15). 
See also the decision in Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 that permits British courts, if primary legislation is ambiguous or obscure, 
in certain circumstances take account of statements made in Parliament by Ministers or other promoters of a Bill in construing that 
legislation and thus not breaching Parliamentary privilege. 
206  [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch), paras 104-114. 
207  See: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2004/si/1/made/en/print 
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2003/3226)208, as amended, inter alia by The Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) 
Regulations 2003 (Amendment) Regulations 2009209 (collectively the UK-FCARs) 
referred to in the quote below as the “Regulations”, it is still necessary to ensure that UK 
national law does not derogate from the Directive, as pointed out by Briggs J in 2012 in 
the Lehman Extended Liens case: 
 
 “It is common ground that this Directive [the EU-FCD] is a minimum 
harmonisation directive: see Recital (22). It is therefore the obligation of each 
Member State to implement it by domestic legislation in a manner that is at least 
as broad as the original scope of the Directive, although Member States may go 
further. In the present case the UK went substantially further than the Directive 
in one important respect, namely by extending the scope of the regime to 
arrangements between any non-natural persons (see sub-paragraph (d) of the 
definition of security financial collateral arrangement) whereas the Directive 
was designed to create a regime limited to a much more restricted class of public 
authorities, central banks and financial institutions: see Article 1.2. But the gold-
plating of a system for the implementation of a minimum harmonisation directive 
in one respect does not justify derogation from it in another. Accordingly, it is for 
the national court to construe the domestic legislation (here the Regulations) as 
far as possible in a manner which does not derogate from the intended scope of 
the Directive, once that scope has been accurately identified as a matter of 
construction of the Directive.”210 
10.4 Certain phrases and concepts in EU Directives are required to be given an autonomous 
meaning. In order to apply them uniformly in all parts of the EU, their meaning is 
determined within the context of the instrument and not by reference to the laws of EU-
MS. Whether or not a phrase or concept in an EU Directive should be given an 
autonomous meaning depends on whether there is a need for uniformity in its application 
throughout the EU. The argument for an autonomous interpretation may be stronger 
where the phrase or concept is novel. One example is the concept of ‘centre of main 
                                                     
 
208  See: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2003/3226/made  
209  See: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/2462/contents/made  
210  [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch), para. 92. 
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interests’ used in Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, which has 
since been recast following the EP approval of Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (Recast EU 
Insolvency Regulation), which expanded the scope of the previous regime to collective 
rescue and restructuring proceedings. The ECJ rules in a 2006 case that, ‘The concept of 
the main interests is peculiar to the Regulation. Therefore, it has an autonomous meaning 
and must therefore be interpreted in a uniform way, independently of national 
legislation.’211 
10.5 In the English case of Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc,212 the 
House of Lords considered how an English court should be interpreted in the UK 
regulations implementing Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms In Consumer Contracts. 
Lord Steyn stated: 
 
 “The Directive is not an altogether harmonious text. It reflects the pragmatic 
compromises which were necessary to arrive at practical solutions between 
member states with divergent legal systems. But, despite some inelegance and 
untidiness in the text, the general principle that the construction must be adopted 
which promotes the effectiveness and practical value of the system ought to 
overcome difficulties. And the concepts of the Directive must be given 
autonomous meanings so that there will be uniform application of the Directive 
so far as is possible.” 
10.6 The UK Privy Council has accepted that ‘appropriation’ in the EU-FCD should also be 
given an autonomous meaning but not be applied rigidly to require a concept of ownership 
that exists in the English legal system (and not in civil law systems) to be disregarded.213  
10.7 The preceding paragraphs have assessed how English law interprets EU law and applies 
it. This is important as evidenced below as well as notably in Annexes 1 and 2. In 
summary, the UK’s interpretation and extension of laws on collateral have in areas 
created conceptual divergences by moving away from EU common principles, thereby 
                                                     
 
211  Case C-341/04 Eurofood, IFSC Ltd [2006] ECR I-3813, para. 31. 
212  [2001] UKHL 52 ; [2002] I AC 481 ; [2001] 3 WLR 1297. 
213  See Chapter 12, para. 12.38-12.43. 
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creating/stretching further the degree of vertical CTR and thus also distancing itself from 
how other EU-27 EU-MSs, in the case explored herein, Ireland, have implemented the 
same common principles thus creating horizontal CTR.  As Annex 1 and 2 demonstrates, 
the UK’s range of jurisdiction-specific rules and concepts that have not inspired EU 
measures, nor been followed by Ireland, skews this relationship further. This is also true 
in relation to the pillars of collateral regulation across the EU, the EU-FCD and EU-SFD 
and how these are implemented in the UK through the UK-FCAR.  
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11. Implementation of the EU-FCD in the UK and key provisions of the UK-
FCAR 
11.1 HM Treasury, as the legislative policymaker, consulted widely on the implementation of 
the EU-FCD into the UK’s legislative and regulatory regime. The UK-FCARs do not 
follow the EU-FCD verbatim, rather EU EU-MS were free to enact broader provisions. 
Equally, in keeping with a number of other EU EU-MS, the UK went further than the EU-
FCD requires by extending the scope of the UK-FCARs to entities not covered by the 
EU-FCD. Moreover, in the UK, judgments, notably those of the English courts, expanded 
the interpretation of key provisions of the EU-FCD as transposed by the UK-FCAR. This 
divergence, while beneficial to business transacted in or through the UK, can cause 
conceptual gaps and CTR to occur between UK (i.e., UK-FCARs) and EU law (i.e. the 
EU-FCD), irrespective of the primacy of EU law.  
11.2 The UK-FCARs apply in Scotland and Northern Ireland as well as England and Wales.  
The UK-FCARs, like the EU-FCD, are not limited to Collateral Assets taken in the EU 
nor collateral arrangements concluded by parties present in the EU. Neither the EU-FCD 
nor the UK-FCARs require either the collateral-provider or the collateral-taker under a 
financial collateral arrangement to be an entity incorporated in an EU-MS, let alone in 
the same EU-MS. The UK-FCARs apply not only to transactions which are entirely 
domestic to the UK but also to transactions between parties neither of which is located in 
the UK or any other EU-MS, provided that the arrangement is governed by English law. 
11.3 The travaux préparatoires to the EU-FCD show that the omission of any territorial 
limitation was deliberate. In the original draft of the proposed Directive, ‘the collateral-
provider’ and ‘the collateral-taker’ were both defined in terms, which were expressed to 
apply ‘whether or not that party is from a Member State’.214 As the EC explained in a 
Memorandum on the proposed Directive issued in March 2001, even though the problems 
of enforcement were due mainly to the patchwork of different legislation in the EU-MS, 
the aim of the proposed Directive was to create an integrated financial market for 
collateral in the EU. The Directive therefore “…has to apply to a collateral arrangement 
                                                     
 
214   See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on financial collateral arrangements dated 27 March 
2001 – C 180 E/312 at E/315. 
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whenever it was subject to the laws of an EU-MS”.215 In an Explanatory Memorandum 
dated 27 March 2001, the EC explained that the inclusion of collateral-takers or collateral-
providers from third countries was not intended to give the Directive extraterritorial 
effect, because it only applied to the extent that the parties were subject to the law of an 
EU-MS. In the course of widespread consultation, no suggestion appears to have been 
received from any consultee that the Directive should be restricted to transactions 
between parties from an EU-MS. For this reason, definitions of ‘collateral-taker’ and 
‘collateral-provider’ in an early draft EU-FCD were later deleted as ‘unnecessary’.216 Any 
such restriction would have drastically reduced the scope of the proposed Directive in a 
manner entirely inconsistent with the conclusions drawn from the consultations. 
11.4 The definition of ‘non-natural person’ in the UK-FCARs expressly includes (note 
differences to the EU-FCD) entities incorporated outside the UK; and in this context is 
clearly not restricted to entities incorporated in another EU-MS. 
11.5 The EU-FCD was intended to apply to collateral arrangements in financial instruments 
irrespective of the place of incorporation of the issuer.217 In today’s global financial 
markets, multinational companies often hold large and diversified portfolios of financial 
instruments of issuers incorporated in a range of different countries, both inside and 
outside the EU. They may well manage these portfolios aggressively and frequently use 
them as security to raise funds to finance their businesses or corporate acquisitions. The 
EU-FCD enables them to offer their investment portfolios as a single package of collateral 
governed by a single set of rules. The collateral-taker’s consent is often sought to the 
substitution of collateral from time to time, without having to take any steps to ensure 
that the substituted collateral is governed by the same rules as the collateral for which it 
is substituted. 
11.6 Neither the EU-FCD nor the UK-FCARs contain any provision governing the choice of 
applicable law save in respect of the situs of book entry securities collateral, 
                                                     
 
215   Memo/01/108 ‘Proposed Directive on financial collateral arrangements – frequently asked questions’ 
216   See Common Position Paper (EC) no. 32/2002 adopted by the Council (OJ) C 119, 22.5.2002, p. E/22. 
217    In an early position paper (dated 13 December 1999) it was stated that the ‘collateral-taker’s interest must remain clear and robust 
irrespective of where the securities to which the interest relates are located’ (see the Position Paper on taking of securities as 
collateral in the European Union by G. Morton and R. Potok, p. 2). 
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compromising shares or other securities the title to which is evidenced by entries in a 
register or account maintained by or on behalf of an intermediary. 218  
11.7 UK legislation does not, of course, apply worldwide even though conceivable in general 
terms. It is impliedly by the territorial jurisdiction of the legislature. UK legislation does 
not normally apply in a context that has no relevant connection with the UK. In the 
Cukurova cases (see below),219 the necessary connection was provided by the parties 
themselves, who agreed that the security should be governed by English law and 
expressly incorporated the right of appropriation conferred by the UK-FCARs. 
11.8 The UK-FCARs apply whenever both parties are non-natural persons, including 
unincorporated firms, partnerships or bodies with legal personality except an 
individual.220 In other words, the proviso that one of the parties must be a financial 
institution or other specified entity is omitted.221 This was the result of a conscious 
decision by HM Treasury, which was made for policy reasons with the support of 
consultees.222 This wide implementation led to a subsequent challenge that the UK-
FCARs were ultra vires.  
11.9 Some of the choices and suggestions of HM Treasury have given rise to challenge. In 
Cukurova,223 the claimants applied for permission to challenge the validity of the UK-
FCARs by way of judicial review. Cukurova argued that HM Treasury had acted ultra 
                                                     
 
218   UK-FCARs, Reg. 19, implementing the EU-FCD, Art. 9. 
219   See Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd v Cukurova Finance International Ltd and Others (Cukurova), unreported 16 November 2007 (High 
Court, British Virgin Islands) and unreported 22 April 2008 (Court of Appeal, British Virgin Islands) 
220    See the definition of ‘non-natural person’ in reg. 3.  It includes entities constituted under the law of a country or territory outside 
the UK and entities constituted under international law. 
221   UK-FCARs, Reg. 3, para (d) of the definition of ‘security financial collateral arrangement’. 
222   See HM Treasury, ‘Implementation of the Directive on Financial Collateral Agreements’, July 2003. 
223   The relevant shares, which ere subject of the security interest in dispute in the Cukurova case where equity securities in two British 
Virgin Islands incorporated private companies that were “…not listed on an exchange or market or publicly traded”  (point 6 of 
the agreed statement of facts set out the judgment of British Virgin Islands Court of Appeal). As a result, the questions in the court 
were, as noted in Footnote 33 of Yeowart and Parsons the questions, whether the private shares were financial collateral within 
the meaning of the UK-FCAR’s Regulation 3 and concluded that they were.  
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vires under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 when implementing into 
domestic law the provisions of the EU-FCD. 
11.10 Cukurova argued that the EU-FCD had been unlawfully implemented in the UK by 
reference to its purpose and in particular disregarded the careful balance struck in the EU-
FCD between rights of unsecured creditors and those of collateral-takers. The extension 
of the scope of the EU-FCD to all non-natural parties represented a significant inroad into 
the rights of unsecured creditors in an insolvency. Cukurova argued that the EU-FCD’s 
central purpose was to ensure stability of the wholesale financial market. The judge was 
not persuaded by this argument. In his view, an important objective of the EU-FCD was 
to achieve stability of the financial markets generally. By far the greater inroad into the 
rights of unsecured creditors had already been made by the EU-FCD itself, since financial 
collateral arrangements involving at least one entity falling within article 1(2)(a)-(d) are 
far more common than those made between two companies neither of which falls within 
those categories. 
11.11 The objective of the EU-FCD is not limited to the wholesale financial market and these 
markets are not referred to in the EU-FCD. The judge in Cukurova considered that the 
dividing line between the wholesale financial market and the financial market generally 
was in any event blurred and difficult to identify. 
11.12 Although the UK-FCARs, as then implemented, struck a different balance between the 
rights of unsecured creditors and collateral-takers than did the EU-FCD, the greater 
protection afforded to secured creditors by the UK-FCARs enhanced the stability of the 
financial market generally. The UK-FCARs furthered the aim of the EU-FCD by 
widening the scope of the protection. They certainly did not undermine that objective. 
The UK-FCARs also avoided the difficulty of drawing a line between the wholesale 
financial market and other financial markets. If it were not for the widening scope of the 
UK-FCARs, two parallel but distinct systems would otherwise operate in the UK. For 
these reasons, the judge had considerable doubts as to whether Cukurova could succeed. 
He accordingly refused permission for the judicial review to proceed and also refused to 
leave to appeal against this decision. 
11.13 There is a risk that another collateral-provider (or an insolvency practitioner) might bring 
a similar judicial review challenge in the future. However, it was generally considered 
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that such a challenge would face formidable difficulties both on grounds of delay and on 
the merits. An extension of time would again be requires, and any challenger would face 
similar potential objections to those identified by Moses LJ in Cukurova. The risk of a 
successful challenge seemed to be diminishing with the passing of time. 
11.14 The above question has been re-opened (but not decided) by Lord Mance who delivered 
the leading judgement of the UK Supreme Court in The United States of America v 
Nolan.224 This case concerned, among other things, whether the different regulations 
under section 2(2) of the 1972 Act were ultra vires because they conferred protection 
going beyond that required to implement or enable the implementation of the relevant 
Directive or to deal with matters arising out of or related to the Directive or its 
operations.225 He referred to the decision in Cukurova: 
 
 “Moses LJ was concerned with a question whether Cukurova should be allowed 
an extension of time within which to challenge the vires of [the FCARs]. 
Ultimately, all he did was express such ‘considerable doubts’ about Cukurova’s 
prospects of success in its challenge as to lead him to a conclusion that justice 
did not demand an extension of time. Nonetheless, it is worth looking at this case 
more closely, because in my view Moses LJ greatly underestimated the force of 
Cukurova’s challenge. 
 
 … I find it difficult to see how this [the implementation of the EU-FCD so as to 
apply to arrangements between non-natural persons neither of which falls into 
one of the specified categories] could be regarded as having been for the purpose 
                                                     
 
224   [2015] UKSC 63. 
225   The regulation examined in Nolan were The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
(Amendment) Regulations 1995 (the ‘1995 Regulations’) which amended the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) 
Act 1992 (‘TULCRA’). These went beyond Directive 77/187/EEC (or now Directive 98/85/EEC) by extending a right to be 
consulted (prior to redundancies) to employees of public administrative bodies where there was no trade union representation. The 
Supreme Court held that s. 2(2) of the 1972 Act was just sufficient in scope to enable the 1995 Regulations to be effective but 
found it a ‘difficult and borderline case’. It was sufficient because Parliament had by its original enactment of TULCRA established 
a unified domestic regime which drew no distinction between different parts of TULCRA which it had or did not have an EU 
obligation to implement. Parliament could be taken to have created, for the domestic purposes of s.2(2) of the 1972 Act, a 
relationship which the Secretary of State was ‘entitled to take into account and to continue it by and in the 1995 Regulations’ 
(Nolan, para 72). Lord Carnwath (dissenting) found it difficult to avoid the conclusion that the extension was outside the power 
conferred by the 1972 Act. 
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of implementing or enabling the implementation of the EU Directive. Equally, 
the extension did not arise out of the obligations in the Directive and was not 
related to them … under the United Kingdom constitution and the 1972 Act [it 
was] a matter which was not for the executive to decide, but for Parliament to 
consider and, if thought fit, to agree as a matter of primary legislation.”226 
11.15 Although Lord Mance’s critical observations introduce new legal uncertainty, several 
points may be made. First, the above observations are obiter dicta and made without HM 
Treasury being represented before the Supreme Court to make submissions on the above 
question. In particular, the question was not examined in the context of the UK-FCARs 
as fully as it was in Cukurova.227 It is unclear whether Lord Mance’s comments were 
intended to cast doubt on the validity of the UK-FCARs or simply to limit Cukurova as a 
precedent for a more liberal interpretation of section 2(2). Secondly, the lapse of time is 
still a relevant factor as more than 12 years have elapsed since the UK-FCARs came into 
force. Thirdly, even if a challenge were to succeed, it seems unlikely that an English court 
would declare the whole UK-FCARs to be ultra vires.228 While it appears that no 
secondary legislation made under section 2(2) has to date been declared ultra vires, it is 
strongly arguable that (if this were to happen to the UK-FCARs) only those provisions 
which go beyond the scope of the EU-FCD should be declared ineffective. If so, then a 
financial collateral arrangement would continue to be protected by the UK-FCARs where 
either the collateral-provider or the collateral-taker (or both) fell into one of the categories 
specified in Article 1(2)(a)-(d) of the EU-FCD. Fourthly, even if a financial collateral 
arrangement between two non-natural persons (neither of which fell into a specified 
category) lost the protection of the UK-FCARs, the arrangement would not be 
automatically invalidated (except where the parties had not registered a charge under 
                                                     
 
226   Nolan, paras 67-69. In the view of Lord Mance and the majority, ‘provisions extending an EU regime domestically into areas not 
covered by or specifically excluded from the EU regime contemplated by the Directive may well fall outside both paragraphs of 
section 2(2)’ (Nolan, para 66). 
227   The question had also been considered by the FMLC in its paper of July 2008, ‘Issue 132 – Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd v Cukurova 
Finance International Ltd and Cukurova Holding AS: Legal assessment of an issue raised in the above case, namely the extent to 
which the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations 2003 are ultra vires the European Communities Act 1972’, which 
concluded with the view that the UK-FCARs were validly made under s. 2(2) of that Act.  
228   In Cukurova the claimants altered their original case and argued before Moses LJ that the UK-FCARs should be quashed only to 
the extent that they extend the personal scope of the EU-FCD and not be quashed in their entirety (which would otherwise put the 
UK in breach of its EU obligation to implement the EU-FCD). Moses LJ did not have to resolve this issue: Cukurova, paras 44-46. 
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section 859A of the Companies Act 2006 in the belief that they could rely on the 
exemption in regulation 4(4) of the UK-FCARs.229 Fifthly, Lord Mance did not refer to 
the Treasury’s power under section 255 of the Banking Act 2009, which is discussed in 
turn. 
11.16 As part of post-crisis financial regulatory reforms, notably on recovery and resolution 
planning, the UK’s Banking Act 2009 includes a wide power to make further regulations 
about financial collateral arrangements. Section 255 enables HM Treasury to go beyond 
the scope of the EU-FCD. The Treasury may introduce any provision that it considers 
necessary or desirable to enable financial collateral arrangements to be commercially 
useful and effective. It may also provide for anything done under or in reliance on the 
UK-FCARs to be treated retrospectively as having had effect despite any lack of vires. 
Section 255 has not been brought into force at the time of writing. It is suggested that, 
although the existence of section 255 may be a disincentive to discourage a further 
challenge, the better course is for the Treasury to bring section 255 into force and exercise 
its power under it to place the validity of the UK-FCARs beyond the possibility of 
challenge.  
11.17 Irrespective of whether proceedings are commenced before a UK court or a foreign court, 
it is likely that the relevant court will apply its own rules of private international law to 
determine whether English law (including the UK-FCARs) is applicable to the 
substantive legal issues involved.230 Where the UK-FCARs are applicable, the UK-
                                                     
 
229  In this case the charge would be void against an administrator, liquidator or creditor of the collateral-provider (if it were a UK 
company) and the money secured by the charge would become immediately repayable (CA 2006, s.859H). The court may order 
that the period for delivery of the documents required by s.859A be extended, where, inter alia, it is ‘just and equitable to grant 
relief’. Where the collateral-provider is still solvent and there is no other competing secured creditor, the practical answer in many 
cases may be for the collateral-provider to grant new collateral over the same assets in the same terms and then deliver the new 
charging document for registration under s. 859A. However, protection under the UK-FCARs could not be restored in this way. 
The loss of protection might be more serious for a security financial collateral arrangement (where legal title in the collateral assets 
has passed to the collateral-taker). Where a security financial collateral arrangement entered into by parties which qualified under 
the UK-FCARs but not under the EU-FCD purported to include a right of appropriation or right of use conferred by the UK-FCARs, 
the right would or could be ineffective. The collateral-taker would also lose the insolvency law protections conferred by the UK-
FCARs. If the inclusion of private company shares as ‘financial instruments’ in the UK-FCARs was also held to go beyond the 
scope of the EU-FCD, then any security or title transfer arrangement over those shares could not constitute or form part of a 
financial collateral arrangement, even if the parties were qualifying entities under both the UK-FCARs and the EU-FCD. 
230    The same is likely to be the case where Scots law governs the transaction. 
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FCARs cover four distinct areas: the modification of the law requiring formalities, the 
modification of insolvency law, the rights of use and appropriation, and conflict of laws. 
11.18 If the issue concerns formalities, the English court will apply the UK-FCARs if the 
formality is imposed by English law. So, if an English incorporated company creates a 
security interest under New York law over securities held on its behalf by a custodian in 
New York, the question of whether the security interest is registrable as a charge at 
Companies House is an English law issue. The UK-FCARs will apply in determining 
whether the security is exempted from the registration requirement under regulation 4(4) 
of the UK-FCARs. 
11.19 Likewise, if the issue is whether the New York security interest should be characterised 
as a floating security and be subject to potential invalidation under section 245 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986, the English court will look to the substantive law governing the 
insolvency proceedings to determine whether section 145 applies at all and, only if it does 
apply, will regulation 10(5)231 of the UK-FCARs be relevant. Where the  collateral-
provider has entered into an insolvency proceeding which is an English administration or 
liquidation, section 145 (and therefore regulation 10(5)) will obviously apply. Less 
obviously, section 245 (and therefore regulation 10(5)) could also apply to a foreign 
insolvency proceeding where a foreign representative makes an application under article 
23 of the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 for an order under or in connection 
with section 245. 
11.20 Regulations 16 and 17 of the UK-FCARs (The right of use and appropriation) would 
apply only where, under English rules of private international law, the law governing the 
security interest or the security financial collateral arrangement is English law. This is 
because regulation 16 only applies if a security financial collateral arrangement 
‘provides’ for the right use and regulation 17 only applies if the ‘terms’ of the security 
                                                     
 
231   UK-FCARs, reg. 10(5) disapplies s. 245 to a charge created or otherwise arising under a security financial collateral arrangement. 
See Chapter 5, Part B.4. 
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financial collateral arrangement include the right of appropriation, thus making it clear 
that it is the governing law that is relevant. 
11.21 Regulation 19 of the UK-FCARs (Standard test regarding the applicable law to book 
entry securities financial collateral arrangements) requires a court applying English rules 
of private international law to determine certain issues in relation to book entry securities 
collateral by reference to ‘the domestic law of the country in which the relevant account 
is maintained’. The issues in question include the legal nature and proprietary effects of 
book entry securities collateral and Regulation 19 is relevant wherever the court in 
question is bound to apply English rules of private international law. 
11.22 The preceding paragraphs have assessed the UK’s approach and explained the 
background to the UK-FCARs, which have been far more innovative in their approach, 
in particular by extending EU-FCD’s scope of who can benefit from the protections to an 
exceptionally wide range of counterparty types. The Irish approach, which is discussed 
in the next Chapter is far more conservative and sticks closer to the wording of the original 
EU-FCD text in keeping with the Irish legislators approach before the GFC and 
subsequently to favour a “copy-out” transposition unless absolutely necessary – such as 
in the Irish MiFID Regulations (See Annex 1).  
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12. Implementation of the EU-FCD in Ireland and key provisions of the Irish-
FCARs 
12.1 As discussed in the preceding chapters, the EU-FCD was implemented into Ireland 
through the Irish-FCARs.  Ireland made use of the option to confine the protections of the 
EU-FCD to transactions between certain categories of company and/or public authority  
and by stating that both parties to a financial collateral arrangement that is protected by 
the Irish-FCAR must be, pursuant to Regulation 3(2) Irish-FCARs, in effect, either a 
public institution such as a central bank or a regulated entity. The UK-FCAR does not 
follow that approach – see Annex 2 for a further review of differences.   
12.2 While the Irish legislative policymakers have prior to and since the GFC generally 
favoured copying out EU legislation into domestic Irish law, some of this is not free from 
error, conceptual gaps and/or home grown CTR as explored in the next paragraphs, 
including in relation to the CBI, as NCA for Ireland, as well as the CBI and Ireland being 
a full member of the EBU, having undertaken well intentioned reforms that have gone 
wrong. From lack of and/or contradictions and thus confusion on provisions and their 
interpretation caused by confusion on the hierarchy of legal instruments to legacy 
guidance documents of the CBI continuing to be in force, albeit “orphaned” following the 
revocation of the law that the guidance covered, Ireland has a multitude of patchwork 
issues despite favouring to stick conceptually closer and have less jurisdiction-specific 
rules, and possibly less vertical and horizontal CTR in its rules.  
12.3 The Irish-FCARs are supplemented by guidance (qua rulebooks) issued by the CBI. 
Frustratingly the good intentions of reforming and consolidating Irish companies law in 
the form of the Companies Act 2014 (CA 2014) has led to conceptual confusion due to 
duplication.  Part 7 of the CA 2014 addresses the perfection of “financial collateral”. The 
CA 2014, despite being primary legislation does not repeal the Irish-FCARs – which as 
a statutory instrument are subsidiary to primary legislation. Crucially, Section 408(1) of 
the CA 2014 establishes a general principle that all charges and mortgages, whether 
created orally or in writing are to be included within the registration system that the Act 
expands on. This contradicts the provisions of Art. 3 of the EU-FCD, which, as an 
instrument of EU law, takes precedence over Irish primary legislation i.e. the CA 2014. 
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Section 408(1) excludes certain categories of assets from the definition of a charge for 
the purpose of a registration requirement and this applies to: 
(a) Cash; 
(b) Money credited to an account of a financial institution, or other deposits; 
(c) Shares, bonds or debt instruments;  
(d) Units in collective investment undertakings or money market instruments; and 
(e) Claims and rights (such as dividends or interest) in respect of categories (b to d). 
12.4 If this conceptual gap (read poor drafting) of Section 408(1) of CA 2014’s relation to the 
EU-FCD or the Irish-FCARs were not bad enough, the exclusion list does not follow the 
types of assets that are exempted from registration and to which formalities are disapplied. 
Section 408(1) misses credit claims, which were added as a matter of EU law in 2009 in 
changes to the EU-FCD nor does it account to other forms of interests in funds. The 
wording in limb (b) is also not in keeping with the spirit of the EU-FCD in that “account 
of a financial institution” appears, certainly as proposed by McGrath in Gullifer & Akseli 
to refer to a charge over an account in which the account holder is itself a financial 
institution rather than, as in other EU EU-MS and the spirit of the EU-FCD, situations 
where the charge is over money held by a company in an account held with a financial 
institution. This CTR and frankly poor drafting could be corrected by statutory 
instrument, as catered for in Section 408(2) CA 2014 but leaving it as is creates confusion.  
12.5 Further confusion exists in relation to the practice of registration (often done 
defensively/pre-emptively) of floating charges. The reasons for this is due to English case 
law as a result of Gray v G-T-P Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1772 (Ch) (Gray v G-T-P) and 
Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2012] EWHC 2997 (CH) substantially 
expanding the meaning and scope of possession and control causing English law to 
expand whereas the Irish courts have not yet had an opportunity to consider the meaning 
of these terms in Ireland. This creates its own state of conceptual gaps and CTR in relation 
to English law bolting ahead and forging new concepts that may impact its neighbours. It 
also runs the risk that if Irish courts were to consider the concepts that there is no certainty, 
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in particular when the UK ceases to be a member of the EU, that it would not reach a 
different conclusion – thus accentuating CTR further.  
12.6 Putting these points of known risk aside for the moment, the absence of the definitions of 
these terms and the wording of the Irish-FCARs means that market participants often had, 
prior to the application of Section 408(1), registered floating charges in the company 
charge register as a matter of caution232. What is noteworthy is that the all Section 408(1) 
excluded charges will be exempt from the obligation to register and thus the 
corresponding protection regardless of whether the chargee has possession or control of 
the collateral and Section 408 provides no alternative safeguards to enable third parties to 
discover the existence of a relevant floating charge.  
12.7 Moreover other problems of certainty and clarity exist in relation to, Section 408(1), as 
Gullifer & Akseli discuss, alters (even if one puts the point aside on whether that section 
is conform with EU and existing Irish law to begin with) the position created by the 
national option and discretion applied in Regulation 3(2) Irish-FCAR. Section 408(1) CA 
2014 disapplies the perfection requirements for the CA 2014’s list of financial collateral 
for security interests created by all companies.  If Irish policymakers are looking to revisit 
the narrow(er) application of Irish-FCAR protections then the change needs to be made 
in amendment to the Irish-FCAR and ideally at the same correct the drafting mistakes in 
Section 408 CA 2014 as opposed to leaving a confusing and multi-tiered system of 
protections to market participants under two acts that are not fully interoperable with one 
another.   
12.8 The same issues highlighted above are also abundant in Ireland’s client assets and client 
money regime. When the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 (Section 
48(1) (Investment Firms) Regulations 2017233 (IFR 2017) came into force in the Ireland, 
the national competent authority, the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI), indicated it would 
                                                     
 
232  As described by Gullifer & Akseli as well as in Donnelly, The Law of Credit and Security (n 17) 602.  
233  Available here: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2017/si/604/made/en/pdf  
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issue new guidance on Part 6 (Client Asset Requirements) and Part 7 (Investor Money 
Requirements) of that law.  
12.9 While the CBI issued the IMR Guidance (see Annex 2 for a comparison of IFR 2017 and 
the IMR Guidance as it compares to the EU and UK rules) it did not indicate a timeframe 
for issuing revised guidance (read CBI rulebook and clarification on supervisory 
expectations) for Part 6 of the IFR 2017.  The CBI instead, rather confusingly, while the 
IFR 2017 revoked the previous investment firm regulations issued in 2017234 and  
integrated updated versions of the Client Asset Regulations 2015235 (CAR 2015) and 
Investor Money Regulations 2015236 (IMR 2015), the CBI announced it would be content 
to, at least until the new Part 6 guidance is issued, to allow the existing Guidance on Client 
Asset Regulations for Investment Firms of March 2015237 (CAR 2015 Guidance) to 
continue to apply. This can be confirmed by the list of Regulatory Requirements and 
Guidance in force on the CBI’s website238.  
12.10 One reason for this could be the fact that the current Part 6 amendments in the “new” IFR 
2017 did not go as far as planned in order to require a substantial revision to the CAR 
Guidance. The IMR Guidance was however amended, meaning that there is a chance that 
the Central Bank would issue more recent CAR Guidance in the near future. No such 
indications have been shown at the time of writing.   
12.11 In summary, this status quo is problematic along with being confusing in that affected 
market participants (domestic and international) are held to supervisory expectations to a 
law that has been revoked even if the new IFR 2017 contain much of the spirit, but not 
the same substance, of the CAR 2015. That poses conceptual gaps and CTR along with 
potential for continued confusion. 
12.12 Some of the key similarities between the CAR 2015 Guidance and the IFR 2017 include:  
                                                     
 
234  Available here: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2017/si/60/made/en/print  
235  Available here: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/si/104/made/en/pdf  
236  Available here: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/si/105/made/en/pdf 
237  Available here: https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/regulation/industry-market-sectors/client-assets/guidance-on-
client-asset-regulations-for-investment-firms-march-2015.pdf?sfvrsn=2  
238  Available here as viewed on 1 September 2019: https://www.centralbank.ie/regulation/industry-market-sectors/client-
assets/regulatory-requirements-and-guidance 
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(a) Client assets are to be used only in accordance with client instructions; 
(b) When an investment firm is deemed to hold client funds or client financial 
instruments; 
(c) What records an investment firm is required to maintain to segregate client assets 
for each client; 
(d) The length of time an investment firm should maintain records to demonstrate 
compliance with the rules; 
(e) The requirements as to designation of client asset accounts; 
(f) What an investment firm should obtain from a third party in advance of opening 
a client asset account with a third party in respect of client funds; 
(g) What an investment firm should do before it deposits client’s collateral with a 
third party; 
(h) What must be reconciled; 
(i) Who should carry out the reconciliation/daily calculation and what records should 
be maintained and what happens if the investment firm has failed to perform the 
reconciliation/daily calculation or if there are reconciliation differences; 
(j) What the daily calculation is and what an investment firm should do if its client 
money resource is not equal to its client money requirement; 
(k) What information an investment firm should provide to its clients regarding 
arrangements for holding client assets prior to first receiving client assets; 
(l) What information an investment firm should provide to its clients regarding 
collateral arrangements; 
(m) When an investment firm should obtain consent in writing from its clients; 
(n) How the Irish jurisdiction-specific “Client Assets Key Information Document” 
should be presented to retail clients and what information should be included in 
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it, as well as how frequently its content should be reviewed and how an 
investment firm should inform clients of any material changes to it; and  
(o) What the responsibilities of, what EU law sets as a common principle as a “single 
officer”, which in the Irish rules is the “Head of Client Asset Oversight” include 
as well as what the and aims of the jurisdiction-specific concept of the “Client 
Asset Management Plan” are and when it should be approved and by whom as 
well as its content.  
12.13 Some of the key differences between the CAR 2015 Guidance and the IFR 2017 include:  
(a) The current Regulation 48(1) IFR 2017 defines what “instruction” means and the 
CAR 2015 Guidance G3 (3) does not go in such a detail; 
(b) Regulation 65 IFR 2017 dealing with the client asset examination also contains 
more details than CAR 2015 Guidance G9 (1)-(4); 
(c) Regulation 61 IFR 2017 has no corresponding equivalent in the CAR 2015 
Guidance; 
(d) Conversely, the CAR 2015 Guidance has a specific section describing how an 
investment firm should hold client funds (G3 (4) and (5)) and another on how it 
should hold client financial instruments (G4 (9)-(11)) which are lacking in the 
IFR 2017; 
(e) There is also a section in the CAR 2015 Guidance (G6 (5)) dealing with when an 
investment firm is required to notify the Central Bank of an excess or shortfall in 
completing its daily calculation, which is not explained in such a manner in the 
IFR 2017;  
(f) The CAR 2015 Guidance also offers more information in relation to what 
information an investment firm should provide to its clients regarding a third 
party prior to first receiving the client assets in G7 (2) as well as where assets are 
held in another jurisdiction (G7 (3));  
(g) The section describing what information is to be provided to clients regarding 
securities collateral in the CAR 2015 Guidance is also more detailed (G7 (5)); 
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(h) The CAR 2015 Guidance is more detailed on when an investment firm should 
obtain consent in writing from its clients in G7 (8); 
(i) The CAR 2015 Guidance is also more detailed on the timescale required for 
submission to the Central Bank and the period the of jurisdiction-specific concept 
of a Client Asset Examination (CAE) should cover and what is to be done with 
the findings arising from the CAE – G9 (5) and (6). 
12.14 The preceding paragraphs in Part I, and notably the preceding three Chapters on the legal 
framework, have set out an introduction to some of the key issues discussed in assessing 
collateralisation and its relevant mechanics along with related risks. These 
Jurisdiction/Regulatory CTR risks stem from Vertical CTR i.e., divergence between UK 
rules that extend principles via Goldplating to that of the EU and also create Horizontal 
CTR i.e., UK rules differ to the Irish rules. Equally, the Irish rules differ to both the EU 
and UK rules in having some very Irish-specific requirements such as the Client Asset 
Examination and Client Asset Management Plan requirements that, while sensible, create 
additional jurisdiction-specific requirements. Moreover, the Irish updating of legislation 
but requiring market participants to comply with supervisory expectations of “old” 
guidance hardwires CTR and is not helpful, unless the EU were to plug those gaps as 
described in Part III,  
12.15 Consequently, the status quo of EU financial services supervision and regulation being 
fragmented, can, as introduced above, be distilled down to a problem of substance and 
approach. Much of what has or is being advanced, is still, despite a recognition of the 
importance of convergence and consistency, being delivered in a fragmented manner 
against a fragmented landscape.  This need not (and should not be left to) continue.   
12.16 The notion that the functioning in the ecosystem has outgrown its legal and regulatory 
design is not a new concept. Equally, the merits of the proposals, which themselves are 
hotly debated amongst academic commentators and industry practitioners, that the 
existing body of legal and regulatory principles may no longer fit the needs of 
stakeholders in a Collateral Ecosystem that has been disrupted beyond the reality of the 
foundations that have made up the “modern financial system” and the Collateral 
Ecosystem are discussed herein.  
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12.17 Absent the creation of an EU UCC and a unitary security interest, or at least greater cross-
border recognition and understanding, would some form of FinTech empowered solution 
have assisted issues in the Collateral Ecosystem? This is debatable, even if market and 
policymaker consensus has begun to embrace DLT as possible means to overcome the 
Giovannini Barriers and equally shifted to moving away from national options and 
discretions – especially in the Eurozone. It is also debatable where policymakers have 
begun accepting criticisms and proposed solutions by commentators, including Gullifer 
& Akseli, that some of established notions of security interests, particularly in light of 
dematerialisation, digitisation and possibly DLT and FinTech’isation of financial 
instruments requires a major rethink on relevant approaches – even if using the EBRD’s 
Model Law, which was published in 1994239.  
 
 
  
                                                     
 
239  See The Model Law for Secured Transactions, EBRD 1994 – available here: https://www.ebrd.com/documents/comms-and-
bis/pdf-model-law-on-secured-transactions.pdf  
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Part II – Putting new thinking into practice to tackle known problems 
13. Standardisation versus comparability in the context of CTR, conceptual 
gaps and convergence 
13.1 As discussed in Part I, standardisation has brought a number of benefits in sectors of 
financial markets. In other areas the existence of standardised transactional 
documentation or terms, has even created the very markets or their propagation across 
borders.  Harmonising the Collateral Ecosystem will also require existing global (but 
mostly London-based) industry associations, that are the gatekeepers of the Collateral 
Asset documentation, including ISDA, ICMA in the case for GMRA and ISLA in the 
case for GMSLA to push greater standardisation and interoperability but also to create 
documentation, perhaps working together with the ESFS that is fit for use in the new 
“new normal” that a post-Brexit Collateral Ecosystem represents. Some of this results in 
short-term pressures such as re-papering, but also requires longer-term solutions.  
13.2 Absent the European Master Agreement (EMA), which does not enjoy much in the way 
of market acceptance, much of the EU-27 market participants in the Collateral Ecosystem 
that form the bulk of mobilisation channels, are generally, at the time of writing, 
transacting:  
(a) on “national” documentation suites such as German or French derivatives or 
repo-master agreements (that have considerably less optionality than those 
mentioned above),  
(b) English-law  governed transaction documentation suites, some of which may 
have been “re-papered” to account for Brexit-driven changes, including selecting 
an EU-27 dispute resolution venue; 
(c) EU-27 copied versions of English law documentation suites such as the 
Irish/French law ISDA (there is currently no EU-27 equivalent for 
GMRA/GMSLA) which is only enjoying slow acceptance and remains largely 
untested by EU-27 (or English) dispute resolution venues.  
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13.3 Aside from this status quo being worrying, it raises questions of legal, documentation and 
regulatory risk but also Coll-RR and Cust-RR, that CTR might exacerbate.  Moreover, 
different market participants as discussed in Chapter 9 have differing documentation 
preferences, bargaining power and individual terms with individual firms. Megabank may 
have any multiple of terms with Multinational Widgets, and in turn Multinational Widgets 
may have any multiple of permutations of terms with peers of Multibank with whom it 
itself has any permutation of primary, secondary, tertiary and ancillary relationships 
across transaction chains.  Where re-papering exercises are being undertaken they may 
(despite the best efforts of legal counsel!) also not be coordinated between dealer entities, 
often competitors to Megabank, when facing Multinational Widgets. While the nexus of 
British and Irish exposures is easier to quantify, the wider relationships across the EU are 
more difficult, in particular once one starts to look beyond FCs and NFC client types.   
13.4 As Gelpern240 explores in his contribution to the case for ISDA-style standardisation in 
the sovereign debt market:   
 “Standardisation is not just part of the fabric of market expectations: 
international policy initiatives to prevent and manage financial crises rest on the 
assumption that sovereign debt contracts follow a generally accepted standard.  
Such initiatives would make no sense in the absence of standardisation.”   
 This is not an issue limited to the sovereign bond markets. This is the case even in asset 
classes/transaction types, including those used in the Collateral Ecosystem, where due to 
absence of standardised documentation, or the upkeep of such documentation:  
 “…it is common to see a handful of negotiated terms embedded in a mish-mash 
of different generation industry generation models, sprinkled with bits of creative 
expression that no one can explain, usually attributed to some long-forgotten 
lawyers.” 
                                                     
 
240  See “The importance of being standard” by Professor Anna Gelpern in the ESCB Legal Conference 2016 (held 6-7 October 2017, 
compiled in January 2017 and made available on 7 February 2017) (Gelpern) available here: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/escblegalconference2016_201702.en.pdf?e2dea3a78485afe4c70d5d5010f368be 
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13.5 Gelpern surmises that some of that variation appears to be deliberate, other variation 
appears to be developed but, that to the extent that it is inadvertent, such variation can be 
costly.  One solution, such as to centralise production of standard terms “… would 
maximise the advantages of standardisation, amplify the signalling capacity of bespoke 
terms, facilitate the diffusion of optimal contract innovations…” [which assumes contract 
theory applies but that statement assumes that even centralised production of say an EU 
regulation, such as say EMIR, cannot have CTR change how certain concepts are operated 
and applied by the relevant supervisors across multiple EU jurisdictions.]  
13.6 Moreover Gelpern proposes that in such an ideal world that embraces standardisation and 
diffuses optimal contracts and innovation in respect thereof: “Terms that have lost 
relevance through boilerplate iteration over time would revised or culled more readily 
than they are today[241]”.   
13.7 Consequently, stakeholders, from users to policymakers in the Collateral Ecosystem 
should view standardisation as an end goal that follows increased comparability and 
convergence but one that is still susceptible to CTR and thus subjected to different risks.    
13.8 As Gelpern correctly summarises most industry and statutory models of standardisation 
share three key features: 
(a) central production of some terms (including boilerplate/framework);  
(b) modularity (enabling combinations of customised and standardised terms, 
selected from a menu); and  
(c) a commitment to revision…yet, as Gelpern does not however mention, that 
revision might include support through: 
(i) legal risk comfort in the form of periodically updated or ad hoc opinions;  
(ii) ability to upgrade the documentation from each industry generation 
through the use of standard of market accepted language, ‘protocols’ 
and/or agreements; 
                                                     
 
241  Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati and Robert E. Scott, “The Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate” (November 25, 2016) 
Working Paper available at: www.ssrn.com/abstract=2835681 (Choi) 
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13.9 Stakeholders, including via various industry associations have moved to embrace 
centralised and modular contracting for financial market transactions. In most instances, 
industry groups work to supply core terms of ‘boilerplate’ for master agreement 
documentation suites and/or framework contracts that span entire markets, thereby 
improving legal certainty, allowing parties to focus on the reflecting the terms that are 
specific to the parties’ circumstances and/or the commercial context of the specific 
subject matter or transaction.  Gelpern cross-refers to Choi et al and the important point 
that boilerplate itself is not immune to risk.   
13.10 Specifically, Choi et al tests the erosion of a term, which causes a vacuum but variation 
that yields CTR (although they do not focus on the CTR point) within the context of pari 
passu clauses in litigation in connection with sovereign debt documentation and 
specifically how the New York courts assess the situation, where the: 
“Rote use [242] of a standard form contract term [243] can erode its meaning, a 
phenomenon made worse when the process of encrustation [244] introduces 
various formulations of the term.  The foregoing process, when it occurs, weakens 
the communicative properties of boilerplate terms, leading some terms to lose 
much if not all, meaning. In theory, if a clause is completely emptied of meaning 
through this process it can create a contractual black hole. A more frequent and 
thus potentially more pervasive problem arises when, as the term loses meaning, 
random variations in language appear and persist resulting in a grey hole.”  
13.11 This grey hole problem is almost more an issue than the black hole as litigation is still, 
according to Choi et al, provoked over meaningless variations in the boilerplate language. 
                                                     
 
242  The term rote use is taken here to mean that standardised terms are used so repetitively that thy may become at risk of obsolescence 
ahead of possible loss their shared meaning i.e. become what Choi et al term a ‘ritualised incantation’.   
243  Which Choi et al take to have the benefit of forming and developing “…a uniform system of communication that is independent of 
any particular contractual context. Thus, parties in heterogeneous environments who wish to communicate a shared intent can 
embody that intent in a fixed and reliable formulation whose meaning does not vary the nature of the contract or its context”.  
Applying this statement to the EU means also assessing how drafting convention can be impacted.    
244  The term encrustation refers to the deteriorative effect that “too much repetition” has on the intelligibility of the language and 
linguistic variations of a standard form clause when nuances are lost during repetition or habitual reliance on clauses which may 
erode the communicative properties of what the parties intended the boilerplate to actually mean or meant to document.  Philip 
Wood QC, a former Allen & Overy colleague, is quoted by Choi et al as encrustation being akin to barnacles accumulating on a 
ship’s hull, with each new growth obfuscating the efficiency of the actual vessel but being so ensconced that it would be difficult 
to break off what has become standard.     
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Gelpern refers to Choi et al in order to promote the sensible argument for greater 
standardisation in the sovereign bond market as well as this author would agree, much to 
the distaste of fellow lawyers retained to assist in transactions in financial markets and 
the Collateral Ecosystem, to apply the same degree of standardisation and transparency 
to all assets classes and transaction types that are eligible for standardisation. This 
statement is made fully cognisant of the fact that standardisation would assist in 
minimising transaction and information costs and asymmetry, reduce (but regrettably not 
eliminate) CTR and increase more efficient allocation of capital and formation of 
contracts. In such a state, even where this is advanced without the help of FinTech, 
lawyers would still retain a role and all the boilerplate optimisation and roll out is 
conceivably still subject to updates driven by market forces, regulatory and legislative 
change as well as modular customisation to meet party specific needs and objectives. 
Standard form precedents used by lawyers and other transaction stakeholders (such as 
financial counterparties who may refer to a document as “house style”), even where 
standardised market documentation exits already are an example of standardisation 
assisting allocation of resources as parties focus on achieving the best negotiated 
outcome.  Nevertheless, as mentioned above CTR can still arise in those situations. 
Especially, when as Gelpern notes in the context of footnote 3 in Choi et al namely that 
the risk of judicial misconstruction (i.e. CTR) is particularly high when old boilerplate 
terms remain in standard-form documentation despite losing all or most of their practical 
relevance.   
13.12 Taking this step further, and as explored by this author in “Handbuch EMIR” a contractual 
black hole in say ISDA documentation failing to meet EMIR compliance without certain 
changes can accelerate failure to interoperate and cause CTR to propagate. This is also 
the case where, certainly in the EU, there is scope for a much wider range of drafting 
conventions in the constituent European legal schools of law (French civil, German civil, 
Common law etc.) which can be disconnected from the standard form contract terms that 
are being put in place.  In such circumstances, CTR can also arise, so too in particular as 
a result of adjudication or, in certain cases judicial interference driving CTR. Where 
German drafting convention is say used in relation to a Custody agreement modelled on 
UK regulatory protections etc., then CTR can arise and further be complicated by judicial 
misinterpretation.  Given that the comparative law application being explored herein 
relates to closely related legal systems with a shared heritage and common drafting 
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conventions, this important discussion is reserved for future research and work in this 
area.  
13.13 Policymakers and industry associations need to continue to update their documentation. 
They also need, longer-term, to produce something better than the EMA or near-
comparables, a multi-asset, multi-transaction type and multi-jurisdictional master 
agreement document suite that operates, conceptually on a Jurisdiction-Agnostic basis. 
The EMA, despite best efforts, has yet to enjoy let alone receive the degree of resounding 
degree of success in uptake in a similar fashion as the English law governed ISDA, 
GMRA, GMSLA master agreement documentation suites and the transnational private 
law framework underpinning that documentation have in terms of market acceptance and 
systemic penetration. Similar action may be required in relation to FMIP-Rulebooks. This 
is the case even where the English law governed documentation suites have at times been 
faced with inertia to revise terms or attempt to solve these, often hardwiring more 
conceptual gaps and CTR in by adopting merely patchwork fixes to avoid wholesale 
redrafting which would otherwise be useful to reduce the drift to grey or black holes.    
13.14 Some policymakers and market participants are, perhaps as they are cognisant that the 
Collateral Ecosystem may be “too rigid to reform” are looking to bypass the need for 
greater standardisation and instead are relying on DLT-enabled solutions, including to 
breakdown the Giovannini Barriers and EPTF Barriers. Some of these risks that a move 
to such new solutions might entail are explored in the next Chapter.     
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14. Blockchain and DLT as disruptive forces to break down barriers? 
14.1 New technical solutions, including those that exist as a result of, or, as empowered by, 
DLT, including solutions commonly referred to as the “Blockchain” are gaining attraction 
as means of sidestepping barriers in the Collateral Ecosystem. This technology, the 
multiple, often incorrect uses of (un-)defined terms of DLT245, FinTech and Blockchain, 
has:  
 “…captured the imagination of Silicon Valley and Wall Street alike, leaving 
behind its origins as the underlying technology of Bitcoin.  Yet much of the 
discussion around its potential uses remain abstract.  The focus is on the power 
of a distributed ledger to decentralize markets and undermine the control of 
existing middlemen [intermediaries].” and: “… In some cases, blockchain could 
disrupt markets and existing participants, while in others, it promises to help 
drive cost savings by reducing labor-intensive processes and eliminating 
duplicate effort.  And in some instances, it can create new markets by exposing 
previously untapped sources of supply. The common thread is that by enabling 
a fundamentally new type of database technology that can be distributed across 
organizations, blockchain creates the foundation for solving problems or 
seizing opportunities that have eluded current systems.”    
                                                     
 
245  For more detailed literature see inter alia: 
 Goldman Sachs, “Blockchain –Putting Theory in Practice, 2016, www.the-blockchain.com/docs/Goldman-Sachs-report-
Blockchain-Putting-Theory-into-Practice.pdf  
 
 McKinsey & Co., “Beyond the Hype: Blockchains in Capital markets 2015” available at www.the-
blockchain.com/docs/Blockchain%20in%20Capital%20Markets.pdf  
 
 Gareth W. Peters and Efstathios Panayi, “Understanding Modern Banking Ledgers through Blockchain Technologies” UCL, 2016, 
available: 
www.weusecoins.com/assets/pdf/library/Understanding%20Modern%20Banking%20through%20Blockchain%29Technologies.p
df  
 
 ECB, “Occasional Paper Series: Distributed ledger technologies in securities post-trading, 2016” available at 
www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scops/ecbop172.en.pdf   
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14.2 Whilst the rise of FinTech has already begun to launch winds of change into even the 
most conservatively rooted types of financial market participants and FMIs, it is 
FinTech’s catapulting of “disruption” into the heart of these traditional business models 
and operative processes that has captured the imagination and transformed the notion of 
the “Blockchain” and FinTech away from being confined to niche communities into 
veritable buzzwords attracting serious interest and investment.  
14.3 This technology has also been identified by market participants as having potential 
benefits in increasing efficiency in post-trade solutions and shifting the status quo of the 
Collateral Ecosystem. Specific proof of concepts being tested include trading of financial 
instruments, settlement and clearing, corporate actions and management of margin 
positions and collateral, facilitating greater ease in loan syndication, or record keeping.  
14.4 Tokenisation of collateral and record keeping or repo and subsequent rehypothecation 
transaction on DLT – which as proposed herein, could help to increase the transparency 
of collateral positions, automate enforcement and clawbacks plus improve compliance 
with regulatory limits. Tokenisation of difficult to mobilise assets, such as the Daimler 
Schuldschein transaction are veritable good use cases but this does not mean all assets 
should (or can) move to DLT, especially absent updates to legal concepts and regulatory 
frameworks as much of DLT solutions operate beyond the (traditional) regulatory 
perimeter and/or may rest upon legal fiction. 
14.5 As a wide-ranging (often grandiose) concept, the “Blockchain” is framed succinctly in 
Swan 2015246 (emphasis for Blockchain for settlement use proposition in bold) as: 
 “We should think about the blockchain as another class of thing like the Internet 
– a comprehensive information technology with tiered technical levels and 
multiple classes of applications for any form of asset registry, inventory and 
exchange, including every area of finance, economics and money; hard assets 
(physical property, homes, cars); and intangible assets (votes, ideas, reputation, 
intention, health data, information, etc.).  But the blockchain concept is even 
more; it is a new organizing paradigm for the discovery, valuation, and transfer 
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of all quanta (discrete units) of anything, and potentially for the coordination of 
all human activity at a much larger scale than has been possible before.”247       
14.6 Before delving into the components of what DLT is and what it could possibly do or an 
assessment of the associated/new or transformed risks, it is important to distinguish 
Blockchain from another buzzword namely “Bitcoin” before looking at ‘smart contracts’ 
and ‘smart property’.  As Swan 2015 sets out248: 
 “In a precise and technical definition, Bitcoin is digital cash that is transacted 
via the Internet in a decentralised trustless system using a public ledger called 
the blockchain.  It is a new form of money that combines the BitTorrent peer-to-
peer file sharing with public key cryptography.  Since its launch in 2009, Bitcoin 
has spawned a group of imitators - alternative currencies using the same general 
approach but with different optimizations and tweaks.  More important, 
blockchain technology could become the seamless embedded economic layer the 
Web has never had, serving as the technological underlay for payments, 
decentralized exchange, token earning and spending, digital asset invocation and 
transfer, and smart contract issuance and execution.  Bitcoin and blockchain 
technology, as a mode of decentralization, could be the next major disruptive 
technology and worldwide computing paradigm (following the mainframe, PC, 
Internet, and social networking/mobile phones)….” 
14.7 As Swan 2015249 summarises the Blockchain in comparably non-technological plain 
English as:  
 “How it works is that a standard algorithm is run over a file (any file) to compress 
it into a short 64-character code (called a hash) that is unique to that document. 
No matter how large the file (e.g. a 9-GB genome file), it is compressed into a 
64-character secure hash that cannot be computed backward.  The hash is then 
included in a blockchain transaction, which adds the timestamp – the proof of 
that digital asset existing at that moment.  The hash can be recalculated from the 
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249  See preface page viii of Swan 2015. 
  
 
 
 
  
 218  
 
 
  
 
  
underlying file (stored privately on the owner’s computer, not on the blockchain), 
confirming that the original contents have not changed.”    
14.8 As further expanded in GS 2016:  
 “The heart of blockchain’s [read equivalent with Bitcoin references in Swan 
2015] potential lies in the unique properties of a distributed database and how 
they can improve transparency, security, and efficiency. Historically, 
organizations used databases as central data repositories to support transaction 
processing and computation. Control of the database rested with its owner, who 
managed access and updates, limiting transparency, scalability, and the ability 
for outsiders to ensure records were not manipulated. A distributed database 
was practically impossible because of technology limitations. But advances in 
software, communications, and encryption now allow for a distributed database 
spanning organizations.”  
14.9 If since the late 1980’s financial instruments are not only dematerialised and thus stored 
and transacted by digital means, why not use blockchain as the avenue by which financial 
instruments are moved? The same applies for transmission channels and storage venues 
of the Collateral Ecosystem. These two thoughts have led many bright minds in the 
private sector and some in the public sector to assess how Blockchain can be used to 
transform the Collateral Ecosystem and financial markets. One of the most exciting areas 
where DLT based FinTech solutions can transform and open new markets is for those 
asset classes and transaction types, that have been left, relatively speaking, in the shadows 
where traditional Collateral Ecosystem and FMIP offerings have failed to provide 
solutions. Secondary markets trading in credit, mobilising receivables as collateral etc., 
are some examples as to where FinTech can transform or improve existing systems.    
14.10 A key component of this FinTech led change, and one that is echoed by a number of post-
GFC reforms with regard to assigning identifiers beyond ISINs and Common Codes (such 
as LEIs, UTIs and the like) to legal entities, transactions and asset types so as to facilitate 
greater reporting and risk management could, as Swan 2015250, take a further leap, namely 
to embrace “smart property”:  
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“…the blockchain can serve as the public records repository for whole societies, 
including the registry of all documents, events, identities and assets can be 
tracked, controlled, and exchanged (bought or sold) on the blockchain.  This 
means that all manner of tangible assets (houses, cars) and digital assets could 
be registered and transacted on the blockchain.” 
14.11 With change however comes risks. Risks specific to the new technology, as well as the 
risk that the base upon which the existing Collateral Ecosystem’s components, that is to 
say, the documentation, operations, control mechanisms and to a degree the assumed 
schools of thought remain valid and fit for purpose. Conventional contract law as well as 
taking security over digital assets as well as application of netting and set-off, and whether 
these are even able to qualify as eligible financial collateral for purposes of the EU-FCD 
are key questions as well as whether there are suitable dispute resolution venues to 
adjudicate.  
14.12 Difficulties also arise where dispute resolution venues are unable to adjudicate on matters 
that require new legal/regulatory concepts or “courts not being able to consider code”.  
See the Working Paper but equally work by Madir   – notably Chapters 7 and 8, and, that 
in the EU, the further issue is that there, again at the time of writing, no harmonised nor 
standardised notion of the law of DLT, ownership interests in digital assets and whether 
these are, despite some jurisdictions taking unilateral action at the national level (such as 
Germany and/or the UK) as to how categorise certain digital assets, the continued 
problem, as in non-digital asset based transactions in financial instruments that the 
governing law or jurisdiction in respect of the creation or storage of digital assets or digital 
representations of assets on a DLT system may be separate to the distinct governing law 
and/or jurisdiction issues (which can be mutually exclusive but need not be) depending 
on the fact patterns. 
14.13 Consequently, market participants wishing to bridge the gaps that exist in legacy systems 
will still need to ensure that the agreements that are employed (coded) in respect of digital 
assets and/or DLT, ensure, as Madir notes at 8.25:  
“…that the governing law will recognise agreements concluded by electronic 
means, for intangible/digital assets or written in code, and that the agreement 
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meets the necessary formalities for contract formation in that jurisdiction, in 
order to give maximum assurance that the contract will be upheld.” 
 The parallels to difficult legal and regulatory questions that arise in relation to 
dematerialisation also present themselves when looking at DLT and FinTech 
transacted assets.  
14.14 These issues also exist, as Madir explores in 8.36 et seq. and questions which governing 
law and ultimately which jurisdiction is applicable to DLT and FinTech transacted assets, 
even where there is an express choice by counterparties and/or like, in the attempts of 
using the approach referenced and discussed herein as PRIMA (see below) are proposed 
by Madir at 8.40 as the Place of the Relevant Operating Authority/Administrator 
(PROPA) or the Place of the Encryption Master key-holder (PREMA). Lastly, as 
valuably explored in Madir in Chapter 9, and by reference to a number of failings (some 
very public) DLT infrastructure and other FinTech is prone to failure and is not free from 
liability.  
14.15 Arriving at an answer to some of the questions introduced above merits assessing the risks 
that are specific to these changes or those that result directly or indirectly as a 
consequence of these changes or, as some commentators call it, disruption. This 
disruptive effect and the risks they may bring deserves quantification and thus 
identification, mitigation and management.  The following sections in this chapter seek 
to present an overview on how:  
(a) DLT and smart contracts may assist in breaking down some of the Giovannini 
Barriers and some of its limitations; 
(b) DLT technology and smart contracts may sidestep CTR but may not fully 
mitigate VARICGA and VARINCA or provide a sufficient failsafe against 
collateral loss/extinguishment; 
(c) Regulatory authorities are approaching this area, notably that of the EP and the 
EC through the CMU and Digital Markets Union projects and efforts the ECB.  
14.16 As GS 2016 equally sets out: 
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 “Blockchain is not a “cure all” or a substitute for fixing broken business 
processes, but [Goldman Sachs] believe [certainly advocates, possibly with bias] 
it is particularly well suited to address a variety of problems: 
 Facilitating secure, de-centralized transactions among many parties in the 
Internet of Things: Because of the inherently decentralized nature of the 
ledger, blockchain is particularly effective at handling distributed 
transactions among a very large number of parties. In addition, blockchain 
delivers a high-level of security for each transaction because of the 
cryptographic verification and validation among parties. As new distributed 
economic models evolve that cover tens or even hundreds of millions of assets 
(such as cars or apartments in the case of the Sharing Economy) or machines 
(the Internet of Things), secure, distributed transaction models will be 
needed to facilitate transactions… 
 Reducing fraud and increasing trust with increased security: In many parts 
of the world, corruption can lead to counterfeiting or alteration of official 
records.  For example, bribery might drive a government insider to change 
a record describing the amount of a payment made, or the owner of record 
of a particular asset.  Similarly, a malicious actor might attempt to selectively 
alter or destroy records (for example a cyber-hacker changing payment 
records or trades between parties). Because each transaction is uniquely 
encoded via cryptography and this encoding is validated by other parties on 
the blockchain, any attempt to alter or remove transaction information would 
be detected by others and corrected by other nodes… 
 Increasing transparency and efficiency in multi-party transactions: In any 
transaction involving two or more parties, the same transaction is typically 
entered separately by each party into that organization’s own independent 
systems.  In the world of capital markets [and thus the Collateral Ecosystem 
underpinning those markets], the same trade order might be entered [often 
duplicate or multiple times in multiple systems] into the systems of two 
counterparties.  In each organization, the transaction works its way through 
middle-office and back-office systems – at which point errors can create the 
need for costly [internal but also external] reconciliation processes with 
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significant manual intervention. By using a distributed ledger technology 
such as blockchain, organizations can streamline [mutualise functions in] 
the clearing and settlement process, shorten settlement windows, and avoid 
substantial capital and operating expenses.” Operational risk is potentially 
also reduced as new transaction channels are improved as “all to all” trading 
takes root or FMIPs’ improve their efficiency in economic and regulatory 
capital allocation terms.     
14.17 This fits in with what Swan 2015 and other market participants and thought leaders set 
out as the stages of Blockchain e.g., Blockchain 1.0 is currency, the deployment thereof 
and alternative currencies, Blockchain 2.0 refers to contracts and financial markets i.e., 
the scope of what is assessed herein and Blockchain 3.0 refers to the application of 
Blockchain to the “real economy” i.e., or life beyond currency, finance and markets.  It 
is important to note that Blockchain 1.0 still remains the ethos of how blockchain operates 
at present, namely, as distilled by Swan 2015251: 
 “[The blockchain] is currently growing as miners add new blocks to it (every 10 
minutes) to record the most recent [Bitcoin] transactions.  The blocks are added 
to the blockchain in a linear, chronological order.  Each full node (i.e. every 
computer connected to the Bitcoin network using a client that performs the task 
of validating and relaying transactions) has a copy of the blockchain, which is 
downloaded automatically when the miner joins the Bitcoin network.  The 
blockchain has complete information about addresses and balances from the 
genesis block (the very first transactions ever executed) to the most recently 
completed block.  The blockchain as a public ledger means that it is easy to query 
any block explorer (such as htpps://blockchain.info/) for transactions associated 
with a particular Bitcoin address… The blockchain is seen as the main 
technological innovation of Bitcoin because it stands as a “trustless” proof 
mechanism of all the transactions on the network.  Users can trust the system of 
the public ledger stored worldwide on many decentralized nodes maintained by 
“miner-accountants”, as opposed to having to establish and maintain trust with 
the transaction counterparty (another person) or a third-party intermediary (like 
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a bank).  The blockchain as s the architecture for a new system of decentralized 
trustless transactions is the key innovation.  The blockchain allows the 
disintermediation and decentralization of all transactions of any type between 
parties on a global basis.”    
14.18 Some Blockchan and indeed some Collateral Ecosystem stakeholders would argue that in 
an ideal world Financial Market Transactions and Collateral Asset Transactions ought to 
be conducted on digitised smart ‘smart contracts’ with the terms, as they apply across 
relationships and contractual agreements as well as the individual assets that are relevant, 
being tokenised and with exposures capable of being netted. The concept of a ‘smart 
contract’ has existed long before ‘digitised disruption’ emerged as a prevalent theme 
shaping the future direction of the financial system.  The emergence of digitised solutions 
for the trading and post-trading environment of the financial system, including those 
solutions built upon DLT.  There is at the time of writing no legal definition of what 
constitutes a ‘smart contract’ albeit a shared consensus of the role that they like DLT can 
play in a future world of financial services. These questions have accelerated notably 
since ‘Bitcoin’ emerged from the shadows in 2009 and have gathered pace as DLT led to 
a “Blockchain Boom Era” in the financial services sector, becoming a mainstream 
priority in 2015 and 2016 but ultimately through 2018 and 2019.  For many the vision of 
how DLT might be able to disrupt or digitise large parts of financial services is quite 
clear.  For others it is not and consensus is lacking. A technology expert might well have 
differing concerns and priorities than a finance or legal specialist.  Stakeholders in T2S 
may find it difficult to source and apply budgets to new untested technology that may 
take longer to settle with less certainty than T2S does.    
14.19 The common market terminology is that smart contracts operate in computer programs 
that exist and apply logic with reference to the DLT. Simple “if-then-else” logical 
statements are applied in much the same effect as a vending machine that performs the 
contract subject to a payment instrument being selected and a selection of good by the 
buyer having been indicated. The first generation of smart contracts have been logically 
binary.  Second generation smart contracts have introduced an ability to deal with more 
complex transactions and operations.  Based on popular programming languages, the 
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second generation ‘smart contracts’ can, according to a 2019 IOSCO Report252, use 
various techniques to self-execute and take control of assets on the DLT and communicate 
with relevant parties to the contract and third parties. Smart contracts would thus able to 
be, on the assumption that they are isolated from risks, able to take root in a number of 
Collateral Ecosystem and financial regulatory environment.   
14.20 Moving to smart ‘smart contracts’ however requires legal finality. In contrast, the digital 
cash commercial solutions of DLT but more specifically Blockchain 1.0 do not require 
smart contracts.  However, if DLT is to disrupt the Collateral Ecosystem and financial 
transactions in the way that many aspire it would, it will need contracts and those 
contracts ought to be digitised and hence the need for ‘smart contracts’. In many ways, 
this may require a rethink of legal principles and regulatory approaches. More 
fundamental questions such as “where do I Custody my blockchain assets…do I print 
them?” or “how do I enforce my contract? And how do I litigate my code and how do I 
prosecute against theft of a private key to my digital assets” these issues are explored now 
in turn.  
14.21 In most legal systems, contracts are formed around the following minimum elements of 
law being satisfied and necessitate having:  
(a) capable parties; 
(b) certainty of subject matter (obligations, rights and responsibilities);  
(c) legal purpose and mutual assent; and 
(d) clarity of terms and when offer and acceptance occur.   
 Consideration, whether in monetary nature or other form of value, may be transferred as 
part of a contract or the performance of obligations thereunder. Smart contracts, as a 
concept, have been in existence prior to the digital revolution that followed the 
commercialisation of the Internet in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. That notion of what 
constitutes a smart contract has evolved. Nevertheless, one key difference, and thus 
potential drawback to contracts other than smart contracts, even those that benefit from 
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Financial Products Mark-Up Language (FpML) has also emerged. This includes the fact 
that smart contracts, even in the current 2.0 version and certainly those that are strictly 
machine-to-machine, are deterministic by nature. They exclude the flexibility and 
optionality common in physical contractual agreements that have a human-to-human 
element. Consequently, the call for a failsafe to either halt or terminate certain aspects of 
the smart contract has almost preceded the birth of the full potential of smart contract 
evolution. In the Collateral Ecosystem, where failsafes are embedded, unless replicated, 
then digitisation could lead to higher levels of risks. Some of this was evidenced by other 
forms of smart contracts, algorithmic-based orders, causing various “flash crashes”253.     
14.22 Examples of ‘crude forms’ or the aforementioned ‘first generation’ of smart contracts still 
exist. They are diverse in nature and can include a point of sale mechanic or system 
ranging from an online payment protocol, to a handheld electronic payment instrument 
keypad (such as those used to accept credit or debit card purchases) to a vending machine, 
or algorithmic allocation of bandwidth or algorithmic execution of financial transactions. 
Regardless of whether users of crude smart contracts swipe, type or tap a payment 
instrument or other identifier to verify the transfer of consideration and/or affirmation or 
entry into terms of a contract, Szabo254 defines255 this as:    
 “A smart contract is a computerized transaction protocol that executes the terms 
of a contract. The general objectives are to satisfy common contractual 
conditions (such as payment terms, liens, confidentiality, and even enforcement), 
minimize exceptions both malicious and accidental, and minimize the need for 
trusted intermediaries. Related economic goals include lowering fraud loss, 
arbitrations and enforcement costs, and other transaction costs.” 
14.23 Consequently a smart contract, certainly, in the first iterations, are not inherently smart.  
They rely on the computerised transaction protocol. As smart contracts continue to 
evolve, there is already consensus emerging that they need to be tiered in how they 
operate: a lower tier which would perform simple movements of assets including safe 
atomic exchanges (when two entities swap in a single operation some asset for some other 
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asset so there is no way that one entity can end up out of pocket), without resorting to 
smart contracts. An upper tier would allow participants to choose what degree of 
programming complexity they want, by storing smart contract code within the metadata 
of lower tier transactions. This would not interfere with the performance of the lower 
layer and enable every node to run only the code it needs to.   
14.24 In each example of a smart contract, varying degrees of human input or interface is 
relevant or even required pre- and post- execution of the transaction. The contract is 
referred to as being “smart” due to an element of formation, performance or execution of 
the contract being digitised and controlling property (including digital property) by digital 
means. The long gestation period that existed since Szabo introduced the term ‘smart 
contract’ boils down to an absence of robust DLT and no venue or platform to enforce 
the terms of ‘smart contracts’.  This is an area that would need to be redressed with 
standardised concepts, uniform rules and an appropriate institutional set-up so as to 
improve legal certainty as well as consensus on whether the terms of the smart contract, 
especially those resting on DLT platforms, should be made public. In contrast, privity of 
contract permits parties to keep certain terms confidential and this may be an issue even 
for some smart contract 1.0 solutions where sensitivity matters.  
14.25 Another operational barrier to smart contracts gaining traction, and this is in addition to 
the questions raised above is, that the coding of contracts into smart contracts is new, 
takes time, is often discouraged given the divergent treatment across schools of legal 
systems and the fact that existing and new contracts, even when standardised are rarely 
machine readable or centrally located in a documentation management system. FpML 
could assist in changing that but this requires both comparability and standardisation of 
terms and considerable effort by counterparties.  Moreover if ‘smart contracts’ are to be 
embedded as a viable tool for financial services (and quite possibly elsewhere) it needs 
consensus, in the EU, certainly at the EU level as to how laws (both national and EU 
systems) will establish a Jurisdiction-Agnostic treatment and recognition of smart 
contracts.      
14.26 At time of writing, whilst such a move to smart contracts might reduce (but not eliminate) 
CTR, VARICGA and VARINCA, is still more a utopia than something that is to be 
implemented. The following paragraphs some of the risks but also solutions for the issues 
described in the Parts above affecting the Collateral Ecosystem. One work-around that 
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might balance interests in the Collateral Ecosystem is to adopt tiers of smart contracts as 
explored below but equally to have smart contracts that coexist in a modular format and 
interface with the non-digitised contract.  
14.27 Moreover, DLT-solutions potentially disrupt a Collateral Ecosystem that largely rests on 
a legal and regulatory framework on collateral and/or security interests, which is heavily 
rooted or dependent on principles that emerged from the mercantilist concepts of the 19th 
century i.e., well before financial instruments were traded, custodied let alone issued or 
“manufactured” in dematerialised, electronified or now digitised form. Moreover, the 
advent of DLT systems undermine much of the technical and quasi-legal framework and 
other instruments of legal or private transnational regulatory regimes such as FMIP-
Rulebooks that have been put in place across the Collateral Ecosystem to bridge divides 
across various schools of legal thought that affect and interact with touchpoints in the 
Collateral Ecosystem.  
14.28 With post-GFC regulatory reforms pressing a need for greater supply of high-Collateral 
Assets to be available and also eligible – not all Collateral Assets are always eligible nor 
available to market participants as a certain portion may be blocked on accounts with 
central securities depositories, custodians or held in non-actively managed portfolios i.e., 
thus be passive participants in the Collateral Ecosystem256 with under-utilised Collateral 
Assets. DLT could solve some of that under-utilisation by easing the ability mobilise such 
assets and open new channels but also side-step perhaps established and entrenched legal 
principles that apply to collateral transactions even though there is considerable 
uncertainty as to how one might apply a conventional security interest to a digitised 
collateral asset in the DLT let alone if possible, if that digitised collateral asset could as a 
DLT represented interest be categorised as a collateral for the purposes of EU legislation 
on collateral and settlement finality.  
14.29 Coding, or any form of quantum computing giving rise to the “singularity” is however 
unlikely going to eliminate CTR nor the existence of nor impact on Coll-RR nor Cust-
RR, especially if the law does not evolve to recognise how to treat code and machine-
driven solutions to matters that have been crafted conceptually on the foot of mercantilist 
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concepts. In short, these risks still matter irrespective of the Collateral Ecosystem being 
subjected to change and ‘disruption’ by technological driven ‘FinTech’ providers some 
of whom have viable solutions. Those viable solutions are however likely to enhance the 
efficiency of the Collateral Ecosystem and also open up new mobilisation channels and/or 
revolutionise the cost of and thus the ability to monetise and mobilise assets to a greater 
potential, including as Collateral Assets. That is a welcome development in its own right, 
even if that is not necessarily going to give rise to a whole new inventory of HQLA. 
14.30 Aside from FinTech and the emergence of RegTech257, the plumbing that makes up the 
Collateral Ecosystem already has varying degrees of complexity. Consequently, ensuring 
that parts are interoperable and intelligible across the transaction value chain is important 
to the efficient and safe functioning of financial markets. FinTech can assist 
standardisation in the Collateral Ecosystem but the strength of that proposition lies also 
in the degree of standardisation in IT systems and technology standards used and their 
resilience.  
14.31 For a number of FinTech solutions, being different is the unique value proposition but 
this is an issue that will need to be overhauled to avoid duplication and resulting 
drawbacks running solutions in parallel or absent the existence of interoperation 
protocols. In many ways, this brings the issues back to the issues on conceptual gaps and 
CTR. It also raises the notion of FinTech Related Risks an overarching term, which at 
the time of writing, has begun to emerge on the policy horizon of global and EU 
regulatory and supervisory bodies. When used herein this term refers to the risks that 
FinTech have on the Collateral Ecosystem and those that are innate to those FinTech 
solutions and their providers. Some of these issues are FinTech Specific Risks, which 
relate to FinTech lacking sufficient: 
(a) harmonised standards: both amongst FinTech specific solutions but equally 
across the wider FinTech community. Consequently, in the absence of 
interoperability of technical standards as well as different regulatory policy 
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approaches means that FinTech might be more fragmented rather than 
harmonised uniform or interoperable standards;  
(b) harmonised commercial conflicts and business processes: FinTech solutions, 
specifically DLT are only as good as the data and business processes that underlie 
it. Failure to reach a consensus amongst counterparties because of fragmented, 
divergent and/or CTR afflicted business processes or commercial conflicts could 
accentuate FinTech Related Risks due to lack of adoption/scalability;  
(c) privacy and/or security: application of a distributed database to commercial 
transactions raises the question of whether FMPs and/or FMIPs want to share 
information about counterparties and/or in an environment which relies on 
“trustless” decentralisation which marks a radical departure from the current 
environment and the business and regulatory practices in which these transactions 
operate or that shape it.  These concerns apply to public (permissioned) as well 
as private (permissioned), often called “bankchain” DLT systems.  This rapid 
departure however is counterbalanced by trends that have emerged from the 
Shared Economy that relies on the “credentialisation” of those involved and thus 
translating into preferential terms. As proven in a number of P2P services (Uber, 
Airbnb etc. credentialisation is key to preferential terms and thus perhaps brings 
to the forefront some of the concerns that DLT, certainly permissionless DLT 
would need to overcome in order to cement itself in the world of finance where 
trust or at least knowing the counterparty is still very core to formalising, 
monitoring and executing business terms. There are a host of examples of DLT 
solutions being susceptible to financial crime and thus loss. Very public failings 
of specific  financial institutions and/or DLT providers or other crypto-asset 
exchanges are just but one unnerving example that has prompted the comparably 
nascent concept of “cyber resilience” becoming a EU and global supervisory 
priority; and 
(d) speed and performance: any distributed database is inherently slower than a 
centralised one. This begs the question whether DLT is appropriate for high-
speed and/or high-volume applications. However, it should be noted that a 
number of DLT systems for capital markets transactions boast the ability for 
instantaneous, often real time gross, settlement.  Whilst a majority of non-DLT 
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FMIP and Collateral Ecosystems offer this, the benefits of reduced settlement risk 
are replaced (see issue on SR3) with increased need for liquidity to meet the 
settlement obligation. This can increase the settlement risk. 
14.32 Connected to the concepts of components, or drivers, or FinTech Related Risks are the 
supervisory priorities of ‘cyber resilience’. As a concept, this term encompasses more 
than cybersecurity and first became a supervisory priority of the SSM in the Eurozone’s 
EBU in 2017. Both of these concepts were highlighted, along with an assessment of 
FinTech’s disruptive benefits and drawbacks in a February 2017 ‘IOSCO Research 
Report on Financial Technologies (Fintech)” (2017 IOSCO Report)258.  
14.33 As highlighted in the 2017 IOSCO Report, the notion of ‘Moore’s law’ and exponential 
growth as applied to computing power has so far been proven accurate. What IOSCO 
does not assess, but what is proposed herein is that FinTech’s disruption itself poses a 
quantifiable and controllable systemic risk in its own right. This is termed herein as 
Systems’ Resilience Replacement Risk (SR3). This measure attempts to capture the 
amount of negative impact that FinTech and specifically DLT’s effect on systems has on 
the resilience of the Collateral Ecosystem and market participants engaged therein. 
Specifically in relation to post-trade this SR3 includes following impacts: 
(a) interoperability of DLT and smart contract solutions with DLT and non-DLT 
systems including those of market participants and existing infrastructures. 
This is an idiosyncratic but also a systemic risk. For most financial market 
participants there is a reluctance to move away from committed capital 
investment plans for to commit financing to overhauling what in most places may 
be a collection of various tried and tested legacy systems. This will mean systems 
would have to coexist and thus this would duplicate costs and possibly deter 
interest to move to the new. Additionally, the lack of scalability for certain types 
of DLT make it inadequate for the range of solutions that FinTech providers are 
looking at in Collateral Ecosystem.  As per the 2017 IOSCO Report (see page 
60), absent any prediction on evolution of Moore’s law and summarised in 
relation to the Bitcoin Blockchain which is permissionless in its design: “…the 
                                                     
 
258  See: https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf  
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number of transactions it can handle per second is not enough for real time 
settlement of securities. On the other hand, in a permissioned DLT, scalability is 
a lesser challenge.”;   
(b) increased liquidity risk, as a result of DLT transactions replacing settlement risk 
with liquidity risk.  In contrast to other RTGS systems that act as a central 
counterparty and thus use the benefit of their credit rating, DLT is trustless and 
thus may detract from the RTGS benefit that it is supposed to bring;  
(c) replacing trust-based post-trade processs and Custody with trustless nodes. This 
not only changes the basic premise of how the Collateral Ecosystem operates but 
also the legal and regulatory framework in which it operates and absent dispute 
resolution venues that can handle such new risks and disputes, may increase legal 
risk.              
(d) susceptibility to cyber-crime and degree of resilience: the concept of cyber-
resilience refers to the ability to withstand failings due to ordinary events 
disrupting systems but also do to cyber risks.  In a DLT world that operates using 
distributed trustless nodes, the issue with malicious nodes or cybercrime becomes 
an issue, especially as methods to perform validation checks are currently not 
standardised and some remain expensive. Moreover, theft and loss of ‘private 
keys’ i.e. that permit the control of the digitised assets have become 
commonplace.  
14.34 A number of high-profile (almost uncountable) incidents of Bitcoin fraud and crypto-
crime are recorded. These include the Mt. Gox incident in 2014, in which hackers stole 
USD 500 million worth of Bitcoin assets without breaching the Bitcoin Blockchain 
protocol and which eventually led to the collapse of the Mt. Gox Bitcoin exchange. Other 
incidents include known nefarious actions by rogue states using crypto-assets as means 
to obtain financial gain or destabilise or monopolise DLT systems.  Whilst undermining 
the attraction of Bitcoin it also highlights a host of new known and unknown threats to 
crypto-assets generally.  
14.35 Irrespective of the risks connected with issues around (lack of) trust, decentralisation and 
lack of oversight/transparency in who is doing what in the Blockchain when and how, 
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such a general change in making property “smarter” and increasing the transparency pre- 
and post-trade could also serve as a simplified solution to overcoming one of the areas 
that is flagged regarding the need for a “look-through” across transaction types and 
relationship levels to be able to trace assets and assess the likelihood of a return.  
Blockchain could assist in that – especially when it comes to difficult to trace assets or 
those that are considered too important to lose or have trapped or where fungibility is (or 
is capable of becoming quite) limited  
14.36 Taking this thought a step forward, if the financial instrument and/or Collateral Asset is 
easier to trace and locate along a transaction chain and relationship level, thus allowing 
greater pre-emptive risk management and allocation, could this assist efficiency and 
safety? This alternative, could rather than, as historically the case, a return of such asset 
requiring an unwind of various transactions or return of equivalent assets or a cash 
equivalent, instead mean that the original collateral provider of such asset could step in 
directly to where that Blockchain identifier places that asset? If the asset has moved to, 
from the perspective of the original collateral provider, to a tertiary relationship, could 
the asset be retransferred with an equivalent Collateral Asset being substituted by the 
recipient and onward collateral provider for that Collateral Asset?   
14.37 In other words, this could circumvent the need to unwind chains or post equivalent assets 
or cash and create a whole new method of more efficient return and replacement of chains 
of collateralised positions as Party A sees its Collateral Assets have moved from Party B 
via Party C to Party D. Rather than unwinding that transaction chain, Party A can trace 
the asset on the ledger of what would likely be bankchain-permissioned DLT and recall 
the collateral asset and have cash settlement take place with according parties.  While this 
does not negate Coll-RR nor Cust-RR and probably also not CTR (could there be a notion 
of CTR in coding? Probably), it does make the question of “where is my collateral and 
how quickly and how much of it can I get back?” easier to answer 
14.38 If exponential computing power is set to grow, then the importance of regulation, new 
thinking on risk as well as sufficient failsafes to ensure resilience are vital, in particular 
if the Collateral Ecosystem continues to be heading towards digitisation and possibly 
‘smart contracts’. Both DLT and smart contracts, irrespective of current capabilities, 
relevance and risks to the Collateral Ecosystem and its users, are likely continue to 
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influence the conversation on the future of the Collateral Ecosystem and greater use-cases 
are likely to continue to emerge.    
14.39 One area where there are tangible use being delivered is from HQLAX259, a consortium 
of financial services providers and a central operator, Deutsche Börse Group, that permits 
collateral providers and takers to transfer interests in (often difficult to mobilise) financial 
instruments between users and across jurisdictions by means of tokenisation of the 
financial instrument. HQLAX uses R3’s DLT-system Corda. This means that the 
financial instrument in question is firstly immobilised as a collateral asset and an interest 
to it is create as a token. The contrasts to say traditional Collateral Ecosystem processes 
of creating mobilisable Collateral Assets is the absence of multiple layers of holding 
chains. Instead, the token, which is legally in most jurisdictions may not be treated as a 
legal interest but instead is a mere promise akin to an IOU. That token is nonetheless  
capable of moving on the DLT network and, as backers of HQLAX say in a network260, 
in this case a private permissioned bankchain DLT i.e., a closed network only accessible 
to HQLAX participants, at a faster rate than would be comparably possible in a traditional 
collateral ecosystem setting. Whether that is entirely the case in terms of speed or 
resilience in light of added risks that are DLT-specific or indeed legal certainty remains 
a point to be proven as do regulatory policymakers’ attitude to use of HQLAX or how it 
will be supervised, possibly as a trading venue under the MiFID II/MiFIR Regime and 
whether it would qualify for EU-SFD protections. The first live transactions were 
executed on a prototype version in January 2018 and the platform launched in 2019.    
14.40 Providers such as Luxembourg-based HQLAX are attempting to create much more stable 
bankchain permissioned systems and other actors have successfully settled financial 
instruments using bankchains.  This is attractive for hard-to-mobilise, often paper-based 
financial instruments such as Schuldscheine or heterogeneous assets such as SME loans, 
but for more liquid markets in very fungible financial instruments and Collateral Assets 
the rise of DLT is unlikely to displace traditional mobilisation channels even if those are, 
as explored in the next Chapter on possible solutions, slowly becoming and needing to do 
more and do so quickly to become more digitised so as to leap ahead of another parallel 
of trading halting in a similar fashion as the 1960’s Paper Crisis if DLT-driven Collateral 
                                                     
 
259  See: https://www.hqla-x.com/ 
260  See: https://www.hqla-x.com/operating-model 
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Asset transactions cannot settle. Other measures that EU policymakers will need to 
consider if the Collateral Ecosystem is “too important to miss” are described in the next 
Chapters of Part III.  
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Part III – Further best practices and outlook ahead 
 
15. So, what else needs doing?  
15.1 The preceding chapters have shown that the Collateral Ecosystem remains fragmented 
and in need of EU-wide reform, if the Single Market is to be built it needs to be built on 
a Single Rulebook. Greater use of standardisation is certainly welcome. DLT equally 
offers some interesting proposals. There are however, some other best practices and 
action points that Collateral Ecosystem stakeholders can apply regardless. The next 
sections assess what needs doing. This ideally ought to translate into action points for:  
(a) market participants; 
(b) documentation;  
(c) risk and compliance management; and 
(d) policymakers: this means revisiting and possibly dusting off legislative proposals 
that had been shelved and these include some key issues discussed in the next 
sections.  
 
15.2 Action for market participants, in relation to their documentation, risk and 
compliance management  
15.3 Market participants could, in addition to adopting some of the new thinking on risks 
inherent to as well as those driven by the Collateral Ecosystem, transaction chains and a 
need for standardisation also work to strengthen various infrastructure in the market 
through improvements to documentation based and non-documentation based 
workstreams.  
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15.4 As the markets in Collateral Assets continue to gather complexity, market participants 
ought to align, whether through individual261 industry association’s efforts or jointly their 
expectations and operational standards on: 
(a) to pre-contractual and pre-onboarding workstreams – possibly creating 
greater use of standardised information request documentation for basic 
information requests and/or standard settlement instructions and identifiers (LEIs 
etc.) as well as relevant (regulatory and other) reporting agreements; 
(b) standardising master agreement and trading documentation further around 
common terms and/or regulatory and/or Brexit-driven changes; 
(c) consider moving, where possible, contract design, documentation and 
execution to greater electronic negotiation and execution platforms: which 
ought to use, what may ultimately become regulatory-approved, “common 
domain models” that digitally serve to represent key features and life cycles 
affecting transactions and can facilitate automated processing/reporting in much 
the same way as this has already been delivered to certain ISDA documented 
derivatives and which could be extended to represent digitally events of default 
and associated processes/notifications; and 
(d) improving pre- and post-trade risk and control functions reviews: such as 
pre-matching, resilience testing of channels and ability to source fungible and less 
fungible Collateral Assets when required.  
15.5 As one can see from the diagram in para. 1.36 the longer a given chain, the more muddled 
the interlinks and exposure issues become.  From a risk assessment perspective, one main 
issue that is common in relation to the length of transaction as well as holding chains is 
assessing whether risk is exacerbated by the counterparty’s own counterparty exposure.   
                                                     
 
261  See for example ISLA and Linklaters’ joint White Paper “The Future of the Securities Lending Market: An Agenda for Change” 
published 27 September 2019, which is available here: https://www.isla.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/ISLA_Linklaters_Digitalisation_Paper_October2019-compressed.pdf  and despite its overtly London-
bias irrespective of Brexit does contain a good collation of suggestions that have been discussed by market participants and their 
counsel since roughly 2015.  
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15.6 Length of financial/collateral transaction chains can vary.  Their length is not mutually 
dependent on one another and depending on what each party does or is restricted from 
doing in respect of an asset.  As noted in the 2011 EP Report, the actual length of the 
holding chain of intermediaries will vary much more depending on jurisdictional issues.  
In certain jurisdictions, there are no other intermediaries involved and investors hold 
instruments directly with the CSD.  In other jurisdictions, the number of intermediaries is 
limited to one and in others the number is not limited.  Once financial instruments trade, 
once they are collateralised and/or held across border the financial/collateral chains as 
well as more importantly the holding chains may involve several intermediaries. 
15.7 As discussed, absent any arrangement to ‘look-through’ (whether using a DLT-
empowered or other “traditional solution”) past the immediate counterparty, the risks, if 
unmitigated could propagate Coll-RR and reduce Recoverability Rates.  This is in 
particular the case where the repo’d asset remains beyond the reach of the repo lender 
wishing to recover and possibly use/dispose of the relevant asset that which would 
continue to incur market risk exposure.  Post-crisis EU legislative and regulatory 
reforms262 have prompted financial market infrastructure providers to meet their clients’ 
needs and increasingly offer tri-party repo services and/or for these to be CCP cleared. 
Work was also undertaken to rectify the defaults/concerns voiced in respect of certain tri-
party market arrangements.  
15.8 Market participants ought to, in addition taking account of the risks in transaction chains, 
also consider whether making greater-use of tri-party Segregation/Custody (on individual 
segregated account basis) but also tri-party repo arrangements. The answers to these 
questions will be firm-specific.  
15.9 A classic tri-party repo involves a tri-party agent, possibly also a clearing/custodian bank 
(for purposes in this context “Party C”) appointed as a collateral manager, which may 
also include sending settlement instructions to an (I)CSD or its affiliate, which interposes 
itself as intermediary between a cash investor (on the cash leg of the repo) and a securities 
                                                     
 
262  See inter alia regulatory intent that was set at the global level by the Bank for International Settlements’ Committee on Payment 
and Settlement Systems Paper “Strengthening repo clearing and settlement arrangements” available at: 
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d91.pdf  
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lender (on the collateral provider leg of the repo).  Each of the parties may engage in tri-
party repo transactions differing Custody and settlement arrangements. This will affect 
how Party A and Party B interlink with each other but also with Party C.  Tri-party repo 
has long been an established transaction arrangement in the U.S. and its attraction 
increased in European capital markets since the GFC.  U.S. style tri-party repo operates 
differently to EU markets.263   
15.10 There are potentially a majority of benefits that not only tri-party repo can have in terms 
of client asset protection due to Segregation arrangements that improves Recoverability 
Rates. Tri-party repo typically does not involve a CCP but if including one this allows for 
potential greater multilateral netting of exposures vis-a-vis those eligible multiple 
counterparties, which can have sufficient benefits for users and reduce their bilateral risk 
exposures.   
15.11 Provided CCPs are resilient, such arrangements can have merits for a range of financial 
and collateral transaction arrangements. Absent any look-through, concern on a 
counterparty’s bilateral risk profile remains sufficiently mitigated when trading via a 
CCP, even if there may heightened opacity as to who that ultimate counterparty is acting 
for. This goes perhaps against the grain of how repo historically evolved (like many 
transaction types on open outcry and/or voice broking), notably on the strength of trusted 
relationships and one’s perception thereof, i.e., the same counterparties traded bilaterally 
with one another.  
15.12 There are also further arrangements in which the opacity of such transaction arrangements 
could be fully removed by greater use of integrated and interconnected technology. One 
example is to remove the intermediary and set up a B2B platform and move repo to 
exchange traded style trading in which collateral passes directly from end-seller to end-
buyer.  As rehypothecation is not needed due to the transfer being direct on a DvP basis 
for the cash leg and thus the velocity of collateral would equal 1. A number of platforms 
such as WeMatch or TradeWeb are leading the way on that transition   
15.13 These suggestions above do not rely upon the proposed actions for policymakers to be 
successfully delivered – although any such reforms would certainly assist. Any action by 
                                                     
 
263  See: https://www.esma.europa.eu/file/22777/download?token=Rn-impme  
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individual, or preferably a consortium of industry associations would be best advised, in 
particular giving the shifts affecting the London market, where ISLA, ICMA and ISDA 
are traditionally at home to coordinate with EU-27 counterparts including counsel who 
are sufficiently cognisant of the EU-specifics versus those in the UK.  
 
15.14 Actions for policymakers 
15.15 The next Chapters assess some deliverables that EU-level policymakers and those within 
the ESFS (at both EU and national level) could advance on a Jurisdiction-Agnostic 
drafting approach to do away with some pre-GFC barriers to convergence and integration, 
such as the Giovannini Barriers and EPTF Barriers, as well as those that have emerged 
since including those related to FinTech. Some of these changes involve revisiting the 
Draft SLL, taking the best of CASS and CAR for EU-use but also in changing the 
patchwork ensuring that the EU’s Single Rulebook actually is a tool fit for purpose.  
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16. Getting serious on the Single Rulebook, convergence and 
standardisation  
16.1 The EU’s legislative and regulatory framework is intended to be compiled in the Single 
Rulebook, a term first coined in 2009 and intended to reflect a unified regulatory 
framework for prudential regulatory matters. The term has since been broadened by 
policymakers to mean harmonisation of the regulatory framework in the EU. 
Nevertheless, the Single Rulebook, on prudential matters is also subject to 
incompleteness and inconsistencies.  The non-prudential part does not exist in a single 
resource and the various components of non-prudential regulation and supervision are far 
from harmonised or converging.  Policymakers often speak of the Single Rulebook but to 
date it is a patchwork of PDFs – that is not opportune and does little to eliminate the 
patchwork of rules and piecemeal changes being advanced in the EU.  
16.2 As explored in para. 1.78 the wealth of rules in the EU could benefit from single office 
that acts as gatekeeper of the EU’s Single Rulebook upon which the Single Market for 
financial services is to continue to be built. While the resource EUR-Lex is (thankfully) 
already making much more use of “consolidated versions” showing the primary 
legislation as published, amended and corrected, and equally, while the ESAs (notably 
EBA and ESMA) are expanding their own “Interactive” Single Rulebook documentation 
tools. That is welcome but problematic as these do not interface with another and 
ultimately that creates fragmentation and further breeding ground for conceptual gaps and 
CTR. This absence of a centralised wholesome resource of rules poses a barrier to actually 
achieving more substantial completion of the EU’s Single Market irrespective of action 
to further the EBU or CMU.  CMU’s efforts refers to reinforcing and expanding the Single 
Rulebook concept but beyond the prudential remit, without any mention of how it might 
be improved.  
16.3 As it stands current public facing products of the EBA and ESMA’s efforts are narrow in 
its scope and neither all-encompassing nor truly uniform. In many ways, the project 
delivery remains stuck in the starting blocks with a differing understanding of where the 
finish line is drawn or even the route of the track to get there. From an EU policy 
perspective, the continued (politically driven) reference to an EU Single Rulebook Project 
as a solution to facilitate further European integration has an appealing sound to it. Yet 
  
 
 
 
  
 241  
 
 
  
 
  
absent any marked action, absent further convergence and consolidation, these statements 
can be lost where the EU’s resource remains comparatively underwhelming and/or 
nebulous as to what a Single Rulebook  actually is.  
16.4 The term “Single Rulebook”, as it is used by EU regulatory and supervisory policymakers 
(notably the EBA based in London, which is familiar with the UK Financial Services 
Handbook264  as a concept) was in the EBA’s own words a term originally coined in 2009 
by the European Council in the following statement to ensure accurate transposition of 
Basel III in all EU-MS, namely to establish:  
“… a unified regulatory framework for the EU financial sector that would 
complete the single market in financial services … It will close regulatory 
loopholes and will thus contribute to a more effective functioning of the Single 
Market.” 
16.5 As a concept, it has been reinforced/cemented in a number of subsequent speeches 
addressing pending regulatory convergence and simplification efforts. Whilst these aims 
are of course beneficial, desirable and necessary for assisting in the convergence of the 
EU regulatory and supervisory environment, including with respect to EU-MS’ national 
legislation  supplementing or transposing EU legislation, the EU Single Rulebook Project 
has not advanced much, beyond prudential regulation, and, as the EBA states “… the 
uniform application of Basel III in all EU-MS”.   
16.6 Change could however do more and do so efficiently if policymakers were to push for 
that, albeit probably on staggered level and which focuses on building around those areas 
of EU financial services legislation, which are comparably self-contained/sectorial at the 
EU level first before tying in relevant national frameworks that exist at the EU-MS level.  
The latter could be done either by providing the content in the respective national 
languages or by presenting the convenience translation of such resources in a preferably 
consolidated approach offering comparability similar to the output conceptually, albeit in 
a much more attractive digitised form. In terms of the EU level, this would mean the 
codification and also collation of the following EU legislative hierarchy used to regulate 
financial services in the “Lamfalussy process”: 
                                                     
 
264  http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/ 
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(a) the “Level 1 texts”, which refer to the legislative acts usually EU Regulations or 
Directives often as framework legislation; 
(b) the “Level 2 texts”, which refer to the implementing measures drafted and 
adopted by the EC, following advice from the ESAs in the form of implementing 
or technical measures;  
(c) “Level 3 texts” reflecting consultations, Q&A and guidance from the ESAs; and  
(d) complemented by collating the “level 4 texts”, which refer to the supervision and 
enforcement measures that are principally enforced by the NCAs in accordance 
with national laws and frameworks and thus, as opposed to the above, merit 
collation for reference in the primary instance and, to the extent appropriate given 
the supervisory jurisdictional powers, establishing common approaches and/or 
guidance. Collation of texts and indexing them in one resource would still leave 
(some of the) respective texts in the language used by the NCA, but would 
provide a centralised common resource and access to common principles or 
comparative tools – similar say but much more digitised than efforts proposed in 
Annexes 1 and 2.  
16.7 Any conformed versions of the relevant levels of EU legislative texts, i.e. in the forms of 
“Modules” or “Chapters”, which might be applied for conduct of business and prudential 
regulatory matters, could form an “EU Core Single Rulebook” combining Level 1, 2 and 
3 texts of EU law. Such an EU Core Single Rulebook would of course need to interact 
with the wider framework that applies across and in each of the EU-MS depending on 
whether the relevant EU-MS would see benefit in consolidating and harmonising their 
rules with that  of a centralised resource of an EU Core Single Rulebook. One could 
conceivably distinguish such a wider coverage as the “EU Uniform Single Rulebook” 
and, much like the UK FS Handbook, preserve EU-MS elements in “Specialist 
Sourcebooks” identifying/badging the relevant national elements as necessary/desirable. 
16.8 Such an approach might create greater transparency but may also speed up harmonisation 
and deliver certainly on the EC’s priorities for completing the Single Market, by driving 
forward relevant integration. Such an approach in knowledge engineering/presentation 
would consolidate the EU texts, preserve the particularities of EU-MS’ regimes, but 
collate such elements in one centralised resource. This not only increases comparability 
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but moreover convergence—both a necessary prelude to further European integration—
and it also circumvents the immediate requirement for translation of EU-MS’ language-
specific resources. 
16.9 New content could be added in much the same way as the UK FS Handbook’s approach 
tackled growth and development of content by adding to existing content or creating 
standalone chapters. Such chapters of an EU Core Single Rulebook could be 
complemented by a number of items that the CMU project seeks to deliver. This includes 
applying maximum harmonisation efforts (EU Regulations instead of Directives) and/or 
promoting enhanced cooperation (following for example BENELUX’s legislative 
cooperation/alignment) in relevant areas where EU-MS’ actions to implement measures 
have differed or where a “29th Regime” may be more efficient. Such areas include, but 
are not limited to, delivery of EU uniform standards with  respect to client assets and 
client money protection265 or harmonisation of depositor guarantee schemes, and to a 
greater extent investor compensation schemes’ rules, which are necessary to promote 
greater integration of financial markets and deliver the CMU as a single harmonised 
market.  
16.10 Policymakers could, concurrently with the building of an EU Core Single Rulebook, also 
agree standards amongst the ESAs and other relevant stakeholders of how such 
chapters/handbooks for 29th Regimes should be set out, or preferably follow an Irish/UK 
non-legalese approach, to present content that is both user-friendly and interoperable with 
other EU legislation, as well as,  more importantly, the other parts of national EU-MS’ 
regimes that remain unaffected by the contents of any 29th Regime. 
16.11 Consequently, the EU, and the ESAs and ECB-SSM might wish look to the EU 
Publications Office to build that tool, possibly by tendering law firms and legal tech 
providers to digitise acts and taxonomy along the lines of existing tenders that have been 
awarded by NCAs. One such NCA included the then UK’s Financial Services Authority 
and its Handbook of Rules and Guidance, which was replaced by the much more digitised 
version that continues to be maintained and expanded by the FCA. The UK’s Prudential 
                                                     
 
265  See Huertas and Theodosopoulou, “Collateral and the Capital Markets Union—What the EC Green Paper Tells Us and What Needs 
Doing” [2015] J.I.B.L.R. 30, 415–422 and the concept of a CASS Rollout as discussed therein as well as herein. 
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Regulatory Authority (PRA) took its own rather PDF-heavy approach.  Some of the 
lessons from that FCA’s experience and successes are transportable to an EU-wide 
solution and the creation of a truly centralised Single Rulebook for the Single Market. 
Moreover, it is conceivable that this would be deliverable, potentially at low cost, and 
thus creating the quality control gatekeeper on content but also as a closer of conceptual 
gaps and CTR. The following paragraphs provide an oversight of what that might look 
like for possibly the Banking and/or Capital Markets Union.  
16.12 What made the FSA and what makes the FCA version of the UK FS Handbook so 
attractive and what could such an EU Uniform Single Rulebook aspire to? Any centralised 
resource curating the new and improved Single Rulebook might with to take note of the 
following key design attributes that make content functional and easy to use:  
(a) content is presented clearly: as to scope of application to type of regulated 
activity and type of regulated person, as well as the content’s relevance and its 
interaction in the hierarchy of content;  
(b) content has clarity as to supervisory jurisdictional hierarchy: it sets out clearly 
whether specific content is applicable to all regulated persons regardless of 
supervisory authority or solely to a person that is lead regulated by one NCA. 
This is achieved through the use of conceptual badging of rules to a type of 
regulated person266; 
(c) consistency of cross-references and hyperlinked content: within the components 
of the new improved Single Rulebook (i.e. between specific rules, modules and 
chapters), but more importantly, the pieces of legislation or regulatory rule-
making instruments were/are, in the UK FS Handbook, also distinguished, where 
relevant and appropriate, with icons that made it easier to ascertain the 
jurisdictional scope or provenance of a rule, by using an EU flag or appropriate 
                                                     
 
266  In relation to Banking Union and any further expansion or consolidation of pan-EU integrated supervisory jurisdiction, it is 
conceivable that consolidation of the EU Single Rulebook Project could also contemplate indicating where a rule is relevant to the 
European Central Bank’s jurisdiction and supervisory oversight in the Banking Union by badging a particular rule as say “SSM” 
or a rule specific to say a particular Member State by badging it accordingly. As explained herein, the UK FS  Handbook had 
badging according to competency of NCA and effectively who “owns the rule” and whom it applies to, but equally important, the 
concept of the provenance of the rule. Both approaches could be applied in enhancing the EU Single Rulebook Project. 
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annotation “EU” to denote that the provision derives from EU legislation or a UK 
flag or annotation “UK”, i.e. to clarify that the provision derives from applicable 
UK legislative material, which may have predated an equivalent EU 
regulatory/supervisory requirement or concept;   
(d) content was not static but evolved over time and the respective presentation 
evolved accordingly: as particular content changes, users cannot only quickly 
ascertain the date of entry of a particular rule, definition, principle or guidance 
note, but can see how the content has changed over time by users changing the 
relevant date of the webpage being displayed. This powerful functional feature is 
known as “time-travelling”. As a result, users can track the evolution of rules or 
revert to any date of an earlier or future version of the UK FS 
Handbook/successor resources as in force at the chosen date, and do so with 
reference to the rules in their entirety and not just the specific rule. This feature 
was quite useful in assisting the relevant users, their professional advisers and 
possibly the supervisors in having clarity in the extent of relevant compliance 
obligations at a given date or to help solve specific regulatory questions on 
particular subjects and how it fits into the overall framework in force; and  
(e) content of multiple NCAs/sources was presented in a single resource: solely 
with relation to the UK FS Handbook in its existence as a single rulebook during 
the period that the components were badged as PRA or FCA rules, users could 
view these on a “Combined View” basis.267  
16.13 The FCA Handbook brought with it, as a result of cooperation with law firms and legal 
tech: 
(a) an “improved” search function: allowing users to search for key words or 
phrases. Although much like with the search function of the UK FS Handbook, 
the precision of results remains an area for continued improvement;  
                                                     
 
267  It should be noted that more as a result of the new FCA Handbook and the PRA Rulebook being separated, and the Combined 
View function being disbanded, there is (currently) no function in the  successor resources to time-travel before 1 April 2013. Any 
user wishing to break beyond this regulatory “space/time continuum” and access the legacy versions of the UK FS Handbook 
(albeit with perhaps issues of data capture) would now need to consult the UK’s National Archives site on this resource. 
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(b) more tools to make sense of time travel: subject to the limits of the new time 
travel tools described above, the power of time travel as a navigation feature has 
been retained in the new FCA Handbook and PRA Rulebook. However, the FCA 
Handbook includes an interactive timeline to show when previous changes to the 
selected provisions were made, as well as when proposed changes are to be made 
which helps establish points of reference. The PRA Rulebook is not quite as 
advanced as the FCA Handbook and merely indicates when a provision is to be 
amended and how;  
(c) introduction of a “rule tracker”: as with the UK FS Handbook, users of the new 
FCA Handbook and/or the PRA Rulebook can either set up alerts (requires an 
account) if changes to a particular provision are proposed or made or periodically 
click the “What’s New” function on the respective website;  
(d) ability for users to open content in PDF: both the new FCA Handbook and the 
PRA Rulebook have a better functionality to open up relevant content as a PDF 
which may be helpful for some users – even though this is, in the EU publications 
world, long a given baseline function; and  
(e) faster finding of relevant regulatory forms: both the new FCA Handbook and 
the PRA Rulebook have a considerably more efficient way to access relevant 
regulatory forms, as these were often contained in the actual modules or chapters 
of the UK FS Handbook or other online resources of the FSA. 
16.14 Any more centralised attempt to harmonise the EU Single Rulebook Project could 
certainly benefit from some of the items above to increase user accessibility. These are 
items that are relevant to the functionality of the design and interaction of a resource that 
consolidates various levels of legislation. Moreover, they are equally jurisdiction 
agnostic. The collation and presentation of forms, submission methods and/or where such 
items are otherwise located could be replicated in a manner that distinguishes between 
EU forms, that are common across the EU, and those that are jurisdiction-specific.   
16.15  Whilst this project will take time, it can be built in parallel to other EBU, CMU and 
Single Market workstreams. Contrary to the current arrangement with the EBA/ESMA 
and its efforts on the EU Single Rulebook Project, it might be beneficial to have a neutral 
party act as host and coordinator of ESAs, the ECB, NCAs and DG-FISMA. Such a 
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neutral party should, as a centralised data repository, be tasked with the hosting, 
construction, management and quality assurance of the components making up this 
enhanced single rulebook resource. The EC has exclusive competence to foster 
harmonisation and integration. Making the extent of the various Level 1–4 texts more 
accessible and clear, and reducing gaps and CTR between EU legislative texts as well as 
between EU and national legislation is not a new power or beyond the EU or the EC’s 
competencies. Rather this focus on eliminating gaps and errors should be a priority as 
smarter and clearer legislation is a pre-requisite to the actual integration of EU financial 
markets. 
16.16 The EU Publications Office, based in Luxembourg, which also runs EUR-Lex, may be 
best placed, either in its current arrangement or by creating a standalone directorate “just” 
dedicated to financial services, to act as a (comparably) neutral coordinator and host a 
separate online resource for this enhanced EU Single Rulebook resource as it works with 
a number of EU bodies, Directorates-General of the EC and external professionals. In its 
role, the EU Publications Office is tasked, inter alia, with collation of documents for 
publication; the preparation of, graphic design, correction, page make-up and verification 
of the texts and other components, in whatever format and on whatever medium, as 
instructed by the institutions and in compliance with the typographical and linguistic 
presentation requirements established in cooperation with the institutions; the indexation 
and cataloguing of publications; the documentary analysis of texts published in the 
Official Journal and other official texts; the consolidation of legislative texts; quality 
control; the physical and electronic distribution of the Official Journal, official texts other 
than those published in the Official Journal and other non-mandatory publications; and 
storage and physical and electronic archiving. The content can be provided by the ESAs, 
the ECB and suitably qualified professional legal advisers with a track-record of building 
rulebooks that emulate the UK FS Handbook. 
16.17 The EU Publications Office, if given a role as a neutral coordinator, might also be a more 
efficient “control body” if it were to be tasked with maintaining the EU Single Rulebook 
but also if it were equally granted competent powers and resources to identify and, in 
conjunction with the ESAs as policymakers, to eliminate the various gaps, inconsistencies 
and errors across the legislative instruments making up the EU financial services 
environment. In such a possible conceptual scenario, the ESAs, and where relevant the 
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ECB-SSM and SRB, along with DG-FISMA (as legislative policymaker), would retain 
their rule and (supervisory/regulatory) policymaking authority (i.e. the draftsman) as well 
as their mandated priorities. They would however benefit and be able to leverage upon an 
independent body to provide greater assistance in ensuring that all the individual strands 
of legislative and regulatory provisions tie together in an interoperable fashion as well as 
to advance convergence, standardisation and/or harmonisation where 
necessary/desirable.  
16.18 In many ways the absence of such a function in the EU means that, unwarranted gaps 
between EU legislative instruments as well as between those and national legislation are 
likely to continue including in the form of conceptual gaps and CTR. As a result, this 
inconsistency of rules, the continued absence of a true EU Single Rulebook will allow 
market fragmentation to persist and will most likely do so irrespective of any political 
will driving the EBU, the Capital Markets Union or the range of other initiatives that seek 
to complete the Single Market. 
 
16.19 Competent delivery of such a transformation from PDF to online based, assisted by 
appropriate legal counsel and professional advisers, by the EC, the ESAs and the ECB, 
would strengthen the market and build CMU, improve certainty and mobilisation of 
collateral. The same would be welcome to create a resource that compares security 
interests’ characteristics. That might serve as a first step to working to an EU-wide 
security interest.   These are far from insurmountable technical issues.  Nevertheless, 
whether this occurs EU-wide or between certain EU-MS, is largely a political question 
and requires overcoming some of the barriers flagged by Bosomworth but also in the 2015 
FMLC Paper.  
16.20 That said, in the interim, however, market participants need to remain cognisant that 
CMU, as currently proposed, does not eliminate, forestall or reduce CTR and legal 
uncertainty, rather if not handled correctly and prudently (equally on the transaction 
documentation level) will surely eliminate a number of the efficient capital allocation 
benefits that CMU is supposed to achieve – especially if this common regulatory language 
is lacking.  In fact, if left unchecked the wind on the good ship convergence may lose 
more wind out of its sail, less oil to its engine etc., if the following issues that the 2015 
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FMLC Paper highlighted as continuing barriers and challenges for policymakers and 
regulators, namely – with comment added: 
Barriers flagged in 2015 FMLC 
Paper 
Comment 
1. “discontinuity in the G20 
handover process” 
one might term discontinuity as “mission drift” or ceasing to pursuit reforms to the 
full level of delivery in favour of prioritising efforts on other reforms.  
 
2. “reticence of governments to 
follow through on specific 
G20 commitments or 
international principles” 
or do so in a consistent manner.  
3. “constraints imposed by 
domestic legislative 
processes” 
in that certain policy objectives cannot be implemented as quickly or as easily in 
domestic legislation as had been anticipated at the international level.  As a result 
this delay due to the conceptual translation barrier may aggravate an uneven 
regulatory environment. 
 
4. “the effects of any tendency 
towards super-equivalence or 
“gold plating” 
as with the above, this continued process of super-equivalence, which occurs 
between international levels, i.e., the USA and the EU, both Goldplating the 
international commitment, may if done without legitimate justification, significantly 
detract from the underlying regulatory policy objective of the particular commitment 
and thus prevent compliance in a productive or meaningful manner.  Equally, 
Goldplating amongst relevant jurisdictions (an EU issue) or amongst differing 
regulators across transaction types (more a US-American issue) can create 
roadblocks that obfuscate the conceptual translation and thus may aggravate an 
uneven regulatory barrier.  
 
5. “a lack of consensus 
regarding consistency and 
comparability assessments” 
without regulators and policymakers having a common understanding of how to 
assess the degree of convergence, and would ideally hope for, the degree of CTR, 
further convergence of consistency and comparability may remain an aspirational 
goal. 
 
6. “limits on the powers of 
international bodies” 
the inability of the FSB or IOSCO and the absence of EU action in respect of 
rectifying convergence, lacks the ability to give credence to that work.  
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7. “concerns regarding 
regulatory cooperation, 
supervision and 
enforcement” 
in the absence of harmonised working practices, standards differ, CTR increases and 
supervisory arbitrage opportunities ensue with certain jurisdictions being perceived 
as lax versus others that are more rigorous.  
8. “a lack of a formal grievance 
procedure” 
for transgressions, inconsistencies or delayed translation of the agreed policy 
objectives into the respective legislative and/or regulatory framework(s). 
 
Figure 5 – 2015 FMLC Paper Barriers 
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17. Revisiting the Draft SLL and how it and a CASS Rollout could support 
other reforms 
17.1 To date, the EU legislative response in harmonising the types of securities interests, in a 
similar fashion taken by the UCC or in other jurisdictions the approach taken on PPSAs, 
has not advanced beyond the concept stage. For reasons discussed in Parts I and II, an EU 
UCC would be welcome. The same lacklustre approach has been taken in slow movement 
to even create a table showing the conceptual similarities and differences between  in the 
form of the Draft SLD/Draft SLL which stalled in 2010/2011, has not even come close to 
what might be necessary to advance financial integration in the post-trade services sector. 
The Draft SLL was heralded by a number of EU policymakers, including the EC in 
preparing CMU as one option that would assist in establishing the necessary prerequisites 
to a resilient foundation of CMU and give greater certainty in the post-trade environment 
of financial instruments. Like with the conceptual gaps around collateral and Custody, 
little if no action has been advanced to revitalise a Draft SLL as a binding EU-wide 
Regulation, akin to an “EU UCC” or even (just as) a voluntary common regime, i.e. a 
29th Regime. The Draft SLL may not be, in its stalled form, perfect, but it marks an anchor 
upon which to advance reform.  
17.2 Commitment to creating a voluntary or 29th Regime” or any other harmonising legislative 
framework for EU-wide financial  instruments beyond areas where such approach has 
been mooted and delivered in actual EU legislation, such as  the pan-European “personal 
pension product” (PEPP) or proposals for a  comparable financial instrument based 
savings products would be welcome for the central role the Collateral Ecosystem plays 
for financial markets that the EU wants to harmonize using CMU (2.0) measures to make 
the Single Market more single.  
17.3 Similar action of dusting off good proposals that both the EBU and ultimately Brexit have 
put on old also apply to action to increase harmonisation of investor protection levels, 
notably beyond those levels in Directive 1997/9 (the Investor Compensation Scheme 
Directive (the ICSD)). This action point not only merits a revival of the reforms to the 
ICSD, but makes it fit for purpose to be interoperable with the revised BU supervisory 
framework as well as the recovery and resolution legislation. Some of these changes were 
contained in the legislative amendment proposals of 201051 and of 201152 to the ICSD.  
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17.4 Both the ICSD and Draft SLL could potentially be quickly ready to be put back on the 
table, having been surprisingly shelved and withdrawn by the Juncker Presidency in 
December 2014. As legislative proposals, these were very much publicised as key to the 
post-GFC reforms that sought to strengthen investor confidence in securities markets. 
More generally, the harmonisation of protection levels of investor compensation schemes 
was also heralded as a precondition to delivery of EBU (before CMU was even a concept), 
yet was seen by some as politically divisive (even though the actual points were minor) 
as ICSD at least was perceived to undermine the reforms culminating in improvements to 
depositor protection and its protection levels under the now subsequently revised Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD).  
17.5 However, both legislative proposals to improve the ICSD focussed on the scope of 
coverage of relevant investor compensation schemes, standardised disclosure 
requirements on scope of coverage and a faster payout speed. The legislative proposals 
were to raise the original (and still in force) staggered protection levels from €20,000 to 
an uniform level of €50,000 in the 2010 legislative proposal and in the 2011 proposal to 
a tiered level ranging between €30,000 and €100,000. In both instances, these 
improvements would have benefitted investors covered by the ICSD schemes. Halting 
reform in securities investor protection has however been repeatedly criticised by a 
number of EU EU-MS, especially those that have a deep, functioning capital markets and 
a strong consumer protection ethos. Why precisely this is not addressed in the 2015 CMU 
Action Plan is strange, especially since the CMU’s objectives are to improve resilience 
and confidence in capital markets and open up non-bank lending funding alternatives.  
17.6 Turning briefly to the U.S. equivalent compensation schemes for inspiration, it should be 
noted that the equivalent to an ICSD scheme, the Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation (SIPC), was itself born out of the “paper crunch” crisis of 1968–70 and 
failures of broker-dealers during the birth of the Eurodollar Market. Like most 
sophisticated investor compensation schemes, SIPC protects investors against the loss of 
cash and securities held by a customer at a financially-troubled SIPC member firm. 
Protection levels are up to a value of U.S.$500,000 of which U.S.$250,000 is the 
applicable limit for cash held. Protection for multiple accounts is available depending on 
the type of capacity the customer acts in. These protection levels are considerably higher 
than any EU relevant ICSD and DGSD. It should also be noted that the US equivalent of 
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the DGSD is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); a creation in 1933 as 
part of Roosevelt’s far-reaching “New Deal” financial market and infrastructure reforms 
in response to the earlier crisis of the 1929 Great Depression. In terms of protection, the 
FDIC protects the consumer in a harmonised fashion up to the value of US $250,000 per 
depositor, per insured FDIC firm per each account in each type of covered category. Both 
SIPC and the FDIC provide considerably more protection than anything the EU has ever 
delivered and the EC should have considered this development in its CMU Plan’s 
“actions” as one that would deliver tangible benefits to consumers.  
17.7 The same applies in respect of insurance sector coverage, and as shown in Annexes 1 and 
2, some of what say the UK has done to level the playing field of rules to the banking and 
securities markets sector to extend this wider to other financial sectors like insurance, 
means that the EU would best be placed to assess and conclude, regardless of the EU-
UK’s changing relationship, grounds to follow suit and provide financial market 
participants with greater  coverage of protections and confidence to engage in more single 
Single Market.  To not do anything would mean that compensation coverage in the EU’s 
insurance sector remains disjointed in Europe to the extent that any national schemes for 
insurance business exist. This failing was recognised in the FSAP and the FSWP, yet, 
little or anything has been done to plug this conceptual gap in consumer protection and 
introduce an insurance sector equivalent to ICSD or DGSD schemes. The UK does have 
insurance guarantee protection through the harmonised scheme, the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme (FSCS), which currently provides uncapped coverage for certain 
eligible claims. The EU’s current detail on efforts with respect to insurance guarantee 
schemes is limited to a landing page.  
17.8 Delivering tangible and achievable measures as a Draft SLL Rollout means advancing 
the revised and new principles to in the short-term a 29th Regime and over the longer-
term actual legislative proposals including focussing on: 
(a) Clarifying and harmonising when/how financial instruments/collateral are 
acquired in legal terms (when ownership transfers): one benefit deliverable in 
the revised Draft SLL would be harmonising when transfer of legal title would 
be deemed to take effect (e.g. at the moment of debiting or crediting of an account 
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holder’s Custody/Depository account on the books and records of an account 
provider268);  
(b) Transparency offered to market participants and choices in respect of where 
their collateral is held: in particular in the holding and disposition of financial 
instruments held through Custody/Depository accounts regarding conflict of laws 
as well as the processing of rights flowing from financial instruments held in 
those accounts.  The Draft SLL also included principles to improve the 
transparency offered to market participants and choices in respect of whether 
their collateral is held at a financial intermediary or directly with a (International) 
Central Securities Depository (I)CSD).  In particular, the differences between 
account models offered by (I)CSDs’ could benefit from greater comparability so 
as to allow standardisation to take place but equally for users of such services to 
better assess their exposure and the commercial proposition.  This is particularly 
the case where there are mismatches between the segregation as well as account 
holding models on the vertical exposure level as well as the horizontal exposure 
level; and  
(c) Aligning protection of investors’ rights in the event of the insolvency/resolution 
of the foreign intermediary through which book entry financial instruments 
are held: In addition to the issues relating to PRIMA, one more practical issue is 
that EU law does not uniformly and consistently define harmonised criteria for 
determining the ‘location’ of an account in complex models of financial 
instrument holding chains involving technical infrastructures such as T2S.  More 
specifically, as the EPTF Report assesses and asks for a review to Art. 9(1) EU-
FCD “without delay” – which has yet to happen, EU law does not (currently) 
specify whether the location of a relevant account should be understood as:  
(i) the place of the relationship office through which the client maintains its 
business relationship?;  
                                                     
 
268  See in particular comments above with regard to the problems on acquisition, disposition of title and fragmented concepts across 
borders. 
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(ii) the place of the actual IT platform  operating and maintain the relevant 
account and whether this is in relation to the location of the servers or the 
legally registered place of business of the platform; 
(iii) the place of business where the client opened its account; 
(iv) the place of business where the transaction is booked;  
(v) the place of business of any sub-account provider or the place of business 
of the (I)CSD account; and  
(d) As advocated by a number of commentators, in view of the possible divergent 
interpretations, Principle 14 of the publically available Draft SLD proposed 
introducing a uniform conflict of laws rule for all account holders and account 
providers included the clarification that a relevant account should be deemed 
maintained by the “…branch which services the client in relation to the securities 
account”.  This logic is fundamentally flawed for a number of reasons and merits 
reform (as set out below) to avoid hardwiring legal risk rather than solving the 
problem:  
(i) branches do not have their own legal personality although they can be 
treated, under English (but not EU supervisory) law, as distinct from head 
offices.  Equally, multiple branches/teams “…service the client in 
relation to the securities account”.  This creates legal uncertainty as to 
who/where the reference point is.  This uncertainty not only applies to 
front office to back office splits, but equally to custodian and sub-
custodian relationships269;  
                                                     
 
269  It should be noted that sub-custodians themselves may have deposited financial instruments with local clearing systems.  This 
introduces further tiers in the holding relationship if viewed from the perspective of an EU market participant i.e., with an EU 
custodian as head custodian interfacing with an EU (I) CSD, a non-EU depositary as sub-custodian and a foreign (I)CSD as sub-
custodian, complemented by relationships with the respective paying agent in the foreign jurisdiction. From the point of view of 
the custodian and (I)CSD, it is important to note from the perspective of an EU market participant user of such services, that despite 
the custodian and (I)CSD possibly being under a regulatory or contractual obligation to exercise a requisite duty of care and skill 
in respect of selecting foreign entities (irrespective of legal opinions) the holding chain is expanded further and to legal systems 
where it may not be absolutely clear to the EU market participant at the top of the holding tier, how it is protected through the 
claims of the head custodian (I)CSD against those lower down in the tiers. 
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(ii) the fact that the branches/teams that service the client (front office) and 
those that service the account (back office) are not mutually 
exclusive/dependent on one another and may move across jurisdictions 
during the relevant lifetime of the client relationship.  The point of 
reference that is relevant is where the account is booked;  
(iii) a possible reform would be to replace the concept of where the account 
is deemed maintained with “…in the jurisdiction of the place of business 
where the relevant account (to which the financial instruments or 
relevant entitlements are credited and recorded) is booked by the account 
provider.” 
17.9 The Draft SLD’s approach on conflicts of laws also comes with deficits, as noted by the 
ECB T2S May 2013 Letter as well as by Paech270 (also author of the 2011 EP Report).  
As further noted, a number of legal-conceptual issues are largely untouched271 by SFD 
and FCD and since their transposition (footnotes and emphasis added): 
 “…further harmonisation efforts, both in international for a and the EU, rapidly 
slowed to a trickle the 2002 Hague Securities Convention and the 2009 Geneva 
Securities Convention, though unanimously adopted after years of expert 
discussions, faced considerable opposition from inside the EU and to date have 
not been implemented by sufficient number of countries.  The European 
Commission worked on its own proposal for a comprehensive harmonisation of 
securities law aimed at mitigating legal uncertainty in this area.”  
                                                     
 
270  See in particular academic work herein: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2012-11_Paech.pdf (Paech 11/2012) but 
more importantly in the context of delivery of T2S in a letter dated 22 May 2013 from the T2S Legal Team, i.e. ECB Legal 
Services, to the T2S Harmonisation Steering Group – a public version available here: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/progress/pdf/hsg/mtg9/20130610_PO_Note_lack_of_conflict_of_law_rule.pdf??2dacba0b3
067d5b80abe948c332b8231 (ECB T2S May 2013 Letter) 
 
271  As Paech 11/2012 summarises in footnote 5 (emphasis added): “The Settlement Finality Directive is confined to system operators 
and system participants. It prescribes that (national) insolvency rules cannot reverse transfer orders once entered into the 
settlement system. The Financial Collateral Directive prescribes that formalities in respect of securities collateral are to be 
abolished and is (by and large) confined to wholesale market participants.  Neither of the Directives attempts to harmonise the 
content of the securities holder’s right, the rules on how such rights are to be transferred or encumbered, or any rules on 
priority or good faith acquisition. Furthermore, the two Directives, given their un-coordinated scope, contribute to creating a 
generally patchy framework for securities holding and disposition in the EU.” 
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 (i.e. this stalled work from the Commission is the Draft SLD described in further detail 
below).  Paech 11/2012 also goes on to state (emphasis in bold and clarifications in square 
brackets): 
 “The fate of both the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention, as well as 
that of the [proposed Draft SLD/SLL] European legislation show a common 
pattern: the instruments (or the project in case of the EU) became bogged down 
as they passed from the stage of expert discussions into the political sphere. The 
proposed solutions were rejected, and even the case for harmonisation was re-
opened and questioned. In all three cases, the furore centred mainly on 
concerns that account holders’ securities would be less protected if existing 
legal concepts governing securities holding, notably the concept of property, 
were undermined. 
 This controversy exposed conflicts and tensions of different kinds. Some 
commentators were genuinely convinced that rights in securities can best be 
expressed in the form of proprietary positions for conceptual reasons, notably in 
view of the general approach which classifies securities as tangibles.  Others 
feared that harmonisation of the legal approaches in respect of securities law 
would inevitably lead to a proliferation of the ‘Anglo-American’ approach 
which purportedly leads to less protection of client securities in the event of a 
bank’s or broker’s insolvency.  Small wonder that this argument proved very 
effective in political terms in the wake of the financial crisis.  A third type of 
criticism skimmed the surface of the legal debate—centring in particular on 
property concepts—but in substance aimed at preserving current business 
models in the securities markets against legal reform, as legal or regulatory 
changes regularly cause costs and might, in this particular case, open up certain 
business domains to international competitors. 
 It was impossible to sort the partisans into clear factions. Governments, 
regulators, issuers, brokers, merchant banks, service providers and private and 
institutional investors across national boundaries could be found on both sides 
of the discussion. There were even divides within organisations acting globally, 
where the merchant bank arm argued in favour of market-focussed 
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harmonisation while the securities service arm held out for conceptual purity272. 
Justice ministries and central banks in one and the same country might likewise 
be at odds over that question – and even different divisions within the ECB did 
not agree as to which concept was the correct basis for harmonisation.” 
 
17.10 The nature of the European project and in particular this workstream is that it is precisely 
the “Anglo-American approach” in particular in relation to the UK’s CASS Sourcebook 
for MiFID retail and professional clients and the United States’ U.C.C. as well as the 
more consumer focussed protections that offers a greater deal of protection than the 
regime both in 2010-2013 (when the debate on the Draft SLD/SLL was more pronounced 
and Paech 11/2012 was being concluded) was offered and this remains fact as of the date 
of this publication in particular, in the absence of a level playing field and application of 
UK CASS style protections across the rest of the EU.  
17.11 Such an application might be realisable in bringing harmonised benefits and more 
resilient measures in a functional manner without the need to detract from delivery of 
CMU and reopen stalled workstreams focussed on harmonising national laws on security 
interests, legal schools of thought and exerting resources in debating the pros and cons of 
Factual PRIMA v Contractual PRIMA or lex rei sitae v lex contractus. 
17.12 Other areas where reforms are likely to be needed include clarifying and harmonising an 
EU definition of contractual and statutory netting and set-off for consistent use in EU 
legislation but equally as a point of reference for national EU-MS to benchmark their 
national security interests against.  The following might serve as a starting-block for a 
jurisdiction-agnostic definition (one that stands alongside the definition in the EU-SFD 
as used in the context of safeguarding transfer orders in settlement systems) – which can 
be further annotated as required with either “contractual” or “statutory”, as may be 
relevant273:  
                                                     
 
272  As proffered by Paech 11/2012 in footnote 15:  “This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that the aim of a merchant bank is 
to secure more and easier cross-border business, whereas the securities service arm of the same banking group will consider the 
protection of the status quo, i.e., market fragmentation, which is more advantageous for its business model.” 
273  For further background reading, please also refer to Wood, Philip, “Set-off and Netting, Derivatives, Clearing Systems”, 2007, 
Sweet & Maxwell. 
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(a) Netting: means the legally enforceable reconciliation and payment under which 
amounts between contracting parties are consolidated into a single payment from 
one party to another; 
(b) Set-off: means the legally enforceable offset or discharge of competing eligible 
claims, whether as a product of netting or not, to extinguish the competing claims 
and produce a single, smaller amount from one party to another.    
17.13 The words “legally enforceable” aim to cover bilateral as well as multilateral netting 
arrangements and equally to facilitate the benchmarking between national laws of EU-
MS and this EU jurisdiction neutral definition which may be relevant in particular for 
those civil/Napoleonic law based legal systems that do not recognise set-off at 
insolvency274 or where there are special jurisdiction-specific rules on the mutuality or 
reciprocity of obligations that are to be netted and set-off.  The key legal principle to note 
is that netting is usually a pre-requisite to the application of set-off by parties and whilst 
the distinction between the two concepts may be established at EU law, further 
harmonisation is desirable.   
17.14 Cross-border financial transactions, including collateralisation arrangements, whether 
based on English law master agreements (such as ISDA or GMRA documentation) have 
in part rolled-out the English law approach to netting and set-off.  Nevertheless, as 
highlighted above, various different (governing) laws or legal systems may have 
application in such situations as well as in relation to insolvency or analogous proceedings 
including BRRD style recovery/resolution application and what that means to identifying 
                                                     
 
274  This should be contrasted further, with those jurisdictions, which however would permit that all contracts between the parties are 
automatically deemed to be cancelled and losses and gains set-off at the point immediately preceding the commencement of 
insolvency proceedings.  This contractual fiction, is typically included by parties in their English law governed master agreements 
including collateralisation arrangements.  One such example would be the parties’ choice to apply Automatic Early Termination 
in the context of an ISDA Master Agreement as a contractual work-around in respect of say a German domiciled counterparty so 
as to conform to the German insolvency law principles in the context of mandatory applicable and overriding insolvency law 
principles applicable in respect of the German domiciled counterparty. The legal effectiveness of Automatic Early Termination 
mechanics in different jurisdiction is periodically confirmed in ISDA’s commissioned legal opinions.  As Wood (2007) notes in 1-
046 in the above mentioned title: “The key question is whether a private contract- whether automatic termination on contractual 
connexity or novation – can defeat a bankruptcy statute which expressly nullifies set-off or rescission or both.  If the contracting-
out defies a statutory prohibition, it must be capable of strong and convincing legal justification if the requirement of predictability 
is to be satisfied.”  And should be borne in mind when assessing the contractual solutions offered by a number of trading and 
collateral documentation as well as the application of EU-FCD or the EU-SFD. 
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certain transactions as well as applying netting/set-off in those transactions.  This 
confusion, even with a more pronounced conflict of laws regime as advocated above, 
merits closing as the conceptual gaps between legal systems ought to be closed, through 
a common point of reference so as to build a common understanding of these key terms 
in building CMU.   
17.15 As evidenced in Annex 2, given some of the questions in the EU-FCD’s drafting, some 
EU counterparties employ contractual/tri-party arrangements to protect return of excess 
collateral in the event such excess is not protected by EU-FCD, or appropriately 
segregated. This is costly but avoids the excess from being “trapped” within the 
counterparty’s insolvency/resolution proceedings. Under the UK CASS rules, there is a 
principle275, which requires that any excess after the solvent netting and set-off is 
promptly paid to the collateral giver or held in accordance with the UK’s Client Money 
Rules i.e., on a segregated basis or a statutory trust basis so as to remove it from the 
insolvency/resolution proceedings in respect of the estate of the account provider.276  
17.16 A CASS Rollout i.e., taking the British and Irish rules, adopting them on a Jurisdiction-
Agnostic manner to benefit the EU-27 would spearhead such convergence and 
harmonisation in a truly transformational manner.  Coupled with a Draft SLL Rollout, 
whether as a 29th Regime plus legislative instrument or just as a 29th Regime, real action 
to close fragmentation could be achieved in ways that Bosomworth also proposes i.e., 
without EU-treaty or other invasive changes – such as on-going work on insolvency laws.    
                                                     
 
275  In particular CASS 7.2.11. 
276  See also Yeowart and Parsons Chapter 18 but specifically issues discussed at 18.90.  
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17.17 Nevertheless, in the EC’s own words in the CMU GP277 this harmonisation of national 
laws is “no easy task”278, so it is questionable why harmonisation of insolvency laws and 
security interests, through more legislation at EU level, in particular building on stalled 
workstreams would solve a problem that the EU has noted for the past 30 years.  These 
(perhaps aspirational) ambitions of harmonising national laws on insolvency or security 
interests in a comprehensive manner are longer term goals, however, ones that should not 
impede a new EU legislation focussing on functional matters in advancing comparability, 
harmonisation and standardisation as methods of delivering greater integration. The U.S. 
legislative evolution over a number of years, delivered harmonisation by adopting an 
approach concentrated on functional harmonisation as opposed to a focus on conceptual 
harmonisation.  The latter has been the Commission’s historical focus.  As the CMU GP 
notes, focus for change will determine between short(er) and long(er) term measures.   
17.18 It although perhaps worth noting that the U.S. U.C.C., is a model code that individual 
state legislatures transposed.  The general U.S. Federal and State legislative evolution 
meant that the U.C.C. as adopted by most American legislatures had a lesser task of 
harmonising State law as legal systems had comparatively more commonalities amongst 
                                                     
 
277  See page 24 of CMU GP (footnotes in square brackets): 
  
 While the discussion around harmonising substantive insolvency legislation has been slow over the past 30 or so years due to its 
complexity, there has been considerable progress in the area of conflict-of-laws rules for cross-border insolvency proceedings 
[Footnote Text: clarifying that Regulation 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings will be replaced by an improved legal instrument 
in 2015]. However, underlying national insolvency frameworks are still divergent in their basic features and in their effectiveness 
[Commission Staff Working Document 2014 (61) final]. Reducing these divergences could contribute to the emergence of pan- 
European equity and debt markets, by reducing uncertainty for investors needing to assess the risks in several Member States. 
Furthermore, the lack or inadequacy of rules enabling early debt restructuring in many Member States, the absence of "second 
chance" provisions, and the excessive length and costs of formal insolvency proceedings can lead to low recovery rates for creditors 
and discourage investors. With a view to achieving progress on insolvency, the Commission adopted a Recommendation on a new 
approach to business failure and insolvency [Commission Recommendation C(2014) 1500] in which it urges Member States to put 
in place early restructuring procedures and 'second chance' provisions. The recommendation also invites Member States to 
consider applying the principles to consumer over-indebtedness and bankruptcy. An evaluation of the Recommendation is planned 
for 2015. 
 
278  It is important to of course recall that EU national legal systems also differ not only in schools of thought but legal culture in 
particular with relation to protection for debtors and sympathy to ease of creation of security interests.  The latter point is discussed 
in Wood, Philip “Comparative Law of Security and Guarantees” in detail at 1-7 (although possibly superseded) in terms of certain 
legal cultural approaches across key jurisdictions and at 1-10 and 1-11 the main issues that Wood in this leading text and unique 
analytical categorisation considered as main issues relating to security interests and how these impact the ranking. 
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U.S. states than perhaps amongst EU-MS and their respective legal schools of thought.  
It should be noted that the U.C.C was transposed only in part by Louisiana (civil law 
jurisdiction) that were deemed by that state as compatible and that a small number of 
other state legislatures have exercised their legislative independence and made a few 
substantial deviations to that of the model code.  Furthermore, in contrast to the EU 
principles of subsidiarity, cases under the U.C.C. may be decided by either state or federal 
courts however, interpretation by state courts of U.C.C. provisions binds the federal 
courts.  The U.C.C. is regularly reviewed and legislative commentary issued by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law 
Institute to meet new needs, as such it is an evolutionary guiding piece of model 
legislation. 
17.19 In Europe, these differing schools of thought in EEA jurisdictions have impacts on laws 
of property, security and proprietary interests and concepts of ownership, entitlement, 
acquisition and disposition of title as well as bona fide acquisition.  It is notably in relation 
to the latter that a functional approach might be helpful in ensuring that the fragmentation 
across national EU legal systems might be set aside and a consistent and legally certain 
regime applied. Historically rules on good faith acquisition were meant to alleviate the 
need for the acquirer that the disposer had not committed fraud and indeed had good title 
and thus remove an impediment of relevant laws to the rapid transferability of financial 
instruments and assets.  And part of the problem is that in providing a solution that 
evolved prior to dematerialised financial instruments and true cross-border transactions a 
number of jurisdictions, had in uncoordinated fashion, applied principles of property law 
– thereby hardwiring conceptual barriers between negotiability and protection against 
fraud and in more recent times, against insolvency risk of the intermediary. 
17.20 Those rules, possibly along with traditional legal concepts applicable to financial 
instruments may be superseded yet, as Paech 11/2012 notes, that market participants and 
markets operate implicitly on the assumption that financial instruments that are in flux 
are transferred with good title and thus without the need to verify this in any great detail.  
As further noted this concept needs to be updated, not least to have a uniform playing 
field, but equally to interoperate with the updated principles of insolvency as well as those 
as amended with respect to resolution of regulated financial institutions and financial 
market infrastructure providers. Equally, a point that can be agreed on with Paech (in 
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particular p. 32) is that any revised Draft SLD/SLL, including an EU UCC in the mould 
of the U.S., should not fully displace the remainder of domestic securities laws and on 
security interests that EU-MS (or indeed market participants) might need to remain. Any 
legislative approach ought to seek to be one of co-existence and overlay as opposed to 
displacement.  This may also reduce resistance from certain EU-MS. 
17.21 Delivering change might also benefit from legislation assisting in the harmonisation 
process and building common items.  As noted above, a lot of change has already been 
delivered through multiple strands of legislation.  Further change can be delivered through 
EU delegated regulation, notably MiFID II/MiFIR and could focus on harmonising some 
of the items relevant for collateral below.  Other change should be delivered in a 
standalone legislative initiative, preferably one that focusses on a functional approach but 
also ties existing legislative strands together in a comprehensive manner i.e., including 
definitions, terms, concepts.  In tying these strands together this means inter alia:  
(a) Aligning collateral ownership reforms with client money and/or client asset 
protections:  Further action is needed to take into account recent national and EU 
regulatory developments affecting collateral generally, as well as those 
specifically relating to the handling and protection of client money and/or client 
assets. Developments in collateral markets also have to be taken into account, 
both in terms of asset classes, transmission channels, Custody and safekeeping 
arrangements and improvements to resilience of securities settlements systems as 
well as revisions that seek greater convergence of the application of relevant 
conflict of laws rules.  Some of this includes assessing how EU-MS addressed 
this, notably  the UK and Ireland, which were translated into clear, workable rules 
(i.e. the CASS Sourcebook279 in particular CASS 5, 6 and 9), that the market has 
implemented (including in a manner that works with the BRRD) without the need 
for ‘over legislation’ and a track-record of active supervisory engagement.  As a 
result these future CMU reforms could, by way of a legislative overlay, 
concentrate on functional questions as opposed to harmonising 28 EU-MS laws.  
This means focussing both on “who owns what” but more importantly “who can 
do what, how and when” with collateral, client assets and client money and 
                                                     
 
279  See: http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/CASS  
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specifically segregation and rights of re-use.  Such a legislative overlay could 
serve to harmonise these issues more efficiently than stalled workstreams have 
progressed and not only across borders (i.e., differences between 
protections/rules in say Ireland versus Italy) but equally through the different tiers 
of holding chains (i.e., from (I)CSD level to end user) but more importantly 
across the various chains of financial transactions, collateral arrangements and 
holding chains.  Concretely this means a uniform set of rules with regard to:  
(i) on-going transparency obligations for dealer entities to provide 
information in a simple, transparent and standardised format to their 
counterparties on how these counterparties’ collateral is held and/or 
segregated, how and when it may be used and which events require 
notifications as to the usage of collateral;  
(ii) periodic regulatory reporting by dealer entities on Client Money and 
Client Asset positions and holdings allowing competent authorities to 
take timely, firm or specific supervisory action thereby assisting in the 
identification, mitigation and management of risk and its propagation; 
and  
(iii) the timely identification, protection and separation (including 
Segregation in a consistent fashion) of Client Assets and Client Money 
from the estate of the provider of the safekeeping and administration of 
financial instruments for the account of clients, including custodianship 
and related services such as cash/collateral management when such 
provider becomes subject to insolvency proceedings (or such analogous 
proceedings) or the administration of a regulatory led resolution plan. 
(b) harmonising consistency of rules and interpretation of the EU-FCD and EU- 
SFD: as applied throughout the EU in particular in the context of greater 
uniformity of legal outcomes particularly in a default/insolvency (or analogous) 
situation, particularly in certain jurisdictions with less developed legislation, the 
principles of applicable insolvency laws in particular due to potential 
inefficiencies for certain jurisdictions that exist as a result of fragmented technical 
standards and differing business practices.  Put otherwise, closing this gap means 
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closing the risk of CTR propagating further in how FCD and SFD are applied 
across the EU; and  
(c) introducing harmonising legislation to create a uniform and comprehensive 
solution to conflict of laws as they apply to securities and in certain 
circumstances ownership rights:  The fact that differing approaches are included 
in various EU legislation presents an unnecessary and unwarranted confusion, 
which may still arise even where parties have still chosen a governing law to 
apply to their arrangements.  This merits not only having harmonised defined 
terms, points of identification such as attributing accounts as being maintained as 
to where they are booked as opposed to the nebulous concept of a relationship 
being serviced etc. and making these rules operable in a manner that does not 
upset or obstruct the privity of contract between counterparties wishing a 
governing law to apply as well as defined fallbacks as to when inactions trigger 
action.  The CSDR took a first step in imposing principles on (I)CSDs operating 
cross-border to address their legal risks and take mitigating action280.  A further 
welcome step for delivery of CMU, as well as increasing resilience of financial 
market infrastructure providers more broadly, would be to expand that 
identification and mitigation requirement and complement it by imposing a 
periodic public disclosure obligation of such legal risks, CTR, general business 
risk, operational risk and scope as well as resilience of mitigating actions.  
Currently any such detailed is largely split between regulatory public disclosure 
requirements of governance arrangements (mostly satisfied through a high-level 
version of the actual governance arrangements) as well as largely voluntary, 
unharmonised and non-comparable to users of financial market infrastructure 
                                                     
 
280  See Art. 43 of CSDR which sets out: 
 
“1.  For the purpose of its authorisation and supervision, as well as for the information of its clients, a CSD shall have 
rules, procedures, and contracts that are clear and understandable for all the securities settlement systems that it 
operates and all other services that it provides.  
2.  A CSD shall design its rules, procedures and contracts so that they are enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions, 
including in the case of the default of a participant.  
3.  A CSD conducting business in different jurisdictions shall take all reasonable steps to identify and mitigate the risks 
arising from potential conflicts of law across jurisdictions.” 
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providers.  Such a change would most likely be able to be delivered through 
delegated legislation of the CSDR and more broadly in respect of MiFID 
II/MiFIR reforms. If as proposed herein financial market infrastructure providers 
were to become users of the Coll-RR, Cust-RR as well as CTR, they could 
measure their own systems, controls and governance arrangements and their 
susceptibility to these new risk methodology measures as well as more 
established risk metrics and periodically make these publically available, thereby 
reinforcing ease of comparability for users. 
17.22 From a settlement perspective, the CSDR recognised and sought to address that 
settlement markets in the EU remain fragmented across national borders and cross-border 
settlement remains costly.  This cost arises due to differing rules (in part with staggered 
application) applicable to settlement and a CSD’s activity.  What the CSDR did deliver 
was a shortening of settlement cycles to T+2 as well as improving settlement discipline 
i.e., requiring CSDs to establish systems to monitor settlement fails, publish the ten 
participants with the highest fail rate, provide the prevention of settlement failures 
through imposing mandatory buy-ins and penalties.  Such harmonising measures would 
be beneficial for arrangements along the “levels” between CSDR and end-user investor.  
Improving those arrangements will require looking at national, notably insolvency laws 
and seeing how EU law can close gaps in much the same way as analysis conducted in 
Annexes 1 and 2.  
17.23 Harmonisation and subsequent standardisation of legislative and regulatory obligations 
touches across the entire spectrum of the component legislative and regulatory provisions.  
Aside from the technical barrier above, there are also more fundamental barriers that are 
beginning to erode, but CMU may be a platform to bring a sledgehammer to break down 
the rest.  One key area in which policymakers have begun to (welcomingly) focus their 
attention is convergence of both the consistent use and standardised use of definitions i.e., 
defining the who and the what as well as harmonising and standardising the terms of the 
obligations imposed in respect of the market participants, the subject matter and the 
relevant definitions i.e., ensuring convergence across the how, when, where, what and 
why.  This remains a long work in progress, complicated not only by the fact that multiple 
work-streams are working around the same set of regulatory policy objectives (the silo 
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mentality factor expanded into multiple silos with little communication between one 
another). 
17.24 This is further complicated by the fact that CTR may have already be hardwired in to 
these work-streams through (A) the differing often opposed objectives of stakeholders in 
each silo, (B) lack of genuine convergence across different silos (between multiple 
stakeholders  or within individual stakeholders), (C) sheer volume of workload, (D) the 
correlation of the impact that the workstreams have on one another and the fact that the 
silos are not isolated whereas working groups may treat them as such, (E) the speed at 
which such reforms need to take place and (F) lack of single project management bringing 
the strands from the silos together at EU level i.e., a degree of legal dirigisme is lacking 
that is perhaps necessary in overcoming the existing fragmentation pre-CMU and the 
emerging fragmentation and hardwiring of CTR as CMU develops.  The building of the 
EBU, an on-going project, is no different. 
17.25 From a lawyer’s perspective or that of a legal academic, the attractive solution might be, 
as proposed in subsequent sections to suggest an EU institution that takes lead on this 
project management to make the Single Rulebook more single and steer (dirige) the 
components of the ESFS that are all committed to delivering convergence but have 
different track records. The nuts and bolts remain the issue in removing the inconsistency 
and improving convergence.  As the 2015 FMLC Paper, summarised: 
 “Considerable progress has been made by the FSB, other international 
standard-setters, national regulators and supervisors towards the ideal of 
regulatory consistency and systematic cooperation, but challenges remain. For 
example, deadlines and timetables have proved difficult to meet and/or subject 
to a failure of coordination.  Countries have legislated unilaterally in advance of 
international principles or standards. Approaches to important issues such as 
“equivalence” or “substituted compliance” differ across countries. Gaps and 
overlaps have emerged between jurisdictional requirements.  In his letter of 
November 2014 to G20 Leaders, the Chair of the FSB, Mark Carney, accepted 
the need for further work by the FSB on aligning the national implementation of 
G20 commitments, announcing that, from next year, the FSB will begin “an 
annual reporting process on implementation”. 
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17.26 Taking a step back, in financial market transactions, defined terms are key and working 
across documents means often having dedicated Common Terms Agreements or 
equivalent documents.  Certain national competent authorities notably those of the UK 
and Ireland have very detailed glossaries (the UK is a prime example in its Financial 
Services Handbook) that do a very robust job in making sure regulators, the regulated and 
end users and the respective professional advisers all have access to the same language 
and can use it competently.  A common regulatory language improves comparability, 
formation of sensible policy with common, harmonised elements and assists 
differentiating and benchmarking.  Why should this be any different for CMU and notably 
collateral?  
17.27 A new cross-sectorial study is long overdue and now more so than ever before paramount 
as demonstrated by the assessment in the Annexes 1 and 2. The sections above, have set 
out that whilst CMU, it comes with a number of issues and challenges for the future 
strength and degree of integration in an EU single market for collateral.  Proposals voiced 
herein, may assist stakeholders in shaping and operating in a Collateral Ecosystem, 
however comes with warnings not to overlook the importance of identification, mitigation 
and management of one’s risk exposure and risk contribution in that ecosystem.  
17.28 Whatever the future holds on the delivery of CMU 2.0 as well as new or improved rules 
on collateral, client assets and client money, the main threat to destabilising the catalyst 
that CMU overall is intended to be remains the will of policymakers, supervisors and 
market participants to push financial integration forward.  Fatigue in that process will be 
inevitable if one does not focus on a functional approach and comparability rather than 
trying to hammer square pegs through round holes.  
17.29 Thus, as mentioned above, irrespective of CMU’s revised delivery strategy being based 
on a sensible and manageable staged approach, it is crucial that policymakers and 
stakeholders have consensus on a rough blueprint of how the supervisory and market 
environment of CMU 2.0 (possibly 5.0?) will look like in five, ten and fifteen years.  This 
roadmap was anticipated to be delivered before end of 2015 and now is scheduled for 
before 2024. One can only hope that it will serve as a valuable provides a roadmap against 
which delivery and reform can be benchmarked as well as managed and that it is flexible 
enough to account for innovation or for mitigating action to be taken in relation to risks 
in its design or risk affecting stakeholders.   
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18. Outlook ahead 
18.1 In conclusion, this thesis’ three parts, and evidence set out in the Annexes 1 and 2, have 
each provided a detailed insight into some of the known and newly proposed challenges, 
risks and levels of fragmentation that are causing barriers to making the Single Market 
for financial services and notably the Collateral Ecosystem that underpins it more single.  
18.2 Whilst the reforms of CMU 1.0 were welcome, CMU 2.0 and Brexit present an 
opportunity for the EU-27 to improve the harmonisation of existing rules and to think of 
new pragmatic ones that improve the resilience of mobilisation channels in the Collateral 
Ecosystem and reduce Coll-RR, Cust-RR and eliminate CTR by equally focusing on 
standardisation and improving comparability.  
18.3 This is an opportunity that ought not to be missed and a failure to act would be 
shortsighted and counterproductive. Fatigue in that process will be inevitable if one does 
not focus on a functional approach and comparability rather than trying to hammer square 
pegs through round holes.  
18.4 However, many of the proposed measures tack on to legislative workstreams that are 
already underway. Some are possibly even “low hanging fruit” in terms of political will 
and drafting. The drafting required ideally needs to take a Jurisdiction-Agnostic approach 
that is holistic and CMU 2.0 is the right channel. Changes ought to be advanced now 
ahead of the next-GFC like event providing an excuse to call that occurrence a catalyst 
for action.  Financial crisis have a habit of coming back to haunt markets and with post-
GFC changes and their failsafes still being implemented there are some known risks that 
have been identified, are ready to be mitigated so that if issues do arise they can be 
managed.  
18.5 Whatever the future holds on the delivery of CMU 2.0 as well as new or improved rules 
on Collateral Assets, Client Assets, Client Money and Custody, the main threat to 
destabilising the catalyst that CMU overall is intended to be remains the will of 
policymakers, supervisors and market participants to push financial integration forward. 
It is also crucial for policymakers and stakeholders that shape the collateral ecosystem 
and financial markets more generally to have consensus on some of the national-
perceptions and how that might hinder getting to the rough blueprint of how the 
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supervisory and market environment of CMU 2.0 (possibly 5.0?) will look like in five, 
ten and fifteen years. Not tackling this very crucial area underpinning the functioning of 
European but also globally linked financial markets may require political will to 
breakthrough perceptions.    
18.6 Not tackling this fundamental area underpinning the functioning of European but also 
globally linked financial markets may require political will to breakthrough perceptions 
of “too rigid to reform” but crucially it is an area that is “too important to miss”.    
[***] 
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Endnotes to Thesis 
 
 
 
1  The 2017 EPTF Report summarises these as follows:  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Giovannini Barriers v EPTF Barriers 
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Figure 7 – EPTF Barriers 
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1  See page 3 of the ECB HTF Report (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/initiatives/shared/docs/ea6ae-ami-seco-2017-12-07-
item-1.3-collateral-management-harmonisation-report.pdf) which in summary relate to the following areas, not all of which have 
(currently at the time of writing) an actual or proposed EU legal/regulatory equivalent that governs what the business processes 
aim to cover and/or where harmonisation is proposed to be advanced:  
 
Collateral Management Harmonisation Activities and their prioritisation EU legal/regulatory 
regime exists to cover 
this activity?  
1. Triparty Collateral 
Management Processes 
Processes Harmonisation of triparty collateral management 
workflows and messaging.  
 11 priority 1 business processes  
 7 priority 2 business processes  
 
Interoperable processes allowing collateral mobility across triparty 
agents. 
 
Not explicitly provided for 
in current EU 
legislation/regulatory 
requirements. 
2. Corporate Actions 
processes (relevant for 
collateral management) 
Harmonisation of Corporate Actions processes, workflows and 
messaging by reinforcing existing harmonisation standards/efforts or 
adding new harmonisation standards (taking into account specific 
considerations from a collateral management perspective).  
 16 priority 1 business processes  
 5 priority 2 business processes 
 
Not explicitly provided for 
in current EU 
legislation/regulatory 
requirements. 
3. Taxation processes 
(relevant for collateral 
management) 
Harmonisation of tax processing in the context of collateral 
management (taking into account identification of parties in 
collateralised transactions). Creation of map of different national 
withholding tax requirements.  
 8 priority 1 business processes 
Not explicitly provided for 
in current EU 
legislation/regulatory 
requirements. 
4. Bilateral Collateral 
Management processes 
Harmonisation of workflows for bilateral collateral management 
(covering non-cleared OTC derivatives and securities financing). 
Interoperability and leverage of existing infrastructures and market 
platforms.  
 2 priority 1 business processes  
 2 priority 2 business process  
 
Market practices needed for cleared OTC derivatives. 
 
Not explicitly provided for 
in current EU 
legislation/regulatory 
requirements other than 
in SFTR, EMIR, CSDR 
and delegated legislation.  
5. Margin Calls Interoperability and leverage of existing infrastructures and market 
platforms for margin processes.  
 1 priority 1 business process 
Not explicitly provided for 
in current EU 
legislation/regulatory 
requirements other than 
in Margin RTS. 
6. Billing Processes 
(relevant for collateral 
management) 
Harmonisation of billing procedures, workflows and messaging.  
 
 3 priority 1 business process  
 2 priority 2 business process 
Not explicitly provided for 
in current EU 
legislation/regulatory 
requirements. 
7. Cut-Off Times Analysis is currently ongoing on minimum requirements for end-of-
day cut off times (to avoid possible different value dates in cross-
infrastructure transactions in different markets, which may create 
frictions for market participants active in different markets). 
 
Not explicitly provided for 
in current EU 
legislation/regulatory 
requirements. 
8. Collateral Data Harmonisation of data exchanges to ensure that information / data is 
available where necessary. Market practises needed for use of data.  
 6 priority 1 business processes  
 1 priority 2 business process 
 
Not explicitly provided for 
in current EU 
legislation/regulatory 
requirements other than 
in SFTR, EMIR, CSDR 
and delegated legislation.  
9. Sourcing of Collateral 10 Minimum requirements for sourcing/movement of collateral across 
Europe (priority 1). 
 
Not explicitly provided for 
in current EU 
legislation/regulatory 
requirements other than 
CSDR.  
10.  Non-Euro Collateral 
processes 
Market practices for the handling of non-euro denominated collateral 
(including related corporate action processes).  
 
 2 priority 1 business processes. 
 
Not explicitly provided for 
in current EU 
legislation/regulatory 
requirements. 
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Annex 1: Comparison on Financial Collateral Arrangement Rules 
 
The following table sets out relevant rules and the assessment of their conceptual divergence or CTR (excluding rules on regulatory notifications to EU-level and national competent authorities).  
Where text is left blank, then no equivalent wording is available.  
Key 
Definitions/Concepts 
EU FCDiii (consolidated version) amended by Directive 2009/44/EC  UK-FCARiv  as amended by 
 Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement Finality and 
Financial Collateral Arrangements) (Amendment) Regulations 
2010/2993 (UK 2010 FCAR Amendment)v 
Irish-FCARvi  Conceptual divergence?  CTR? And other 
comments 
Definition of 
“financial collateral 
arrangement” 
Art. 2(1)(a) 
 
“‘financial collateral arrangement’ means a title transfer financial collateral 
arrangement or a security financial collateral arrangement whether or not these are 
covered by a master agreement or general terms and conditions;” 
Regulation 3 
 
“financial collateral arrangement” means a title transfer financial 
collateral arrangement or a security financial collateral arrangement, 
whether or not these are covered by a master agreement or general terms 
and conditions;” 
Regulation (2)(1) 
“financial collateral arrangement” means a title transfer financial 
collateral arrangement or a security financial collateral arrangement 
(whether or not covered by a master agreement or by general terms 
and conditions)” 
 
All definitions are identical.   
Definition of TTCA 
Art. 2(1)(b) 
 
“‘title transfer financial collateral arrangement’ means an arrangement, including 
repurchase agreements, under which a collateral provider transfers full ownership of, or 
full entitlement to, financial collateral to a collateral taker for the purpose of securing 
or otherwise covering the performance of relevant financial obligations;” 
Regulation 3 
“title transfer financial collateral arrangement” means an agreement or 
arrangement, including a repurchase agreement, evidenced in writing, 
where— 
(a) the purpose of the agreement or arrangement is to secure or otherwise 
cover the relevant financial obligations owed to the collateral-taker;  
 
(b) the collateral-provider transfers legal and beneficial ownership in 
financial collateral to a collateral-taker on terms that when the relevant 
financial obligations are discharged the collateral-taker must transfer legal 
and beneficial ownership of equivalent financial collateral to the 
collateral-provider; and 
 
(c) the collateral-provider and the collateral-taker are both non-natural 
persons;”  
 
Regulation 2(1) 
 
““title transfer financial collateral arrangement” means an 
arrangement under which a collateral provider transfers full 
ownership of, or full entitlement to, financial collateral to a collateral 
taker for the purpose of securing or otherwise covering the 
performance of relevant financial obligations, and includes a 
repurchase agreement;” 
 The UK limbs introduced in Regulation 
3 (a) to and including (c) reflect the 
concepts introduced in Art. 1 of the EU-
FCD. 
 
 The UK-FCAR’s scope is wider and 
super-equivalent to that of the EU-FCD 
and Irish-FCARs in that extends to all 
non-natural persons. This in some ways 
is quite welcome.   
 
 As these laws pre-date the entry into 
force of the EU’s SFTR, the reference 
to “repurchase agreement” is not to be 
read in accordance with the definition in 
the EU SFTR of “repurchase 
transaction”, but rather is undefined 
here. EU policymakers would be 
assisting the market in creating greater 
certainty by replacing “repurchase 
agreement” within the definition with a 
cross-referenced definition to 
“securities financing transaction” as 
defined in SFTR.   
 
 It should be noted that Art. 3(13) and 
(14) SFTR cross-refer to TTCA and 
SFCA respectively as defined in the EU 
FCD and Art. 3(16) to “financial 
instrument” as defined in MiFID II. 
 
Definition of SFCA  
Art. 2(1)(c) 
‘security financial collateral arrangement’ means an arrangement under which a 
collateral provider provides financial collateral by way of security to or in favour of a 
collateral taker, and where the full or qualified ownership of, or full entitlement to, the 
financial collateral remains with the collateral provider when the security right is 
established; 
Regulation 3 
“security financial collateral arrangement” means an agreement or 
arrangement, evidenced in writing, where—  
 
(a) the purpose of the agreement or arrangement is to secure the relevant 
financial obligations owed to the collateral-taker;  
 
Regulation 2(1) 
“security financial collateral arrangement” means an arrangement 
under which a collateral provider provides financial collateral by way 
of security to or in favour of a collateral taker, and where the full or 
qualified ownership of, or full entitlement to, the financial collateral 
 The UK-FCAR’s scope is wider and 
super-equivalent to that of the EU FCD 
and Irish-FCARs in that extends to all 
non-natural persons. This in some ways 
is quite welcome.   
 The UK-FCARs do not have reference 
to the concept of “qualified ownership” 
as in the EU-FCD and Irish-FCARs;  
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(b) the collateral-provider creates or there arises a security interest in 
financial collateral to secure those obligations;  
 
(c) the financial collateral is delivered, transferred, held, registered or 
otherwise designated so as to be in the possession or under the control of 
the collateral-taker or a person acting on its behalf; any right of the 
collateral-provider to substitute financial collateral of the same or greater 
value or withdraw excess financial collateral or to collect the proceeds of 
credit claims until further notice shall not prevent the financial collateral 
being in the possession or under the control of the collateral-taker; and  
 
(d) the collateral-provider and the collateral-taker are both non-natural 
persons;  
 
remains with the collateral provider when the security right is 
established;  In the UK, in addition to limb (c) being 
considerably wider and there being 
issues on the understanding of  
“control” as in Gray v G-T-P (see 
below) there are also issues  resulting 
from the case of Re Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (In 
Administration) [2012] EWHC 2997 
(Ch),which established that there is no 
requirement that the arrangement must 
be strictly bilateral as this would 
exclude from the scope of the 
FCAR arrangements that 
grant security to a trustee for a group of 
beneficiaries. 
 The UK 2010 FCAR Amendment in 
Regulation 4(c) inserts the following:  
“(2) For the purposes of these 
Regulations “possession” of financial 
collateral in the form of cash or 
financial instruments includes the case 
where financial collateral has been 
credited to an account in the name of 
the collateral-taker or a person acting on 
his behalf (whether or not the collateral-
taker, or person acting on his behalf, 
has credited the financial collateral to 
an account in the name of the collateral-
provider on his, or that person’s, books) 
provided that any rights the collateral-
provider may have in relation to that 
financial collateral are limited to the 
right to substitute financial collateral of 
the same or greater value or to 
withdraw excess financial collateral.”. 
 
Definition of Cash 
Art 2(d) 
‘cash’ means money credited to an account in any currency, or similar claims for the 
repayment of money, such as money market deposits; 
Regulation 3281 
“cash” means money in any currency, credited to an account, or a similar 
claim for repayment of money and includes money market deposits and 
Regulation 2(1) 
“cash” means money credited to an account, or a claim for the 
repayment of money (for example, money market deposits); 
 The UK-FCAR definition of “cash” is 
somewhat wider and super-equivalent 
in its scope even if it covers items 
explicitly that are otherwise implied 
                                                     
 
281  It should be noted that in the UK, in Gray v G-T-P the financial collateral consisted of the balance from time to time standing to the credit of a bank account in the name of G-T-P Group Limited. Following the ratio of this English case, Yeowart and Parsons suggest at 3.06 that “It appears to have been accepted as common ground that the 
customer’s interest in the credit balance was ‘cash’ for the purposes of the [UK] FCARs.  
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sums due or payable to, or received between the parties in connection with 
the operation of a financial collateral arrangement or a close-out netting 
provision; 
 
(such as realised proceeds of financial 
collateral arrangement or funds from 
close-out netting) in the EU-FCD and 
Irish-FCARs.282    
 Recital 18 of the EU-FCD indicates that 
money market deposits are an example 
of “similar claims to the repayment of 
money”, whereas, as noted in Yeowart 
and Parsons  at 3.08 in relation to the 
UK’s definition of cash (but by 
extension the EU-FCD), “Although 
certificates of deposit might have been 
included, they are perhaps more 
naturally classified as ‘money market 
instruments’ expressly included in the 
definition [of EU-FCD and thus UK-
FCARs and Irish-FCARs] of ‘financial 
instruments’.” 
 None of the legislative instruments 
reviewed make any definitive statement 
on the treatment of virtual currencies as 
money.vii 
Definition of 
financial 
instruments  
 
Art. 2(e) 
‘financial instruments’ means shares in companies and other securities equivalent to 
shares in companies and bonds and other forms of debt instruments if these are 
negotiable on the capital market, and any other securities which are normally dealt in 
and which give the right to acquire any such shares, bonds or other securities by 
subscription, purchase or exchange or which give rise to a cash settlement (excluding 
instruments of payment), including units in collective investment undertakings, money 
market instruments and claims relating to or rights in or in respect of any of the 
foregoing; 
Regulation 3 
“financial collateral” means either cash, financial instruments or credit 
claims; 
Regulation 3 
“financial instruments” means—  
(a) shares in companies and other securities equivalent to shares in 
companies;  
 
(b) bonds and other forms of instruments giving rise to or acknowledging 
indebtedness if these are tradeable on the capital market; and  
 
(c) any other securities which are normally dealt in and which give the 
right to acquire any such shares, bonds, instruments or other securities by 
subscription, purchase or exchange or which give rise to a cash settlement 
(excluding instruments of payment);  
and includes units of a collective investment scheme within the meaning of 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, eligible debt securities within 
the meaning of the Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001, money 
market instruments, claims relating to or rights in or in respect of any of the 
Regulation 2(1) 
“financial collateral” means cash, financial instruments or credit claims 
provided under a financial collateral arrangement, but does not include 
shares in a company whose exclusive purpose is— 
(a) to own means of production that are essential 
for the collateral provider’s business, or 
(b) to own real property; 
Regulation 2(1) 
“financial instruments” means any of the following: 
 
(a) shares in companies; 
(b) securities equivalent to shares in companies; 
 EU-FCD does not contain a definition 
of “financial collateral” as used in the 
UK-FCARs or the Irish-FCARs with 
the latter being considerably more 
detailed fashion to carve out certain 
companies and their operative business.  
 The definition of “financial instrument” 
across the relevant rules is the same 
even if there is a conceptual divergence 
between EU-FCD definition of 
“financial instruments” and that in the 
MiFID II/MiFIR Regime.  
 The reference to shares in the definition 
of financial instruments would include 
shares in a private company. This point 
has been considered in the unreported 
British Virgin Islands case Cukurova. 
                                                     
 
282  For a further discussion on the nature of this drafting, which Yeowart and Parsons state at 3.11 that it “…leaves something to be desired” see their discussion in paras. 3.12 and 3.13 as to the “felicitous drafting” in the UK-FCARs. The issue that this UK-driven conceptual divergence is one that goes beyond the scope of the  EU FCD, and the 
risks that poses,  is not discussed therein.  
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financial instruments included in this definition and any rights, privileges 
or benefits attached to or arising from any such financial instruments;  
 
(c) bonds and other forms of debt instruments if 
negotiable on the capital market; 
(d) any securities (other than instruments 
referred to in subparagraphs (a) to (c)) that are 
normally dealt in and give the right to acquire 
any such shares, bonds or other securities by 
subscription, purchase or exchange; 
(e) any securities (other than instruments 
referred to in subparagraphs (a) to (c) and 
instruments of payment) that give rise to a cash 
settlement; 
(f) units in collective investment undertakings; 
(g) money market instruments; 
(h) claims relating to, or rights in or in respect 
of, shares, securities, bonds, and instruments of 
a kind referred to in subparagraphs (a) to (d); 
 
 Yeowart and Parsons note in 3.30 that 
the difference in the construction of the 
definition of “financial instrument” in 
Art. 2(e) when compared to Regulation 
3 of the UK-FCARs and the phrase 
“…and any other securities which are 
normally dealt in…” could be construed 
in reading that all securities previously 
set out in Art. 2(e) must be “normally 
dealt in.” If that statement is true, then 
this would exclude private limited 
companies from EU-FCD protections, 
and by definition mean that the UK-
FCAR’s protections afforded inter alia 
to private limited companies etc., would 
go beyond the principles of EU law in 
the form of a conceptual divergence. A 
similar situation would thus perhaps 
apply in relation to Regulation 2.1(d) of 
the Irish-FCARs, which follow the UK-
FCAR’s logic and thus could itself be 
incompatible with how some might read 
that provision.  
Definition of 
relevant financial 
obligations Art. 2(f) 
‘relevant financial obligations’ means the obligations which are secured by a financial 
collateral arrangement and which give a right to cash settlement and/or delivery of 
financial instruments. Relevant financial obligations may consist of or include:  
(i) present or future, actual or contingent or prospective obligations 
(including such obligations arising under a master agreement or 
similar arrangement);  
(ii) obligations owed to the collateral taker by a person other than the 
collateral provider; or  
(iii) obligations of a specified class or kind arising from time to time; 
Regulation 3 
“relevant financial obligations” means the obligations which are secured or 
otherwise covered by a financial collateral arrangement, and such 
obligations may consist of or include—  
(a) present or future, actual or contingent or prospective obligations 
(including such obligations arising under a master agreement or 
similar arrangement);  
 
(b) obligations owed to the collateral-taker by a person other than 
the collateral-provider;  
 
(c) obligations of a specified class or kind arising from time to time;  
 
Regulation 2(1) 
“relevant financial obligation” means an obligation (whether present or 
future, and whether actual, contingent or prospective) secured by a 
financial collateral arrangement that gives a right to a cash settlement 
or the delivery of financial instruments, or both, and includes— 
(a) an obligation arising under a master agreement or similar 
arrangement, 
(b) an obligation owed to a collateral taker by a person other 
than the collateral provider, and 
(c) an obligation of any class or kind arising from time to 
time specified in the arrangement or, if the arrangement is 
varied, the arrangement as varied; 
 The UK-FCARs omit the reference in 
EU FCD, which the Irish-FCARs stick 
with, regarding “a right to cash 
settlement and/or delivery of financial 
instruments”.  
 The Irish-FCARs make the useful point 
that an obligation is owed as varied if it 
is varied.  
Definition of book 
entry securities 
collateral  Art. 2(g)  
‘book entry securities collateral’ means financial collateral provided under a financial 
collateral arrangement which consists of financial instruments, title to which is 
evidenced by entries in a register or account maintained by or on behalf of an 
intermediary; 
Regulation 3.  
“book entry securities collateral” means financial collateral subject to a 
financial collateral arrangement which consists of financial instruments, 
title to which is evidenced by entries in a register or account maintained 
by or on behalf of an intermediary; 
Regulation 2(1) 
“book entry securities collateral” means financial collateral that 
consists of financial instruments title to which is evidenced by entries 
in a register or account kept by or on behalf of an intermediary; 
 The UK-FCAR contains a definition of 
“intermediary” as follows:   
“intermediary” means a person that 
maintains registers or accounts to which 
financial instruments may be credited or 
debited, for others or both for others 
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and for its own account but does not 
include—  
 
(a) a person who acts as a registrar or 
transfer agent for the issuer of 
financial instruments; or  
 
(b) a person who maintains registers 
or accounts in the capacity of 
operator of a system for the 
holding and transfer of financial 
instruments on records of the 
issuer or other records which 
constitute the primary record of 
entitlement to financial 
instruments as against the issuer;  
 
Definition of 
relevant account  
Art. 2(h) 
‘relevant account’ means in relation to book entry securities collateral which is subject 
to a financial collateral arrangement, the register or account — which may be 
maintained by the collateral taker — in which the entries are made by which that book 
entry securities collateral is provided to the collateral taker; 
Regulation 3 
“relevant account” means, in relation to book entry securities collateral 
which is subject to a financial collateral arrangement, the register or 
account, which may be maintained by the collateral-taker, in which entries 
are made, by which that book entry securities collateral is transferred or 
designated so as to be in the possession or under the control of the 
collateral-taker or a person acting on its behalf; 
 
Regulation 2(1) 
“relevant account”, in relation to book entry securities collateral, 
means the register or account (whether kept by the collateral taker or 
by a third party) in which the entries are made and by which that 
collateral is provided to the collateral taker; 
 The UK’s definition’s addition of “or a 
person acting on its behalf” in relation 
to the provision of collateral reflects the 
changes in case-law in Gray v G-T-P 
but also to account for the role of 
nominees.   
Definition of 
equivalent collateral 
Art. 2(i) 
‘equivalent collateral’:  
(i) in relation to cash, means a payment of the same amount and in the 
same currency;  
(ii) in relation to financial instruments, means financial instruments of the 
same issuer or debtor, forming part of the same issue or class and of 
the same nominal amount, currency and description or, where a 
financial collateral arrangement provides for the transfer of other 
assets following the occurrence of any event relating to or affecting 
any financial instruments provided as financial collateral, those other 
assets; 
 
Regulation 3  
“equivalent financial collateral” means—  
(a) in relation to cash, a payment of the same amount and in the 
same currency;  
 
(b) in relation to financial instruments, financial instruments of the 
same issuer or debtor, forming part of the same issue or class 
and of the same nominal amount, currency and description or, 
where the financial collateral arrangement provides for the 
transfer of other assets following the occurrence of any event 
relating to or affecting any financial instruments provided as 
financial collateral, those other assets;  
and includes the original financial collateral provided under the 
arrangement;  
 
Regulation 2(1) 
“equivalent collateral” means— 
(a) in relation to collateral that is cash, a payment of the same amount 
and in the same currency, and 
(b) in relation to collateral that is a financial instrument— 
(i) another financial instrument of the same issuer or debtor 
that is part of the same issue or class, and is of the same 
nominal amount, currency and description, as the first-
mentioned instrument, or 
(ii) if the relevant financial collateral arrangement provides 
for the transfer of other assets following the occurrence of 
an event relating to or affecting a financial instrument 
provided as financial collateral, those other assets; 
 
Conceptually all definitions are the same – save 
that the UK adds, rather logically, that the use of 
“equivalent financial collateral” does not negate 
the “original financial collateral.”  
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Definition of right of 
use 
Art 2(m) 
‘right of use’ means the right of the collateral taker to use and dispose of financial 
collateral provided under a security financial collateral arrangement as the owner of it 
in accordance with the terms of the security financial collateral arrangement; 
  The EU-FCD definition is surprisingly not 
replicated in the UK-FCARs and Irish-FCARs. 
Definition of close-
out netting provision 
Art. 2(n) 
‘close-out netting provision’ means a provision of a financial collateral arrangement, or 
of an arrangement of which a financial collateral arrangement forms part, or, in the 
absence of any such provision, any statutory rule by which, on the occurrence of an 
enforcement event, whether through the operation of netting or set-off or otherwise:  
(i) the obligations of the parties are accelerated so as to be immediately 
due and expressed as an obligation to pay an amount representing their 
estimated current value, or are terminated and replaced by an 
obligation to pay such an amount; and/or  
(ii) an account is taken of what is due from each party to the other in 
respect of such obligations, and a net sum equal to the balance of the 
account is payable by the party from whom the larger amount is due to 
the other party; 
Regulation 3 
“close-out netting provision” means a term of a financial collateral 
arrangement, or of an arrangement of which a financial collateral 
arrangement forms part, or any legislative provision under which on the 
occurrence of an enforcement event, whether through the operation of 
netting or set-off or otherwise—  
(a) the obligations of the parties are accelerated to become immediately due 
and expressed as an obligation to pay an amount representing the original 
obligation’s estimated current value or replacement cost, or are terminated 
and replaced by an obligation to pay such an amount; or  
(b) an account is taken of what is due from each party to the other in respect 
of such obligations and a net sum equal to the balance of the account is 
payable by the party from whom the larger amount is due to the other party;  
 
Regulation 2(1) 
“close-out netting provision” means— 
(a) a provision of a financial collateral arrangement, or an 
arrangement of which a financial collateral arrangement 
forms part, or 
(b) a rule of law, 
as a result of which, on the occurrence (whether through the operation 
of netting or set-off or otherwise) of an enforcement event— 
(i) either or both of the following apply: 
(I) the obligations of the parties— 
(A) are accelerated so as to be 
immediately due and are expressed as 
an obligation to pay an amount 
representing the estimated current 
value of the obligations, or 
(B) are terminated and replaced by an 
obligation to pay such an amount; 
(II) an account is taken of what is due from each 
party to the other in respect of those obligations 
and the party from which the larger amount is 
due is required to pay to the other party a net 
amount equal to the balance of the account; 
 The Irish-FCAR formatting change by 
splitting out limb (i) of Art. 2(n) from 
the words “or, are terminated and 
replaced by an obligation…” in Irish-
FCAR’s Regulation 2(1) (i)(1)(B) 
means that under the Irish-FCARs this 
wording is split out further even though 
operationally on reaches the same 
result.  
 The UK-FCARs, welcomingly, 
introduce the concept of “estimated 
replacement cost”  as an alternative to 
the estimated current value.  
Definition of credit 
claims 
Art. 2(o)  
‘credit claims’ means pecuniary claims arising out of an agreement whereby a credit 
institution, as defined in Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/48/EC, including the 
institutions listed in Article 2 of that Directive, grants credit in the form of a loan. 
Regulation 4 of 2010 UK-FCAR Amendment 
““credit claims” means pecuniary claims which arise out of an agreement 
whereby a credit institution, as defined in Article 4(1) of Directive 
2006/48/EC  of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to the 
taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast), 
including the institutions listed in Article 2 of that Directive, grants credit 
in the form of a loan” 
Regulation 2(1) 
“credit claim” means a pecuniary claim arising out of an agreement 
under which a credit institution, as defined in Article 4(1) of the 
Recast Credit Institutions Directive, including the institutions listed in 
Article 2 of that Directive, grants credit in the form of a loan; 
 No difference or divergence in wording. 
 The wording has not been amended to 
reflect changes that are referred to as 
CRR II/ CRD V and which impact the 
legislative reference in the wording.  
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Concept of collateral 
asset mobilisation 
“provision”  Art. 2(2) 
References in this Directive to financial collateral being ‘provided’, or to the 
‘provision’ of financial collateral, are to the financial collateral being delivered, 
transferred, held, registered or otherwise designated so as to be in the possession or 
under the control of the collateral taker or of a person acting on the collateral taker's 
behalf. Any right of substitution, right to withdraw excess financial collateral in favour 
of the collateral provider or, in the case of credit claims, right to collect the proceeds 
thereof until further notice, shall not prejudice the financial collateral having been 
provided to the collateral taker as mentioned in this Directive.  
 
 Regulation 2(1) 
“provision of financial collateral” is to be construed in accordance 
with paragraph (2); 
Regulation 2(2) 
For the purposes of these Regulations, financial collateral is provided 
when financial collateral that is or is to be delivered, transferred, held, 
registered or otherwise designated so as to be in the possession or 
under the control of a collateral taker or a person acting on a collateral 
taker’s behalf is so delivered, transferred, held, registered or otherwise 
designated. 
Regulation 2(3) 
Financial collateral has been provided to a collateral taker for the 
purposes of these Regulations if paragraph (2) has been complied 
with in relation to that collateral even if there exists a right of 
substitution of the financial collateral, a right to withdraw excess 
financial collateral in favour of the collateral provider or, in the case 
of a credit claim that is financial collateral, a right to collect the 
proceeds of the claim until further notice. 
 
 The UK-FCAR’s coverage of this 
concept is implied in the TTCA and 
SFCA definition.   
Who can benefit 
from the 
protections? Art. 1 (2)  
The collateral taker and the collateral provider must each belong to one of the 
following categories:  
(a) a public authority (excluding publicly guaranteed undertakings unless they fall 
under points (b) to (e)) including:  
(i) public sector bodies of Member States charged with or intervening in the 
management of public debt, and  
(ii) public sector bodies of Member States authorised to hold accounts for 
customers;  
(b) a central bank, the European Central Bank, the Bank for International Settlements, a 
multilateral development bank as referred to in Annex VI, Part 1, Section 4 of 
Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 
relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) (1), 
the International Monetary Fund and the European Investment Bank;  
(c) a financial institution subject to prudential supervision including:  
UK-FCARs apply, by virtue of relevant definitions in Regulation 3 (in 
particular TTCA and SFCA as well as the following items) to when both 
the collateral-provider and collateral-taker are both “non-natural 
persons”.  
Regulation 3  
“non-natural person” means any corporate body, unincorporated firm, 
partnership or body with legal personality except an individual, including 
any such entity constituted under the law of a country or territory outside 
the United Kingdom or any such entity constituted under international 
law; 
“relevant account” means, in relation to book entry securities collateral 
which is subject to a financial collateral arrangement, the register or 
account, which may be maintained by the collateral-taker, in which entries 
are made, by which that book entry securities collateral is transferred or 
designated so as to be in the possession or under the control of the 
collateral-taker or a person acting on its behalf; 
 
 
Regulation 3(2)  
The collateral taker and the collateral provider who are the parties to 
the financial collateral arrangement must each be one of the following: 
(a) a public authority (excluding a publicly guaranteed 
undertaking unless it is covered by one or more of 
paragraphs (b) to (l)); 
(b) a central bank, the European Central Bank, the Bank for 
International Settlements, a multilateral development bank, 
the International Monetary Fund or the European 
Investment Bank; 
(c) a credit institution (as defined in Article 4(1) of the 
Recast Credit Institutions Directive, but including the 
institutions listed in Article 2 of that Directive); 
(d) an investment firm (as defined in Article 4(1)(1) of 
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 April 20046 ); 
 Irish-FCARs have  definition of “public 
authority” that extends to:  
 
(a) a local government body, 
 
(b) a public sector body of a EU-MS that 
is charged with responsibility for, or is 
involved in, the management of public 
debt, and 
 
(c) a public sector body of a EU-MS 
that is authorised to hold accounts for 
customers; 
 The UK-FCARs are considerably 
broader in who can benefit from the 
protections as unlike the EU FCD and 
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(i) a credit institution as defined in Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/48/EC, 
including the institutions listed in Article 2 of that Directive;  
(ii) an investment firm as defined in Article 4(1)(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets 
in financial instruments (2);  
(iii) a financial institution as defined in Article 4(5) of Directive 
2006/48/EC;  
(iv) an insurance undertaking as defined in Article 1(a) of Council Directive 
92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life 
insurance (third non-life insurance Directive) (3) and an assurance 
undertaking as defined in Article 1(1)(a) of Directive 2002/83/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning 
life assurance (1)  
(v) an undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities 
(UCITS) as defined in Article 1(2) of Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 
December 1985 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable 
securities (UCITS) (2);  
(vi) a management company as defined in Article 1a(2) of Directive 
85/611/EEC;  
(d) a central counterparty, settlement agent or clearing house, as defined respectively in 
Article 2(c), (d) and (e) of Directive 98/26/EC, including similar institutions regulated 
under national law acting in the futures, options and derivatives markets to the extent 
not covered by that Directive, and a person, other than a natural person, who acts in a 
trust or representative capacity on behalf of any one or more persons that includes any 
bondholders or holders of other forms of securitised debt or any institution as defined 
in points (a) to (d); 
 (e) a person other than a natural person, including unincorporated firms and 
partnerships, provided that the other party is an institution as defined in points (a) to 
(d). 
(e) a financial institution (as defined in Article 4(5) of the 
Re-cast Credit Institutions Directive); 
(f) an insurance undertaking (as defined in Article 1(a) of 
Council Directive 92/49/EEC7 ); 
(g) an assurance undertaking (as defined in Article 1(1)(a) 
of Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 5 November 20028 ); 
(h) a management company (as defined in Article 1a(2) of 
Council Directive 85/611/EEC9 ); 
(i) an undertaking for collective investment in transferable 
securities (UCITS) as defined in Article 1(2) of Council 
Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 December 1985 on the 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to undertakings for collective in-
vestment in transferable securities (UCITS); 
(j) a central counterparty, settlement agent or clearing 
house, or any similar entity that is operating in the futures, 
options or derivatives markets in a way not covered by the 
Settlement Finality Directive, provided the entity is 
regulated under the law of the State or of another country; 
(k) a person (other than a natural person) who acts as a 
trustee, or in a representative capacity, on behalf of— 
(i) any one or more persons of whom at least one 
is a bondholder or the holder of any other form 
of securitised debt, or 
(ii) an authority, bank, institution or other entity 
referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (d); 
(l) any other person or group (other than a natural person), 
but only if the other party to the arrangement is an authority, 
bank, institution or other entity of a kind specified in any of 
paragraphs (a) to (k). 
   
(3) In paragraph (2)(j) “central counterparty”, “clearing house” and 
“settlement agent” have the respective meanings given by Article 2 of 
the Settlement Finality Directive. 
Irish-FCARs, they apply to any non-
natural person constituted under the 
laws of the United Kingdom or 
international law.  This is an 
exceptionally powerful extension of the 
law.  
Optional exclusion 
of scope 
Article 1(3)     The UK made use of this exemption 
whereas Ireland did not.  
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Member States may exclude from the scope of this Directive financial collateral 
arrangements where one of the parties is a person mentioned in paragraph 2(e).  
If they make use of this option Member States shall inform the Commission which 
shall inform the other Member States thereof. 
To what do the 
protections apply? 
Recital 13  
This Directive seeks to protect the validity of financial collateral arrangements which 
are based upon the transfer of the full ownership of the financial collateral, such as by 
eliminating the so-called re-characterisation of such financial collateral arrangements 
(including repurchase agreements) as security interests. 
Recital 14 
The enforceability of bilateral close-out netting should be protected, not only as an 
enforcement mechanism for title transfer financial collateral arrangements including 
repurchase agreements but more widely, where close-out netting forms part of a 
financial collateral arrangement. Sound risk management practices commonly used in 
the financial market should be protected by enabling participants to manage and reduce 
their credit exposures arising from all kinds of financial transactions on a net basis, 
where the credit exposure is calculated by combining the estimated current exposures 
under all outstanding transactions with a counterparty, setting off reciprocal items to 
produce a single aggregated amount that is compared with the current value of the 
collateral. 
Art. 1(4)(a)  
The financial collateral to be provided shall consist of cash, financial instruments or 
credit claims 
In definition of SFCA and TTCA.  Regulation 3(1)  
These Regulations apply to a financial collateral arrangement and to 
financial collateral only if the arrangement and collateral comply with 
this Regulation. 
 
Regulation 10 
Non-compliance with certain obligations can be subject of close-
out netting provision  
If an enforcement event occurs when an obligation referred to in 
Regulation 8(2) has not been complied with, the obligation can be the 
subject of a close-out netting provision. 
Regulation 12 
Recognition of close-out netting provisions 
(1) A close-out netting provision has effect in accordance with its terms 
irrespective of whether— 
(a) winding-up proceedings or reorganisation measures 
have been commenced, or are continuing, in relation to the 
collateral provider or collateral taker concerned, or 
(b) rights arising in respect of the relevant financial 
collateral purport to have been assigned or attached as a 
result of judicial or other process or any other disposition. 
(2) The operation of a close-out netting provision is subject to a 
requirement to do any of the things referred to in paragraphs (a) to (c) 
of Regulation 6(3), or to realise any collateral in any particular way, 
only if the relevant financial collateral arrangement so provides. 
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, Regulation 6(4) 
applies to the operation of a close-out netting provision. 
 The Irish-FCARs set a two stage test on 
what needs to be complied with in order 
for the protections to apply. Whilst 
similar concepts are included in the EU 
FCD does not have a rigid test in the 
same way as the Irish-FCARs.  
 UK-FCARs defines “security interest” 
as: “…means any legal or equitable 
interest or any right in security, other 
than a title transfer financial collateral 
arrangement, created or otherwise 
arising by way of security including—  
(a) a pledge;  
(b) a mortgage;  
(c) a fixed charge;   
(d)  a charge created as a 
floating charge where the 
financial collateral charged is 
delivered, transferred, held, 
registered or otherwise 
designated so as to be in the 
possession or under the 
control of the collateral-taker 
or a person acting on its 
behalf; any right of the 
collateral-provider to 
substitute financial collateral 
of the same or greater value 
or to collect the proceeds of 
credit claims until further 
notice or withdraw excess 
financial collateral shall not 
prevent the financial 
collateral being in the 
possession or under the 
control of the collateral-
taker; or   
(e) a lien;“ 
 
It is not clear whether the UK-FCAR’s 
draftsman indicated this to be any 
security interest governed by the laws of 
the jurisdictions of the UK and/or that 
applies to all comparable types of 
security interest regardless of which law 
they’re subject to.  
 
Exclusions of 
eligible financial 
collateral? Art. 1(4)(b)      
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Member States may exclude from the scope of this Directive financial collateral 
consisting of the collateral provider's own shares, shares in affiliated undertakings 
within the meaning of seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 on 
consolidated accounts (3), and shares in undertakings whose exclusive purpose is to 
own means of production that are essential for the collateral provider's business or to 
own real property. 
Art. 1(4)(c) 
Member States may exclude from the scope of this Directive credit claims where the 
debtor is a consumer as defined in Article 3(a) of Directive 2008/48/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for 
consumers (1) or a micro or small enterprise as defined in Article 1 and Article 2(2) 
and (3) of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 
concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (2), save where 
the collateral taker or the collateral provider of such credit claims is one of the 
institutions referred under Article 1(2)(b) of this Directive.  
Arrangements 
evidenced in writing 
 Recital 11 
Moreover, this Directive should protect only financial collateral arrangements which 
can be evidenced. Such evidence can be given in writing or in any other legally 
enforceable manner provided by the law which is applicable to the financial collateral 
arrangement. 
Article 1 (5) 
This Directive applies to financial collateral once it has been provided and if that 
provision can be evidenced in writing. The evidencing of the provision of financial 
collateral must allow for the identification of the financial collateral to which it applies. 
For this purpose, it is sufficient to prove that the book entry securities collateral has 
been credited to, or forms a credit in, the relevant account and that the cash collateral 
has been credited to, or forms a credit in, a designated account. For credit claims, the 
inclusion in a list of claims submitted in writing, or in a legally equivalent manner, to 
the collateral taker is sufficient to identify the credit claim and to evidence the 
provision of the claim provided as financial collateral between the parties.  
Without prejudice to the second subparagraph, Member States may provide that the 
inclusion in a list of claims submitted in writing, or in a legally equivalent manner, to 
the collateral taker is also sufficient to identify the credit claim and to evidence the 
provision of the claim provided as financial collateral against the debtor or third 
parties.  
This Directive applies to financial collateral arrangements if that arrangement can be 
evidenced in writing or in a legally equivalent manner. 
Art. 2(3) 
Concept included in definition of SFCA and TTCA. Regulation 2(4) 
A reference in these Regulations to writing includes a reference to any 
other method of recording information that is legally equivalent to 
writing, and in particular includes recording by electronic means 
(such as a computer) or in or by any other durable medium.  
 
Regulation 3(4) 
For these Regulations to apply to a financial collateral arrangement, 
there must be evidence in writing of the arrangement. 
 
Regulation 3(5) 
For these Regulations to apply to financial collateral, there must be 
evidence in writing of the provision of that collateral. The evidence 
must identify the financial collateral concerned. For that purpose, it is 
sufficient to prove— 
(a) in the case of book entry securities collateral, that that 
collateral has been credited to, or forms a credit in, the 
relevant account, and  
(b) in the case of cash collateral, that that collateral has been 
credited to, or forms part of, a designated account. 
Regulation 3(6) 
 Irish-FCAR Regulations follow 
conceptually the pre-requisites set in 
Articles 1(5) and 2 (3) EU-FCD  
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References in this Directive to ‘writing’ include recording by electronic means and any 
other durable medium. 
 
The inclusion of a credit claim in a list of claims submitted in writing 
to a collateral taker— 
(a) is sufficient to identify the credit claim and to evidence 
the provision of the claim as financial collateral between the 
parties, and 
(b) is also sufficient for those purposes against the debtor or 
third parties. 
 
Lex rei sitae rule 
applicable?  
Recital 8 
The lex rei sitae rule, according to which the applicable law for determining whether a 
financial collateral arrangement is properly perfected and therefore good against third 
parties is the law of the country where the financial collateral is located, is currently 
recognised by all Member States. Without affecting the application of this Directive to 
directly-held securities, the location of book entry securities provided as financial 
collateral and held through one or more intermediaries should be determined. If the 
collateral taker has a valid and effective collateral arrangement according to the 
governing law of the country in which the relevant account is maintained, then the 
validity against any competing title or interest and the enforceability of the collateral 
should be governed solely by the law of that country, thus preventing legal uncertainty 
as a result of other unforeseen legislation. 
Regulation 19 
19.—(1) This regulation applies to financial collateral arrangements 
where book entry securities collateral is used as collateral under the 
arrangement and are held through one or more intermediaries.  
(2) Any question relating to the matters specified in paragraph (4) of 
this regulation which arises in relation to book entry securities collateral 
which is provided under a financial collateral arrangement shall be 
governed by the domestic law of the country in which the relevant account 
is maintained.  
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (2) “domestic law” excludes any rule 
under which, in deciding the relevant question, reference should be made 
to the law of another country.  
(4) The matters referred to in paragraph (2) are—  
(a)the legal nature and proprietary effects of book entry securities 
collateral; 
(b)the requirements for perfecting a financial collateral arrangement 
relating to book entry securities collateral and the transfer or passing of 
control or possession of book entry securities collateral under such an 
arrangement; 
(c)the requirements for rendering a financial collateral arrangement which 
relates to book entry securities collateral effective against third parties; 
(d)whether a person’s title to or interest in such book entry securities 
collateral is overridden by or subordinated to a competing title or interest; 
and 
Regulation 18 
(1) Any question with respect to any of the matters specified in 
paragraph (2) arising in relation to book entry securities collateral is to 
be governed by the domestic law of the country in which the relevant 
account is maintained, irrespective of any law of that country that 
provides for the law of another country to be referred to in deciding the 
question. 
(2) The matters referred to in paragraph (1) are the following: 
(a) the legal nature and proprietary effects of the book entry 
securities collateral concerned; 
(b) the requirements for perfecting a financial collateral 
arrangement relating to that collateral and the provision of 
that collateral under such an arrangement and, more 
generally, the completion of steps necessary to render such 
an arrangement and provision effective against third parties; 
(c) whether a person’s title to, or interest in, that collateral 
is overridden by, or subordinated to, a competing title or 
interest; 
(d) whether a person has in good faith acquired title to, or 
an interest in, that collateral; 
(e) the steps required for the realisation of that collateral 
following the occurrence of an enforcement event. 
 All definitions follow the PRIMA 
approach.  
 Interestingly the Irish-FCARs follow 
conceptually the items sets out in 
Regulation 19(4) of the UK-FCARs.  
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(e)the steps required for the realisation of book entry securities collateral 
following the occurrence of any enforcement event. 
 
Perfection and 
formal requirements 
under national law Recital 9 
In order to limit the administrative burdens for parties using financial collateral under 
the scope of this Directive, the only perfection requirement regarding parties which 
national law may impose in respect of financial collateral should be that the financial 
collateral is under the control of the collateral taker or of a person acting on the 
collateral taker's behalf while not excluding collateral techniques where the collateral 
provider is allowed to substitute collateral or to withdraw excess collateral. This 
Directive should not prohibit Member States from requiring that a credit claim be 
delivered by means of inclusion in a list of claims. 
Recital 10 
For the same reasons, the creation, validity, perfection, enforceability or admissibility 
in evidence of a financial collateral arrangement, or the provision of financial collateral 
under a financial collateral arrangement, should not be made dependent on the 
performance of any formal act such as the execution of any document in a specific 
form or in a particular manner, the making of any filing with an official or public body 
or registration in a public register, advertisement in a newspaper or journal, in an 
official register or publication or in any other matter, notification to a public officer or 
the provision of evidence in a particular form as to the date of execution of a document 
or instrument, the amount of the relevant financial obligations or any other matter. This 
Directive must however provide a balance between market efficiency and the safety of 
the parties to the arrangement and third parties, thereby avoiding inter alia the risk of 
fraud. This balance should be achieved through the scope of this Directive covering 
only those financial collateral arrangements which provide for some form of 
dispossession, i.e. the provision of the financial collateral, and where the provision of 
the financial collateral can be evidenced in writing or in a durable medium, ensuring 
thereby the traceability of that collateral. For the purpose of this Directive, acts 
required under the law of a Member State as conditions for transferring or creating a 
security interest on financial instruments, other than book entry securities, such as 
endorsement in the case of instruments to order, or recording on the issuer's register in 
the case of registered instruments, should not be considered as formal acts. 
Arts. 3 and 4 [not set out here in the interests of space] 
Parts 2 and 3  
[not set out here in the interests of space] 
Regulations 4 to and including 6 as well as Part 5 
[not set out here in the interests of space] 
No divergences 
Right of use?  
Recital 19 
This Directive provides for a right of use in case of security financial collateral 
arrangements, which increases liquidity in the financial market stemming from such 
reuse of ‘pledged’ securities. This reuse however should be without prejudice to 
national legislation about separation of assets and unfair treatment of creditors. 
Art. 5  
Regulation 16 
Right of use under a security financial collateral arrangement 
16. (1) If a security financial collateral arrangement provides for the 
collateral-taker to use and dispose of any financial collateral provided under 
Regulation 8 
Right of collateral taker to use financial collateral if arrangement 
so provides 
8. (1) If and to the extent that the terms of a security financial collateral 
arrangement so provide, the collateral taker under the arrangement has 
No major conceptual divergences other than the 
fact that the very pragmatic (and welcome) drafting 
in UK-FCAR’s Regulation 18 and the duty to value 
the financial collateral is not reflected in the EU 
FCD or the Irish-FCARs.   
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Right of use of financial collateral under security financial collateral 
arrangements  
1. If and to the extent that the terms of a security financial collateral arrangement so 
provide, Member States shall ensure that the collateral taker is entitled to exercise a 
right of use in relation to financial collateral provided under the security financial 
collateral arrangement.  
2. Where a collateral taker exercises a right of use, he thereby incurs an obligation to 
transfer equivalent collateral to replace the original financial collateral at the latest on 
the due date for the performance of the relevant financial obligations covered by the 
security financial collateral arrangement. Alternatively, the collateral taker shall, on the 
due date for the performance of the relevant financial obligations, either transfer 
equivalent collateral, or, if and to the extent that the terms of a security financial 
collateral arrangement so provide, set off the value of the equivalent collateral against 
or apply it in discharge of the relevant financial obligations.  
3. The equivalent collateral transferred in discharge of an obligation as described in 
paragraph 2, first subparagraph, shall be subject to the same security financial collateral 
agreement to which the original financial collateral was subject and shall be treated as 
having been provided under the security financial collateral arrangement at the same 
time as the original financial collateral was first provided.  
4. Member States shall ensure that the use of financial collateral by the collateral taker 
according to this Article does not render invalid or unenforceable the rights of the 
collateral taker under the security financial collateral arrangement in relation to the 
financial collateral transferred by the collateral taker in discharge of an obligation as 
described in paragraph 2, first subparagraph.  
5. If an enforcement event occurs while an obligation as described in paragraph 2 first 
subparagraph remains outstanding, the obligation may be the subject of a close-out 
netting provision.  
6. This Article shall not apply to credit claims. 
 
the arrangement, as if it were the owner of it, the collateral-taker may do so 
in accordance with the terms of the arrangement.  
(2) If a collateral-taker exercises such a right of use, it is obliged to 
replace the original financial collateral by transferring equivalent financial 
collateral on or before the due date for the performance of the relevant 
financial obligations covered by the arrangement or, if the arrangement so 
provides, it may set off the value of the equivalent financial collateral 
against or apply it in discharge of the relevant financial obligations in 
accordance with the terms of the arrangement.  
(3) The equivalent financial collateral which is transferred in discharge 
of an obligation as described in paragraph (2), shall be subject to the same 
terms of the security financial collateral arrangement as the original 
financial collateral was subject to and shall be treated as having been 
provided under the security financial collateral arrangement at the same 
time as the original financial collateral was first provided.  
(4) If a collateral-taker has an outstanding obligation to replace the 
original financial collateral with equivalent financial collateral when an 
enforcement event occurs, that obligation may be the subject of a close-out 
netting provision.  
Regulation 17 
Appropriation of financial collateral under a security financial collateral 
arrangement 
17. (1)  Where a security interest is created or arises under a security 
financial collateral arrangement on terms that include a power for the 
collateral-taker to appropriate the financial collateral, the collateral-taker 
may exercise that power in accordance with the terms of the security 
financial collateral arrangement, without any order for foreclosure from the 
courts (and whether or not the remedy of foreclosure would be available).  
(2) Upon the exercise by the collateral-taker of the power to appropriate the 
financial collateral, the equity of redemption of the collateral-provider shall 
be extinguished and all legal and beneficial interest of the collateral-
provider in the financial collateral shall vest in the collateral taker. 
 
a right to use and dispose of financial collateral provided under the 
arrangement. 
(2) Subject to paragraph (3), a collateral taker under a security financial 
collateral arrangement who exercises such a right is required to transfer 
equivalent collateral to replace the original financial collateral not later 
than the due date for the performance of the relevant financial 
obligations covered by the arrangement. 
(3) Instead of complying with paragraph (2), the collateral taker may, 
on the due date for the performance of the relevant financial 
obligations, either— 
(a) transfer equivalent collateral, or 
(b) if and to the extent that the terms of the arrangement so 
provide, set off the value of the equivalent collateral against, 
or apply it in discharge of, the relevant financial obligations. 
(4) Equivalent collateral transferred in accordance with paragraph (2) 
or (3) is subject to the same security financial collateral agreement as 
that to which the original financial collateral was subject and is to be 
taken to have been provided under the security financial collateral 
arrangement at the same time as the original financial collateral was 
first provided. 
(5) This Regulation does not apply to credit claims. 
 
Regulation 9 
Use of financial collateral by collateral taker not to render rights of 
collateral taker invalid or unenforceable 
The use of financial collateral by a collateral taker in accordance with 
Regulation 8 does not render invalid or unenforceable the rights of the 
collateral taker under the security financial collateral arrangement 
concerned in relation to financial collateral transferred in discharge of 
an obligation referred to in paragraph (2) of that Regulation. 
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Regulation 18 
Duty to value collateral and account for any difference in value on 
appropriation 
18. (1) Where a collateral-taker exercises a power contained in a 
security financial collateral arrangement to appropriate the financial 
collateral the collateral-taker must value the financial collateral in 
accordance with the terms of the arrangement and in any event in a 
commercially reasonable manner.  
(2) Where a collateral-taker exercises such a power and the value of the 
financial collateral appropriated differs from the amount of the relevant 
financial obligations, then as the case may be, either—  
(a)the collateral-taker must account to the collateral-provider for the 
amount by which the value of the financial collateral exceeds the relevant 
financial obligations; or 
(b)the collateral-provider will remain liable to the collateral-taker for any 
amount whereby the value of the financial collateral is less than the 
relevant financial obligations. 
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Annex 2: Rules on Client Assets, Client Money and Safekeeping 
 
The following table sets out relevant rules and the assessment of their conceptual divergence or CTR (excluding rules on regulatory notifications to EU-level and national competent 
authorities) 
Where text is left blank, then no equivalent wording is available.  
Nr. EU Rules 
 
UK Rulesviii 
 
Irish Rules Conceptual divergence or CTR? 
 MiFIRix 
 MiFID IIx 
 Commission Delegated 
Regulationxi 
 Commission Delegated 
Directivexii 
CASS Sourcebook of FCA Handbookxiii 
 
 
 
 
 
(referred to herein as the CASS and which, as indicated below ought 
to be read in conjunction with UK transposition legislation of MiFID 
II and the Commission Delegated Directive as well as other parts of 
the FCA Handbook – see Endnotes) 
 
NB: an assessment of Chapters in the SUP and SYSC Sourcebooks of 
the FCA Handbook or relevant provisions from the PRA Rulebook 
are beyond the scope of this assessment and would not materially 
extend beyond the analysis in respect of the CASS Sourcebook.  
Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) 
Act 2013 (Section 48(1) (Investment Firms) 
Regulations 2017xiv 
 
 
 
(referred to herein as the IFR 2017 and which, as 
indicated below ought to be read in conjunction with Irish 
transposition legislation of MiFID II and the Commission 
Delegated Directive – the MiFID Regulations (body as 
well as Sch. 3 thereof) - see Endnotes).  
Investor Money Requirements Guidance 
2018, Central Bank of Irelandxv 
 
 
 
(referred to herein as the IMR Guidance) 
 
NB the text below regarding IMR Guidance excludes 
the therein referenced Appendices for reasons of space 
of this table, but these may nevertheless prove useful 
for practitioners, policymakers and other interested 
parties.  
Guidance on  Client Asset Regulations For 
Investment Firmsxvi 
 
 
 
(referred to herein as the CAR Guidance) 
 
Yes/No/ N/A 
  
General comment: 
 
A number of provisions of both the UK and Irish regime were permitted by the European Commission to be retained as they were considered to be “super-equivalent” to the provisions on Clients Assets and Safekeeping as required to be implemented in accordance with the provisions of MiFID II, MiFIR and the Commission Delegated 
Regulation as well as the Commission Delegated Directive and hence are retained in the national regimes of the UK and that of the Republic of Ireland. This, while of course beneficial in providing better protections than the minimum protections set at the EU level, does still contribute to conceptual divergences and CTR as analysed below.  
 
This is the case even where the UK rules are drafted in a more prescriptive manner when compared to the EU Rules and the Irish Rules where covering the same concepts and subject matter or equally more prescriptive in that the UK Rules go beyond a number of items that the EU Rules cover. The Irish Rules are also generally more 
prescriptive than the EU Rules when it relates to the same subject matter and in limited circumstances in the issues, which the EU Rules do not cover.   
 
1.   
Recital 12 MiFID II 
 
The purpose of this Directive is to cover 
undertakings the regular occupation of business 
of which is to provide investment services and/or 
perform investment activities on a professional 
basis. Its scope should therefore not cover any 
person with a different professional activity 
 
Recital 1 Commission Delegated Regulation 
 
Directive 2014/65/EU establishes the framework 
for a regulatory regime for financial markets in 
the Union, governing operating conditions 
relating to the performance by investment firms 
of investment services and, where appropriate, 
ancillary services and investment activities; 
organisational requirements for investment firms 
performing such services and activities, for 
regulated markets and data reporting services 
providers; reporting requirements in respect of 
transactions in financial instruments; position 
limits and position management controls in 
commodity derivatives; transparency 
requirements in respect of transactions in 
financial instruments. 
 
 
Recital 2 Commission Delegated Directive 
 
The protection of client financial instruments and 
funds is an important part of that regime, 
investment firms being subject to an obligation to 
make adequate arrangements to safeguard 
investor's ownership and rights in respect of 
securities and funds entrusted to an investment 
firm. Investment firms should have in place 
proper and specific arrangements to ensure the 
safeguarding of client financial instruments and 
funds. 
 
In addition to the obligations of CASS, relevant firms are 
required to comply in their conduct with 11 Principles set out in 
PRIN 2 of the FCA Handbook. These include:  
 
1. Integrity  A firm must conduct its business with 
integrity. 
2. Skill, care and 
diligence 
A firm must conduct its business with 
due skill, care and diligence. 
3. Management 
and control 
A firm must take reasonable care to 
organise and control its affairs 
responsibly and effectively, with 
adequate risk management systems 
4. Financial 
prudence 
A firm must maintain adequate 
financial resources. 
5. Market conduct A firm must observe proper standards 
of market conduct. 
 
6. Customers’ 
interests 
A firm must pay due regard to the 
interests of its customers and treat 
them fairly. 
7. Communications 
with clients 
A firm must pay due regard to the 
information needs of its clients, and 
communicate information to them in a 
way which is clear, fair and not 
misleading. 
8. Conflicts of 
interests 
A firm must manage conflicts of 
interest fairly, both between itself and 
its customers and between 
a customer and another client. 
9. Customers: 
relationships of 
trust 
A firm must take reasonable care to 
ensure the suitability of its advice and 
discretionary decisions for 
any customer who is entitled to rely 
upon its judgment. 
10. Clients’ assets A firm must arrange adequate 
protection for clients' assets when it is 
responsible for them. 
11. Relations with 
regulators 
A firm must deal with its regulators in 
an open and cooperative way, and 
must disclose to 
the FCA appropriately anything 
relating to the firm of which that 
Regulation 97 of the IFR 2017 revokes:  
 
(a) the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 
2013 (Section 48(1)) (Investment Firms) Regulations 
2017 [ S.I. No. 60 of 2017 ]xvii; 
 
(b) the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 
2013 (Section 48(1)) Investor Money Regulations 2015 
for Fund Service Providers [ S.I. No. 105 of 2015 ]xviii; 
and 
 
(c) the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 
2013 (Section 48(1)) Client Asset Regulations 2015 [ S.I. 
No. 104 of 2015 ]xix.  
 
Regulation 3 IFR 2017 
 
Scope and application 
 
3. Save where the context provides otherwise— 
 
(a) MiFID investment firms are subject to the 
requirements in Parts 2 and 6, 
 
(b) investment business firms who are not fund 
administrators are subject to the requirements in Parts 2, 3 
and 6, 
 
(c) fund administrators are subject to the requirements in 
Parts 2 to 5 and 7, 
 
(d) management companies authorised pursuant to the 
UCITS Regulations are subject to the requirements in 
Parts 6 and 7, 
 
(e) alternative investment fund managers authorised 
pursuant to the AIFM Regulations are subject to the 
requirements in Parts 6 and 7, 
 
(f) fund service providers are subject to the requirements 
in Part 7, and 
 
(g) market operators are subject to the requirements in 
Part 8. 
1. General Requirements IMR Guidance 
 
1.1  IMR Guidance 
 
Interpretation 
 
This Guidance relates to the Central Bank’s Investor 
Money Requirements which are set out in Part 7 of the 
Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 
(Section 48(1)) (Investment Firms) Regulations 2017) 
(the “Regulations”). Defined terms in the Regulations 
have the same meaning in this Guidance. 
 
1.2 IMR Guidance 
 
Examples of circumstances in which money is 
investor money  
 
(i) Cheques, electronic transfers and 
other payable orders  
 
Cheques and other payable orders 
received from investors will be 
investor money from the time of 
receipt of the cheque or other 
payable order by the fund service 
provider. Money sent to an investor 
by way of, cheque, electronic 
transfers or other payable order 
does not cease to be investor 
money until the cheque, electronic 
transfers or other payable order is 
presented and paid by the third 
party (as defined in Part 7).  
 
(ii) Interest  
 
If a fund service provider has 
agreed in writing to pay interest to 
Structure of the Guidance 
 
Guidance is only provided where it is considered it may 
assist in the interpretation of the Regulations; it is not 
provided for all the Regulations. The Guidance 
document should be read in a two page format with the 
relevant excerpted Regulations on the left hand side of 
the Guidance document and the related Guidance where 
warranted in the corresponding right hand side of the 
Guidance document. The Guidance is not 
comprehensive and does not replace or pre-empt any 
legislative provisions. 
 
The Regulations are set out under the following seven 
headings which the Central Bank regards as the seven 
core Client Asset Principles of a client asset regime. For 
ease of reference this Guidance document is also set out 
on the same basis, but for ease of interpretation, it is 
provided in a Q&A format:  
  
1. Segregation   
An investment firm should physically hold, or arrange 
for the holding of, client assets separate from the 
investment firm’s own assets and maintain accounting 
segregation between the investment firm’s own assets 
and client assets. For the avoidance of doubt this 
principle applies to client assets that may be held by a 
nominee.   
  
2. Designation and Registration   
An investment firm should ensure that client assets are 
clearly identified in its internal records and in the 
records of third parties.  The client assets must be 
identifiable and separate from the investment firm’s own 
assets.  
  
3. Reconciliation  
An investment firm should keep accurate books and 
records to enable it at any time and without delay to 
provide an accurate record of the client assets held by 
the investment firm for each client and the total held in 
the client asset account. An investment firm should 
conduct a reconciliation between its internal records and 
those external records of any third party with whom 
No in terms of aims, but Yes in terms of terminology and some jurisdiction-
specifics. 
 
Conceptual divergences include: 
 
 Much more encompassing scope and prescriptive of UK Rules in CASS in 
terms of who, what, how (but not where) when compared to EU and Irish 
Rules  
  
 IMR 2017 introduces a jurisdiction-specific concept through the definition 
of “fund administrator” which means an “investment business firm” which 
has been authorised by the Central bank of Ireland and appointed to 
provide administration services to investment funds. In this context: 
 
o “investment fund” means a UCITS or an AIF or a sub-fund of a 
UCITS or AIF i.e., all EU terminology;  
  
o MiFID investment firms are referred to as “investment 
business firm”, in reference to the Investment Intermediaries 
Act 1995, as amended, and which means a person authorised 
by the Central Bank of Ireland  pursuant to section 10 of the 
Investment Intermediaries Act 1995 but shall not include the 
following: 
 
 (a) a restricted activity investment product 
intermediary within the meaning of section 2(1) of 
the Investment Intermediaries Act 1995 ; 
 
 (b) an investment business firm authorised under 
the Investment Intermediaries Act 1995 who 
satisfies all of the following: 
 
 (i) its authorisation is limited to the 
provision of the investment business 
service specified in section 26(1)(a)(i) 
of the Investment Intermediaries Act 
1995 or the provision of investment 
advice in relation to that investment 
business service; 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 296  
 
 
  
 
  
regulator would reasonably expect 
notice. 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Application and general provisions 
 
1.1 Application and purpose  
 
Application  
1.1.1G  
CASS applies to a firm as specified in the remainder of this chapter.  
 
 
 
Regulation 4(2) IFR 2017 
 
(2) In addition to those obligations imposed on investment 
firms under the MiFID Regulations, an investment firm 
shall notify the Bank, in writing, as soon as it becomes 
aware of any of the following: 
 
(a) a breach by the investment firm of— 
 
(i) these Regulations, 
 
(ii) supervisory and regulatory requirements, and 
 
(iii) any other enactment or legal instrument which may 
reasonably be considered to be of prudential concern to 
the Bank or which may impact on the reputation or good 
standing of the investment firm; 
 
(b) any situation or event which impacts, or potentially 
impacts, on the investment firm to a significant extent; 
 
(c) the commencement of any legal proceedings by, or 
against, the investment firm; 
 
(d) the initiation of any criminal prosecution against— 
 
(i) the investment firm, or 
 
(ii) any officer or employee of the investment firm for 
offences relating to money laundering, terrorist financing, 
fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty or breach of trust; 
 
(e) a visit to the investment firm by— 
 
(i) any regulatory, professional, statutory or law 
enforcement authority or body operating in the State, or 
 
(ii) an authority in any other jurisdiction that performs a 
function similar to the functions performed by the Bank; 
 
(f) the imposition on the investment firm of any sanction, 
fine, penalty or other administrative measure by any of the 
authorities or bodies referred to in subparagraph (e). 
 
investors, such interest is investor 
money when the interest is paid 
into the third party collection 
account. Payment of accrued 
interest to investors prior to its 
receipt should not be paid from the 
third party collection account 
unless funded prior to distribution.  
 
1.3 IMR Guidance  
 
Examples of Another Money  
 
The below examples are not exhaustive. If in 
doubt, a fund service provider should be 
prudent in its approach and act in the best 
interest of the investors.  
 
(i) Investment Fund Asset  
 
If money held in a third party 
collection account is an asset of an 
Investment Fund, Part 7 of the 
Regulations does not apply.  
 
(ii) Money Payable to a fund service 
provider or to other party  
 
Money that is due and payable to a 
fund service provider itself, or to a 
third party, is other money where it 
is due and payable in accordance 
with the following provisions: 
 
a) the amount is in accordance with 
a formula or basis previously 
disclosed to the investor by the fund 
service provider; or  
 
b) a statement showing the amount 
of fees and commissions has issued 
to the investor and a number of 
working days, no less than 10, - (as 
determined by the fund service 
client assets are held as provided in Regulation 5(1) to 
5(3). In effect, in respect of client funds, an investment 
firm is reconciling its general internal client asset bank 
ledger to the external client asset bank record provided 
by a third party, e.g., in the form of a bank statement. An 
illustrative form of a bank reconciliation is included at 
Appendix II of this Guidance document; an investment 
firm should follow a similar format for its client 
financial instrument reconciliation. 
 
4. Daily Calculation  
Each working day an investment firm should ensure that 
the aggregate balance on its client asset bank accounts 
(client money resource) as at the close of business on the 
previous working day is equal to the amount it should be 
holding on behalf of its clients (client money 
requirement).  An illustrative example of a daily 
calculation is included at Appendix II this Guidance 
document.  
  
5. Client Disclosure and Client Consent   
An investment firm should provide information to its 
clients in a way that informs the client on how and 
where their client assets are held and the resulting risks 
thereof. An investment firm should also inform its retail 
clients, in the Client Assets Key Information Document 
(“CAKID”), of the circumstances in which the 
Regulations will apply and will not apply (refer to 
Regulation 7(19)).    
 
6. Risk Management  
An investment firm should ensure it applies systems and 
controls that are appropriate to identify risks in relation 
to client assets and should put in place mitigants to 
counteract these risks.  
  
7. Client Asset Examination   
An investment firm should engage an external auditor to 
report at least on an annual basis on the investment 
firm’s safeguarding of client assets.   
  
Throughout the Guidance, reference is made to certain 
reporting obligations to the Central Bank by the 
investment firm under the Regulations. Where possible, 
any obligation to report information in this regard should 
be completed by the investment firm using the Central 
Bank’s Online Reporting System (“ONR”). 
 (ii) its authorisation permits it to 
transmit orders to a person, or class 
of persons, not specified in section 
26(1A) of the Investment 
Intermediaries 1995; 
 
 (c) a person so authorised but only to carry out 
custodial operations involving the safekeeping 
and administration of investment instruments; 
 
 (d) a certified person within the meaning of 
section 55 of the Investment Intermediaries Act 
1995; 
 
 Conceptual differences but no major divergence exists in that MiFID 
II terminology use of “financial instruments and funds belonging to 
clients”, which is summarised as “client assets” becomes, as a result 
of transposition: 
 
o In the UK Rules: 
 “Client Assets” for financial instruments in 
MiFID II terminology; and  
 “Client Money” for funds in MIFID II 
terminology; 
 
o In the Irish Rules in the IMR 2017 and MiFID Regulations 
(incl. Sch. 3) 
 “client financial instruments”283  for 
financial instruments in MIFID II 
terminology;  
 “client funds”284 for funds in MIFID II 
terminology;   
 “client assets” means client funds  and 
client financial instruments; HOWEVER 
 
 Due to the introduction in the 
Irish Rules and the IMR 2017 of 
a jurisdiction “fund 
administrator” concept the 
IMR 2017 also has a concept of 
“investor money” which means 
any money, to which an 
investor is beneficially entitled, 
received from or on behalf of 
an investor or held by the fund 
service provider on behalf of 
an investor and includes 
(without limitation)-  
                                                     
 
283 Which is defined in Part 6 of the IMR 2017 in Regulation 47(1) as:  
 
“client financial instruments” means financial instruments as defined in Regulation 3(1) of the MiFID Regulations or investment instruments as defined in section 2(1) of the Investment Intermediaries Act 1995 , which is held by an investment firm on behalf of a client and includes, without limitation, any— 
 
(a) client financial instrument that is held with a nominee, and 
 
(b) claim relating to, or a right in or in respect of a financial instrument;” 
 
284 Which is defined in Part 6 of the IMR 2017 in Regulation 47(1) as:  
 
“client funds” means any money, to which a client is beneficially entitled, received from or on behalf of a client or held by the investment firm on behalf of a client and includes (without limitation)— 
 
(a) client funds held by or with a nominee, and 
 
(b) in the case of money that is comprised partly of client funds and partly of other money, that part of the money that is client funds, but does not include money that an investment firm— 
 
(i) receives from or on behalf of the client, or 
 
(ii) owes to or retains on behalf of the client 
 
and which relates exclusively to an activity of the investment firm which is not a regulated financial service;” 
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provider and recorded in its investor 
money management plan), - has 
elapsed, and the investor has not 
raised any queries; or c) the precise 
amount of fees or commissions has 
been agreed by the investor in 
writing, or has been finally 
determined by a court of competent 
jurisdiction.  
 
Examples of money, once known, 
which may be due to a third party 
include, but are not limited to, the 
following:  
 Commission;  
 Transaction Charges;  
 Performance Fees;  
 Management Fees; and  
 Contingent Deferred Sales 
Charges.  
 
(iii) Cheques  
 
A cheque or other payable order 
received from an investor is not 
honoured by the paying third party.  
 
(iv) Transferred Money  
 
Investor money paid ceases to be 
investor money where the money is 
paid or transferred, from the third 
party collection account to:  
 
a) bank account in the name of the 
investor (not being an account 
which is also in the name of the 
fund service provider);  
 
b) a third party upon the written 
instructions of the investor and is 
no longer under the control of the 
fund service provider. 
o Investor money 
held by or with a 
nominee of the 
fund service 
provider, 
o In the case of 
money that is 
comprised partly 
of investor money 
and partly of 
money of any 
other type, that 
part of the money 
that is investor 
money. 
  
 Part 6 and Regulation 47(1) 
define and use the following 
concepts which go beyond EU 
Rules (and are different or 
beyond UK Rules):  
o “collateral”285, 
which does not 
correspond to a 
concept in the EU 
Rules and is 
conceptually 
different to the 
UK’s CASS 3 
Chapter; and  
 
o a “collateral 
margined 
transaction”286 
which goes 
beyond the EU 
Rules and the UK 
Rules.  
 
o “margin”287 
 
 
o “other money”288 
[NB in the context 
of the IMR this is 
referred to in IMR 
1.3 as “Another 
Money”] 
 
 The seven core Client Asset Principles of CAR reinforce (even though 
see comments re application of CAR Guidance) the principles 
introduced in the IMR 2017 and the IMR Guidance. Conceptually they 
                                                     
 
285 Which is defined in Part 6 of the IMR 2017 in Regulation 47(1) as: 
 
 “collateral” means, with respect to a client— 
 
(i) client funds, or 
 
(ii) client financial instruments which has been paid for in full by the client, 
 
which are held by an investment firm as security for amounts which may be due to that investment firm by that client;” 
 
286 Which is defined in Part 6 of the IMR 2017 in Regulation 47(1) as:  
 
“collateral margined transaction” means a transaction effected by an investment firm with or for a client relating to a financial instrument under the terms of which the client will, or may, be liable to make a deposit of cash or collateral, either at the outset or subsequently, in order to secure performance of an obligation which the client may have to perform 
when the transaction falls to be completed or upon the earlier closing out of the client’s position with such financial instruments;” 
 
287 Which is defined in Part 6 of the IMR 2017 in Regulation 47(1) as: “margin” means funds or other forms of asset which a client deposits as security to open and maintain an investment position;” 
 
288 Which is defined in Part 6 of the IMR 2017 in Regulation 47(1) as: “other money” means any money which is not client funds;” 
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also follow the principles in the UK’s CASS rules in the spirit of FCA 
Principle 10 in a much-expanded form.  
2.  AS ABOVE IN ROW 1 AND: 
 
Recital 4 MiFID II 
 
The financial crisis has exposed weaknesses in 
the functioning and in the transparency of 
financial markets. The evolution of financial 
markets has exposed the need to strengthen the 
framework for the regulation of markets in 
financial instruments, including where trading in 
such markets takes place over-the-counter (OTC), 
in order to increase transparency, better protect 
investors, reinforce confidence, address 
unregulated areas, and ensure that supervisors are 
granted adequate powers to fulfil their tasks. 
 
Recital 51 MiFID II 
 
In order to protect an investor’s ownership and 
other similar rights in respect of securities and the 
investor’s rights in respect of funds entrusted to a 
firm, those rights should in particular be kept 
distinct from those of the firm. This principle 
should not, however, prevent a firm from doing 
business in its name but on behalf of the investor, 
where that is required by the very nature of the 
transaction and the investor is in agreement, for 
example stock lending. 
 
Recital 52 MiFID II 
 
The requirements concerning the protection of 
client assets are a crucial tool for the protection of 
clients in the provision of services and activities. 
Those requirements can be excluded when full 
ownership of funds and financial instrument is 
transferred to an investment firm to cover any 
present or future, actual or contingent or 
prospective obligations. That broad possibility 
may create uncertainty and jeopardise the 
effectiveness of the requirements concerning the 
safeguard of client assets. Thus, at least when 
retail client assets are involved, it is appropriate 
to limit the possibility of investment firms to 
conclude title transfer financial collateral 
arrangements as defined under Directive 
2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council (4), for the purpose of securing or 
otherwise covering their obligations. 
 
Purpose 
1.1.2G  
The purpose of this chapter is to set out to whom, for what activities, 
and within what territorial limits the rules, evidential provisions and 
guidance in CASS apply. 
 
AS ABOVE AS IN ROW 1 – save that for the 
jurisdiction-specific concept of “fund administrator” 
(whose requirements are set out in Parts 4 and 5 of the 
IMR 2017) and, specifically in relation to  “investor 
money” and the rules in Part 7 IMR 2017 in relation to 
Investor Money Requirements sets out in: 
 
Regulation 15 IMR 2017 
 
Client Assets 
 
15. A fund administrator shall not hold client assets or 
investor money without the prior written approval of the 
[Central] Bank of [Ireland]. 
 
 
 
 
  No in terms of aims, but Yes in terms of terminology and some jurisdiction-
specifics that exist in Ireland in particular:   
 
 Part 7 of the IMR 2017 as it applies to “fund service providers” which 
is much narrower than in the EU Rules, which looks at “investment 
firms” and in the UK where CASS 1.2.2. states “CASS applies to every 
firm” except certain exceptions – which is the broadest sense of 
application. 
  
 Part 7 of the IMR 2017 (Regulations 71 to and including 83) applies 
the requirements set in the IMR 2017 as it applies to client assets 
applies to investor money.  
 
3.   
Articles 1 and 2 MiFID II 
 
[Not replicated here for reasons of space as well 
as not being fully relevant for the purposes of the 
analysis in this row.] 
1.2 General application: who? what? 
 
General application: who? 
1.2.1G 
The rules in CASS 1.2 set out the maximum scope of this sourcebook. 
The application of CASS is modified for certain activities by 1 CASS 
1.4. Also particular chapters or sections of CASS may have provisions 
which limit their application. 
 
Scope and application  
3. Save where the context provides otherwise—  
(a) MiFID investment firms are subject to the 
requirements in Parts 2 and 6,  
(b) investment business firms who are not fund 
administrators are subject to the requirements in Parts 2, 3 
and 6,  
(c) fund administrators are subject to the requirements in 
Parts 2 to 5 and 7,  
(d) management companies authorised pursuant to the 
UCITS Regulations are subject to the requirements in 
Parts 6 and 7,  
(e) alternative investment fund managers authorised 
pursuant to the AIFM Regulations are subject to the 
requirements in Parts 6 and 7,  
(f) fund service providers are subject to the requirements 
in Part 7, and  
(g) market operators are subject to the requirements in 
Part 8. 
 To whom do the Client Asset Regulations apply?  
 
G1 (1) The Regulations issued in pursuant of Section 48 
of the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 
2013 apply to the following regulated entities holding 
client assets:   
 
a) investment firms authorised under Part 4 of MiFID;  
b) investment business firms authorised under Section 
10 of the IIA;  
c) UCITS management companies authorised under 
UCITS which is authorised  to conduct services pursuant 
to Regulation 16(2) of S.I. 352 of 2011;   
d) alternative investment fund managers authorised 
under AIFM which is authorised to conduct services 
pursuant to Regulation 7(4) of the S.I. No 257 of 2013;   
e) any of the above firms (a, b, c & d) in respect of 
passported activities carried out by the firms from a 
branch in another European Economic Area (“EEA”) 
country.   
 
The Regulations do not apply to an incoming EEA 
investment firm with respect to its passported activities 
in Ireland or any branch of an EEA investment firm 
operating in Ireland.  
  
G1 (2) In this Guidance:  
Generally conceptually equivalent across the relevant rules.  
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- an investment firm shall mean an investment firm, an 
investment business firm, an alternative investment fund 
manager or a UCITS management company as described 
in G (1) a), b), c) and d)  
- definitions in the Regulations have the same meaning 
in the Guidance. 
4.  Recital 12 MiFID II 
 
[See Row 1 for Text] 
 
Articles 1 and 2 MiFID II 
 
[Not replicated here for reasons of space as well 
as not being fully relevant for the purposes of the 
analysis in this row.] 
1.2.2R 
CASS applies to every firm, except as provided for in CASS 1.2.3 R, 
with respect to the carrying on of: 
 
(1) all regulated activities except to the extent that a provision of 
CASS provides for a narrower application; and 
(2) unregulated activities to the extent specified in any provision of 
CASS. 
 
   Same as above 
5.   
Articles 1 and 2 MiFID II 
 
[Not replicated here for reasons of space as well 
as not being fully relevant for the purposes of the 
analysis in this row.] 
1.2.3R 
CASS does not apply to: 
 
(1) an ICVC; or 
(2) an incoming EEA firm other than an insurer, with respect to its 
passported activities; or 
(3) a UCITS qualifier. 
 
   Same as above 
6.  Articles 1 and 2 MiFID II 
 
[Not replicated here for reasons of space as well 
as not being fully relevant for the purposes of the 
analysis in this row.] 
1.2.4R 
With the exception of this chapter and the insurance client money 
chapter, CASS does not apply to: 
 
(1) an authorised professional firm with respect to its non-mainstream 
regulated activities; or 
(2) the Society. 
 
   The UK specific exclusion mentioning these types of firms and their activity 
does not exist in the same form, although it is implied by way of use of 
definitions, in the EU drafting.  Ireland has no corresponding provisions to 
that of the UK’s drafting. 
7.  Articles 1 and 2 MiFID II 
 
[Not replicated here for reasons of space as well 
as not being fully relevant for the purposes of the 
analysis in this row.] 
1.2.5R 
The insurance client money chapter does not apply to an authorised 
professional firm with respect to its non-mainstream regulated 
activities, which are insurance distribution activities, if: 
 
(1) the firm's designated professional body has made rules which 
implement article 10.6 of the IDD; 
(2) those rules have been approved by the FCA under section 332(5) 
of the Act; and 
(3) the firm is subject to the rules in the form in which they were 
approved. 
CASS 1.2.5AG01/10/2018 
(1) In the client money chapter and the insurance client money 
chapter, an insurance undertaking acts as such when it carries on the 
business of effecting or carrying out contracts of insurance. 
(2) An insurance undertaking does not act as such when it enters into 
a reinsurance contract as a client of the reinsurer. 
 
   The UK specific exclusion mentioning these types of insurance firms and their 
activity does not exist in the same form, although it is implied by way of use of 
definitions, in the EU drafting.  Ireland has no corresponding provisions to 
that of the UK’s drafting. 
8.  Articles 1 and 2 MiFID II 
 
[Not replicated here for reasons of space as well 
as not being fully relevant for the purposes of the 
analysis in this row.] 
General application: what? 
1.2.7G 
(7) The debt management client money chapter applies to CASS debt 
management firms receiving or holding client money for, or on behalf 
of, a client in the course of or in connection with debt management 
activity. 
 
   The UK specific exclusion mentioning these types of debt management firms 
and their activity does not exist in the same form, although it is implied by 
way of use of definitions, in the EU drafting.  Ireland has no corresponding 
provisions to that of the UK’s drafting. 
9.  Articles 1 and 2 MiFID II 
 
[Not replicated here for reasons of space as well 
as not being fully relevant for the purposes of the 
analysis in this row.] 
Application for retail clients, professional clients and eligible 
counterparties 
1.2.8G 
(1) CASS applies directly in respect of activities conducted with or 
for all categories of clients. 
(3) The insurance client money chapter does not generally distinguish 
between different categories of client. However, the term consumer is 
used for those to whom additional obligations are owed, rather than 
the term retail client. This is to be consistent with the client categories 
used in the Insurance: New Conduct of Business sourcebook. 
(4) Each provision in the collateral rules, custody chapter, the client 
money chapter and CASS 9 (Information to clients) makes it clear 
whether it applies to activities carried on for retail clients, 
professional clients or both. 
(4A) There is no further modification of the rules in the chapters 
referred to in (4) for activities carried on for eligible counterparties. 
Such clients are treated in the same way as other professional clients 
for the purposes of these rules. 
(5) The debt management client money chapter generally applies in 
respect of relevant dealings with the client category known as 
customers. In general, the client categories of retail clients, 
professional clients, as well as eligible counterparties, have no 
   The UK’s rules are comparably more prescriptive in the treatment and 
categorisation of categories of clients. NB the jurisdiction-specifics  
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relevance to credit-related regulated activities, including debt 
management activities. 
 
10.  Articles 1 and 2 MiFID II 
 
[Not replicated here for reasons of space as well 
as not being fully relevant for the purposes of the 
analysis in this row.] 
Application for affiliates 
1.2.9AG 
(1) The fact that a firm's client is an affiliated company for MiFID 
business does not affect the operation of CASS to the firm in relation 
to that client. 
(2) For business that is not MiFID business, the operation of the 
custody chapter or the client money chapter may differ if a firm's 
client is an affiliated company and depending on certain other 
conditions (see, for example, CASS 6.1.10B R and CASS 7.10.26 R). 
 
   The UK’s rules are comparably more prescriptive in the treatment and 
categorisation of affiliates 
11.  Articles 1 and 2 MiFID II 
 
[Not replicated here for reasons of space as well 
as not being fully relevant for the purposes of the 
analysis in this row.] 
Investments and money held under different regimes 
1.2.11R 
(1) A firm must not keep money in respect of which any one of the 
following chapters applies in the same client bank account or client 
transaction account as money in respect of which another of the 
following chapters applies: 
(a) the client money chapter; 
(b) the insurance client money chapter; 
(c) the debt management client money chapter. 
(2) In accordance with CASS 7.10.36 R, a firm which is subject to the 
client money chapter and holds money both (i) in its capacity as a 
trustee firm and (ii) other than in its capacity as a trustee firm must 
not keep money held in its capacity as a trustee firm in the same client 
bank account or client transaction account as money held other than in 
its capacity as a trustee firm. 
(3) To the extent that the restriction under (1) or (2) applies to a firm, 
the client bank accounts and client transaction accounts that a firm 
holds in respect of different chapters or in its different capacities (as 
the case may be) must be separately designated. 
 
Regulation 49 IMR 2017 
 
Holding and depositing client funds 
 
49. (1) All money received from, or on behalf of, a client 
shall be held as client funds in accordance with this Part 
unless such money relates exclusively to an activity of the 
investment firm which is not a regulated financial service. 
 
(2) For the purposes of this Part, an investment firm is 
deemed to hold client funds where— 
 
(a) the funds have been deposited on behalf of a client of 
the investment firm to a third party client asset account 
with a third party or a relevant party in the name of the 
investment firm or of a nominee, and 
 
(b) the investment firm has the capacity to effect 
transactions on that third party client asset account. 
 
(3) Client funds received from, or on behalf of, a client 
shall be deposited into a third party client asset account 
without delay, and in any event not later than one working 
day after the receipt of such client funds. 
 
(4) Where an investment firm deposits client funds with a 
qualifying money market fund, the units in that qualifying 
money market fund shall be held in accordance with the 
requirements for holding and depositing client financial 
instruments. 
 
(5) Where an investment firm receives client funds from, 
or on behalf of, a client, the investment firm shall, as soon 
as practicable after receiving those client funds, send to 
the client a receipt in writing for those client funds, except 
where the client funds are received by electronic transfer 
or in settlement of a specific contract. 
 
(6) Where an investment firm receives from, or on behalf 
of, a client, money that is comprised of a mixture of client 
funds and other money, the investment firm shall first pay 
all of the client funds and other money into a third party 
client asset account and thereafter shall, without delay, 
transfer out of, or withdraw, from the third party client 
asset account the other money. 
 
(7) If an investment firm receives or identifies at any stage 
that it is holding money where— 
 
(a) it is not clear if that money is client funds, or 
 
(b) there is insufficient documentation to identify the 
client who owns such money, 
 
the investment firm shall, first pay the money into a third 
party client asset account and within 5 working days of 
the initial receipt of such money, or identifying that it is 
holding money where subparagraphs (a) or (b) apply, 
either identify the client concerned or return the money. 
 
(8) Where client funds are deposited with a third party the 
investment firm shall review the arrangements for the 
holding of client funds with that third party— 
 
(a) as against the criteria set out in paragraphs 3(3) and 
3(4) of Schedule 3 to the MiFID Regulations, 
3 IMR Guidance 
 
Holding and Depositing Investor Money 
 
(i) As part of the assessment provided 
for in Regulation 72(6), the Central 
Bank expects a fund service 
provider to take into account how 
investor rights would be affected in 
the event of the insolvency of the 
fund service provider, or the third 
party, or both.  
 
(ii) The Central Bank expects a fund 
service provider to clearly 
document in its investor money 
management plan the procedures it 
would follow to carry out the 
review required by Regulations 
72(6) and 72(7). 
What are client assets?  
 
G1 (3)  Client assets consist of client funds and client 
financial instruments/investment instruments. Use of the 
term client financial instrument in this guidance 
document will also mean investment instrument. 
 
G1 (4)  Client funds are defined in the Regulations and 
include funds owed to or held on behalf of clients 
including cash, cheques or other payable orders, current 
and deposit accounts including  margin collateral 
associated with client positions.  
  
Examples of circumstances in which assets are client 
assets  
 
G2 (1) Cheques and other payable orders will be client 
funds from the time of receipt of the cheque or other 
payable order by the investment firm except where G2 
(5) applies. Funds sent to a client by way of cheque or 
other payable order do not cease to be client funds until 
the cheque or other payable order is presented and paid 
by the eligible credit institution.  
  
G2 (2) If an investment firm has agreed in writing to pay 
interest to clients, such interest is client funds when the 
interest is paid.  Payment of accrued interest to clients 
prior to its receipt should not be paid from the client 
asset account unless previously funded by an investment 
firm.  
  
G2 (3) Where an investment firm receives margin3 in 
respect of margin transactions, such margin will be 
deemed to be client assets unless full ownership has 
been transferred (refer to G2 (4)).   
 
These examples are not exhaustive and if in doubt an 
investment firm should be prudent in its approach and 
act in the best interests of its clients.   
  
Examples of circumstances in which assets are not 
client assets  
 
G2 (4) Where a client transfers full ownership of client 
assets to an investment firm for the purpose of securing 
or otherwise covering present or future, actual or 
contingent or prospective obligations, such client assets 
should no longer be regarded as belonging to the client.   
  
Where an investment firm has received full title or full 
ownership to money under a collateral arrangement, the 
fact that it has also taken a security interest over its 
obligation to repay that money to the client would not 
result in the money being client funds.  But where an 
investment firm takes a charge or security interest over 
money held in a client asset account, that money would 
still be client funds as there would be no absolute 
transfer of title. 
 
When a client enters into an arrangement to transfer full 
ownership, the Central Bank would expect an 
investment firm to evidence that it has considered the 
appropriateness of such a transaction for each client and 
has clearly explained to the client the implications of this 
transaction(s), i.e., one of which is, these assets will not 
be regarded as client assets. An investment firm is 
o Broadly, all rules are conceptually similar save that the UK has jurisdiction 
specifics, as mentioned above regarding debt management firms and 
insurance firms.  
  
o NB the Irish specific concepts in terms of maintaining an Investor Money 
Management Plan (IMMP) and a Client Asset Management Plan (CAMP) 
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(b) if there is any material change to the relationship with 
the third party which affects the manner by which clients 
funds are held, and 
 
(c) in any event, at least on an annual basis. 
 
(9) An investment firm shall not hold client assets without 
the prior written approval of the Bank. 
 
Regulation 50 IMR 2017 
 
Holding and depositing client financial instruments 
 
50. (1) All financial instruments received from, or on 
behalf of, a client shall be held as client financial 
instruments in accordance with this Part. 
 
(2) For the purposes of this Part, an investment firm is 
deemed to hold client financial instruments where the 
investment firm— 
 
(a) has been entrusted by, or on account of, a client with 
those client financial instruments, and 
 
(b) either— 
 
(i) holds those client financial instruments, including by 
way of holding documents of title to them, or 
 
(ii) entrusts those client financial instruments to a 
nominee, 
 
and the investment firm has the capacity to effect 
transactions in respect of those client financial 
instruments. 
 
(3) An investment firm shall hold a client financial 
instrument in a place and a manner that, clearly and at all 
times, identifies it as a client financial instrument and 
distinguishes it from a financial instrument that the 
investment firm may hold that is not a client financial 
instrument. 
 
(4) An investment firm shall hold documents of title to 
client financial instruments— 
 
(a) itself, or 
 
(b) with a nominee company of an investment firm, or 
 
(c) with a relevant party in a safe custody account 
designated as a third party client asset account subject to 
the investment firm maintaining the capacity to effect 
transactions on the account in question. 
 
(5) An investment firm shall have procedures to record 
client financial instruments, including procedures to 
receive, hold and withdraw physical client financial 
instruments (including share certificates) and such 
procedures shall enable the effective monitoring of the 
movement of such client financial instruments. 
 
(6) Client financial instruments shall not be deposited by 
an investment firm with a third party otherwise than in a 
third party client asset account maintained by the 
investment firm at that third party. 
 
(7) Where client financial instruments are deposited with a 
third party, the investment firm shall review the 
arrangements for the holding of the client financial 
instruments with that third party— 
 
(a) as against the criteria set out in paragraph 2 of 
Schedule 3 to the MiFID Regulations, 
 
(b) if there is any material change to the relationship with 
the third party which affects the manner by which client 
instruments are held, and 
reminded of its obligation under Regulation 3(1): “an 
investment firm shall act honestly, fairly and 
professionally in accordance with the best interests of its 
clients”.  
  
G2 (5) An investment firm which receives a cheque, or 
other payable order made payable to a third party (e.g., a 
product producer), and which directly transmits that 
cheque or other payable order to that party.  
  
G2 (6) Funds that are due and payable to an investment 
firm itself, in accordance with the     following 
provisions:  
 the amount is in accordance with a formula 
or basis previously disclosed to the client 
by the investment firm; or  
 a number of working days as determined 
by the investment firm and recorded in its 
Client Asset Management Plan4 (“CAMP”) 
have elapsed since a statement showing 
the amount of fees and commissions 
issued to the client, and the client has not 
raised any queries. The Central Bank 
expects the investment firm to allow at 
least ten working  days to elapse; or  
 the precise amount of fees or commissions 
has been agreed by the client in writing, or 
has been finally determined by a court of 
competent jurisdiction.  
  
G2 (7) A cheque or other payable order received from a 
client is not honoured by the paying eligible credit 
institution.  
  
G2 (8) Client assets cease to be client assets where:  
 they are paid, or transferred, to the client 
whether directly or into an account with an  
eligible credit institution or relevant party 
in the name of the client (not being an 
account which is also in the name of the 
investment firm); or 
 where they are paid, or transferred, to a 
third party on the written instruction5 of 
the client and are no longer under the 
control of the investment firm.  In addition, 
acting in accordance with the terms of an 
investment management agreement or the 
completion of an order or application form 
will be considered to be a request from the 
client to pay the client assets to the 
relevant third party.  
  
These examples are not exhaustive and if in doubt an 
investment firm should be prudent in its approach and 
act in the best interests of its clients.  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 302  
 
 
  
 
  
 
(c) in any event, at least on an annual basis. 
12.   1.2.12G 
The purpose of the rules regarding the segregation of investments and 
money held under different regimes is to reduce the risk of confusion 
between assets held under different regimes either on an on-going 
basis or on the failure of a firm or a third party holding those assets. 
 
 2.1 IMR Guidance  
 
When is a fund service provider deemed to hold 
investor money  
 
(i) Subscriptions  
 
a) Money received prior to the cash 
transfer cut off time for the investment 
fund on the dealing date is considered 
investor money. On the cash transfer cut 
off time on the dealing date, this money 
should be transferred to the investment 
fund and entrusted to the depositary. 
Where money is received from an investor 
on/after the cut off time on the dealing 
date, this money should not be held in a 
collection account. This money is not 
investor money and should be dealt with in 
accordance with the legal arrangement 
between the fund service provider and the 
investment fund.  
 
b) If circumstances arise where an 
investment fund is investing money as an 
‘investor’ into another investment fund and 
lodges this money into a third party 
collection account held by a fund service 
provider, the investing fund will fall under 
the definition of ‘investor’ under the 
Regulations.  
 
(ii) Redemption proceeds / Dividends  
 
A fund service provider will be deemed to hold investor 
money when money is received by the fund service 
provider from an Investment Fund and is deposited into 
a third party collection account for onward transmission 
to the investor. This would apply in the case of a 
redemption of the investment fund or where an 
investment fund pays a dividend.  
 
2.2 IMR Guidance 
 
How a fund service provider should hold investor 
money  
 
(i) Investor money denominated in another 
currency The Central Bank expects a fund 
service provider to receive money into a 
third party collection account from the 
investor in the currency of the transaction 
as instructed by the investor or in the base 
currency of the investment fund. Where 
the fund service provider has no third party 
collection account denominated in that 
currency and it would be unduly 
burdensome for it to open such an account, 
the fund service provider may convert 
investor money on receipt and hold it in a 
third party collection account in a different 
currency. 
 
(ii) Mixed Remittances Examples of mixed 
remittances include but are not limited to 
the following:  
 Commission;  
 Transaction Charges;  
 Performance Fees;  
 Management Fees; and  
 Contingent Deferred Sales Charges.  
How should an investment firm deal with money 
received for investment in an activity that is not a 
regulated financial service?  
 
G2 (9) Money received by an investment firm for 
investment in an activity that is not a regulated financial 
service6 should not be deposited in a client asset 
account; this money should be held in a segregated 
account.  If an investment firm chooses to operate a 
client asset type regime for its non regulated business, 
the Central Bank does not have an objection.  However, 
it is critical the investment firm clearly explains to its 
clients that such assets:  
 
a)  are held separately from client assets;  
b)  will not be protected as client assets; and  
c)  will not be covered under the Investor Compensation 
Scheme.   
 
o Generally the rules follow the same concepts across the jurisdictions save 
that the UK and Ireland both also have jurisdiction-specific rules that 
apply to funds and their treatment in respect of various investor 
compensation schemes’ rules (the principles of which derive from EU 
legislative reforms in EC Directive 1997/9 which stalled due to reforms 
that led to DGSD 3 and the Banking Union)289.   
 
o The IMR Guidance is considerably more prescriptive, even if its rules are 
specific to the jurisdiction-limited concept of “fund service provider” and 
how it engages with or otherwise accounts for money flows.  
                                                     
 
289 For a further discussion of this development (incl. the table on Page 598 and 599 of comparative existing deposit and investor protection schemes versus EDIS) see Huertas in EDIS – The Third Pillar of the EU’s Banking Union: Big, Bold but can it be beautiful” first published in 2016, Vol. 31, Issue 11, Journal of International Banking Law & 
Regulation.  
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a) As part of the process provided for in 
Regulation 72(5), when addressing 
instances of mixed remittances in the 
investor money management plan (i.e. the 
steps a fund service provider would follow 
in assessing how to deal with the receipt of 
investor money in this manner), 
consideration of other 
regulations/legislation should be taken into 
account, e.g. anti-money laundering 
obligations. A fund service provider should 
consider adopting cut-off time limits for 
the collection of the missing investor 
documents. The timeframe adopted should 
be reflective of the level of importance of 
documents omitted by the investor, 
ensuring the adoption of such timeframes 
will not result in the fund service provider 
breaching any other regulations/legislation; 
a fund service provider should seek legal 
advice if it is in any doubt such assessment 
should be made without delay, but in any 
event, a fund service provider should 
ensure it takes action in order to act in 
accordance with Regulation 72(5). A fund 
service provider should have clear 
procedures in place to ensure that the 
unallocated money is monitored and 
reconciled each working day. All such 
investor money should be included in the 
fund service provider’s daily reconciliation 
and daily calculation.  
 
b) If an investor pays investor money into 
an incorrect bank account in error (e.g., the 
fund service provider’s own firm bank 
account), the fund service provider should 
transfer that investor’s money into a third 
party collection account without delay but 
in any event no later than one working day 
in accordance with Regulation 72 (3) of 
the Regulations. A fund service provider 
should not ignore such an occurrence and, 
if such an exception occurs, the fund 
service provider should:  
 
A. investigate as to why an 
investor’s money was 
deposited into the incorrect 
bank account;  
 
B. put in place a procedure to 
prevent such an event from 
reoccurring; and 
 
C. reflect this procedure in the 
fund service provider’s 
investor money management 
plan. 
13.   1.2.13G 
A firm may, where permitted by the relevant rules opt to hold under a 
single chapter money that would otherwise be held under different 
chapters (see CASS 7.10.3 R and CASS 7.10.30 R). However, making 
such an election does not remove the requirement under CASS 
1.2.11R (1). 
 
   While conceptually this is implied in jurisdiction-specific legislation the UK’s 
drafting is much more explicit. 
14.   1.3 General application: where? 
 
1.3.1G 
The rules in CASS 1.3 set out the maximum territorial scope of this 
sourcebook. Particular rules may have express territorial limitations. 
 
   While conceptually implied in other jurisdiction-specific legislation the UK’s 
drafting is much more explicit.  
15.   UK establishments: general 
1.3.2R 
Except as provided for in CASS 1.2.3 R (2), CASS applies to every 
firm, in relation to regulated activities carried on by it from an 
establishment in the United Kingdom. 
 
   While conceptually implied in other jurisdiction-specific legislation the UK’s 
drafting is much more explicit. 
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16.   UK firms: passported activities from EEA branches 
1.3.3R 
CASS applies to every UK firm, other than an insurer, in relation to 
passported activities carried on by it from a branch in another EEA 
State. 
 
   While conceptually implied in other jurisdiction-specific legislation the UK’s 
drafting is much more explicit. 
17.   1.3.4R 
CASS does not apply to an incoming ECA provider acting as such. 
 
   No equivalent in other jurisdictions. 
18.   1.4 Application: particular activities 
 
Occupational pension scheme firms (OPS firms) 
1.4.1R 
In the case of OPS activity undertaken by an OPS firm, CASS applies 
with the following general modifications: 
 
(1) references to customer are to the OPS or welfare trust, whichever 
fits the case, in respect of which the OPS firm is acting or intends to 
act, and with or for the benefit of which the relevant activity is to be 
carried on; and 
(2) if an OPS firm is required by any rule in CASS to provide 
information to, or obtain consent from, a customer, that firm must 
ensure that the information is provided to, or consent obtained from, 
each of the trustees of the OPS or welfare trust in respect of which 
that firm is acting, unless the context requires otherwise. 
 
   No equivalent in other jurisdictions. 
19.   Stock lending activity with or for clients 
1.4.2G 
(1) The custody chapter and the client money chapter apply in respect 
of any stock lending activity that is undertaken with or for a client by 
a firm. 
(2) The collateral rules apply, where relevant, in respect of stock 
lending activity. 
 
   No substantial equivalent in other jurisdictions – despite some references in 
Ireland to securities financing transactions – which ties into SFTR and goes 
beyond the UK-specific use (incorrectly of the EU term) of “stock lending” in 
this context. 
20.   Corporate finance business 
1.4.3G 
(1) The custody chapter and the client money chapter apply in respect 
of corporate finance business that is undertaken by a firm. 
(2) The collateral rules apply, where relevant, in respect of corporate 
finance business. 
 
   No equivalent in other jurisdictions. 
21.   Oil market activity and energy market activity 
1.4.4G 
(1) The custody chapter and the client money chapter apply in respect 
of oil market activity and other energy market activity that is 
undertaken by a firm. 
(2) The collateral rules apply, where relevant, in respect of energy 
market activity. 
 
   No equivalent in other jurisdictions. 
22.   Appointed representatives and tied agents 
1.4.5G 
(1) Although CASS does not apply directly to a firm's appointed 
representatives, a firm will always be responsible for the acts and 
omissions of its appointed representatives in carrying on business for 
which the firm has accepted responsibility (section 39(3) of the Act). 
In determining whether a firm has complied with any provision of 
CASS, anything done or omitted by a firm's appointed representative 
(when acting as such) will be treated as having been done or omitted 
by the firm (section 39(4) of the Act). Equally, CASS does not apply 
directly to tied agents. A MiFID investment firm will be fully and 
unconditionally responsible for the acts and omission of the tied 
agents that it appoints. 
(2) Firms should also refer to SUP 12 (Appointed representatives), 
which sets out requirements which apply to firms using appointed 
representatives and tied agents. 
 
   No equivalent in other jurisdictions. 
23.  Articles 1 and 2 MiFID II 
 
[Not replicated here for reasons of space as well 
as not being fully relevant for the purposes of the 
analysis in this row.] 
Depositaries 
1.4.6R 
The client money chapter does not apply to a depositary when acting 
as such. 
 
   The UK rules differ in terms of concept by explicitly stating that depositories, 
which at the EU level are introduced as a regulatory concept by the AIFMD/R 
Regime (which came into force in 2011 thus well after the EU FCD), are 
outside the scope of the EU FCD, and thus also considered separately by the 
Irish rules.  
24.  Articles 1 and 2 MiFID II 
 
[Not replicated here for reasons of space as well 
as not being fully relevant for the purposes of the 
analysis in this row.] 
1.4.6AG 
Firms acting as trustee or depositary of an AIF are reminded of the 
obligations in FUND 3.11 (Depositaries) and Chapter IV (Depositary) 
of the AIFMD level 2 regulation which apply in addition to those in 
CASS. 
 
   As in Row 23. 
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25.  Articles 1 and 2 MiFID II 
 
[Not replicated here for reasons of space as well 
as not being fully relevant for the purposes of the 
analysis in this row.] 
1.4.6BG 
Firms acting as trustee or depositary of a UCITS are reminded of the 
obligations in COLL 6.6B (UCITS depositaries) and in the UCITS 
level 2 regulation, which apply in addition to those in CASS. 
 
   As in Row 23. 
26.  Articles 1 and 2 MiFID II 
 
[Not replicated here for reasons of space as well 
as not being fully relevant for the purposes of the 
analysis in this row.] 
1.4.7R 
Subject to CASS 1.4.6 R, CASS applies to a depositary, when acting 
as such, with the following general modifications: 'client' means 
'trustee', 'trust', 'AIF', 'AIFM acting on behalf of the AIF', ‘UCITS 
scheme’, ‘authorised fund manager acting on behalf of the UCITS 
scheme’, or 'collective investment scheme', as appropriate. 
 
   As in Row 23. 
27.   1.4.8AR 
(1) The application of CASS for a trustee firm acting as a depositary 
is set out in CASS 1.4.6 R and CASS 1.4.7 R. 
(2) The application of CASS for a trustee firm that is not acting as a 
depositary is limited as follows: 
(a) the mandate rules apply; 
(b) for MiFID business, the custody chapter and the client money 
chapter apply; and 
(c) for business that is not MiFID business, the custody chapter and 
the client money chapter apply only to trustee firms acting as trustees 
of personal pension schemes or stakeholder pension schemes, 
including SIPPs. 
(3) To the extent that CASS applies to a trustee firm, it applies with 
the following general modification: 'client' means 'relevant trustee', 
'trust', or 'beneficiary', as appropriate. 
 
   As in Row 23. 
28.   Auction regulation bidding 
Debt management activities 
1.4.15G 
(1) The debt management client money chapter applies to CASS debt 
management firms receiving or holding client money. 
(2) The mandate rules apply, where relevant, to CASS debt 
management firms carrying on debt management activity. 
 
   No conceptual equivalent in other jurisdictions. 
29.   1.5 Application: electronic media and E-Commerce 
 
Application to electronic media 
1.5.1G 
GEN 2.2.14 R (References to writing) has the effect that electronic 
media may be used to make communications that are required by the 
Handbook to be "in writing" unless a contrary intention appears. 
 
   No explicit conceptual equivalent in other jurisdictions, which is otherwise 
implied (but not for same subject matter) generally for communications, as set 
out in MiFID II/MiFIR or in Ireland in the IMR 2017 as MiFID Regulations.  
30.   1.5.2G 
For any electronic communication with a customer, a firm should: 
 
(1) have in place appropriate arrangements, including contingency 
plans, to ensure the secure transmission and receipt of the 
communication; it should also be able to verify the authenticity and 
integrity of the communication; the arrangements should be 
proportionate and take into account the different levels of risk in a 
firm's business; 
(2) be able to demonstrate that the customer wishes to communicate 
using this form of media; and 
(3) if entering into an agreement, make it clear to the customer that a 
contractual relationship is created that has legal consequences. 
 
   No conceptual equivalent in other jurisdictions. 
31.   1.5.3G 
Firms should note that GEN 2.2.14 R does not affect any other legal 
requirement that may apply in relation to the form or manner of 
executing a document or agreement. 
 
   No conceptual equivalent in other jurisdictions. 
32.   CHAPTER 1A 
CASS firm classification and operational oversight 
 
1A.1 Application 
 
1A.1.1R 
(1) Subject to (2), (3) and (4), this chapter applies to a firm to which 
either or both of CASS 6 (Custody rules) and CASS 7 (Client money 
rules) applies. 
(2) In relation to a firm to which CASS 5 (Client money: insurance 
distribution activity) and CASS 7 (Client money rules) apply, this 
chapter does not apply in relation to client money that a firm holds in 
accordance with CASS 5. 
(3) The rules and guidance in CASS 1A.2 apply to a firm even if at 
the date of the determination or, as the case may be, the notification, 
   No conceptual equivalent in other jurisdictions. Other jurisdictions do not 
require a similar type of classification as in the UK.  
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either or both of CASS 6 and CASS 7 do not apply to it, provided 
that: 
(a) either or both of those chapters applied to it during part or all of 
the previous calendar year; or 
(b) it projects that either or both will apply to it in the current calendar 
year. 
(4) This chapter does not apply to a firm to which only CASS 6 
applies, applied or is projected to apply, merely because: 
(a) it is, was, or is projected to be a firm which arranges safeguarding 
and administration of assets; or 
(b) when acting as a small AIFM and in relation to excluded custody 
activities, it would be, would have been or would be projected to be a 
firm which arranges safeguarding and administration of assets but for 
the exclusion in article 72AA of the RAO. 
 
33.   1A.1.2R 
The rules and guidance in CASS 1A.2 (CASS firm classification) do 
not apply to a firm following its failure. 
 
   Same as in Row 32. 
34.   1A.2 CASS firm classification 
 
1A.2.1G 
The application of certain rules in this chapter depends upon the 
‘CASS firm type’ within which a firm falls. The ‘CASS firm types’ 
are defined in accordance with CASS 1A.2.7 R. The ‘CASS firm 
type’ within which a firm falls is also used to determine whether it is 
required to have the CASS operational oversight function described in 
CASS 1A.3.1A R and whether the reporting obligations in SUP 16.14 
(Client money and asset return) apply to it. 
 
   Same as in Row 32. 
35.   1A.2.2R 
(1) A firm must once every year, and by the time it is required to 
make a notification in accordance with CASS 1A.2.9R (4), determine 
whether it is a CASS large firm, CASS medium firm or a CASS small 
firm according to the amount of client money or safe custody assets 
which it holds, using the limits set out in the table in CASS 1A.2.7 R. 
(2) For the purpose of determining its ‘CASS firm type’ in accordance 
with CASS 1A.2.7 R, a firm must: 
(a) if it currently holds client money or safe custody assets, calculate 
the higher of the highest total amount of client money and the highest 
total value of safe custody assets held during the previous calendar 
year ending on 31 December and use that figure to determine its 
‘CASS firm type’; 
(b) if it did not hold client money or safe custody assets in the 
previous calendar year but projects that it will do so in the current 
calendar year, calculate the higher of the highest total amount of client 
money and the highest total value of safe custody assets that it 
projects that it will hold during that year and use that figure to 
determine its ‘CASS firm type’; but 
(c) in either case, exclude from its calculation any client money held 
in accordance with CASS 5 (Client money: insurance distribution 
activity) or CASS 13 (Claims management: client money). 
 
   Same as in Row 32. 
36.   CASS 1A.2.3R 
For the purpose of calculating the value of the total amounts of client 
money and safe custody assets that it holds on any given day during a 
calendar year a firm must: 
(1) in complying with CASS 1A.2.2R (2)(a), base its calculation upon 
internal reconciliations performed during the previous year; 
(2) in relation to client money or safe custody assets denominated in a 
currency other than sterling, translate the value of that money or that 
safe custody assets into sterling at the previous day’s closing spot 
exchange rate; and 
(3) in relation to safe custody assets only, calculate their total value 
using the previous day’s closing mark to market valuation, or if in 
relation to a particular safe custody asset none is available, the most 
recent available valuation. 
 
Regulation 48(5) IMR 2017 
 
(5) Without prejudice to Regulations 48(3), 49(6) and 
49(7), an investment firm is not required to pay into a 
third party client asset account such client assets that it 
receives on behalf of a client where to do so would result 
in the investment firm breaching any law or order of any 
court of competent jurisdiction. 
 
Regulation 48(6) IMR 2017 
 
(6) Where, in accordance with an instruction from a client, 
a client asset is transferred to a third party, the investment 
firm shall ensure that such transfer is overseen and 
approved, prior to or at the time of transfer, by a relevant 
person other than the relevant person who is conducting 
the transfer. 
 
Regulation 57 IMR 2017 
 
57. (1) In relation to third party client asset accounts, other 
than fixed term deposit accounts, which hold client funds, 
an investment firm shall reconcile daily, the balance of all 
client funds held, as recorded by the investment firm with 
the balance of all client funds deposited, as recorded by 
the third party as set out in a statement or other form of 
Regulation 2.2  
How a fund service provider should hold investor 
money  
 
(i) Investor money denominated in another currency 
The Central Bank expects a fund service provider to 
receive money into a third party collection account 
from the investor in the currency of the transaction as 
instructed by the investor or in the base currency of the 
investment fund. Where the fund service provider has 
no third party collection account denominated in that 
currency and it would be unduly burdensome for it to 
open such an account, the fund service provider may 
convert investor money on receipt and hold it in a third 
party collection account in a different currency. 
 
(ii) Mixed Remittances Examples of mixed remittances 
include but are not limited to the following:  
Commission  Transaction Charges;  Performance 
Fees;  Management Fees; and  Contingent Deferred 
Sales Charges.  
 
a) As part of the process provided for in Regulation 
72(5), when addressing instances of mixed remittances 
in the investor money management plan (i.e. the steps a 
fund service provider would follow in assessing how to 
Client assets shall only be used in accordance with 
client instructions  
 
G3 (3) An instruction from the client, for example, may 
take the form of what has been agreed in a signed terms 
of business/client documentation or recorded telephone 
line. Instructions are not required where client assets are 
passed for settlement within CREST or other settlement 
systems or for such transactions as mandatory corporate 
events.   
 
 
 
What must an investment firm reconcile?  
 
G5 (1)  In order to carry out the reconciliations an 
investment firm should, where applicable, reconcile:  
 
(a) the balance on each client asset bank account as 
recorded by the investment firm with the balance on that 
account as set out in the statement or other form of 
confirmation or similar document issued by the relevant 
third party with which those client asset accounts are 
held currency by currency. Dormant accounts should 
also be included;  
Largely conceptually equivalent – NB some of the Irish rules, would need 
amending to reflect the Brexit driven changes to dealing in assets. Moreover, 
the Irish rules are quite prescriptive on expectations concerning 
reconciliations.  
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confirmation from the third party and such reconciliation 
shall be carried out by the end of the working day 
immediately following the working day to which the 
reconciliation relates. 
 
(2) In relation to third party client asset accounts which 
hold fixed term deposits, an investment firm shall 
reconcile, at least monthly, the balance of all client funds 
deposited, as recorded by the investment firm with the 
balance of all client funds held, as recorded by the third 
party as set out in a statement or other form of 
confirmation from the third party and such a reconciliation 
shall be carried out within 3 working days of the date to 
which the reconciliation relates. 
 
(3) In relation to third party client asset accounts which 
hold client financial instruments, an investment firm shall 
reconcile, at least monthly, the balance of client financial 
instruments held, as recorded by the investment firm, with 
the balance of all client financial instruments held, as 
recorded by the third party as set out in a statement or 
other form of confirmation from the third party, and such 
a reconciliation shall be carried out within 10 working 
days of the date to which the reconciliation relates. 
 
(4) An investment firm shall ensure that the quantity and 
type of client financial instruments held by the investment 
firm or nominee, are the same quantity and type as those 
which the investment firm should be holding on behalf of 
the clients. 
 
(5) Each reconciliation shall be carried out by a relevant 
person who is independent of the production and 
maintenance of the records used for the purpose of 
carrying out the reconciliation. 
 
(6) Each reconciliation shall be reviewed by a relevant 
person who is independent of the person who carried out 
the reconciliation and of the person who produced and 
maintained the records used for the purpose of carrying 
out the reconciliation. 
 
(7) An investment firm shall— 
 
(a) ensure that the reconciliations required pursuant to 
Regulations 57(1), 57(2) and 57(3) are performed using 
client asset records that are accurate and the reconciliation 
itself is performed accurately, 
 
(b) investigate within one working day the cause of any 
reconciliation difference in the reconciliation required 
pursuant to Regulations 57(1), 57(2) and 57(3), 
 
(c) identify the cause of any reconciliation difference 
identified in Regulation 57(7)(b) within 5 working days, 
and 
 
(d) resolve any reconciliation difference identified in 
Regulation 57(7)(b) as soon as practicable. 
 
Regulation 58 IMR 2017 
 
Daily calculation 
 
58. (1) An investment firm shall, each working day, 
ensure that the client funds resource as at the close of 
business on the previous working day is equal to the client 
funds requirement. 
 
(2) For the purposes of Regulation 58(1), an investment 
firm shall use values in its own accounting records which 
may have been reconciled with statements from a third 
party rather than values contained in statements received 
from a third party. 
 
(3) In the event of a shortfall of client funds, an 
investment firm shall deposit into a third party client asset 
account, without delay and in any event within one 
working day from the date to which the calculation 
deal with the receipt of investor money in this manner), 
consideration of other regulations/legislation should be 
taken into account, e.g. anti-money laundering 
obligations. A fund service provider should consider 
adopting cut-off time limits for the collection of the 
missing investor documents. The timeframe adopted 
should be reflective of the level of importance of 
documents omitted by the investor, ensuring the 
adoption of such timeframes will not result in the fund 
service provider breaching any other 
regulations/legislation; a fund service provider should 
seek legal advice if it is in any doubt such assessment 
should be made without delay, but in any event, a fund 
service provider should ensure it takes action in order 
to act in accordance with Regulation 72(5). A fund 
service provider should have clear procedures in place 
to ensure that the unallocated money is monitored and 
reconciled each working day. All such investor money 
should be included in the fund service provider’s daily 
reconciliation and daily calculation.  
 
b) If an investor pays investor money into an incorrect 
bank account in error (e.g., the fund service provider’s 
own firm bank account), the fund service provider 
should transfer that investor’s money into a third party 
collection account without delay but in any event no 
later than one working day in accordance with 
Regulation 72 (3) of the Regulations. A fund service 
provider should not ignore such an occurrence and, if 
such an exception occurs, the fund service provider 
should: A. investigate as to why an investor’s money 
was deposited into the incorrect bank account; B. put in 
place a procedure to prevent such an event from 
reoccurring; and IMR Guidance Central Bank of 
Ireland Page 7 C. reflect this procedure in the fund 
service provider’s investor money management plan. 
 
8 IMR Guidance  
 
Daily Calculation 
 
An illustrative example of a daily calculation is 
included at Appendix II of [the IMR] Guidance.  
 
8.1 The investor money requirement for a fund 
service provider  
 
(i) For any third party collection account held 
by a fund service provider, the investor 
money requirement includes: 
 
 
a) cash which is received from 
investors for pending 
subscriptions prior to the cash 
transfer cut-off time on the 
dealing date of the investment 
fund(s); or  
 
b) cash received from the 
investment fund(s) as a result 
of, for example, redemptions / 
dividends that have yet to be 
paid to the investors of the 
investment fund(s); or  
 
c) cash rebates, distributions 
or any other investor related 
payments.  
 
(ii) These examples are not exhaustive. If in 
doubt, a fund service provider should be 
prudent in its approach and act in the best 
interests of the investors.  
 
(iii) Any investor money held in an account 
that is not denominated in euro may be 
(b) an investment firm’s client asset safe custody records 
of client dematerialised financial instruments with 
statements or similar documents obtained from the 
relevant third party. In the case of dematerialised 
financial instruments not held through an eligible 
custodian, statements should be obtained from the 
person who maintains the record of legal entitlement;   
(c) an investment firm’s records of cash collateral held 
in respect of clients’ margined transactions with the 
statement or similar document issued by the person with 
whom the collateral is maintained; and   
(d) client financial instruments physically held by an 
investment firm. An investment firm should count at 
least monthly all client financial instruments physically 
held by it, or any nominee of the investment firm, and 
reconcile the results of this count to its record of the 
client financial instruments held in its physical 
possession. This reconciliation should be carried out 
within ten working days of the date to which the 
reconciliation relates.   
The above is not an exhaustive list; an investment firm 
should reconcile all accounts that hold client assets. An 
investment firm should ensure that the reconciliations 
are performed using client asset records that are 
accurate, complied in a timely manner and the 
reconciliation itself is performed accurately. 
 
G5 (2)  For the avoidance of doubt, Regulation 5(2) 
makes provision for fixed term deposit accounts to be 
reconciled on a monthly basis; note all other client asset 
bank accounts containing client funds should be 
reconciled on a daily basis in accordance with 
Regulation 5(1). An investment firm should have 
procedures in place in order to monitor when 
transactions are processed through its client asset bank 
accounts.  
 
G5 (3)  In the case of securities financing, in order to 
complete a reconciliation, an investment firm should 
ensure that the records of the investment firm include:  
(a) details of the client on whose instructions the use of 
the client financial instruments has been effected; and  
(b) the number of client financial instruments used 
belonging to each client who has given consent, so as to 
enable the correct allocation of any loss or gain. 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the daily calculation for an Investment 
Firm? 
 
What is the client money requirement for an 
Investment Firm?  
 
G6 (1) The client money requirement represents all 
client funds held on behalf of clients or validly due to 
clients as of the date of the calculation, that should be 
recorded in the books and records of the investment 
firm, appropriately adjusted for reconciliation items on 
the client asset bank reconciliation.  For example, client 
funds are validly due to the client if the client has 
delivered an asset but the client has not been credited 
with the proceeds, or funds have been returned to the 
client but the funds have not been cleared in the client 
asset bank account of the investment firm (e.g., 
uncashed cheques) or unallocated funds. Where 
applicable, an investment firm should ensure that it takes 
account of dividends and any stock lending fees earned 
by the client. In effect, the client money requirement 
may be more commonly referred to as an investment 
firm’s client creditors’ ledger appropriately adjusted for 
reconciliation items on the client asset bank 
reconciliation. An investment firm’s client debtors 
should not be included unless a client is one of the same 
or there is a legally enforceable agreement in place 
between clients.   
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relates, such money from the investment firm’s own assets 
as is necessary to ensure that the client funds resource is 
equal to the client funds requirement. 
 
(4) In the event of an excess of client funds, an investment 
firm shall withdraw from a third party client asset account, 
without delay and in any event within one working day 
from the date to which the calculation relates, such money 
from a third party client asset account as is necessary to 
ensure that the client funds resource is equal to the client 
funds requirement. 
 
(5) The daily calculation shall be carried out by a relevant 
person who is independent of the production and 
maintenance of the records used for the purpose of 
carrying out the daily calculation. 
 
(6) The daily calculation shall be reviewed by a relevant 
person who is independent of the person who carried out 
the daily calculation and of the person who produced and 
maintained the records used for the purpose of carrying 
out the calculation. 
included in that currency or may be 
converted to euro using the Central Bank 
rate for that day or any other established 
automatic rate feed.  
 
8.2 When is a fund service provider required to 
notify the Central Bank of an excess or shortfall in 
completing its daily calculation?  
 
(i) The Central Bank will require each 
fund service provider to assess 
what level of shortfall or surplus is 
considered material and record this 
rationale in its investor money 
management plan.  
 
(ii) The Central Bank expects a fund 
service provider to immediately 
notify the Central Bank via the ONR 
when the level of money it deposits 
or withdraws from its third party 
collection account is material and to 
explain in the notification the 
reasons for this transfer. The 
Central Bank, where it considers 
necessary, may engage with the 
fund service provider to discuss its 
funding and its rationale.  
 
(iii) A fund service provider should 
ensure that each daily calculation 
has the relevant supporting backup 
material available to enable the 
verification of figures in the daily 
calculation.  
 
(iv) Where a fund service provider 
outsources the performance of the 
daily calculation, it should have 
appropriate oversight of the 
process to ensure that the third 
party (including a group entity) has 
appropriate processes, systems and 
controls for the performance of this 
activity. The fund service provider 
should maintain a record to 
evidence the oversight of the 
process. 
 
 
An investment firm writing margin transactions should 
also include:  
a) any excess margin due to clients and  
b) the amount an investment firm would be liable to pay 
to clients in respect of their margined transactions, if 
each client’s open position was liquidated and the 
account was closed.  
Less  
c) the net amount an investment firm would receive in 
respect of an investment firm’s margined transactions 
for clients with counterparties, if each such open 
position was liquidated and the investment firm's 
account with the counterparty was closed. Negative 
balances should be deducted from positive balances; if 
negative balances are greater than positive balances, this 
figure should be treated as zero for the purpose of 
calculating the client money requirement.  
 
G6 (2) When calculating the client money requirement, 
an investment firm should ensure the provisions of 
Regulation 3(4) are adhered to. 
 
What is the client money resource for an Investment 
Firm?  
 
G6 (3) The client money resource represents all of the 
investment firm’s client asset bank balances that should 
be recorded in the books and records of an investment 
firm, appropriately adjusted by reconciliation items on 
the client asset bank reconciliation. Any funds held in 
foreign currency may be included in the individual 
foreign currencies or may be converted to the base 
currency using the Central Bank rate for that day or any 
other established automatic rate feed. In effect, the client 
money resource may be more commonly referred to as 
an investment firm’s client asset bank ledger 
appropriately adjusted by reconciliation items on the 
client asset bank reconciliation. In the event of  an 
investment firm having an overdrawn bank balance in a 
particular client asset bank account, it should include 
this overdrawn balance in the client money resource for 
the purpose of the daily calculation in order to provide a 
true client money resource position. 
 
What should an investment firm do if its client 
money resource is not equal to its client money 
requirement?  
 
G6 (4) A shortfall occurs when an investment firm’s 
client money resource is less than its client money 
requirement. An excess occurs when an investment 
firm’s client money resource is greater than its client 
money requirement.  An investment firm should ensure 
that the Daily Calculation is completed in adequate time 
to enable an investment firm to fund a shortfall or 
transfer an excess within the permitted industry banking 
cut off times; cut-off times may vary depending on 
currency type.   
  
  
  
  
When is an investment firm required to notify the 
Central Bank of an excess or shortfall in completing 
its daily calculation?  
 
G6 (5) The level of funding required as a result of a 
shortfall in client funds for each investment firm will 
vary and whether this level of funding is material will 
also differ for each investment firm. Likewise, the size 
of the withdrawal required as a result of a surplus will 
also differ for each investment firm. As a result, the 
Central Bank will require each investment firm to assess 
what level of shortfall or surplus is considered material 
and record this rationale in its CAMP.   
The Central Bank expects an investment firm to 
immediately notify the Central Bank via the ONR when 
the level of money it lodges or withdraws from its client 
asset bank account is material and to explain in the 
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notification the reasons for this transfer. The Central 
Bank where necessary may engage with an investment 
firm to discuss its funding and its rationale. 
 
How and who in an investment firm should carry out 
the daily calculation and what records should be 
kept?  
 
G6 (6) An investment firm should be in a position to 
demonstrate upon request, the date upon which a 
calculation was prepared; this evidence can be 
maintained in electronic form.  
 
G6 (7) An investment firm may perform its daily 
calculations electronically provided that the daily 
calculations can be reproduced without delay (refer to 
Regulation 3(24)).   
 
G6 (8) An investment firm should ensure that each daily 
calculation has the relevant supporting backup material 
for each calculation to enable the verification of figures 
in the daily calculation.  
 
G6 (9) Where an investment firm outsources the 
performance of the daily calculation, it should have 
adequate oversight of the process to ensure that the third 
party has appropriate processes, systems and controls for 
the performance of this activity. This would also apply 
where the outsourced provider is part of the same group. 
The manner in which the investment firm oversees this 
activity should be documented in the investment firm’s 
CAMP. The investment firm should maintain a record to 
evidence the oversight of the process. 
37.   1A.2.4G 
One of the consequences of CASS 1A.2.2 R is that a firm that 
determines itself to be a CASS small firm or a CASS medium firm 
will, at least if it exceeds during the course of a calendar year either of 
the limits in CASS 1A.2.7 R that applies to it, become in the next 
calendar year: 
 
(1) in the case of a CASS small firm, a CASS medium firm or a 
CASS large firm; and 
(2) in the case of a CASS medium firm, a CASS large firm. 
 
   Same as in Row 32. 
38.   1A.2.5R 
(1) Notwithstanding CASS 1A.2.2 R, provided that the conditions in 
(2) are satisfied a firm may elect to be treated: 
(a) as a CASS medium firm, in the case of a firm that is classed by the 
application of the limits in CASS 1A.2.7 R as a CASS small firm; and 
(b) as a CASS large firm, in the case of a firm that is classed by the 
application of the limits in CASS 1A.2.7 R as a CASS medium firm. 
(2) The conditions to which (1) refers are that in either case: 
(a) the election is notified to the FCA in writing; 
(b) the notification in accordance with (a) is made at least one week 
before the election is intended to take effect; and 
(c) the FCA has not objected. 
 
   Same as in Row 32. 
39.   1A.2.6G 
CASS 1A.2.5 R provides a firm with the ability to opt in to a higher 
category of ‘CASS firm type’. This may be useful for a firm whose 
holding of client money and safe custody assets is near the upper 
categorisation limit for a CASS small firm or a CASS medium firm. 
 
   Same as in Row 32. 
40.   1A.2.7R 
CASS firm types 
 
CASS 
firm type 
Highest 
total 
amount of 
client 
money 
held 
during the 
firm’s last 
calendar 
year or as 
the case 
may be 
that it 
Highest 
total 
value of 
safe 
custody 
assets 
held by 
the firm 
during the 
firm's last 
calendar 
year or as 
the case 
   Same as in Row 32. 
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projects 
that it will 
hold 
during the 
current 
calendar 
year 
may be 
that it 
projects 
that it will 
hold 
during the 
current 
calendar 
year 
CASS 
large firm 
more than 
£1 billion 
more than 
£100 
billion 
CASS 
medium 
firm 
an 
amount 
equal to 
or greater 
than £1 
million 
and less 
than or 
equal to 
£1 billion 
an 
amount 
equal to 
or greater 
than £10 
million 
and less 
than or 
equal to 
£100 
billion 
CASS 
small 
firm 
less than 
£1 
million 
less than 
£10 
million 
 
 
41.   1A.2.9R 
Once every calendar year a firm must notify to the FCA in writing the 
information specified in (1), (2) or (3) as applicable, and the 
information specified in (4), in each case no later than the day 
specified in (1) to (4): 
(1) if it held client money or safe custody assets in the previous 
calendar year, the highest total amount of client money and the 
highest total value of safe custody assets held during the previous 
calendar year, notification of which must be made no later than the 
fifteenth business day of January; or 
(2) if it did not hold client money or safe custody assets in the 
previous calendar year but at any point up to the fifteenth business 
day of January the firm projects that it will do so in the current 
calendar year, the highest total amount of client money and the 
highest total value of safe custody assets that the firm projects that it 
will hold during the current calendar year, notification of which must 
be made no later than the fifteenth business day of January; or 
(3) in any other case, the highest total amount of client money and the 
highest total value of safe custody assets that the firm projects that it 
will hold during the remainder of the current calendar year, 
notification of which must be made no later than the business day 
before the firm begins to hold client money or safe custody assets; and 
(4) in every case, of its ‘CASS firm type’ classification, notification 
of which must be made at the same time the firm makes the 
notification under (1), (2) or (3). 
 
   Same as in Row 32. 
42.   1A.2.10R 
For the purpose of the annual notification to which CASS 1A.2.9 
Rrefers, a firm must apply the calculation rule in CASS 1A.2.3 R. 
 
   Same as in Row 32. 
43.   1A.2.11G 
For the purpose of CASS 1A.2.9R (1), the FCA will treat that 
obligation as satisfied if a firm submitted a CMAR for each period 
within the previous calendar year in compliance with SUP 16.14.3 R. 
 
   Same as in Row 32. 
44.   1A.2.12R 
A firm's 'CASS firm type' and any change to it takes effect: 
 
(1) if the firm notifies the FCA in accordance with CASS 1A.2.9 R 
(1) or CASS 1A.2.9 R (2), on 1 February following the notification; 
or 
(2) if the firm notifies the FCA in accordance with CASS 1A.2.9 R 
(3), on the day it begins to hold client money or safe custody assets; 
or 
(3) if the firm makes an election under CASS 1A.2.5 R (1), and 
provided the conditions in CASS 1A.2.5 R (2) are satisfied, on the 
day the notification made under CASS 1A.2.5 R (2)(a) states that the 
election is intended to take effect. 
 
   Same as in Row 32. 
45.   1A.2.13G    Same as in Row 32. 
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Any written notification made to the FCA under this chapter should 
be marked for the attention of: "Client Assets Firm Classification". 
 
46.  Recital 5 Commission Delegated Directive 
 
A single officer with overall responsibility for the 
safeguarding of client instruments and funds 
should be appointed in order to reduce risks of 
fragmented responsibility across diverse 
departments, especially in large and complex 
firms, and to remedy unsatisfactory situations 
where firms do not have overarching sight of their 
means of meeting their obligations. The single 
officer should possess sufficient skills and 
authority in order to discharge duties effectively 
and without impediment, including the duty to 
report to the firm's senior management in respect 
of oversight of the effectiveness of the firm's 
compliance with the safeguarding of client assets 
requirements. The appointment of a single officer 
should not preclude that officer from carrying out 
additional roles where this does not prevent the 
officer from discharging the duties for 
safeguarding client financial instruments and 
funds effectively 
 
Article 7 Commission Delegated Directive  
Governance arrangements concerning the 
safeguarding of client assets 
 
Member States shall ensure that investment firms 
appoint a single officer of sufficient skill and 
authority with specific responsibility for matters 
relating to the compliance by firms with their 
obligations regarding the safeguarding of client 
financial instruments and funds. 
 
Member States shall allow investment firms to 
decide, ensuring full compliance with this 
Directive, whether the appointed officer is to be 
dedicated solely to this task or whether the officer 
can discharge responsibilities effectively whilst 
having additional responsibilities. 
 
1A.3 Responsibility for CASS operational oversight 
 
 
1A.3.1R 
(1) A CASS small firm must allocate to a single director or senior 
manager of sufficient skill and authority responsibility for: 
(a) oversight of the firm’s operational compliance with CASS; and 
(b) reporting to the firm's governing body in respect of that oversight. 
(2) A CASS small firm that is not an SMCR firm must make the 
allocation in (1) to a director or senior manager who is approved to 
perform a significant influence function for that firm. 
[Note: article 7, first paragraph of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
Para. 6 of Schedule 3 of MiFID Regulations  
 
Governance arrangements concerning the 
safeguarding of client assets 
 
6. (1) Investment firms shall appoint a single officer of 
sufficient skill and authority with specific responsibility 
for matters relating to the compliance by firms with their 
obligations regarding the safeguarding of client financial 
instruments and funds. 
 
(2) Investment firms shall decide, ensuring full 
compliance with this Schedule, whether the appointed 
officer is to be dedicated solely to this task or whether the 
officer can discharge responsibilities effectively whilst 
having additional responsibilities. 
 
Regulation 63 IMR 2017 
 
Risk management 
 
63. (1) An investment firm shall ensure that the Head of 
Client Asset Oversight shall have the necessary resources, 
including staff that are adequately trained with sufficient 
skill and expertise, to carry out the responsibilities listed 
in Regulation 63(2) having regard to the nature, scale and 
complexity of the business of the investment firm. 
 
(2) The Head of Client Asset Oversight shall perform 
relevant duties including but not limited to the following: 
 
(a) ensuring that every Funds Facilities Agreement and 
Financial Instruments Facilities Agreement referred to in 
Regulations 53(1) and 53(2) is obtained and maintained in 
accordance with Regulation 67(2); 
 
(b) reviewing, at least on an annual basis, the provisions 
of every Funds Facilities Agreement and Financial 
Instruments Facilities Agreement to ensure compliance 
with the requirements of this Part, in particular 
Regulations 53(1) and 53(2) (as the case may be); 
 
(c) ensuring that any other agreement entered into 
between the investment firm and a third party does not 
contradict or supersede the requirements of this Part, in 
particular Regulations 53(1) and 53(2), or the terms of the 
Fund Facilities Agreement or the Financial Instruments 
Facilities Agreement; 
 
(d) providing approval, in writing, of the reviews referred 
to in Regulations 49(8) and 50(7); 
 
(e) ensuring that the client asset management plan referred 
to in Regulation 64(1) is produced, maintained, reviewed 
and updated as the information upon which the client asset 
management plan is based, changes; 
 
(f) ensuring that any potential or actual breaches of this 
Part are reported in writing to the board of the investment 
firm in the case of a company or to each of the partners in 
the case of a partnership; 
 
(g) ensuring that the Bank is notified, in accordance with 
Regulation 68, of any breaches of this Part without delay; 
 
(h) approving any returns in relation to client assets that 
are required by this Part to be submitted to the Bank; 
 
(i) reporting in writing to the board of the investment firm 
in the case of a company or to each of the partners in the 
case of a partnership in respect of any issues raised by the 
internal and external auditors in relation to client assets; 
 
(j) ensuring that the relevant persons performing 
reconciliations referred to in Regulations 57(1) to 57(3) 
and the daily calculations referred to in Regulation 58(1) 
9 IMR Guidance  
 
Risk Management 
 
(i) In general, the Central Bank expects that a 
director to be appointed as Head of 
Investor Money Oversight (HIMO). If this 
is not the case, the HIMO should be a 
senior manager within the fund service 
provider with direct access to the board in 
respect of that function. 
 
(ii) The board of the fund service provider 
(the “Board”) is ultimately responsible for 
safeguarding investor money, the 
requirement to have a Head of Investor 
Money Oversight role does not detract 
from this. In most cases, the Central Bank 
expects a director to be nominated and 
appointed for the Head of Investor Money 
Oversight position. If this is not the case, 
the Head of Investor Money Oversight 
should be a senior manager within the 
fund service provider with direct access to 
the Board in respect of that function.  
 
(iii) The Board should ensure that the 
individual undertaking the Head of 
Investor Money Oversight can 
demonstrate that he / she is free from any 
conflicts of interest in this area and 
document this in the investor money 
management plan. In this regard, the 
Head of Investor Money Oversight should 
be sufficiently removed from the 
performance of day-to-day operational 
functions relating to the administration of 
investor money. The Board should 
document in the investor money 
management plan the rationale for the 
nomination and appointment of the 
HIMO, including the criteria used by the 
fund service provider in making the 
appointment.  
 
(iv) The fund service provider should arrange 
for appropriate cover to ensure the HIMO 
duties are addressed where the HIMO is 
on leave. 
 
 
10 IMR Guidance 
 
Investor Money Management Plan  
 
(i) The investor money management plan 
should be regarded as a master document 
and must be continually re-assessed to 
ensure it remains current and reflective of 
the fund service provider’s evolving 
business model. Not all material referred 
to in the investor money management 
plan needs to be contained within the 
document itself. However, it should 
record the location of where such 
information is readily available (for 
example, including live hyperlinks within 
the investor money management plan 
that direct the reader to the relevant 
information and documentation, and / or 
What is meant by Risk Management for client assets 
and how can an investment firm demonstrate risk 
management for client assets?  
 
G8 (1) The Central Bank expects an investment firm to 
have appropriate risk management processes and 
systems in place to identify risks to the investment 
firm’s objectives, processes and policies in respect of 
holding client assets. While the risk management policy 
for client assets is distinct, it may be incorporated as part 
of the investment firm’s governance framework.   
 
G8 (2) An investment firm is expected to consider and 
document in its CAMP how its business model may 
contribute to the risks associated with safeguarding 
client assets and the controls it has in place to mitigate 
these risks.   
 
G8 (3) An investment firm is required to carry out the 
following: a)  appoint an individual to the role of ‘Head 
of Client Asset Oversight’ (“HCAO”), which is a Pre-
Approved Controlled Function (“PCF”)8 (refer to 
Regulation 8(1)); and  b)  document and maintain a 
CAMP  (refer to  Regulation 8(3)).  
 
G8 (4) An investment firm is not limited to Regulations 
8(1) and 8(3); it may adopt additional risk management 
processes to fully safeguard client assets appropriate to 
the nature, scale and complexity of its business model. 
The responsibilities of the HCAO and the content of the 
CAMP should be tailored to the business model of the 
investment firm. 
 
What should the responsibilities of the Head of Client 
Asset Oversight include?  
 
G8 (5) The Board is ultimately responsible for 
safeguarding client assets; the requirement to have a 
HCAO does not detract from this. In most cases, the 
Central Bank expects a director to be nominated for the 
HCAO position. Where an investment firm proposes to 
appoint an individual who is not a director (e.g., in a 
large investment firm), the individual should be a senior 
manager at the investment firm who has direct access to 
the Board in respect of that function.  
 
G8 (6) The Board should ensure that the individual 
undertaking the HCAO can demonstrate that he/she is 
free from any conflicts of interest in this area. In this 
regard, the HCAO should be sufficiently removed from 
the performance of day to day operational functions 
relating to the administration of client assets.   
 
G8 (7) The HCAO is required to comply with the 
Central Bank’s current Fitness and Probity Standards 
and any subsequent updates or amendments.  
 
G8 (8) The Board should ensure that  sufficient due 
diligence has been undertaken to support the nomination 
of the individual to the HCAO, monitor the on-going 
suitability as required by the Fitness and Probity 
Regulations and provide an appropriate level of 
resources for the HCAO to carry out the role effectively.  
 
G8 (9) It is expected that the HCAO’s role is filled at all 
times; where the HCAO  may be absent from the 
investment firm for a very short period (e.g., annual 
leave), the Board and the HCAO should ensure that an 
appropriate Control Function (“CF”) is available to 
provide cover to make submissions to the Central Bank.  
  
G8 (10) An investment firm should report to the Central 
Bank’s using the ONR in respect of Regulation 8(1)(c). 
 
 
 
o Broadly conceptually equivalent use of “single officer” and requirement 
for risk and control functions. UK and Irish regimes have single officer as 
part of either a specific approved (regulator – in the case of Ireland the 
regulator approved “Pre-Approved Control Function” concept or in the 
case of the UK,  these persons being self-approved in line with the UK’s 
Senior Managers and Certification Regime that replaced the Regulatory 
“Approved Person” Regime). 
  
o The Irish expectations on the CAMP and the IMMP are more prescriptive 
than requirements in the UK and do not exist as concepts at the EU level.  
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are adequately trained and have sufficient skill and 
expertise to perform those functions; 
 
(k) undertaking an assessment of risks to client assets 
arising from the investment firm’s business model; 
 
(l) ensuring that the client asset examination referred to in 
Regulation 65 is completed and the assurance report is 
submitted to the Bank through the Online Reporting 
System and in accordance with the timeframes set out in 
Regulation 68; 
 
(m) ensuring that an appropriate person is available to 
provide cover to make submissions to the Bank, in periods 
where the Head of Client Asset Oversight is absent from 
the investment firm. 
 
Regulation 64 IMR 2017 
 
Client asset management plan 
 
64. (1) An investment firm shall have a client asset 
management plan in order to safeguard client assets. 
 
(2) The client asset management plan shall be reviewed 
and updated— 
 
(a) if there is any change to the investment firm’s business 
model which affects the manner by which client assets are 
held, and 
 
(b) in any event, at least on an annual basis, 
 
to ensure that the information contained therein is 
accurate. 
 
(3) The board of an investment firm shall approve the 
client asset management plan— 
 
(a) when material changes are made, 
 
(b) when it is reviewed and updated in accordance with 
Regulation 64(2), and 
 
(c) in any event, at least on an annual basis. 
 
(4) The client asset management plan shall, at least, 
record, the following: 
 
(a) details of an investment firm’s business model, 
operational structures and governance arrangements; 
 
(b) the range and type of client assets held by an 
investment firm; 
 
(c) the range of investment services carried out by an 
investment firm; 
 
(d) the risks to the safeguarding of client assets including 
those specific to the particular business model of an 
investment firm; 
 
(e) the processes and controls to mitigate the risks referred 
to in subparagraph (d); 
 
(f) information to facilitate the distribution of client assets, 
particularly in the event of an investment firm’s 
insolvency; 
 
(g) the process that an investment firm follows with 
respect to the handling of money that is comprised of a 
mixture of client funds and other money to ensure 
compliance with Regulation 49(6); 
 
(h) the process that an investment firm will follow to 
identify the client in the circumstances covered by 
Regulation 49(7); 
 
including the file path to the relevant 
material’s location on the fund service 
provider’s systems etc.). The reader 
should have relevant access to any such 
information / documentation held 
external to the investor money 
management plan.  
 
(ii) The investor money management plan 
should be approved on at least an annual 
basis by the Board. Material changes to 
the investor money management plan 
should be notified to the Board and 
discussed. This should include any 
significant changes to the fund service 
providers business or arrangements and 
any errors, omissions or control 
weaknesses highlighted from the regular 
monitoring, including the external 
auditors review (refer to Investor Money 
Examination section herein) to ensure 
that the investor money management 
plan remains current. Any changes to the 
investor money management plan should 
be documented and an updated investor 
money management plan should be 
prepared and approved by the Board.  
 
(iii) Any judgement made by the Board and / 
or senior management in relation to the 
following should be documented with the 
basis for that judgement and the 
information used to support it at that 
time:  
 
a. materiality;  
b. new investment funds;  
c. using new third parties;  
d. managing concentration risk 
(counterparty).  
 
(iv) This is not an exhaustive list; in the event 
circumstances change, the impact on 
management’s judgement should be 
considered and updated.  
 
a. On an on-going basis, a fund service 
provider should monitor its 
materiality threshold level and, in 
particular, when there is a change 
to its business model, the 
environment or the level of investor 
money held, amend the materiality 
threshold level when appropriate. 
Amendments to the materiality 
threshold level should be approved 
by the Head of Investor Money 
Oversight and the Board, and be 
clearly communicated to the fund 
service provider’s staff.  
 
b. Non-material changes to the 
Investor Money Management Plan 
should be documented and 
presented to the board for the 
purposes of the annual review.  
 
(v) Each fund service provider should 
document in its investor money 
management plan matters which are 
relevant to its business model and the 
related risks to safeguarding investor 
money. The following list of what should 
What is the purpose of the CAMP?  
 
G8 (11) The CAMP has the following key purposes: a) 
to document an investment firm’s business model and 
related risks in respect of the safeguarding of client 
assets and the controls in place to mitigate these;         b) 
to demonstrate how an investment firm’s systems and 
controls meet the principles of the client assets regime; 
c) to enable the Board to document and monitor material 
changes to an investment firm’s business model, 
changes to controls and processes and therefore the 
changes in the associated risks to safeguarding client 
assets; and d) to make information readily available to 
assist in the prompt distribution of client assets 
particularly in the event of the investment firm’s 
insolvency.   
 
G8 (12) The CAMP should be regarded as a master 
document and not all material referred to in the CAMP 
needs to be contained within the document; however it 
should record the location of where the information is 
readily available. Note: Regulation 3(24) provides that, 
where information is held electronically, an investment 
firm shall ensure that it can produce such records 
without delay.   
 
When should the CAMP be approved and by whom?  
 
G8 (13) Regulations 8(4) and 8(5) set out when the 
CAMP should be approved and by whom. Material 
changes to the CAMP should be notified to the Board 
and discussed; this should include any significant 
changes to the investment firm’s business or 
arrangements or any errors, omissions or control 
weaknesses highlighted from the regular monitoring, 
including the external auditors review (refer to Client 
Asset Examination section), to ensure the CAMP 
remains current. Any changes to the CAMP should be 
documented and reported to the Board and an updated 
CAMP should be prepared and approved by the Board.  
 
G8 (14) An investment firm should define and document 
its materiality threshold levels in its CAMP. The 
rationale for these thresholds and related triggers should 
be set for dealing with breaches of its controls, processes 
and procedures. These thresholds and related triggers 
should be approved by the Board and take into account 
both quantitative and qualitative factors, e.g., the level of 
client assets; the complexity of client assets; the type of 
clients; and prior history of breaches relating to client 
assets.  
 
G8 (15) An investment firm should specify and 
document a quantitative level of materiality, taking into 
account the amount of client assets held but also 
considering the investment firm’s own net assets. 
Furthermore, a breach may be quantitatively immaterial 
but indicative of a qualitative issue which may indicate a 
risk to effectively safeguarding client assets. An 
investment firm should document in its CAMP the basis 
for its judgment in this area. Staff within the investment 
firm that are assigned to tasks relating to obligations 
under the Regulations should be sufficiently qualified, 
knowledgeable and experienced to identify issues both 
qualitative and quantitative. The investment firm may 
have different materiality levels or risk triggers for 
different processes and controls.  
 
G8 (16) An investment firm should document the 
materiality threshold level for reporting and escalating 
matters to the Board in respect of any errors or breaches 
in its controls to safeguard client assets. In areas of 
judgement, an investment firm should document its 
approach and any triggers set. 
 
When should the CAMP be approved and by whom 
(cont’d.)?  
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(i) the process that an investment firm will follow to carry 
out the reviews referred to in Regulations 49(8) and 50(7); 
 
(j) the procedures referred to in Regulation 50(5); 
 
(k) where, in accordance with Regulation 66, an 
investment firm outsources to another party, the 
performance of the reconciliation or the daily calculation, 
the manner in which an investment firm will exercise 
oversight over the outsourced activity; 
 
(l) the process that an investment firm will follow to 
ensure that client funds or client financial instruments are 
not deposited into an investment firm’s own bank account 
or custody account; 
 
(m) the process and timeframes that an investment firm 
will follow if, in error, client funds or client financial 
instruments are deposited by a client into an investment 
firm’s own bank account or custody account; 
 
(n) the basis and criteria that will be used by an 
investment firm to determine materiality in order to 
safeguard client assets, including for the purposes of 
Regulation 68(1)(c) and (d); 
 
(o) such other matters as may be determined by the Bank 
from time to time. 
be included in the investor money 
management plan under this heading is 
not exhaustive.  
 
a. A fund service provider should 
define and document its materiality 
threshold levels in its investor 
money management plan. The 
rationale for these thresholds and 
related triggers should be set for 
dealing with breaches of its 
controls, processes and procedures. 
The thresholds and related triggers 
should be approved by the Board 
and take into account both 
quantitative and qualitative factors 
(e.g. the level of investor money, 
the type of investors and prior 
history of breaches relating to 
investor money).  
 
b. A fund service provider should 
specify and document in its investor 
money management plan a 
quantitative level of materiality, 
taking into account the amount of 
investor money held but also 
considering the fund service 
provider’s own net assets. 
Furthermore, a breach may be 
quantitatively immaterial but 
indicative of a qualitative issue 
which may indicate a risk to 
effectively safeguarding investor 
money.  
 
(vi) A quantitative level of materiality, taking 
into account the amount of investor 
money held but also considering the fund 
service provider’s own net assets. 
Furthermore, a breach may be 
quantitatively immaterial but indicative of 
a qualitative issue which may indicate a 
risk to effectively safeguarding investor 
money.  
 
(vii) A fund service provider should document 
in its investor management plan the basis 
for its judgment in determining 
materiality thresholds for the purposes of 
Regulation 83 of the Regulations.  
 
(viii) A fund service provider should document 
the materiality level for reporting and 
escalating matters to the Board in respect 
of any errors or breaches in the controls 
to safeguard investor money, (including, 
its approach to making judgements and 
any relevant trigger set). Threshold levels 
should be monitored and amended if 
necessary, particularly where there is a 
change in business model, operating 
environment or levels of investor money 
held.  
 
(ix) For the purpose of Regulation 79(4)(a) a 
fund service provider should consider: 
 
a. The reporting lines to the Board 
and/or senior management in 
relation to investor money 
management: A fund service 
provider should document the 
G8 (17) Judgement made by the Board and/or senior 
management in relation to the following should be 
documented with the basis for that judgement and the 
information used to support it at that time:   
materiality;  use of firm money to facilitate market 
settlement;   concluding where a product or service is 
regulated or unregulated;   approving new products;   
using new third parties;   managing concentration risk 
(client and counterparty).  
This is not an exhaustive list; in the event circumstances 
change, the impact on management’s judgement should 
be considered and updated.  
 
G8 (18) On an on-going basis, an investment firm 
should monitor its materiality threshold level and in 
particular when there is a change to its business model, 
the environment or the level of client assets held, amend 
the materiality threshold level when appropriate. 
Amendments to the materiality threshold level should be 
approved by the Board and clearly communicated to the 
investment firm’s staff. 
 
What should be included in the CAMP?  
 
G8 (19) For the purpose of Regulation 8(6)(a), an 
investment firm should consider the following where 
relevant:    
a) reporting lines to the Board and/or senior 
management in relation to client asset management. An 
investment firm should document the management 
information provided to the Board to monitor the risks 
and mitigants associated with the safeguarding of client 
assets including details of the recipients of this 
information. This management information should be 
recorded in the firm’s CAMP or, as outlined in G8 (12), 
record where such information is located;  
b) the rationale for holding client assets. As part of this, 
consideration should be given where there is an 
outsourcing arrangement in place, with a group company 
or a third party, for the safeguarding of client assets. The 
investment firm should clearly document the 
arrangement, identifying the outsourced company, the 
rationale for the outsourced arrangement and an 
explanation as to where the arrangement fits into the 
overall control process. The statement should also 
specify what is excluded from the outsourcing 
arrangement. The investment firm should document how 
the effectiveness of the outsourced arrangement is 
overseen and monitored, including identifying whom 
within the investment firm is responsible for oversight of 
each outsourced arrangement;  
c) a record of how an investment firm is able to 
differentiate, monitor and control the client assets 
subject to the Regulations from those assets which are 
not within the scope of the Regulations. The investment 
firm should document its rationale and judgement when 
there is ambiguity on concluding where a service or 
activity is not  subject to the Regulations;  
d) a record of the particular responsibilities of the 
HCAO. 
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management information provided 
to the Board to monitor the risks 
and mitigants associated with the 
safeguarding of investor money, 
including details of the recipients of 
this information.  
 
b. The rationale for holding investor 
money: as part of this, 
consideration should be given 
where there is an outsourcing 
arrangement in place to hold 
investor money with a group 
company or a third party for the 
safeguarding of investor money. 
The fund service provider should 
clearly document the arrangement, 
identifying the outsourced 
company, the rationale for the 
outsourced arrangement and an 
explanation as to where the 
arrangement fits into the overall 
control process. The statement 
should also specify what is excluded 
from the outsourcing arrangement. 
The fund service provider should 
document how the effectiveness of 
the outsourced arrangement is 
overseen and monitored, including 
identifying who within the fund 
service provider is responsible for 
oversight of each outsourced 
arrangement.  
 
c. A records of the particular 
responsibilities of the Head of 
Investor Money Oversight.  
 
(x) A fund service provider should document 
the material risks to investor money held 
as well as the processes and controls to 
mitigate those risks, as provided for under 
Regulations 79(4)(c) and 79(4)(d). This 
should include items such as:  
 
a. counterparty risk including 
jurisdiction and associated legal 
risks,  
b. concentration risk,  
c. operational risk including risk of 
fraud,  
d. compliance with investor mandates,  
e. outsourcing,  
f. group arrangements, and  
g. any other relevant issues.  
 
(xi) The Central Bank expects a fund service 
provider to map the material risks 
identified to the relevant controls and 
processes in place, in order to mitigate 
these risks. When considering these risks, 
a fund service provider should consider 
the life cycle of the transaction - the 
receipt of money from the investor to the 
point where the money is transferred to 
the investment fund and, likewise, from 
the investment fund until it is returned 
back to the investor.  
 
(xii) Consideration of the life cycle could 
include, but is not limited to flowcharts or 
illustrative diagrams showing critical 
interventions, particularly in cases where 
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the processing of investor money requires 
manual intervention. The fund service 
provider should record how cash is 
received and disbursed.  
 
(xiii) A description of relevant systems should 
be captured including how access to these 
systems is controlled and how segregation 
is implemented in practice.  
 
(xiv) A list of the fund service provider’s third 
parties holding investor money including 
all account numbers, details of the 
authorised persons to the third party 
collection accounts and whether such 
third party collection accounts are pooled. 
The Central Bank expects a fund service 
provider to have and apply a process to 
ensure that any amendments to the list of 
third parties are made only following 
approval by senior management. 
Counterparty risks and the controls in 
place to mitigate them should be 
documented. A fund service provider 
should document its processes in 
maintaining and updating relevant legal 
agreements associated with the holding of 
investor money.  
 
(xv) A description of the systems and controls 
in relation to the production of 
information in relation to investor money 
and submission of such information to a 
third party. The Central Bank expects a 
fund service provider to have appropriate 
segregation of duties to ensure 
documented controls are reviewed by 
independent and appropriately qualified 
and knowledgeable persons.  
 
(xvi) For the purpose of Regulation 79(4)(d), 
the fund service provider should consider 
the following, where relevant:  
 
a. all legal agreements between a 
fund service provider and a third 
party holding investor money and 
any amendments to such 
agreements;  
 
b. all legal agreements between a 
fund service provider and any third 
party nominated by the fund 
service provider to hold investor 
money on behalf of the fund service 
provider;  
 
c. details of third party collection 
accounts held with a third party 
nominated by the fund service 
provider;  
 
d. all Investor Money Facilities 
Agreements from third parties 
holding investor money, confirming 
segregation of such investor 
money;  
 
e. details of the relevant accounts on 
the general ledger system recording 
investor money transactions, 
including instructions on how to 
access reports on the system;  
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f. details of all persons with access to 
the ledger system;  
 
g. details of how to access or generate 
any relevant reports from the 
general ledger system;  
 
h. description of any key reports used 
to monitor investor money with 
instructions on how to generate 
such reports;  
 
i. record of where the most recent 
daily calculation is stored and 
details of how to access previous 
daily calculations;  
 
j. records of where the most recent 
bank reconciliation is stored and 
details of how to access previous 
reconciliations.  
 
(xvii) The investor management plan should be 
sufficiently detailed to enable the reader, 
including the Central Bank and an 
insolvency practitioner, to understand the 
business model and controls for 
safeguarding investor money. An 
insolvency practitioner needs to know the 
location and the value of investor money. 
A fund service provider should ensure 
there is sufficient information available to 
enable the distribution of investor money 
to take place as quickly as possible with 
minimum cost to investors. This 
information should also be available in the 
event that a fund service provider is 
required to facilitate an orderly transfer of 
investor money to another fund service 
provider. 
47.   1A.3.1-AG 
The material in CASS 1A.3.1BG about how CASS 1A.3 fits into the 
FCA senior managers and certification regime for SMCR firms also 
applies to a CASS small firm that is an SMCR firm and the function 
in CASS 1A.3.1R. However: 
 
(1) the function in CASS 1A.3.1R is not a separate FCA certification 
function; and 
(2) the person performing that function will not necessarily be subject 
to the employee certification regime described in SYSC 27 (Senior 
managers and certification regime: Certification regime). 
 
   See comments in Row 46.  
48.  Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 
2017/593 (Commission Delegated Directive) 
 
Article 7 
Governance arrangements concerning the 
safeguarding of client assets 
 
Member States shall ensure that investment firms 
appoint a single officer of sufficient skill and 
authority with specific responsibility for matters 
relating to the compliance by firms with their 
obligations regarding the safeguarding of client 
financial instruments and funds. 
 
The approved persons regime and the certification regime 
1A.3.1AR 
A CASS medium firm and a CASS large firm must allocate to a 
single director or senior manager of sufficient skill and authority the 
function of: 
 
(1) oversight of the operational effectiveness of that firm’s systems 
and controls that are designed to achieve compliance with CASS; 
(2) reporting to the firm’s governing body in respect of that oversight; 
and 
(3) completing and submitting a CMAR to the FCA in accordance 
with SUP 16.14. 
[Note: article 7, first paragraph of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
 
Regulation 14 
 
Directors  
 
14. (1) A fund administrator shall ensure that no person 
appointed as a director of the fund administrator is a 
director of a depositary, trustee or custodian appointed to 
an investment fund in respect of which the fund 
administrator provides administration services.  
 
(2) A fund administrator, who is not a sole trader, shall 
ensure that—  
 
(a) it has a minimum of 2 directors who are present in the 
State for the whole of 110 working days in a year, and  
 
(b) its directors disclose, in writing, to the fund 
administrator any concurrent directorship which they hold 
on the board of an investment fund or an entity which 
provides services to such investment fund.  
 
9. Risk Management  
 
(i) In general, the Central Bank expects that a director 
to be appointed as Head of Investor Money Oversight 
(HIMO). If this is not the case, the HIMO should be a 
senior manager within the fund service provider with 
direct access to the board in respect of that function.  
 
(ii) The board of the fund service provider (the 
“Board”) is ultimately responsible for safeguarding 
investor money, the requirement to have a Head of 
Investor Money Oversight role does not detract from 
this. In most cases, the Central Bank expects a director 
to be nominated and appointed for the Head of Investor 
Money Oversight position. If this is not the case, the 
Head of Investor Money Oversight should be a senior 
manager within the fund service provider with direct 
access to the Board in respect of that function. 
 
(iii) The Board should ensure that the individual 
undertaking the Head of Investor Money Oversight can 
demonstrate that he / she is free from any conflicts of 
 See comments in Row 46.  
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interest in this area and document this in the investor 
money management plan. In this regard, the Head of 
Investor Money Oversight should be sufficiently 
removed from the performance of day-to-day 
operational functions relating to the administration of 
investor money. The Board should document in the 
investor money management plan the rationale for the 
nomination and appointment of the HIMO, including 
the criteria used by the fund service provider in making 
the appointment.  
 
(iv) The fund service provider should arrange for 
appropriate cover to ensure the HIMO duties are 
addressed where the HIMO is on leave. 
 
49.   1A.3.1BG 
(1) 
(a) CASS 1A.3.1AR describes the FCA controlled function known as 
the CASS operational oversight function (CF10a). The table of FCA 
controlled functions in SUP 10A.4.4R together with SUP 10A.7.9R 
specify the CASS operational oversight function as an FCA required 
function for a firm to which CASS 1A.3.1AR applies. 
(b) The CASS operational oversight function does not apply to an 
SMCR firm. For an SMCR firm, the function in CASS 1A.3.1AR is 
not a separate controlled function and performing that function does 
not require approval as an approved person. Paragraphs (1A) to (4) 
describe how CASS 1A.3.1AR applies to SMCR firms. 
(c) However, nothing in paragraphs (1A) to (4) affects the 
requirement for the function in CASS 1A.3.1AR to be allocated to a 
single director or senior manager of sufficient skill and authority in 
accordance with CASS 1A.3.1AR and CASS 1A.3.2AR. 
(1A) There are three elements of the regime for SMCR firms that are 
particularly relevant to CASS 1A, although they do not all apply to all 
SMCR firms: 
(a) a firm’s obligation to allocate certain responsibilities to its SMF 
managers (see SYSC 24 (Senior managers and certification regime: 
Allocation of prescribed responsibilities)); 
(b) a firm’s obligation to ensure that one or more of its SMF managers 
have overall responsibility for each of its activities, business areas and 
management functions (see SYSC 26 (Senior managers and 
certification regime: Overall and local responsibility)); and 
(c) the certification regime (see SYSC 27 (Senior managers and 
certification regime: Certification regime)). 
(2) 
(a) This paragraph (2) explains how CASS 1A.3.1AR applies to an 
SMCR firm to which SYSC 24 and SYSC 26 both apply. 
(b) The firm must allocate responsibility for the firm’s compliance 
with CASS to one of its SMF managers (see SYSC 24.2.1R). That 
responsibility is an “FCA-prescribed senior management 
responsibility”. The full list of FCA-prescribed senior management 
responsibilities is in the table in SYSC 24.2.6R. 
(c) Although the CASS function in SYSC 24.2.1R is different from 
the function in CASS 1A.3.1AR, the firm may allocate the function in 
CASS 1A.3.1AR to the SMF manager in (b). 
(d) The firm may allocate the CASS FCA-prescribed senior 
management responsibility described in (b) to an SMF manager who 
does not perform any other function coming within the FCA regime 
for SMF managers in SMCR firms. See SUP 10C.7 (Other overall 
responsibility function (SMF18)) and SUP 10C.8.1R (Other local 
responsibility function (SMF22)) for details. Where this is the case, 
the manager will be performing the other overall responsibility 
function or the other local responsibility function. 
(e) The firm may choose to allocate the function in CASS 1A.3.1AR 
to someone who is not an approved person and SMF manager. If so: 
(i) that person will be subject to the employee certification regime 
described in SYSC 27 (Senior managers and certification regime: 
(Certification Regime); 
(ii) that person will be subject to supervision by the SMF manager in 
(b); and 
(iii) the function in CASS 1A.3.1AR will be the CASS oversight FCA 
certification function in SYSC 27.8.1R. 
(3) In relation to an SMCR firm to which SYSC 24 applies but SYSC 
26 does not apply, the guidance in sub-paragraphs (2)(b), (2)(c), and 
2(e) applies, but the guidance in sub-paragraph (2)(d) does not apply. 
(4) 
(a) The position of an SMCR firm to which neither SYSC 24 nor 
SYSC 26 apply is slightly different. 
(b) The firm may choose to allocate the function in CASS 1A.3.1AR 
to an SMF manager. 
   See comments in Row 46. 
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(c) The firm may instead choose to allocate the function in CASS 
1A.3.1AR to someone who is not an SMF manager. 
(d) Where (c) applies, the person performing the function in CASS 
1A.3.1AR will fall into the certification regime. The function in 
CASS 1A.3.1AR will be the CASS oversight FCA certification 
function in SYSC 27.8.1R. 
 
50.   1A.3.1CR 
If, at the time a firm that is not an SMCR firm becomes a CASS 
medium firm or a CASS large firm in accordance with CASS 
1A.2.12R(1) or CASS 1A.2.12R(2), the firm is not able to comply 
with CASS 1A.3.1A R because it has no director or senior manager 
who is an approved person in respect of the CASS operational 
oversight function, the firm must: 
 
(1) take the necessary steps to ensure that it complies with CASS 
1A.3.1A R as soon as practicable, which must at least include 
submitting an application for a candidate in respect of the CASS 
operational oversight function within 30 business days of the firm 
becoming a CASS medium firm or a CASS large firm; and 
(2) until such time as it is able to comply with CASS 1A.3.1A R, 
allocate to a director performing a significant influence function or a 
senior manager performing a significant influence function 
responsibility for: 
(a) oversight of the firm's operational compliance with CASS; 
(b) reporting to the firm's governing body in respect of that oversight; 
and 
(c) completing and submitting the CMAR to the FCA in accordance 
with SUP 16.14. 
 
   See comments in Row 46. 
51.   1A.3.1DG 
(1) CASS 1A.3.1CR provides a grace period for a firm that is not an 
SMCR firm to apply for someone to be approved to perform the 
CASS operational oversight function. 
(2) There is no equivalent to CASS 1A.3.1CR for an SMCR firm, 
because a person does not need specific FCA approval before carrying 
out the function. This is explained in (3) to (5), below. 
(3) As explained in CASS 1A.3.1BG(2), the function in CASS 
1A.3.1AR is not, by itself, a controlled function. 
(4) Therefore, if an approved person is to perform the function for an 
SMCR firm, it can be allocated to any director or senior manager who 
is already an approved person who is suitable to carry it out. 
However, if the firm wishes to allocate the function to someone as 
described in CASS 1A.3.1BG(2)(d), it will need to get FCA approval 
before the firm appoints them. 
(5) If the function is to be carried out by a certification employee: 
(a) FCA approval is not needed because performance of a role that 
falls into the certification regime does not require FCA approval; 
(b) the firm should: 
(i) either issue them with a certificate under SYSC 27 (Senior 
managers and certification regime: Certification regime) before the 
firm becomes a CASS medium firm or a CASS large firm; or 
(ii) give the function to a suitable approved person pending issue of 
the certificate. 
 
   See comments in Row 46. 
52.  Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 
(Commission Delegated Directive) 
 
Article 7 
Governance arrangements concerning the 
safeguarding of client assets 
 
Member States shall allow investment firms to 
decide, ensuring full compliance with this 
Directive, whether the appointed officer is to be 
dedicated solely to this task or whether the officer 
can discharge responsibilities effectively whilst 
having additional responsibilities. 
 
1A.3.2AR 
Where a firm allocates the responsibilities in CASS 1A.3.1R or CASS 
1A.3.1AR (“the CASS oversight responsibilities”) to a director or 
senior manager (“P”), the firm must not allocate any other 
responsibilities to P in addition to the CASS oversight responsibilities, 
unless the firm is satisfied on reasonable grounds that: 
 
(1) P will still be able to discharge the CASS oversight 
responsibilities effectively; and 
(2) the firm’s full compliance with CASS will not be compromised. 
[Note: article 7, second paragraph of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
   See comments in Row 46. 
53.   1A.3.2BR 
A firm may allow the CASS oversight responsibilities to be shared 
amongst one or more directors or senior managers where this is done 
as part of a job share between those persons. 
 
   See comments in Row 46. 
54.   1A.3.3R 
(1) Subject to (2), a firm must make and retain an appropriate record 
of the person to whom responsibility is allocated in accordance with 
CASS 1A.3.1 R, CASS 1A.3.1A R or CASS 1A.3.1C R (2). 
   See comments in Row 46. 
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(2) A CASS small firm must make and retain such a record only 
where it allocates responsibility to a person other than the person in 
that firm who performs the compliance oversight function. 
(3) A firm must ensure that the record made under this rule is retained 
for a period of five years after it is made. 
 
55.   CHAPTER 3  
Collateral 
 
3.1 Application and Purpose 
 
Application 
3.1.1R 
This chapter applies to a firm when it receives or holds assets in 
connection with an arrangement to secure the obligation of a client in 
the course of, or in connection with, its designated investment 
business, including MiFID business. 
 
Regulation 55 IMR 2017 
 
Collateral margined transactions 
 
55. (1) With respect to collateral margined transactions, an 
investment firm, in advance of depositing collateral with, 
or pledging, charging or granting a security arrangement 
over the collateral to, a relevant party or eligible 
custodian, shall— 
 
(a) notify the credit institution, relevant party or eligible 
custodian that the investment firm— 
 
(i) is under an obligation to keep the collateral separate 
from the investment firm’s collateral, and 
 
(ii) that the relevant party or eligible custodian must not 
claim any lien or right of retention or sale over the 
collateral except to cover the obligations to the relevant 
party or eligible custodian which gave rise to that deposit, 
pledge, charge or security arrangement, or any charges 
relating to the administration or safekeeping of the 
collateral, 
 
(b) instruct the relevant party or eligible custodian that— 
 
(i) the value of the collateral passed by the investment 
firm on behalf of clients must be credited to the 
investment firm’s third party client asset account with the 
relevant party or eligible custodian, 
 
(ii) where collateral has been passed and the initial margin 
has been liquidated to satisfy margin requirements, any 
balance of the sale proceeds that is not a margin 
requirement must be paid into a third party client asset 
account without delay, and 
 
(iii) where collateral is passed to an exchange or clearing 
house, any balance of the sale proceeds that is not a 
margin requirement must be dealt with in accordance with 
the rules of the relevant exchange or clearing house, 
 
(c) ensure that a client’s fully paid (non-collateral) 
financial instruments and a client’s margin financial 
instruments will be held in separate third party client asset 
accounts with the relevant party or eligible custodian and 
that no right of set-off will apply to either of these 
accounts. 
 
(2) An investment firm shall not use one client’s collateral 
as security for the obligations of another client or another 
person, unless legally enforceable agreements to do so are 
in place. 
  Conceptual equivalence between UK and Irish Rules but no conceptual 
equivalence exists at EU level.  
56.   3.1.2G 
Firms are reminded that this chapter does not apply to an incoming 
EEA firm, other than an insurer, with respect to its passported 
activities. The application of this chapter is also dependent on the 
location from which the activity is undertaken (see CASS 1.3.2 R and 
CASS 1.3.3 R). 
 
   No conceptual equivalent outside of the UK. 
57.   3.1.3R 
This chapter does not apply to a firm that has only a bare security 
interest (without rights to hypothecate) in the client's asset. In such 
circumstances, the firm must comply with the custody rules or client 
money rules as appropriate. 
 
Regulation 48(4) IMR 2017 
 
(4) Except in accordance with a legally enforceable 
agreement, an investment firm shall not use the assets of a 
client for any purpose other than for the sole account of 
that client. 
  Conceptual equivalence between UK and Irish rules. 
58.   3.1.4G 
For the purpose of this chapter only, a bare security interest in the 
client's asset gives a firm the right to realise the assets only on a 
client's default and without the right to use other than in default. 
 
Regulation 48(4) IMR 2017 
 
(4) Except in accordance with a legally enforceable 
agreement, an investment firm shall not use the assets of a 
client for any purpose other than for the sole account of 
that client. 
  Irish rules are drafted to cover a slightly different point than the UK’s point 
which permits blanket right of use.  
59.   Purpose Regulation 48(4) IMR 2017   Same comment as in Row 59. 
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3.1.5G 
The purpose of this chapter is to ensure that an appropriate level of 
protection is provided for those assets over which a client gives a firm 
certain rights. The arrangements covered by this chapter are those 
under which the firm is given a right to use the asset, and the firm 
treats the asset as if legal title and associated rights to that asset had 
been transferred to the firm subject only to an obligation to return 
equivalent assets to the client upon satisfaction of the client's 
obligation to the firm. The rights covered in this chapter do not 
include those arrangements by which the firm has only a bare security 
interest in the client's asset (in which case the custody rules or client 
money rules apply). 
 
 
(4) Except in accordance with a legally enforceable 
agreement, an investment firm shall not use the assets of a 
client for any purpose other than for the sole account of 
that client. 
60.   3.1.6G 
Examples of the arrangements covered by this chapter include the 
taking of collateral by a firm, under the ISDA English Law (transfer 
of title) and the New York Law Credit Support Annexes (assuming 
the right to rehypothecate has not been disapplied). 
 
   Same comment as in Row 59. 
61.   3.1.7G 
This chapter recognises the need to apply a differing level of 
regulatory protection to the assets which form the basis of the two 
different types of arrangement described in CASS 3.1.5 G. Under the 
bare security interest arrangement, the asset continues to belong to the 
client until the firm's right to realise that asset crystallises (that is, on 
the client's default). But under a "right to use arrangement", the client 
has transferred to the firm the legal title and associated rights to the 
asset, so that when the firm exercises its right to treat the asset as its 
own, the asset ceases to belong to the client and in effect becomes the 
firm's asset and is no longer in need of the full range of client asset 
protection. The firm may exercise its right to treat the asset as its own 
by, for example, clearly so identifying the asset in its own books and 
records. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 59. 
62.  Commission Delegated Directive Recital 2  
The protection of client financial instruments and 
funds is an important part of that regime, 
investment firms being subject to an obligation to 
make adequate arrangements to safeguard 
investor's ownership and rights in respect of 
securities and funds entrusted to an investment 
firm. Investment firms should have in place 
proper and specific arrangements to ensure the 
safeguarding of client financial instruments and 
funds. 
3.1.7AG 
Firms are reminded of the client's best interests rule which requires a 
firm to act honestly, fairly and professionally, in accordance with the 
best interests of its clients, when agreeing to, entering into, exercising 
its rights under and fulfilling its obligations under an arrangement 
covered by this chapter, and when structuring its business to include 
such arrangements. 
 
Regulation 31 MiFID Regulations 
 
31. (1) When providing investment services or, where 
appropriate, ancillary services, to its clients, an investment 
firm shall— 
 
(a) act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance 
with the best interests of its clients, and 
 
(b) comply, in particular, with the principles set out in 
Regulations 32 and 33. 
  Conceptual equivalence across relevant rules.  
63.   3.1.8G 
A prime brokerage firm is reminded of the additional obligations in 
CASS 9.3.1R which apply to prime brokerage agreements. 
 
   No conceptual equivalent outside of UK of a designated firm class of “prime 
brokerage” firm and thus relevant obligations that apply to it.  
64.   3.2 Requirements 
 
Application 
3.2.2R 
A firm that receives or holds a client's assets under an arrangement to 
which this chapter applies and which exercises its right to treat the 
assets as its own must ensure that it maintains adequate records to 
enable it to meet any future obligations including the return of 
equivalent assets to the client. 
 
   Conceptual equivalence between UK and EU plus Irish rules although the UK 
requirements are much more prescriptive.  
65.   3.2.3G 
If the firm has the right to use the client's asset under a "right to use 
arrangement" but has not yet exercised its right to treat the asset as its 
own, the client money rules or the custody rules will continue to apply 
as appropriate until such time as the firm exercises its right, at which 
time CASS 3.2.2 R will apply. 
 
   Conceptual equivalence between UK and EU plus Irish rules although the UK 
requirements are much more prescriptive. 
66.  Article 63 MiFID Org Regulation 
 
Article 63 
Statements of client financial instruments or 
client funds 
(Article 25(6) of Directive 2014/65/EU) 
1.   Investment firms that hold client financial 
instruments or client funds shall send at least on a 
quarterly basis, to each client for whom they hold 
financial instruments or funds, a statement in a 
durable medium of those financial instruments or 
funds unless such a statement has been provided 
in any other periodic statement. Upon client 
3.2.4G 
When appropriate, firms that enter into the arrangements with retail 
clients covered in this chapter will be expected to identify in the 
statement of custody assets sent to the client in accordance with 
COBS 16.4 (Statements of client designated investments or client 
money), article 63 of the MiFID Org Regulation (see COBS 16A.5) or 
CASS 9.5 (Reporting to clients on request) details of the assets which 
form the basis of the arrangements. Where the firm utilises global 
netting arrangements, a statement of the assets held on this basis will 
suffice. 
 
   Conceptual equivalence between UK and EU plus Irish rules although the UK 
requirements are much more prescriptive. 
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request, firms shall provide such statement more 
frequently at a commercial cost. 
The first subparagraph shall not apply to a credit 
institution authorised under Directive 2000/12/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council in 
respect of deposits within the meaning of that 
Directive held by that institution. 
 
2.   The statement of client assets referred to in 
paragraph 1 shall include the following 
information: 
(a) details of all the financial instruments or funds 
held by the investment firm for the client at the 
end of the period covered by the statement; 
(b) the extent to which any client financial 
instruments or client funds have been the 
subject of securities financing transactions; 
(c) the extent of any benefit that has accrued to the 
client by virtue of participation in any 
securities financing transactions, and the basis 
on which that benefit has accrued; 
(d) a clear indication of the assets or funds which 
are subject to the rules of Directive 
2014/65/EU and its implementing measures 
and those that are not, such as those that are 
subject to Title Transfer Collateral Agreement; 
(e) a clear indication of which assets are affected 
by some peculiarities in their ownership status, 
for instance due to a security interest; 
(f) the market or estimated value, when the market 
value is not available, of the financial 
instruments included in the statement with a 
clear indication of the fact that the absence of a 
market price is likely to be indicative of a lack 
of liquidity. The evaluation of the estimated 
value shall be performed by the firm on a best 
effort basis. 
In cases where the portfolio of a client includes 
the proceeds of one or more unsettled 
transactions, the information referred to in point 
(a) may be based either on the trade date or the 
settlement date, provided that the same basis is 
applied consistently to all such information in the 
statement. 
The periodic statement of client assets referred to 
in paragraph 1 shall not be provided where the 
investment firm provides its clients with access to 
an online system, which qualifies as a durable 
medium, where up-to-date statements of client's 
financial instruments or funds can be easily 
accessed by the client and the firm has evidence 
that the client has accessed this statement at least 
once during the relevant quarter. 
 
3.   Investment firms which hold financial 
instruments or funds and which carry out the 
service of portfolio management for a client may 
include the statement of client assets referred to in 
paragraph 1 in the periodic statement it provides 
to that client pursuant to Article 60(1). 
 
67.   CHAPTER 5 
Client money: insurance distribution activity 
 
5.1.1R 
(1) CASS 5.1 to CASS 5.6 apply, subject to (2), (3) and CASS 5.1.3 R 
to CASS 5.1.6 R, to a firm that receives or holds money in the course 
of or in connection with its insurance distribution activity. 
(2) CASS 5.1 to CASS 5.6 do not, subject to (3), apply: 
(a) to a firm to the extent that it acts in accordance with the client 
money chapter; or 
(c) to an insurance undertaking in respect of its permitted activities; or 
(d) to a managing agent when acting as such; or 
(e) with respect to money held by a firm which: 
(i) is an approved bank; and 
(ii) has requisite capital under article 10(6)(b) of the IDD; 
but only when held by the firm in an account with itself, in which case 
the firm must notify the client (whether through a client agreement, 
terms of business, or otherwise in writing) that: 
   No conceptual equivalent outside the UK although this is implied in EU and 
Irish rules depending on license. See Row 7.  
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(iii) money held for that client in an account with the approved bank 
will be held by the firm as banker and not as trustee (or in Scotland as 
agent); and 
(iv) as a result, the money will not be held in accordance with CASS 
5.1 to CASS 5.6. 
(3) A firm may elect to comply with: 
(b) CASS 5.1, CASS 5.2 and CASS 5.4 to CASS 5.6 in respect of 
money which it receives in the course of carrying on an activity which 
would be insurance distribution activity, and which money would be 
client money, but for article 72D of the Regulated Activities Order 
(Large risks contracts where risk situated outside the EEA); 
but the election must be in respect of all the firm's business which 
consists of that activity. 
 
(4) A firm must keep a record of any election in (3). 
 
68.   5.1.2G 
A firm that is an approved bank, and relies on the exemption under 
CASS 5.1.1 R (2)(e), should be able to account to all of its clients for 
amounts held on their behalf at all times. A bank account opened with 
the firm that is in the name of the client would generally be sufficient. 
When money from clients deposited with the firm is held in a pooled 
account, this account should be clearly identified as an account for 
clients. The firm should also be able to demonstrate that an amount 
owed to a specific client that is held within the pool can be reconciled 
with a record showing that individual's client balance and is, 
therefore, identifiable at any time. 
 
 4 IMR Guidance – Designation 
 
4.1 Designation of third party collection accounts in 
the financial records of a fund service provider  
 
(i) A fund service provider may hold investor 
money in an individually designated third 
party collection account e.g.,- “XYZ Ltd 
third party collection account Investment 
Fund A” or a pooled designated third 
party collection account(s) for all 
investment funds e.g.,- “XYZ Ltd third 
party collection account”.  
 
(ii) Where a fund service provider holds 
investor money in a pooled third party 
collection account, accounting 
segregation should be maintained. In its 
internal records, a fund service provider 
should maintain detailed and accurate 
records in order to identify how much 
each investor holds in that pooled third 
party collection account and movements 
in that balance.  
 
(iii) The designation in respect of a third party 
collection account requires the specific 
designation to be used with no variation 
permitted. The designation should be in 
the name field of the third party collection 
account and not in the address field.  
 
4.2 Designation of third party collection accounts in 
the financial records of a third party  
 
(i) Where the third party collection accounts 
are designated in the financial records of a 
third party, the designation should be in 
the name field of the third party collection 
account and not in the address field or 
any other field within the third party’s 
financial records. If a third party has 
limited capacity to record the full title, an 
abbreviation such as “Coll a/c” is 
acceptable. The Central Bank expects the 
verification of the designation to take the 
form of a bank statement or other 
electronic form. A fund service provider 
may hold this verification electronically.  
 
(ii) (ii) The verification process should be 
followed each time a third party collection 
account is opened and not each time 
investor money is deposited in that 
particular third party collection account. 
Arising from Regulation 75(1), the fund 
service provider has up to three working 
 Broadly, conceptual equivalent between UK and Irish rules – save for 
comments in Row 67 and the fact that no rules outside of UK contain a 
concept of primary pooling event and/or secondary pooling event (see below) 
which is of relevance to concept of “pooled account”.  
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days after the initial deposit of the money 
to withdraw the money if the third party 
collection account is not correctly 
designated. This process of designation 
verification is a separate process to what 
is required under Regulation 75(2)(b), 
which relates to ensuring that the third 
party collection account is set up in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
Investor Money Facilities Agreement.  
 
(iii) The Investor Money Facilities Agreement 
can be printed on the headed paper of the 
fund service provider of the third party, 
should be signed and dated by the third 
party and stamped with the third party’s 
official stamp. The Agreement should be 
reviewed annually and may need to be 
amended in the event of any change in 
the relationship between a fund service 
provider and the relevant third party. 
Where third party collection accounts are 
opened simultaneously (i.e. on the same 
day), one confirmation may be obtained 
but the fund service provider should 
ensure that the confirmation from the 
third party lists all applicable account 
numbers. This confirmation can be 
provided and received in electronic form. 
 
6 IMR Guidance  
 
Verification and Third Party Collection Accounts 
 
Where third party collection accounts are opened 
simultaneously (i.e. on the same day), one confirmation 
of the third party collection account may be obtained 
but the fund service provider should ensure that the 
confirmation from the third party lists all applicable 
account numbers. This confirmation can be provided 
and received in electronic form. 
 
69.   5.1.3R 
An authorised professional firm regulated by The Law Society (of 
England and Wales), The Law Society of Scotland or The Law 
Society of Northern Ireland that, with respect to its regulated 
activities, is subject to the rules of its designated professional body as 
specified in CASS 5.1.4 R, in force on 14 January 2005, must comply 
with those rules and if it does so, it will be deemed to comply with 
CASS 5.2 to CASS 5.6. 
 
   No real conceptual equivalent in EU (to a lesser degree) or Irish rules (to a 
greater degree) but implied elsewhere.  
70.   5.1.4R 
For the purposes of CASS 5.1.3 R the relevant rules are: 
(1) If regulated by the Law Society (of England and Wales); 
(a) the Solicitors' Accounts Rules 1998; or 
(b) where applicable, the Solicitors Overseas Practice Rules 1990; 
(2) if regulated by the Law Society of Scotland, the Solicitors' 
(Scotland) Accounts, Accounts Certificate, Professional Practice and 
Guarantee Fund Rules 2001; 
(3) if regulated by the Law Society of Northern Ireland, the Solicitors' 
Accounts Regulations 1998. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 69. 
71.   5.1.4AR 
(1) A firm will, subject to (3), be deemed to comply with CASS 5.3 to 
CASS 5.6 if it receives or holds client money and it either: 
(a) in relation to a service charge, complies with the requirement to 
segregate such money in accordance with section 42 of the Landlord 
and Tenant Act 1987 ("the 1987 Act"); or 
(b) in relation to money which is clients' money for the purpose of the 
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors' Rules of Conduct ("RICS 
rules") in force as at 14 January 2005, it complies with the 
requirement to segregate and account for such money in accordance 
with the RICS Members' Accounts rules. 
(2) Paragraph (1)(a) also applies to a firm in Scotland or in Northern 
Ireland if in acting as a property manager the firm receives or holds a 
   Same comment as in Row 69. 
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service charge and complies (so far as practicable) with section 42 of 
the 1987 Act as if the requirements of that provision applied to it. 
(3) In addition to complying with (1), a firm must ensure that an 
account in which money held pursuant to the trust fund mentioned in 
section 42(3) of the 1987 Act or an account maintained in accordance 
with the RICS rules satisfies the requirements in CASS 5.5.49 R to 
the extent that the firm will hold money as trustee or otherwise on 
behalf of its clients. 
 
72.   5.1.5R 
Subject to CASS 5.1.5A R money is not client money when: 
(1) it becomes properly due and payable to the firm: 
(a) for its own account; or 
(b) in its capacity as agent of an insurance undertaking where the firm 
acts in accordance with CASS 5.2; or 
(2) it is otherwise received by the firm pursuant to an arrangement 
made between an insurance undertaking and another person (other 
than a firm) by which that other person has authority to underwrite 
risks, settle claims or handle refunds of premiums on behalf of that 
insurance undertaking outside the United Kingdom and where the 
money relates to that business. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 69. 
73.   5.1.5AR 
CASS 5.1.5 R (1)(b) and CASS 5.1.5 R (2) do not apply, and hence 
money is client money, in any case where: 
 
(1) in relation to an activity specified in CASS 5.2.3 R (1) (a) to 
CASS 5.2.3 R (1) (c), the insurance undertaking has agreed that the 
firm may treat money which it receives and holds as agent of the 
undertaking, as client money and in accordance with the provisions of 
CASS 5.3 to CASS 5.6; and 
(2) the agreement in (1) is in writing and adequate to show that the 
insurance undertaking consents to its interests under the trusts (or in 
Scotland agency) in CASS 5.3.2 R or CASS 5.4.7 R being 
subordinated to the interests of the firm's other clients. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 69. 
74.   5.1.6R 
Except where a firm and an insurance undertaking have (in 
accordance with CASS 5.1.5A R) agreed otherwise, for the purposes 
of CASS 5.1 to CASS 5.6 an insurance undertaking (when acting as 
such) with whom a firm conducts insurance distribution activity is not 
to be treated as a client of the firm. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 69. 
75.   Purpose 
5.1.7G 
(1) Principle 10 (Clients' assets) requires a firm to arrange adequate 
protection for clients' assets when the firm is responsible for them. An 
essential part of that protection is the proper accounting and handling 
of client money. The rules in CASS 5.1 to CASS 5.6 also give effect 
to the requirement in article 10.6 of the IDD that all necessary 
measures should be taken to protect clients against the inability of an 
insurance intermediary to transfer premiums to an insurance 
undertaking or to transfer the proceeds of a claim or premium refund 
to the insured. 
(2) There are two particular approaches which firms can adopt which 
reflect options given in article 10.6. The first is to provide by law or 
contract for a transfer of risk from the insurance intermediary to the 
insurance undertaking (CASS 5.2). The second is that client money is 
strictly segregated by being transferred to client accounts that cannot 
be used to reimburse other creditors in the event of the firm's 
insolvency (CASS 5.3 and CASS 5.4 provide different means of 
achieving such segregation). CASS 5.1.5A R permits a firm subject to 
certain conditions to treat money which it collects as agent of an 
insurance undertaking as client money; the principle of strict 
segregation is, however, satisfied because such undertakings must 
agree to their interests being subordinated to the interests of the firm's 
other clients. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 69. 
76.   5.1.8G 
A firm which carries on MiFID business or designated investment 
business in relation to life assurance business may, in accordance with 
CASS 7.10.3R and in relation to that business only, either comply 
with CASS 7 or elect to comply with the insurance client money 
chapter. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 69. 
77.  Article 8 Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Member States shall require investment firms to 
ensure that their external auditors report at least 
5.1.9G 
Firms are reminded that SUP 3 contains provisions which are relevant 
to the preparation and delivery of reports by auditors. 
 
Regulation 65 IMR 2017 
 
Client asset examination 
 
11 IMR Guidance 
 
Investor Money Examination 
 
What is the Client Asset Examination (“CAE”)? 
 
G9 (1) The CAE may be carried out by the investment 
firm’s statutory auditor or an independent auditor. An 
Conceptually equivalent although Irish rules go considerably beyond the rules 
introduced at the EU level, only addressed at a high-level in the UK CASS 
rules (but similar concepts – albeit less pronounced – exist in FCA Handbook 
SUP and SYSC), and considerably expanded in the Irish rules. 
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annually to the competent authority of the home 
Member State of the firm on the adequacy of the 
firm's arrangements under Article 16(8), (9) and 
(10) of Directive 2014/65/EU and this Chapter. 
65. (1) An investment firm shall arrange for an external 
auditor to prepare a report as part of, or in addition to, the 
report required under paragraph 7 of Schedule 3 to the 
MiFID Regulations (in this Part referred to as an 
“assurance report”) in relation to that investment firm’s 
safeguarding of client assets at least on an annual basis. 
 
(2) An investment firm shall ensure that the external 
auditor appointed for the purposes of paragraph (1)— 
 
(a) has the necessary resources and skills relating to the 
business of the investment firm, 
 
(b) receives the investment firm’s full cooperation in a 
timely manner in relation to conducting the client asset 
examination and the preparation of the assurance report, 
 
(c) in addition to the requirements of paragraph 7 of 
Schedule 3 to the MiFID Regulations, reports as to 
whether, throughout the period to which the client asset 
examination relates— 
 
(i) the investment firm has maintained processes and 
systems adequate to meet the requirements of this Part, 
 
(ii) the investment firm was compliant with this Part as at 
the period end date, 
 
(iii) any matter has come to the attention of the external 
auditor to suggest that the investment firm has acted in a 
manner which is not consistent with that documented 
within the client asset management plan which has been in 
operation, and 
 
(iv) any changes made to the client asset management plan 
have been drafted in sufficient detail to meet the 
requirements of this Part, capturing the risks faced by the 
investment firm in holding client assets, given the nature 
and complexity of the business of the investment firm. 
 
(3) The board of the investment firm shall assess the 
findings of the assurance report. 
 
(4) The investment firm shall ensure that any remedial 
actions necessary arising from the assurance report are set 
out in writing, submitted to the Bank in accordance with 
Regulation 68 and the timeframes referred to in 
Regulation 68, and that such remedial actions are carried 
out without delay. 
 
(5) If an investment firm which is permitted to hold client 
assets, claims not to have held client assets throughout the 
period to which the client asset examination relates, the 
investment firm shall— 
 
(a) arrange that an external auditor performs such 
procedures as the external auditor deems appropriate to 
enable the external auditor to determine whether anything 
has come to its attention that causes the external auditor to 
believe that the investment firm held client assets during 
that period, and 
 
(b) ensure that the external auditor provides the assurance 
report to the investment firm in a timely manner and in 
any event, in good time to enable the investment firm to 
comply with its reporting obligations under Regulation 68. 
11.1 Who may conduct the Investor Money 
Examination  
 
The investor money examination may be conducted by 
the fund service provider’s statutory auditor or another 
external auditor. A fund service provider should 
provide the auditor with all information and 
explanations that the auditor requires for the purposes 
of conducting the investor money examination.  
 
11.2 The Scope of the Investor Money Examination  
 
(i) In relation to the assessment of the 
investor money management plan, a fund 
service provider should ensure that the 
auditor reviews the process undertaken 
by the fund service provider to assess the 
on-going appropriateness of the investor 
money management plan, including 
evidence of the steps taken by the fund 
service provider to test and maintain the 
investor money management plan.  
 
(ii) In addition to all other procedures that 
the auditor deems necessary for the 
completion of the investor money 
examination, subject to the 
considerations as set out within the 
auditor’s technical standard1 on auditing 
compliance with the Regulations, the 
Central Bank expects a fund service 
provider to engage with the auditor to 
seek, at a minimum, third party 
confirmations (external confirmations) for 
a representative sample of account 
balances held in respect of investor 
money, both at year-end and also on one 
other randomly selected date during the 
year.  
 
11.2 When any findings arise from the Investor 
Money Examination  
 
The assurance report prepared by the auditor 
following the Investor Money Examination 
should make provision for the fund service 
provider to comment and to set out actions it 
has taken, or will take, where the report has 
identified recommendations for remediation 
and to ensure that such remedial actions are 
submitted in writing to the Central Bank. The 
fund service provider should address those 
findings without delay. The auditor is not 
required to comment on the appropriateness of 
the fund service provider’s proposed remedial 
action. 
investment firm should provide the auditor with all 
information and explanations that the auditor requires 
for the purposes of completing the CAE. 
 
What is the scope of the CAE?  
 
G9 (2) The assurance audit report should  provide a 
reasonable assurance9 opinion in respect of Regulation 
9(3)(a) and (b) and a limited assurance opinion in 
respect of Regulation 9(3)(c) and (d).  
 
G9 (3) In relation to the assessment of the CAMP, an 
investment firm should ensure that the auditor reviews 
the process undertaken by the investment firm to assess 
the on-going appropriateness of the CAMP including 
evidence of the steps taken by the investment firm to test 
and maintain the CAMP.   
 
G9 (4) In addition to all other procedures which the 
auditor deems necessary for the completion of the CAE, 
subject to the considerations as set out within the 
auditor’s technical standard on auditing compliance with 
the Regulations, the Central Bank expects the 
investment firm to engage with the auditor to seek at a 
minimum:  
a) third party confirmations (external confirmations) for 
a representative sample of balances held in respect of 
client assets both at year-end and also on one other 
randomly scheduled date during the year;   
b) positive confirmation requests from a representative 
sample of clients, as determined by the auditor, of client 
asset balances at the randomly selected date during the 
year, other than the period end date. 
78.   5.2 Holding money as agent of an insurance undertaking 
 
Introduction 
5.2.1G 
If a firm holds money as agent of an insurance undertaking then the 
firm's clients (who are not insurance undertakings) will be adequately 
protected to the extent that the premiums which it receives are treated 
as being received by the insurance undertaking when they are 
received by the agent and claims money and premium refunds will 
only be treated as received by the client when they are actually paid 
over. The rules in CASS 5.2 make provision for agency agreements 
between firms and insurance undertakings to contain terms which 
make clear when money should be held by a firm as agent of an 
   No conceptual equivalent outside the UK although this is implied in EU and 
Irish rules depending on license. See Row 7. 
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undertaking. Firms should refer to CASS 5.1.5 R to determine the 
circumstances in which they may treat money held on behalf of 
insurance undertakings as client money. 
 
79.   5.2.2G 
(1) Agency agreements between insurance intermediaries and 
insurance undertakings may be of a general kind and facilitate the 
introduction of business to the insurance undertaking. Alternatively, 
an agency agreement may confer on the intermediary contractual 
authority to commit the insurance undertaking to risk or authority to 
settle claims or handle premium refunds (often referred to as "binding 
authorities"). CASS 5.2.3 R requires that binding authorities of this 
kind must provide that the intermediary is to act as the agent of the 
insurance undertaking for the purpose of receiving and holding 
premiums (if the intermediary has authority to commit the insurance 
undertaking to risk), claims monies (if the intermediary has authority 
to settle claims on behalf of the insurance undertaking) and premium 
refunds (if the intermediary has authority to make refunds of premium 
on behalf of the insurance undertaking). Accordingly such money is 
not, except where a firm and an insurance undertaking have in 
compliance with CASS 5.1.5A R agreed otherwise, client money for 
the purposes of CASS 5. 
(2) Other introductory agency agreements may also, depending on 
their precise terms, satisfy some or all of the requirements of the type 
of written agreement described in CASS 5.2.3 R. It is desirable that an 
intermediary should, before informing its clients (in accordance with 
CASS 5.2.3 R (3)) that it will receive money as agent of an insurance 
undertaking, agree the terms of that notification with the relevant 
insurance undertakings. 
 
   No conceptual equivalent outside the UK although this is implied in EU and 
Irish rules depending on license. See Row 7. 
80.   Requirement for written agreement before acting as agent of an 
insurance undertaking 
5.2.3R 
(1) A firm must not agree to: 
(a) deal in investments as agent for an insurance undertaking in 
connection with an insurance distribution activity; or 
(b) act as agent for an insurance undertaking for the purpose of 
settling claims or handling premium refunds; or 
(c) otherwise receive money as agent of an insurance undertaking; 
unless: 
 
(d) it has entered into a written agreement with the insurance 
undertaking to that effect; and 
(e) it is satisfied on reasonable grounds that the terms of the policies 
issued by the insurance undertaking to the firm's clients are likely to 
be compatible with such an agreement; and 
(f) 
(i) (in the case of (a)) the agreement required by (d) expressly 
provides for the firm to act as agent of the insurance undertaking for 
the purpose of receiving premiums from the firm's clients; and 
(ii) (in the case of (b)) the agreement required by (d) expressly 
provides for the firm to act as agent of the insurance undertaking for 
the purpose of receiving and holding claims money (or, as the case 
may be, premium refunds) prior to transmission to the client making 
the claim (or, as the case may be, entitled to the premium refund) in 
question. 
(2) A firm must retain a copy of any agreement it enters pursuant to 
(1) for a period of at least six years from the date on which it is 
terminated. 
(3) Where a firm holds, or is to hold, money as agent for an insurance 
undertaking it must ensure that it informs those of its clients which are 
not insurance undertakings and whose transactions may be affected by 
the arrangement (whether in its terms of business, client agreements 
or otherwise in writing) that it will hold their money as agent of the 
insurance undertaking and if necessary the extent of such agency and 
whether it includes all items of client money or is restricted, for 
example, to the receipt of premiums. 
(4) A firm may (subject to the consent of the insurance undertaking 
concerned) include in an agreement in (1) provision for client money 
received by its appointed representative, field representatives and 
other agents to be held as agent for the insurance undertaking (in 
which event it must ensure that the representative or agent provides 
the information to clients required by (3)). 
 
   No conceptual equivalent outside the UK although this is implied in EU and 
Irish rules depending on license. See Row 7. 
81.   5.2.4G 
Firms are reminded that CASS 5.1.5A R provides that, if the 
insurance undertaking has agreed in writing, money held in 
accordance with an agreement made under CASS 5.2.3 R may be 
   No conceptual equivalent outside the UK although this is implied in EU and 
Irish rules depending on license. See Row 7.  
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treated as client money and may (but not otherwise) be kept in a client 
bank account. 
 
82.   5.2.5G 
A firm which provides for the protection of a client(which is not an 
insurance undertaking) under CASS 5.2 is relieved of the obligation 
to provide protection for that client under CASS 5.3 or CASS 5.4 to 
the extent of the items of client money protected by the agency 
agreement. 
 
   No conceptual equivalent outside the UK although this is implied in EU and 
Irish rules depending on license. See Row 7.  
83.   5.2.6G 
A firm may, in accordance with CASS 5.2.3 R (4), arrange for an 
insurance undertaking to accept responsibility for the money held by 
its appointed representatives, field representatives, and other agents, 
in which event CASS 5.5.18 R to CASS 5.5.25 G will not apply. 
 
   No conceptual equivalent outside the UK although this is implied in EU and 
Irish rules depending on license. See Row 7.  
84.   5.2.7G 
A firm may operate on the basis of an agency agreement as provided 
for by CASS 5.2.3 R for some of its clients and with protection 
provided by a client money trust in accordance with CASS 5.3 or 
CASS 5.4 for other clients. A firm may also operate on either basis 
for the same client but in relation to different transactions. A firm 
which does so should be satisfied that its administrative systems and 
controls are adequate and, in accordance with CASS 5.2.4 G, should 
ensure that money held for both types of client and business is kept 
separate. 
 
   No conceptual equivalent outside the UK although this is implied in EU and 
Irish rules depending on license. See Row 7.  
85.   5.3 Statutory trust 
 
5.3.1G 
Section 137B(1) of the Act (Miscellaneous ancillary matters) provides 
that rules may make provision which results in client money being 
held by a firm on trust (England and Wales and Northern Ireland) or 
as agent (Scotland only). CASS 5.3.2 R creates a fiduciary 
relationship between the firm and its client under which client money 
is in the legal ownership of the firm but remains in the beneficial 
ownership of the client. In the event of failure of the firm, costs 
relating to the distribution of client money may have to be borne by 
the trust. 
 
Regulation 48(2) IMR 2017 
 
(2) An investment firm shall take all steps as may be 
necessary to ensure that any client asset is held by it in 
trust for the benefit of the client on behalf of whom such 
client asset is being held. 
  No conceptual equivalent outside the UK although this is implied in EU and 
Irish rules albeit not with reference to a statutory trust. The UK rules are 
very (welcomingly) prescriptive as to requirements. 
86.   5.3.2R 
A firm (other than a firm acting in accordance with CASS 5.4) 
receives and holds client money as trustee (or in Scotland as agent) on 
the following terms: 
 
(1) for the purposes of and on the terms of CASS 5.3, CASS 5.5 and 
the client money (insurance) distribution rules; 
(2) subject to (4), for the clients (other than clients which are 
insurance undertakings when acting as such) for whom that money is 
held, according to their respective interests in it; 
(3) after all valid claims in (2) have been met, for clients which are 
insurance undertakings according to their respective interests in it; 
(4) on the failure of the firm, for the payment of the costs properly 
attributable to the distribution of the client money in accordance with 
(2) and (3); and 
(5) after all valid claims and costs under (2) to (4) have been met, for 
the firm itself. 
 
   No conceptual equivalent outside the UK although this is implied in EU and 
Irish rules albeit not with reference to a statutory trust. The UK rules are 
very (welcomingly) prescriptive as to requirements. 
87.   5.3.3G 
(1) A firm which holds client money can discharge its obligation to 
ensure adequate protection for its clients in respect of such money by 
complying with CASS 5.3 which provides for such money to be held 
by the firm on the terms of a trust imposed by the rules. 
(2) The trust imposed by CASS 5.3 is limited to a trust in respect of 
client money which a firm receives and holds. The consequential and 
supplementary requirements in CASS 5.5 are designed to secure the 
proper segregation and maintenance of adequate client money 
balances. In particular, CASS 5.5 does not permit a firm to use client 
money balances to provide credit for clients (or potential clients) such 
that, for example, their premium obligations may be met in advance 
of the premium being remitted to the firm. A firm wishing to provide 
credit for clients may however do so out of its own funds. 
 
   No conceptual equivalent outside the UK although this is implied in EU and 
Irish rules albeit not with reference to a statutory trust. The UK rules are 
very (welcomingly) prescriptive as to requirements. 
88.   5.4 Non-statutory client money trust 
 
Introduction 
5.4.1G 
(1) CASS 5.4 permits a firm, which has adequate resources, systems 
and controls, to declare a trust on terms which expressly authorise it, 
   No conceptual equivalent outside the UK although this is implied in EU and 
Irish rules albeit not with reference to a statutory trust. The UK rules are 
very (welcomingly) prescriptive as to requirements. 
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in its capacity as trustee, to make advances of credit to the firm's 
clients. The client money trust required by CASS 5.4 extends to such 
debt obligations which will arise if the firm, as trustee, makes credit 
advances, to enable a client's premium obligations to be met before 
the premium is remitted to the firm and similarly if it allows claims 
and premium refunds to be paid to the client before receiving 
remittance of those monies from the insurance undertaking. 
(2) CASS 5.4 does not permit a firm to make advances of credit to 
itself out of the client money trust. Accordingly, CASS 5.4 does not 
permit a firm to withdraw commission from the client money trust 
before it has received the premium from the client in relation to the 
non-investment insurance contract which generated the commission. 
 
89.   Voluntary nature of this section 
5.4.2R 
A firm may elect to comply with the requirements in this section, and 
may do so for some of its business whilst complying with CASS 5.3 
for other parts. 
 
   No conceptual equivalent outside the UK although this is implied in EU and 
Irish rules albeit not with reference to a statutory trust. The UK rules are 
very (welcomingly) prescriptive as to requirements. 
90.   5.4.3R 
A firm is not subject to CASS 5.3 when and to the extent that it acts in 
accordance with this section. 
 
   No conceptual equivalent outside the UK although this is implied in EU and 
Irish rules albeit not with reference to a statutory trust. The UK rules are 
very (welcomingly) prescriptive as to requirements. 
91.   Conditions for using the non-statutory client money trust 
5.4.4R 
A firm may not handle client money in accordance with the rules in 
this section unless each of the following conditions is satisfied: 
 
(1) the firm must have and maintain systems and controls which are 
adequate to ensure that the firm is able to monitor and manage its 
client money transactions and any credit risk arising from the 
operation of the trust arrangement and, if in accordance with CASS 
5.4.2 R a firm complies with both the rules in CASS 5.3 and CASS 
5.4, such systems and controls must extend to both arrangements; 
(2) the firm must obtain, and keep current, written confirmation from 
its auditor that it has in place systems and controls which are adequate 
to meet the requirements in (1); 
(3) the firm must designate a manager with responsibility for 
overseeing the firm's day to day compliance with the systems and 
controls in (1) and the rules in this section; 
(4) the firm (if, under the terms of the non-statutory trust, it is to 
handle client money for retail customers) must have and at all times 
maintain capital resources of not less than £50,000 calculated in 
accordance with MIPRU 4.4.1 R; and 
(5) in relation to each of the clients for whom the firm holds money in 
accordance with CASS 5.4, the firm must take reasonable steps to 
ensure that its terms of business or other client agreements adequately 
explain, and obtain the client's informed consent to, the firm holding 
the client's money in accordance with CASS 5.4 (and in the case of a 
client which is an insurance undertaking (when acting as such) there 
must be an agreement which satisfies CASS 5.1.5A R). 
CASS 5.4.5G01/01/2007 
RP 
The amount of a firm's capital resources maintained for the purposes 
of MIPRU 4.2.11 R will also satisfy (in whole or in part) the 
requirement in CASS 5.4.4 R (4). 
 
   No conceptual equivalent outside the UK although this is implied in EU and 
Irish rules albeit not with reference to a statutory trust. The UK rules are 
very (welcomingly) prescriptive as to requirements. 
92.   Client money to be received under the non-statutory client money 
trust 
5.4.6R 
Except to the extent that a firm acts in accordance with CASS 5.3, a 
firm must not receive or hold any client money unless it does so as 
trustee (or, in Scotland, as agent) and has properly executed a deed (or 
equivalent formal document) to that effect. 
 
   No conceptual equivalent outside the UK although this is implied in EU and 
Irish rules albeit not with reference to a statutory trust. The UK rules are 
very (welcomingly) prescriptive as to requirements. 
93.   Contents of trust deed 
5.4.7R 
The deed referred to in CASS 5.4.6 R must provide that the money 
(and, if appropriate, designated investments) are held: 
 
(1) for the purposes of and on the terms of: 
(a) CASS 5.4; 
(b) the applicable provisions of CASS 5.5; and 
(c) the client money (insurance) distribution rules 
(2) subject to (4), for the clients (other than clients which are 
insurance undertakings when acting as such) for whom that money is 
held, according to their respective interests in it; 
(3) after all valid claims in (2) have been met for clients which are 
insurance undertakings according to their respective interests in it; 
   No conceptual equivalent outside the UK although this is implied in EU and 
Irish rules albeit not with reference to a statutory trust. The UK rules are 
very (welcomingly) prescriptive as to requirements. 
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(4) on failure of the firm, for the payment of the costs properly 
attributable to the distribution of the client money in accordance with 
(2) and (3); and 
(5) after all valid claims and costs under (2) to (4) have been met, for 
the firm itself. 
CASS 5.4.8R14/01/2005 
RP 
The deed (or equivalent formal document) referred to in CASS 5.4.6 
R may provide that: 
 
(1) the firm, acting as trustee (or, in Scotland, as agent), has power to 
make advances or give credit to clients or insurance undertakings 
from client money, provided that it also provides that any debt or 
other obligation of a client or resulting obligation of an insurance 
undertaking, in relation to an advance or credit, is held on the same 
terms as CASS 5.4.7 R; 
(2) the benefit of a letter of credit or unconditional guarantee provided 
by an approved bank on behalf of a firm to satisfy any shortfall in the 
firm's client money resource (as calculated under CASS 5.5.65 R) 
when compared with the firm's client money requirement (as 
calculated under CASS 5.5.66 R or as appropriate CASS 5.5.68 R), is 
held on the same terms as CASS 5.4.7 R. 
 
94.   5.5 Segregation and the operation of client money accounts 
 
Application 
5.5.1R 
Unless otherwise stated each of the provisions in CASS 5.5 applies to 
firms which are acting in accordance with CASS 5.3 (Statutory trust) 
or CASS 5.4 (Non-statutory trust). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules.   
95.   5.5.2G 
One purpose of CASS 5.5 is to ensure that, unless otherwise 
permitted, client money is kept separate from the firm's own money. 
Segregation, in the event of a firm's failure, is important for the 
effective operation of the trust that is created to protect client money. 
The aim is to clarify the difference between client money and general 
creditors' entitlements in the event of the failure of the firm. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules. 
96.   Requirement to segregate 
5.5.3R 
A firm must, except to the extent permitted by CASS 5.5, hold client 
money separate from the firm's money. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules. 
97.   Money due to a client from a firm 
5.5.4R 
If a firm is liable to pay money to a client, it must as soon as possible, 
and no later than one business day after the money is due and payable: 
 
(1) pay it into a client bank account, in accordance with CASS 5.5.5 
R; or 
(2) pay it to, or to the order of, the client. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules. 
98.   Segregation 
5.5.5R 
A firm must segregate client money by either: 
 
(1) paying it as soon as is practicable into a client bank account; or 
(2) paying it out in accordance with CASS 5.5.80 R. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules. 
99.   5.5.6G 
The FCA expects that in most circumstances it will be practicable for 
a firm to pay client money into a client bank account by not later than 
the next business day after receipt. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules. 
100.   5.5.7G 
Where an insurance transaction involves more than one firm acting in 
a chain such that for example money is transferred from a "producing" 
broker who has received client money from a consumer to an 
intermediate broker and thereafter to an insurance undertaking, each 
broker firm will owe obligations to its immediate client to segregate 
client money which it receives (in this example the producing broker 
in relation to the consumer and the intermediate broker in relation to 
the producing broker). A firm which allows a third party broker to 
hold or control client money will not thereby be relieved of its 
fiduciary obligations (see CASS 5.5.34 R). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules. 
101.   5.5.8R    Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules. 
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A firm may segregate client money in a different currency from that 
of receipt. If it does so, the firm must ensure that the amount held is 
adjusted at intervals of not more than twenty five business days to an 
amount at least equal to the original currency amount (or the currency 
in which the firm has its liability to its clients, if different), translated 
at the previous day's closing spot exchange rate. 
 
102.   5.5.9R 
A firm must not hold money other than client money in a client bank 
account unless it is: 
 
(1) a minimum sum required to open the account, or to keep it open; 
or 
(2) money temporarily in the account in accordance with CASS 5.5.16 
R (Withdrawal of commission and mixed remittance); or 
(3) interest credited to the account which exceeds the amount due to 
clients as interest and has not yet been withdrawn by the firm. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
103.   5.5.10R 
If it is prudent to do so to ensure that client money is protected (and 
provided that doing so would otherwise be in accordance with CASS 
5.5.63 R (1)(b)(ii)), a firm may pay into, or maintain in, a client bank 
account money of its own, and that money will then become client 
money for the purposes of CASS 5 and the client money (insurance) 
distribution rules. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
104.   5.5.11R 
A firm, when acting in accordance with CASS 5.3 (statutory trust), 
must ensure that the total amount of client money held for each client 
in any of the firm's client money bank accounts is positive and that no 
payment is made from any such account for the benefit of a client 
unless the client has provided the firm with cleared funds to enable 
the payment to be made. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
105.   5.5.11AG 
When a firm acts in accordance with CASS 5.3 (Statutory trust) it 
should not make a payment from the client bank account unless it is 
satisfied on reasonable grounds that the client has provided it with 
cleared funds. Accordingly, a firm should normally allow a 
reasonable period of time for cheques to clear. If a withdrawal is 
made and the client's cheque is subsequently dishonoured it will be 
the firm's responsibility to make good the shortfall in the account as 
quickly as possible (and without delay whilst a cheque is re-
presented). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
106.   5.5.12R 
If client money is received by the firm in the form of an automated 
transfer, the firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that: 
 
(1) the money is received directly into a client bank account; and 
(2) if money is received directly into the firm's own account, the 
money is transferred into a client bank account no later than the next 
business day after receipt. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
107.   5.5.13G 
A firm can hold client money in either a general client bank account 
(CASS 5.5.38 R) or a designated client bank account (CASS 5.5.39 
R). A firm holds all client money in general client bank accounts for 
its clients as part of a common pool of money so those particular 
clients do not have a claim against a specific sum in a specific 
account; they only have a claim to the client money in general. A firm 
holds client money in designated client bank accounts for those clients 
who requested that their client money be part of a specific pool of 
money, so those particular clients do have a claim against a specific 
sum in a specific account; they do not have a claim to the client 
money in general unless a primary pooling event occurs. If the firm 
becomes insolvent, and there is (for whatever reason) a shortfall in 
money held for a client compared with that client's entitlements, the 
available funds will be distributed in accordance with the client 
money (insurance) distribution rules. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
108.   Non-statutory trust - segregation of designated investments 
5.5.14R 
(1) A firm which handles client money in accordance with the rules 
for a non-statutory trust in CASS 5.4 may, to the extent it considers 
appropriate, but subject to (2), satisfy the requirement to segregate 
client money by segregating or arranging for the segregation of 
designated investments with a value at least equivalent to such money 
as would otherwise have been segregated into a client bank account. 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
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(2) A firm may not segregate designated investments unless it: 
(a) takes reasonable steps to ensure that any consumers whose client 
money interests may be protected by such segregation are aware that 
the firm may operate such an arrangement and have (whether through 
its terms of business, client agreements, or otherwise in writing) an 
adequate opportunity to give their informed consent; 
(b) ensures that the terms on which it will segregate designated 
investments include provision for it to take responsibility for meeting 
any shortfall in its client money resource which is attributable to falls 
in the market value of a segregated investment; 
(c) provides in the deed referred to in CASS 5.4.6 R for designated 
investments which it segregates to be held by it on the terms of the 
non-statutory trust; and 
(d) takes reasonable steps to ensure that the segregation is at all times 
in conformity with the range of permitted investments, general 
principles and conditions in CASS 5 Annex 1 R. 
 
109.   5.5.15G 
A firm which takes advantage of CASS 5.5.14 R will need to consider 
whether its permission should include the permitted activity of 
managing investments. If the firm is granted a power to manage with 
discretion the funds over which it is appointed as trustee under the 
trust deed required by CASS 5.4 then it will be likely to need a 
permission to manage investments. It is unlikely to need such a 
permission, however, if it is merely granted a power to invest but the 
deed stipulates that the funds may only be managed with discretion by 
another firm (which has the necessary permission). Such an 
arrangement would not preclude the firm holding client money as 
trustee from appointing another firm (or firms) as manager and setting 
an appropriate strategy and overall asset allocation, subject to the 
limits set out in CASS 5 Ann 1 R. A firm may also need to consider 
whether it needs a permission to operate a collective investment 
scheme if any of its clients are to participate in the income or gains 
arising from the acquisition or disposal of designated investments. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
110.   Withdrawal of commission and mixed remittance 
5.5.16R 
(1) A firm may draw down commission from the client bank account 
if: 
(a) it has received the premium from the client (or from a third party 
premium finance provider on the client's behalf); and 
(b) this is consistent with the firm's terms of business which it 
maintains with the relevant client and the insurance undertaking to 
whom the premium will become payable; 
and the firm may draw down commission before payment of the 
premium to the insurance undertaking, provided that the conditions in 
(a) and (b) are satisfied. 
 
(2) If a firm receives a mixed remittance (that is part client money and 
part other money), it must: 
(a) pay the full sum into a client bank account in accordance with 
CASS 5.5.5 R; and 
(b) pay the money that is not client money out of the client bank 
account as soon as reasonably practicable and in any event by not 
later than twenty-five business days after the day on which the 
remittance is cleared (or, if earlier, when the firm performs the client 
money calculation in accordance with CASS 5.5.63 R (1)). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
111.   5.5.17G 
(1) As soon as commission becomes due to the firm (in accordance 
with CASS 5.5.16 R (1)) it must be treated as a remittance which 
must be withdrawn in accordance with CASS 5.5.16 R (2). The 
procedure required by CASS 5.5.16 R will also apply where moneyis 
due and payable to the firm in respect of fees due from clients 
(whether to the firm or other professionals). 
(2) Firms are reminded that money received in accordance with CASS 
5.2 must not, except where a firm and an insurance undertaking have 
(in accordance with CASS 5.1.5A R) agreed otherwise, be kept in a 
client bank account. Client money received from a third-party 
premium finance provider should, however, be segregated into a 
client bank account. 
(3) Where a client makes payments of premium to a firm in 
instalments, CASS 5.5.16 R (1) applies in relation to each instalment. 
(4) If a firm is unable to match a remittance with a transaction it may 
be unable to immediately determine whether the payment comprises a 
mixed remittance or is client money. In such cases the remittance 
should be treated as client money while the firm takes steps to match 
the remittance to a transaction as soon as possible. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
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112.   Appointed representatives, field representatives and other agents 
5.5.18R 
(1) Subject to (4), a firm must in relation to each of its appointed 
representatives, field representatives and other agents comply with 
CASS 5.5.19 R to CASS 5.5.21 R (Immediate segregation) or with 
CASS 5.5.23 R (Periodic segregation and reconciliation). 
(2) A firm must in relation to each representative or other agent keep 
a record of whether it is complying with CASS 5.5.19 R to CASS 
5.5.21 R or with CASS 5.5.23 R. 
(3) A firm is, but without affecting the application of CASS 5.5.19 R 
to CASS 5.5.23 R, to be treated as the recipient of client money which 
is received by any of its appointed representatives, field 
representatives or other agents. 
(4) Paragraphs (1) to (3) do not apply in relation to an appointed 
representative, field representative or other agent to which (if it were a 
firm) CASS 5.1.4AR (1) or CASS 5.1.4AR (2) would apply, but 
subject to the representative or agent maintaining an account which 
satisfies the requirements of CASS 5.5.49 R to the extent that the 
representative or agent will hold client money on trust or otherwise on 
behalf of its clients. 
 
   Conceptually jurisdiction specific to the UK.  
113.   Immediate segregation 
5.5.19R 
A firm must establish and maintain procedures to ensure that client 
money received by its appointed representatives, field representatives, 
or other agents of the firm is: 
 
(1) paid into a client bank account of the firm in accordance with 
CASS 5.5.5 R; or 
(2) forwarded to the firm, or in the case of a field representative 
forwarded to a specified business address of the firm, so as to ensure 
that the money arrives at the specified business address by the close of 
the third business day. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
114.   5.5.20G 
For the purposes of CASS 5.5.19 R, the client money received on 
business day one should be forwarded to the firm or specified 
business address of the firm no later than the next business day after 
receipt (business day two) in order for it to reach that firm or specified 
business address by the close of the third business day. Procedures 
requiring the client money to be sent to the firm or the specified 
business address of the firm by first class post no later than the next 
business day after receipt would meet the requirements of CASS 
5.5.19 R. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
115.   5.5.21R 
If client money is received in accordance with CASS 5.5.19 R, the 
firm must ensure that its appointed representatives, field 
representatives or other agents keep client money (whether in the 
form of premiums, claims money or premium refunds) separately 
identifiable from any other money (including that of the firm) until 
the client money is paid into a client bank account or sent to the firm. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
116.   5.5.22G 
A firm which acts in accordance with CASS 5.5.19 R to CASS 5.5.21 
R need not comply with CASS 5.5.23 R. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
117.   Periodic segregation and reconciliation 
5.5.23R 
(1) A firm must, on a regular basis, and at reasonable intervals, ensure 
that it holds in its client bank account an amount which (in addition to 
any other amount which it is required by these rules to hold) is not 
less than the amount which it reasonably estimates to be the aggregate 
of the amounts held at any time by its appointed representatives, field 
representatives, and other agents. 
(2) A firm must, not later than ten business days following the expiry 
of each period in (1): 
(a) carry out, in relation to each such representative or agent, a 
reconciliation of the amount paid by the firm into its client bank 
account with the amount of client money actually received and held 
by the representative or other agent; and 
(b) make a corresponding payment into, or withdrawal from, the 
account. 
 
 7 IMR Guidance 
 
Reconciliation 
 
An illustrative form of a bank reconciliation is included 
at Appendix I of [the IMR] Guidance.  
 
7.1 What a fund service provider must reconcile  
 
(i) A fund service provider should reconcile 
each third party collection account in the 
currency of denomination; dormant 
accounts should also be included.  
 
(ii) The balance on each third party collection 
account as recorded by the fund service 
provider should be reconciled with the 
balance on that account as set out in the 
statement, or similar document, issued by 
the relevant third party with which those 
third party collection accounts are held. 
 Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive and Irish rules are jurisdiction-specific as they 
relate to “fund service providers”.  
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The statement or other form of 
confirmation from the third party may be 
provided in an electronic format, on 
condition that the fund service provider 
retains a copy, either in electronic or hard 
copy format, and can be reproduced 
without delay. A fund service provider 
should ensure that the reconciliation is 
performed from investor money records 
that are accurate and that the 
reconciliation itself is performed 
accurately.  
 
(iii) A fund service provider should to be in a 
position to demonstrate upon request, 
the date on which a reconciliation was 
prepared. This evidence can be in 
electronic form.  
 
(iv) A fund service provider should ensure 
each reconciliation has relevant 
supporting backup material to facilitate 
the verification of figures in the 
reconciliation; the backup material should 
include statements received from third 
parties. (v) The manner in which the fund 
service provider exercises oversight 
should be documented in the fund service 
provider’s investor money management 
plan. The fund service provider should 
maintain a record to evidence the on-
going oversight of the process.  
 
7.2 IMR Guidance  
 
Material reconciliation differences for the purposes of 
reporting to the Central Bank  
 
(i) When considering whether a 
reconciliation difference is material, the 
Central Bank expects the following 
considerations to be taken into account:  
 
a) The monetary value of the 
reconciliation difference;  
 
b) The number of 
reconciliation differences 
appearing within 
reconciliations over time;  
 
c) The length of time that a 
reconciliation difference 
remains outstanding; and  
 
d) The nature of the 
reconciliation difference.  
 
(ii) Taking the quantum of the reconciliation 
difference into account alone when 
seeking to establish whether an amount is 
material may result in a number of low 
value reconciliation differences being 
ignored when in aggregate these issues 
may prove to be material to a fund service 
provider. Low value items by virtue of 
their nature, age or number of 
occurrences may be indicative of 
significant underlying issues within a fund 
service provider, which should be 
reported to the Central Bank. While not 
an exhaustive list, in general, 
reconciliation differences may arise as a 
result of:  
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a) Timing differences: The 
Central Bank expects any 
reconciliation timing 
difference that has not cleared 
within ten (10) working days 
to be reported as a material 
reconciliation difference.  
 
b) Errors on the part of a 
third party: It is a fund 
service provider’s 
responsibility to contact the 
third party in order to resolve 
any errors which it identifies. 
The Central Bank expects 
errors which remain un-
reconciled in excess of fifteen 
(15) working days to be 
reported as material 
reconciliation differences. c) 
Errors on the part of the fund 
service provider: The Central 
Bank expects errors which 
remain un-reconciled in 
excess of 15 working days to 
be reported as material 
reconciliation differences. 
However, errors identified in 
the fund service provider’s 
records which result in the 
fund service provider having 
to lodge own firm money into 
the third party collection 
account should be reported to 
the Central Bank without 
delay.  
 
 
(iii) The Central Bank may engage with a fund 
service provider to discuss how its 
material reconciliation differences have 
been determined and to assess if other 
factors need to be considered. 
118.   CASS 5.5.24G14/01/2005 
RP 
(1) CASS 5.5.23 R allows a firm with appointed representatives, field 
representatives and other agents to avoid the need for the 
representative to forward client money on a daily basis but instead 
requires a firm to segregate into its client money bank account 
amounts which it reasonably estimates to be sufficient to cover the 
amount of client money which the firm expects its representatives or 
agents to receive and hold over a given period. At the expiry of each 
such period, the firm must obtain information about the actual amount 
of client money received and held by its representatives so that it can 
reconcile the amount of client money it has segregated with the 
amounts actually received and held by its representatives and agents. 
The frequency at which this reconciliation is to be performed is not 
prescribed but it must be at regular and reasonable intervals having 
regard to the nature and frequency of the insurance business carried 
on by its representatives and agents. For example, a period of six 
months might be appropriate for a representative which conducts 
business involving the receipt of premiums only infrequently whilst 
for other representatives a periodic reconciliation at monthly intervals 
(or less) may be appropriate. 
(2) Where a firm operates on the basis of CASS 5.5.23 R, the money 
which is segregated into its client bank account is client money and 
will be available to meet any obligations owed to the clients of its 
representatives who for this purpose are treated as the firm's clients. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
119.   5.5.25G 
A firm which acts in accordance with CASS 5.5.23 R need not 
comply with CASS 5.5.19 R to CASS 5.5.21 R. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
120.   Client entitlements 
5.5.26R 
A firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that it is notified promptly 
of any receipt of client money in the form of client entitlements. 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
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121.   5.5.27G 
The 'entitlements' mentioned in CASS 5.5.26 R refer to any kind of 
miscellaneous payment which the firm receives on behalf of a client 
and which are due to be paid to the client. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
122.   5.5.28R 
When a firm receives a client entitlement on behalf of a client, it must 
pay any part of it which is client money: 
 
(1) for client entitlements received in the United Kingdom, into a 
client bank account in accordance with CASS 5.5.5 R; or 
(2) for client entitlements received outside the United Kingdom, into 
any bank account operated by the firm, provided that such client 
money is: 
(a) paid to, or in accordance with, the instructions of the client 
concerned; or 
(b) paid into a client bank account in accordance with CASS 5.5.5 R 
(1), as soon as possible but no later than five business days after the 
firm is notified of its receipt. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
123.   5.5.29R 
A firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that a client entitlement 
which is client money is allocated within a reasonable period of time 
after notification of receipt. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
124.   Interest and investment returns 
5.5.30R 
(1) In relation to consumers, a firm must, subject to (2), take 
reasonable steps to ensure that its terms of business or other client 
agreements adequately explain, and where necessary obtain a client's 
informed consent to, the treatment of interest and, if applicable, 
investment returns, derived from its holding of client money and any 
segregated designated investments. 
(2) In respect of interest earned on client bank accounts, (1) does not 
apply if a firm has reasonable ground to be satisfied that in relation to 
insurance distribution activities carried on with or for a consumer the 
amount of interest earned will be not more than £20 per transaction. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
125.   5.5.31G 
If no interest is payable to a consumer, that fact should be separately 
identified in the firm's client agreement or terms of business. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
126.   5.5.32G 
If a firm outlines its policy on its payment of interest, it need not 
necessarily disclose the actual rates prevailing at any particular time; 
the firm should disclose the terms, for example, LIBOR plus or minus 
'x' percentage points. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
127.   Transfer of client money to a third party 
5.5.33G 
CASS 5.5.34 R sets out the requirements a firm must comply with 
when it transfers client money to another person without discharging 
its fiduciary duty owed to that client. Such circumstances arise when, 
for example, a firm passes client money to another broker for the 
purposes of the client's transaction being effected. A firm can only 
discharge itself from its fiduciary duty by acting in accordance with, 
and in the circumstances permitted by, CASS 5.5.80 R. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
128.   5.5.34R 
A firm may allow another person, such as another broker to hold or 
control client money, but only if: 
 
(1) the firm transfers the client money for the purpose of a transaction 
for a client through or with that person; and 
(2) in the case of a consumer, that customer has been notified 
(whether through a client agreement, terms of business, or otherwise 
in writing) that the client money may be transferred to another person. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
129.   5.5.35G 
In relation to the notification required by CASS 5.5.34 R (2), there is 
no need for a firm to make a separate disclosure in relation to each 
transfer made. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
130.   5.5.36G 
A firm should not hold excess client money with another broker. It 
should be held in a client bank account. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
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131.   Client bank accounts 
5.5.37G 
The FCA generally requires a firm to place client money in a client 
bank account with an approved bank. However, a firm which is an 
approved bank must not (subject to CASS 5.1.1 R (2)(e)) hold client 
money in an account with itself. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
132.   5.5.38R 
(1) A firm must ensure that client money is held in a client bank 
account at one or more approved banks. 
(2) If the firm is a bank, it must not hold client money in an account 
with itself. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
133.   5.5.39R 
A firm may open one or more client bank accounts in the form of a 
designated client bank account. Characteristics of these accounts are 
that: 
 
(1) the account holds money of one or more clients; 
(2) the account includes in its title the word 'designated'; 
(3) the clients whose money is in the account have each consented in 
writing to the use of the bank with which the client money is to be 
held; and 
(4) in the event of the failure of that bank, the account is not pooled 
with any other type of account unless a primary pooling event occurs. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
134.   5.5.40G 
(1) A firm may operate as many client accounts as it wishes. 
(2) A firm is not obliged to offer its clients the facility of a designated 
client bank account. 
(3) Where a firm holds money in a designated client bank account, the 
effect upon either: 
(a) the failure of a bank where any other client bank account is held; 
or 
(b) the failure of a third party to whom money has been transferred 
out of any other client bank account in accordance with CASS 5.5.34 
R; 
(each of which is a secondary pooling event) is that money held in the 
designated client bank account is not pooled with money held in any 
other account. Accordingly clients whose money is held in a 
designated client bank account will not share in any shortfall resulting 
from a failure of the type described in (a) or (b). 
 
(4) Where a firm holds client money in a designated client bank 
account, the effect upon the failure of the firm (which is a primary 
pooling event ) is that money held in the designated client bank 
account is pooled with money in every other client bank account of 
the firm. Accordingly, clients whose money is held in a designated 
client bank account will share in any shortfall resulting from a 
failureof the firm. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
135.   5.5.41R 
A firm may hold client money with a bank that is not an approved 
bank if all the following conditions are met: 
 
(1) the client money relates to one or more insurance transactions 
which are subject to the law or market practice of a jurisdiction 
outside the United Kingdom; 
(2) because of the applicable law or market practice of that overseas 
jurisdiction, it is not possible to hold the client money in a client bank 
account with an approved bank; 
(3) the firm holds the money with such a bank for no longer than is 
necessary to effect the transactions; 
(4) the firm notifies each relevant client and has, in relation to a 
consumer, a client agreement, or terms of business which adequately 
explain that: 
(a) client money will not be held with an approved bank; 
(b) in such circumstances, the legal and regulatory regime applying to 
the bank with which the client money is held will be different from 
that of the United Kingdom and, in the event of a failure of the bank, 
the client money may be treated differently from the treatment which 
would apply if the client money were held by an approved bank in the 
United Kingdom; and 
(c) if it is the case, the particular bank has not accepted that it has no 
right of set-off or counterclaim against money held in a client bank 
account, in respect of any sum owed on any other account of the firm, 
notwithstanding the firm's request to the bank as required by CASS 
5.5.49 R; and 
(5) the client money is held in a designated bank account. 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
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136.   A firm's selection of a bank 
5.5.42G 
A firm owes a duty of care to a client when it decides where to place 
client money. The review required by CASS 5.5.43 R is intended to 
ensure that the risks inherent in placing client money with a bank are 
minimised or appropriately diversified by requiring a firm to consider 
carefully the bank or banks with which it chooses to place client 
money. For example, a firm which is likely only to hold relatively 
modest amounts of client money will be likely to be able to satisfy 
this requirement if it selects an authorised UK clearing bank. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
137.   5.5.43R 
Before a firm opens a client bank account and as often as is 
appropriate on a continuing basis (and no less than once in each 
financial year), it must take reasonable steps to establish that the bank 
is appropriate for that purpose. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
138.   5.5.44G 
A firm should consider diversifying placements of client money with 
more than one bank where the amounts are, for example, of sufficient 
size to warrant such diversification. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
139.   5.5.45G 
When considering where to place client money and to determine the 
frequency of the appropriateness test under CASS 5.5.43 R, a firm 
should consider taking into account, together with any other relevant 
matters: 
 
(1) the capital of the bank; 
(2) the amount of client money placed, as a proportion of the bank's 
capital and deposits; 
(3) the credit rating of the bank (if available); and 
(4) to the extent that the information is available, the level of risk in 
the investment and loan activities undertaken by the bank and its 
affiliated companies. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
140.   5.5.46G 
A firm will be expected to perform due diligence when opening a 
client bank account with a bank that is authorised by an EEA 
regulator. Any continuing assessment of that bank may be restricted 
to verification that it remains authorised by an EEA regulator. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
141.   Group banks 
5.5.47R 
Subject to CASS 5.5.41 R, a firm that holds or intends to hold client 
money with a bank which is in the same group as the firm must: 
 
(1) undertake a continuous review in relation to that bank which is at 
least as rigorous as the review of any bank which is not in the same 
group, in order to ensure that the decision to use a group bank is 
appropriate for the client; 
(2) disclose in writing to its client at the outset of the client 
relationship (whether by way of a client agreement, terms of business 
or otherwise in writing) or, if later, not less than 20 business days 
before it begins to hold client money of that client with that bank: 
(a) that it is holding or intends to hold client money with a bank in the 
same group; 
(b) the identity of the bank concerned; and 
(c) that the client may choose not to have his money placed with such 
a bank. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
142.   5.5.48R 
If a client has notified a firm in writing that he does not wish his 
money to be held with a bank in the same group as the firm, the firm 
must either: 
 
(1) place that client money in a client bank account with another bank 
in accordance with CASS 5.5.38 R; or 
(2) return that client money to, or pay it to the order of, the client. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
143.   Notification and acknowledgement of trust (banks) 
5.5.49R 
When a firm opens a client bank account, the firm must give or have 
given written notice to the bank requesting the bank to acknowledge 
to it in writing: 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
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(1) that all money standing to the credit of the account is held by the 
firm as trustee (or if relevant in Scotland, as agent) and that the bank 
is not entitled to combine the account with any other account or to 
exercise any right of set-off or counterclaim against money in that 
account in respect of any sum owed to it on any other account of the 
firm; and 
(2) that the title of the account sufficiently distinguishes that account 
from any account containing money that belongs to the firm, and is in 
the form requested by the firm. 
 
144.   5.5.50R 
In the case of a client bank account in the United Kingdom, if the 
bank does not provide the acknowledgement referred to in CASS 
5.5.49 R within 20 business days after the firm dispatched the notice, 
the firm must withdraw all money standing to the credit of the account 
and deposit it in a client bank account with another bank as soon as 
possible. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
145.   5.5.51R 
In the case of a client bank account outside the United Kingdom, if 
the bank does not provide the acknowledgement referred to in CASS 
5.5.49 R within 20 business days after the firm dispatched the notice, 
the firm must notify the client of this fact as set out in CASS 5.5.53 R. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
146.   5.5.52G 
Firms are reminded of the provisions of CASS 5.5.41 R (4), which 
sets out the notification and consents required when using a bank that 
is not an approved bank. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
147.   Notification to clients: use of an approved bank outside the United 
Kingdom 
5.5.53R 
A firm must not hold, for a consumer, client money in a client bank 
account outside the United Kingdom, unless the firm has previously 
disclosed to the consumer (whether in its terms of business, client 
agreement or otherwise in writing): 
 
(1) that his money may be deposited in a client bank account outside 
the United Kingdom but that the client may notify the firm that he 
does not wish his money to be held in a particular jurisdiction; 
(2) that in such circumstances, the legal and regulatory regime 
applying to the approved bank will be different from that of the 
United Kingdom and, in the event of a failure of the bank, his money 
may be treated in a different manner from that which would apply if 
the client money were held by a bank in the United Kingdom; and 
(3) if it is the case, that a particular bank has not accepted that it has 
no right of set-off or counterclaim against money held in a client bank 
account in respect of any sum owed on any other account of the firm, 
notwithstanding the firm's request to the bank as required by CASS 
5.5.49 R. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
148.   5.5.54G 
There is no need for a firm to make a separate disclosure under CASS 
5.5.53 R (1) and CASS 5.5.53 R (2) in relation to each jurisdiction. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
149.   5.5.55G 
Firms are reminded of the provisions of CASS 5.5.41 R (4), which 
sets out the notification and consents required when using a bank that 
is not an approved bank. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
150.   5.5.56R 
If a client has notified a firm in writing before entering into a 
transaction that client money is not to be held in a particular 
jurisdiction, the firm must either: 
 
(1) hold the client money in a client bank account in a jurisdiction to 
which the client has not objected; or 
(2) return the client money to, or to the order of, the client. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
151.   5.5.57G 
Firms are reminded of the provisions of CASS 5.5.41 R (4), which 
sets out the notification and consents required when using a bank that 
is not an approved bank. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
152.   Notification to consumers: use of broker or settlement agent 
outside the United Kingdom 
5.5.58R 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
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A firm must not undertake any transaction for a consumer that 
involves client money being passed to another broker or settlement 
agent located in a jurisdiction outside the United Kingdom, unless the 
firm has previously disclosed to the consumer (whether in its terms of 
business, client agreement or otherwise in writing): 
 
(1) that his client money may be passed to a person outside the United 
Kingdom but the client may notify the firm that he does not wish his 
money to be passed to a money in a particular jurisdiction; and 
(2) that, in such circumstances, the legal and regulatory regime 
applying to the broker or settlement agent will be different from that 
of the United Kingdom and, in the event of a failure of the broker or 
settlement agent, this money may be treated in a different manner 
from that which would apply if the money were held by a broker or 
settlement agent in the United Kingdom. 
 
153.   5.5.59G 
There is no need for a firm to make a separate disclosure under CASS 
5.5.58 R in relation to each jurisdiction. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
154.   5.5.60R 
If a client has notified a firm before entering into a transaction that he 
does not wish his money to be passed to another broker or settlement 
agent located in a particular jurisdiction, the firm must either: 
 
(1) hold the client money in a client bank account in the United 
Kingdom or a jurisdiction to which the money has not objected and 
pay its own money to the firm's own account with the broker, agent or 
counterparty; or 
(2) return the money to, or to the order of, the client. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
155.   Notification to the FCA: failure of a bank, broker or settlement 
agent 
5.5.61R 
On the failure of a third party with which client money is held, a firm 
must notify the FCA: 
 
(1) as soon as it becomes aware, of the failure of any bank, other 
broker or settlement agent or other entity with which it has placed, or 
to which it has passed, client money; and 
(2) as soon as reasonably practical, whether it intends to make good 
any shortfall that has arisen or may arise and of the amounts involved. 
Client money calculation and reconciliation 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
156.   5.5.62G 
(1) In order that a firm may check that it has sufficient money 
segregated in its client bank account (and held by third parties) to 
meet its obligations to clients it is required periodically to calculate 
the amount which should be segregated (the client money 
requirement) and to compare this with the amount shown as its client 
money resource. This calculation is, in the first instance, based upon 
the firm's accounting records and is followed by a reconciliation with 
its banking records. A firm is required to make a payment into the 
client bank account if there is a shortfall or to remove any money 
which is not required to meet the firm's obligations. 
(2) For the purpose of calculating its client money requirement two 
alternative calculation methods are permitted, but a firm must use the 
same method in relation to CASS 5.3 and CASS 5.4. The first refers 
to individual client cash balances; the second to aggregate amounts of 
client money recorded on a firm business ledgers. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
157.   5.5.63R 
(1) A firm must, as often as is necessary to ensure the accuracy of its 
records and at least at intervals of not more than 25 business days: 
(a) check whether its client money resource, as determined by CASS 
5.5.65 R on the previous business day, was at least equal to the client 
money requirement, as determined by CASS 5.5.66 R or CASS 5.5.68 
R, as at the close of business on that day; and 
(b) ensure that: 
(i) any shortfall is paid into a client bank account by the close of 
business on the day the calculation is performed; or 
(ii) any excess is withdrawn within the same time period unless CASS 
5.5.9 R or CASS 5.5.10 R applies to the extent that the firm is 
satisfied on reasonable grounds that it is prudent to maintain a 
positive margin to ensure the calculation in (a) is satisfied having 
regard to any unreconciled items in its business ledgers as at the date 
on which the calculations are performed; and 
(c) include in any calculation of its client money requirement 
(whether calculated in accordance with CASS 5.5.66 R or CASS 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
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5.5.68 R) any amounts attributable to client money received by its 
appointed representatives, field representatives or other agents and 
which, as at the date of calculation, it is required to segregate in 
accordance with CASS 5.5.19 R. 
(2) A firm must within ten business days of the calculation in (a) 
reconcile the balance on each client bank account as recorded by the 
firm with the balance on that account as set out in the statement or 
other form of confirmation used by the bank with which that account 
is held. 
(3) When any discrepancy arises as a result of the reconciliation 
carried out in (2), the firm must identify the reason for the 
discrepancy and correct it as soon as possible, unless the discrepancy 
arises solely as a result of timing differences between the accounting 
systems of the party providing the statement or confirmation and 
those of the firm. 
(4) While a firm is unable to resolve a difference arising from a 
reconciliation, and one record or a set of records examined by the firm 
during its reconciliation indicates that there is a need to have a greater 
amount of client money than is in fact the case, the firm must assume, 
until the matter is finally resolved, that the record or set of records is 
accurate and either pay its own money into a relevant account or make 
a withdrawal of any excess. 
 
158.   5.5.64R 
A firm must keep a record of whether it calculates its client money 
requirement in accordance with CASS 5.5.66 R or CASS 5.5.68 R 
and may only use one method during each annual accounting period 
(which method must be the same in relation to both CASS 5.3 and 
CASS 5.4). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
159.   Client money resource 
5.5.65R 
 
The client money resource, for the purposes of CASS 5.5.63 R (1)(a), 
is: 
 
(1) the aggregate of the balances on the firm's client money bank 
accounts, as at the close of business on the previous business day and, 
if held in accordance with CASS 5.4, designated investments (valued 
on a prudent and consistent basis) together with client money held by 
a third party in accordance with CASS 5.5.34 R; and 
(2) (but only if the firm is comparing the client money resource with 
its client's money (accruals) requirement in accordance with CASS 
5.5.68 R) to the extent that client money is held in accordance with 
CASS 5.3 (statutory trust), insurance debtors (which in this case 
cannot include pre-funded items); and 
(3) (but only if the firm is comparing the client money resource with 
its client's money (accruals) requirement in accordance with CASS 
5.5.68 R) to the extent that client money is held in accordance with 
CASS 5.4 (non-statutory trust): 
(a) all insurance debtors (including pre-funded items whether in 
respect of advance premiums, claims, premium refunds or otherwise) 
shown in the firm's business ledgers as amounts due from clients, 
insurance undertakings and other persons, such debts valued on a 
prudent and consistent basis to the extent required to meet any 
shortfall of the client money resource compared with the firm's client 
money requirement; and 
(b) the amount of any letter of credit or unconditional guarantee 
provided by an approved bank and held on the terms of the trust (or, 
in Scotland, agency), limited to: 
(i) the maximum sum payable by the approved bank under the letter 
of credit or guarantee; or 
(ii) if less, the amount which would, apart from the benefit of the 
letter of credit or guarantee, be the shortfall of the client money 
resource compared with the client money requirement under CASS 
5.5.66 R or CASS 5.5.68 R. 
But a firm may treat a transaction with an insurance undertaking 
which is not a UK domestic firm as complete, and accordingly may 
(but only for the purposes of the calculation in (1)) disregard any 
unreconciled items of client money transferred to an intermediate 
broker relating to such a transaction, if: 
(4) it has taken reasonable steps to ascertain whether the transaction is 
complete; and 
(5) it has no reason to consider the transaction has not been 
completed; and 
(6) a period of at least 12 months has elapsed since the money was 
transferred to the intermediate broker for the purpose of the 
transaction. 
Client money (client balance) requirement 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
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160.   5.5.66R 
A firm's client money (client balance) requirement is the sum of, for 
all clients, the individual client balances calculated in accordance with 
CASS 5.5.67 R but excluding any individual balances which are 
negative (that is, uncleared client funds). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
161.   5.5.67R 
The individual client balance for each client must be calculated as 
follows: 
 
(1) the amount paid by a client to the firm (to include all premiums); 
plus 
(2) the amount due to the client (to include all claims and premium 
refunds); plus 
(3) the amount of any interest or investment returns due to the client; 
(4) less the amount paid to insurance undertakings for the benefit of 
the client (to include all premiums and commission due to itself) (i.e. 
commissions that are due but have not yet been removed from the 
client account); 
(5) less the amount paid by the firm to the client (to include all claims 
and premium refunds); 
and where the individual client balance is found by the sum ((1) + (2) 
+ (3)) - ((4) + (5)). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
162.   Client money (accruals) requirement 
5.5.68R 
A firm's client money (accruals) requirement is the sum of the 
following: 
 
(1) all insurance creditors shown in the firm's business ledgers as 
amounts due to insurance undertakings, clients and other persons; plus 
(2) unearned commission being the amount of commission shown as 
accrued (but not shown as due and payable) as at the date of the 
calculation (a prudent estimate must be used if the firm is unable to 
produce an exact figure at the date of the calculation). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
163.   5.5.69R 
A firm which calculates its client money requirement on the preceding 
basis must in addition and within a reasonable period be able to match 
its client money resource to its requirement by reference to individual 
clients (with such matching being achieved for the majority of its 
clients and transactions). 
 
[deleted] 
[deleted] 
[deleted] 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
164.   Failure to perform calculations or reconciliation 
5.5.76R 
A firm must notify the FCA immediately if it is unable to, or does not, 
perform the calculation required by CASS 5.5.63 R (1). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
165.   5.5.77R 
A firm must notify the FCA immediately it becomes aware that it may 
not be able to make good any shortfall identified by CASS 5.5.63 R 
(1) by the close of business on the day the calculation is performed 
and if applicable when the reconciliation is completed. 
 
NB:  the obligations in this Rule ought to be read in conjunction 
with the general duties imposed in Principle 11 i.e.: 
 
A firm must deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way, 
and must disclose to the FCA appropriately anything relating to 
the firm of which that regulator would reasonably expect notice. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
166.   Discharge of fiduciary duty 
5.5.79G 
The purpose of CASS 5.5.80 R to CASS 5.5.83 R is to set out those 
situations in which a firm will have fulfilled its contractual and 
fiduciary obligations in relation to any client money held for or on 
behalf of its client, or in relation to the firm's ability to require 
repayment of that money from a third party. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
167.   5.5.80R 
Money ceases to be client money if it is paid: 
 
(1) to the client, or a duly authorised representative of the client; or 
Regulation 48(5) IMR 2017 
 
(5) Without prejudice to Regulations 48(3), 49(6) and 
49(7), an investment firm is not required to pay into a 
 See Row 36. Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
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(2) to a third party on the instruction of or with the specific consent of 
the client, but not if it is transferred to a third party in the course of 
effecting a transaction, in accordance with CASS 5.5.34 R; or 
(3) into a bank account of the client (not being an account which is 
also in the name of the firm); or 
(4) to the firm itself, when it is due and payable to the firm in 
accordance with CASS 5.1.5 R (1); or 
(5) to the firm itself, when it is an excess in the client bank account as 
set out in CASS 5.5.63 R (1)(b)(ii). 
 
third party client asset account such client assets that it 
receives on behalf of a client where to do so would result 
in the investment firm breaching any law or order of any 
court of competent jurisdiction. 
 
Regulation 48(6) IMR 2017 
 
(6) Where, in accordance with an instruction from a client, 
a client asset is transferred to a third party, the investment 
firm shall ensure that such transfer is overseen and 
approved, prior to or at the time of transfer, by a relevant 
person other than the relevant person who is conducting 
the transfer. 
168.   5.5.81G 
(1) A firm which pays professional fees (for example to a loss adjuster 
or valuer) on behalf of a client may do so in accordance with CASS 
5.5.80 R (2) where this is done on the instruction of or with the 
consent of the client. 
(2) When a firm wishes to transfer client money balances to a third 
party in the course of transferring its business to another firm, it 
should do so in compliance with CASS 5.5.80 R and a transferee firm 
will come under an obligation to treat any client money so transferred 
in accordance with these rules. 
(3) Firms are reminded of their obligation, when transferring money 
to third parties in accordance with CASS 5.5.34 R, to use appropriate 
skill, care and judgment in their selection of third parties in order to 
ensure adequate protection of client money. 
(4) Firms are reminded that, in order to calculate their client money 
resource in accordance with CASS 5.5.63 R to CASS 5.5.65 R, they 
will need to have systems in place to produce an accurate accounting 
record showing how much client money is being held by third parties 
at any point in time. For the purposes of CASS 5.5.63 R to CASS 
5.5.65 R, however, a firm must assume that monies remain at an 
intermediate broker awaiting completion of the transaction unless it 
has received confirmation that the transaction has been completed. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
169.   5.5.82R 
When a firm draws a cheque or other payable order to discharge its 
fiduciary duty under CASS 5.5.80 R, it must continue to treat the sum 
concerned as client money until the cheque or order is presented and 
paid by the bank. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
170.   5.5.83R 
For the purposes of CASS 5.1.5 R, if a firm makes a payment to, or 
on the instructions of, a client, from an account other than a client 
bank account, until that payment has cleared, no equivalent sum will 
become due and payable to the firm or may be withdrawn from a 
client bank account by way of reimbursement. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
171.   Records 
5.5.84R 
A firm must ensure that proper records, sufficient to show and explain 
the firm's transactions and commitments in respect of its client 
money, are made and retained for a period of three years after they 
were made. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent to EU and Irish rules, even if UK rules are 
considerably more prescriptive. 
172.   5.6 Client money distribution 
 
Application 
5.6.1R 
 
(1) CASS 5.6 (the client money (insurance) distribution rules) applies 
to a firm that in holding client money is subject to CASS 5.3 
(statutory trust) or CASS 5.4 (Non-statutory trust) when a primary 
pooling event or a secondary pooling event occurs. 
(2) In the event of there being any discrepancy between the terms of 
the trust as required by CASS 5.4.7 R (1)(c) and the provisions of 
CASS 5.6, the latter shall apply. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
173.   5.6.2G 
(1) The client money (insurance) distribution rules have force and 
effect on any firm that holds client money in accordance with CASS 
5.3 or CASS 5.4. Therefore, they may apply to a UK branch of a non-
EEA firm. In this case, the UK branch of the firm may be treated as if 
the branch itself is a free-standing entity subject to the client money 
(insurance) distribution rules. 
(2) Firms that act in accordance with CASS 5.4 (Non-statutory trust) 
are reminded that the client money (insurance) distribution rules 
should be given effect in the terms of trust required by CASS 5.4. 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
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174.   Purpose 
5.6.3G 
The client money (insurance) distribution rules seek to facilitate the 
timely return of client money to a client in the event of the failure of a 
firm or third party at which the firm holds client money. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
175.   Failure of the authorised firm: primary pooling event 
5.6.4G 
A primary pooling event triggers a notional pooling of all the client 
money, in every type of client money account, and the obligation to 
distribute it. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
176.   5.6.5R 
A primary pooling event occurs: 
 
(1) on the failure of the firm; or 
(2) on the vesting of assets in a trustee in accordance with an 'assets 
requirement' imposed under 55P(1)(b) or (c) (as the case may be) of 
the Act; or 
(3) on the coming into force of a requirement for all client money held 
by the firm; or 
(4) when the firm notifies, or is in legal pro of its duty to notify, the 
FCA, in accordance with CASS 5.5.77 R, that it is unable correctly to 
identify and allocate in its records all valid claims arising as a result 
of a secondary pooling event. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
177.   5.6.6R 
CASS 5.6.5 R (4) does not apply so long as: 
 
(1) the firm is taking steps, in consultation with the FCA, to establish 
those records; and 
(2) there are reasonable grounds to conclude that the records will be 
capable of rectification within a reasonable period. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
178.   Pooling and distribution 
5.6.7R 
If a primary pooling event occurs: 
 
(1) client money held in each client money account of the firm is 
treated as pooled; 
(2) the firm must distribute that client money in accordance with 
CASS 5.3.2 R or, as appropriate, CASS 5.4.7 R, so that each client 
receives a sum which is rateable to the client money entitlement 
calculated in accordance with CASS 5.5.66 R; and 
(3) the firm must, as trustee, call in and make demand in respect of 
any debt due to the firm as trustee, and must liquidate any designated 
investment, and any letter of credit or guarantee upon which it relies 
for meeting any shortfall in its client money resource and the proceeds 
shall be pooled together with other client money as in (1) and 
distributed in accordance with (2). 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
179.   5.6.8G 
A client's main claim is for the return of client money held in a client 
bank account. A client may claim for any shortfall against money held 
in a firm's own account. For that claim, the client will be an unsecured 
creditor of the firm. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
180.   Client money received after the failure of the firm 
5.6.9R 
Client money received by the firm (including in its capacity as trustee 
under CASS 5.4 (Non-statutory trust)) after a primary pooling event 
must not be pooled with client money held in any client money 
account operated by the firm at the time of the primary pooling event. 
It must be placed in a client bank account that has been opened after 
that event and must be handled in accordance with the client money 
rules, and returned to the relevant client without delay, except to the 
extent that: 
 
(1) it is client money relating to a transaction that has not completed 
at the time of the primary pooling event; or 
(2) it is money relating to a client, for whom the client money 
requirement, calculated in accordance with CASS 5.5.66 R or CASS 
5.5.68 R, shows that money is due from the client to the firm 
including in its capacity as trustee under CASS 5.4 (Non-statutory 
trust) at the time of the primary pooling event. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
181.   5.6.10G    UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
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Client money received after the primary pooling event relating to an 
incomplete transaction should be used to complete that transaction. 
 
182.   5.6.11R 
If a firm receives a mixed remittance after a primary pooling event, it 
must: 
 
(1) pay the full sum into the separate client bank account opened in 
accordance with CASS 5.6.9 R; and 
(2) pay the money that is not client money out of that client bank 
account into the firm's own bank account within one business day of 
the day on which the remittance is cleared. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
183.   5.6.12G 
Whenever possible the firm should seek to split a mixed remittance 
before the relevant accounts are credited. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
184.   Failure of a bank, other broker or settlement agent: secondary 
pooling events 
5.6.13R 
If both a primary pooling event and a secondary pooling event occur, 
the provisions of this section relating to a primary pooling event 
apply. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
185.   5.6.14R 
A secondary pooling event occurs on the failure of a third party to 
which client money held by the firm has been transferred under CASS 
5.5.34 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
186.   5.6.15R 
CASS 5.6.20 R to CASS 5.6.31 R do not apply if, on the failure of the 
third party, the firm repays to its clients or pays into a client bank 
account, at an unaffected bank, an amount equal to the amount of 
client money which would have been held if a shortfall had not 
occurred at that third party. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
187.   5.6.16G 
When client money is transferred to a third party, a firm continues to 
owe a fiduciary duty to the client. However, consistent with a 
fiduciary's responsibility (whether as agent or trustee) for third parties 
under general law, a firm will not be held responsible for a shortfall in 
client money caused by a third party failure if it has complied with 
those duties. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
188.   5.6.17G 
To comply with its duties, the firm should show proper care: 
 
(1) in the selection of a third party; and 
(2) when monitoring the performance of the third party. 
In the case of client money transferred to a bank, by demonstrating 
compliance with CASS 5.5.43 R, a firm should be able to demonstrate 
that it has taken reasonable steps to comply with its duties. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
189.   Failure of a bank 
5.6.18G 
When a bank fails and the firm decides not to make good the shortfall 
in the amount of client money held at that bank, a secondary pooling 
event will occur in accordance with CASS 5.6.20 R. The firm would 
be expected to reflect the shortfall that arises at the firm's bank in the 
periodic client money calculation by reducing the client money 
resource and client money requirement accordingly. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
190.   5.6.19G 
The client money (insurance) distribution rules seek to ensure that 
clients who have previously specified that they are not willing to 
accept the risk of the bank that has fails, and who therefore requested 
that their client money be placed in a designated client bank account 
as a different bank, should not suffer the loss of the bank that has 
failed. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
191.   Failure of a bank: pooling 
5.6.20R 
If a secondary pooling event occurs as a result of the failure of a bank 
where one or more general client bank accounts are held, then: 
 
(1) in relation to every general client bank account of the firm, the 
provisions of CASS 5.6.22 R and CASS 5.6.26 R to CASS 5.6.28 G 
will apply; 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
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(2) in relation to every designated client bank account held by the firm 
with the failed bank, the provisions of CASS 5.6.24 R and CASS 
5.6.26 R to CASS 5.6.28 G will apply; and 
(3) any money held at a bank, other than the bank that has failed, in 
designated client bank accounts is not pooled with any other client 
money. 
 
192.   5.6.21R 
If a secondary pooling event occurs as a result of the failure of a bank 
where one or more designated client bank accounts are held then in 
relation to every designated client bank account held by the firm with 
the failed bank, the provisions of CASS 5.6.24 R and CASS 5.6.26 R 
to CASS 5.6.28 G will apply. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
193.   5.6.22R 
Money held in each general client bank account of the firm must be 
treated as pooled and: 
 
(1) any shortfall in client money held, or which should have been 
held, in general client bank accounts, that has arisen as a result of the 
failure of the bank, must be borne by all the clients whose client 
money is held in a general client bank account of the firm, rateably in 
accordance with their entitlements; 
(2) a new client money entitlement must be calculated for each client 
by the firm, to reflect the requirements in (1), and the firm's records 
must be amended to reflect the reduced client money entitlement; 
(3) the firm must make and retain a record of each client's share of the 
client money shortfall at the failed bank until the client is repaid; and 
(4) the firm must use the new client entitlements, calculated in 
accordance with (2), when performing the client money calculation in 
accordance with CASS 5.5.63 R to CASS 5.5.69 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
194.   5.6.23G 
The term 'which should have been held' is a reference to the failed 
bank's failure (and elsewhere, as appropriate, is a reference to the 
other failed third party's failure) to hold the client money at the time 
of the pooling event. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
195.   5.6.24R 
For each client with a designated client bank account held at the failed 
bank: 
 
(1) any shortfall in client money held, or which should have been 
held, in designated client bank accounts that has arisen as a result of 
the failure, must be borne by all the clients whose client money is held 
in a designated client bank account of the firm at the failed bank, 
rateably in accordance with their entitlements; 
(2) a new client money entitlement must be calculated for each of the 
relevant clients by the firm, and the firm's records must be amended to 
reflect the reduced client money entitlement; 
(3) the firm must make and retain a record of each client's share of the 
client money shortfall at the failed bank until the client is repaid; and 
(4) the firm must use the new client money entitlements, calculated in 
accordance with (2), when performing the periodic client money 
calculation, in accordance with CASS 5.5.63 R to CASS 5.5.69 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
196.   5.6.25R 
A client whose money was held, or which should have been held, in a 
designated client bank account with a bank that has failed is not 
entitled to claim in respect of that money against any other client bank 
account or client transaction account of the firm. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
197.   Client money received after the failure of a bank 
5.6.26R 
Client money received by the firm after the failure of a bank, that 
would otherwise have been paid into a client bank account at that 
bank: 
 
(1) must not be transferred to the failed bank unless specifically 
instructed by the client in order to settle an obligation of that client to 
the failed bank; and 
(2) must be, subject to (1), placed in a separate client bank account 
that has been opened after the secondary pooling event and either: 
(a) on the written instruction of the client, transferred to a bank other 
than the one that has failed; or 
(b) returned to the client as soon as possible. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
198.   5.6.27R    UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
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If a firm receives a mixed remittance after the secondary pooling 
event which consists of client money that would have been paid into a 
general client bank account, a designated client bank account or a 
designated client fund account maintained at the bank that has failed, 
it must: 
 
(1) pay the full sum into a client bank account other than one operated 
at the bank that has failed; and 
(2) pay the money that is not client money out of that client bank 
account within one business day of the day on which the remittance is 
cleared. 
 
199.   5.6.28G 
Whenever possible the firm should seek to split a mixed remittance 
before the relevant accounts are credited. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
200.   Failure of an intermediate broker or settlement agent: pooling 
5.6.29R 
If a secondary pooling event occurs as a result of the failure of 
another broker or settlement agent to whom the firm has transferred 
client's money then, in relation to every general client bank account of 
the firm, the provisions of CASS 5.6.26 R to CASS 5.6.28 G and 
CASS 5.6.30 R will apply. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
201.   5.6.30R 
Money held in each general client bank account of the firm must be 
treated as pooled and: 
 
(1) any shortfall in client money held, or which should have been 
held, in general client bank accounts, that has arisen as a result of the 
failure, must be borne by all the clients whose client money is held in 
a general client bank account of the firm, rateably in accordance with 
their entitlements; 
(2) a new client money entitlement must be calculated for each client 
by the firm, to reflect the requirements of (1), and the firm's records 
must be amended to reflect the reduced client money entitlement; 
(3) the firm must make and retain a record of each client's share of the 
client money shortfall at the failed intermediate broker or settlement 
agent until the client is repaid; and 
(4) the firm must use the new client money entitlements, calculated in 
accordance with (2), when performing the periodic client money 
calculation, in accordance with CASS 5.5.63 R to CASS 5.5.69 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
202.   Client money received after the failure of a broker or settlement 
agent 
5.6.31R 
Client money received by the firm after the failure of another broker 
or settlement agent, to whom the firm has transferred client money 
that would otherwise have been paid into a client bank account at that 
broker or settlement agent: 
 
(1) must not be transferred to the failed thirty party unless specifically 
instructed by the client in order to settle an obligation of that client to 
the failed broker or settlement agent; and 
(2) must be, subject to (1), placed in a separate client bank account 
that has been opened after the secondary pooling event and either: 
(a) on the written instruction of the client, transferred to a third party 
other than the one that has failed; or 
(b) returned to the client as soon as possible. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
203.   Notification on the failure of a bank, other broker or settlement 
agent 
5.6.32R 
The provisions of CASS 5.5.61 R apply. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
204.   5.7 Mandates 
 
5.7.1R [deleted] 
5.7.2R [deleted] 
5.7.3G [deleted] 
5.7.4G [deleted] 
5.7.5G [deleted] 
5.7.6R [deleted] 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
205.   5.8 Safe keeping of client’s documents and other assets 
Application 
5.8.1R 
(1) CASS 5.8 applies to a firm (including in its capacity as trustee 
under CASS 5.4) which in the course of insurance distribution activity 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
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takes into its possession for safekeeping any client title documents 
(other than documents of no value) or other tangible assets belonging 
to clients. 
(2) CASS 5.8 does not apply to a firm when: 
(a) carrying on an insurance distribution activity which is in respect of 
a reinsurance contract; or 
(b) acting in accordance with CASS 6 (Custody rules). 
 
206.   Purpose 
5.8.2G 
The rules in this section amplify the obligation in Principle 10 which 
requires a firm to arrange adequate protection for client's assets. Firms 
carrying on insurance distribution activities may hold, on a temporary 
or longer basis, client title documents such as policy documents (other 
than policy documents of no value) and also items of physical 
property if, for example, a firm arranges for a valuation. The rules are 
intended to ensure that firms make adequate arrangements for the safe 
keeping of such property. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
207.   Requirement 
5.8.3R 
(1) A firm which has in its possession or control documents 
evidencing a client's title to a contract of insurance or other similar 
documents (other than documents of no value) or which takes into its 
possession or control tangible assets belonging to a client, must take 
reasonable steps to ensure that any such documents or items of 
property: 
(a) are kept safe until they are delivered to the client; 
(b) are not delivered or given to any other person except in 
accordance with instructions given by the client; and that 
a record is kept as to the identity of any such documents or items of 
property and the dates on which they were received by the firm and 
delivered to the client or other person. 
 
(2) A firm must retain the record required in (1) for a period of three 
years after the document or property concerned is delivered to the 
client or other person. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific concepts.  
208.  For Deposits with Money Market Funds see 
Recital 4 Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Where an investment firm deposits funds it holds 
on behalf of a client with a qualifying money 
market fund, the units or shares in that money 
market fund should be held in accordance with 
the requirements for holding financial instruments 
belonging to clients. Clients should be required to 
explicitly consent to the depositing of those 
funds. When assessing the quality of money 
market instrument there should be no mechanistic 
reliance on external ratings. However a 
downgrade below the two highest short-term 
credit ratings by any agency registered and 
supervised by ESMA that has rated the 
instrument should lead the manager to undertake 
a new assessment of the credit quality of the 
money market instrument to ensure it continues to 
be of high quality. 
CASS 5 Annex 1 Segregation of designated investments: 
permitted investments, general principles and conditions (This 
Annex belongs to CASS 5.5.14 R) 
 
1.  The general principles which must be 
followed when client money 
segregation includes designated 
investments: 
(a) There must be a 
suitable spread of 
investments; 
(b) Investments must be 
made in accordance 
with an appropriate 
liquidity strategy; 
(c) The investments must 
be in accordance with 
an appropriate credit 
risk policy; 
(d) Any foreign exchange 
risks must be 
prudently managed. 
2. Table of permitted designated 
ivnestments for the purpose of Cass 
5.5.14 R (1) 
Investment 
type 
Qualification 
1. 
Negotiable 
debt 
security 
(including 
a certificate 
of deposit) 
(a) Remaining term to 
maturity of 5 years or 
less; and 
 
(b) The issuer or 
investment must have 
a short-term credit 
rating of A1 by 
Standard and Poor's, or 
P1 by Moody's 
Investor Services, or 
F1 by Fitch if the 
instrument has a 
   Some conceptual link but considerably overtaken by UK jurisdiction specific 
concepts. 
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remaining term to 
maturity of 366 days 
or less; or a minimum 
long term credit rating 
of AA- by Standards 
and Poor's, or Aa3 by 
Moody's Investor 
Services or AA- by 
Fitch if the instrument 
has a term to maturity 
of more than 366 days. 
2. A repo in 
relation to 
negotiable 
debt 
security 
As for 1 above and 
where the credit rating 
of the counterparty 
also meets the criteria 
in 1. 
3. Bond 
funds 
(a) An authorised fund 
or a recognised 
scheme or an 
investment company 
which is registered by 
the Securities and 
Exchange Commission 
of the United States of 
America under the 
Investment Company 
Act 1940; 
 
(b) A minimum credit 
rating and risk rating 
of Aaf and S2 
respectively by 
Standard and Poor's or 
Aa and MR2 
respectively by 
Moody's Investor 
Services or AA and V2 
respectively by Fitch. 
4. Money 
market 
fund 
(a) An authorised fund 
or a recognised 
scheme; 
 
(b) A minimum credit 
and risk rating of Aaa 
and MR1+ 
respectively by 
Moody's Investor 
Services or AAAm by 
Standard and Poor's or 
AAA and V1+ 
respectively by Fitch. 
5. 
Derivatives 
Only for the purpose 
of prudently managing 
foreign currency risks. 
3. The general conditions which must be 
satisfied in the segregation of 
designated investments are: 
(a) any redemption of an 
investment must be by 
payment into the firm's 
client money bank 
account; 
(b) where the credit or risk 
rating of a designated 
investment falls below 
the minimum set out in 
the Table, the firm 
must dispose of the 
investment as soon as 
possible and in any 
event not later than 20 
business days 
following the 
downgrade; 
(c) where any investment 
or issuer has more than 
one rating, the lowest 
shall apply. 
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209.   Chapter 6: 
Custody rules 
 
6.1 Application 
 
6.1.1R 
This chapter (the custody rules) applies to a firm: 
(1A) when it holds financial instruments belonging to a client in the 
course of its MiFID business; 
(1B) when it is safeguarding and administering investments, in the 
course of business that is not MiFID business; 
(1C) when it is acting as trustee or depositary of an AIF; 
(1D) when it is acting as trustee or depositary of a UCITS; and 
(1E) in respect of any arrangement for a client to transfer full 
ownership of a safe custody asset (or an asset which would be a safe 
custody asset but for the arrangement) to the firm which is: 
(a) in the course of, or in connection with, the firm's designated 
investment business; and 
(b) for the purpose of securing or otherwise covering present or 
future, actual or contingent or prospective obligations, and the 
application of the custody rules to a firm under this paragraph is set 
out in the rules and guidance in CASS 6.1.6 R to CASS 6.1.9 G; and 
(1F) when it is a small AIFM carrying on excluded custody activities. 
 
   Takes inspiration from EU rules and has conceptually equivalent to some 
principles of Irish rules but UK rules are prescriptive beyond common 
principles.  
210.   6.1.1-AR 
In applying the custody rules to a small AIFM's excluded custody 
activities, any reference to a firm carrying on the regulated activities 
of safeguarding and administering investments, safeguarding and 
administering assets (without arranging) or arranging safeguarding 
and administration of assets includes those excluded custody activities 
that would, but for the exclusion in article 72AA of the RAO, amount 
to whichever of those regulated activities is referred to. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 209. 
211.   6.1.1AG 
The regulated activity of safeguarding and administering investments 
covers both the safeguarding and administration of assets (without 
arranging) and arranging safeguarding and administration of assets, 
when those assets are either safe custody investments or custody 
assets. A safe custody investment is, in summary, a designated 
investment which a firm receives or holds on behalf of a client. 
Custody assets include designated investments, and any other assets 
that the firm holds or may hold in the same portfolio as a designated 
investment held for or on behalf of a client. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 209. 
212.   6.1.1BR 
(1) Firms to which the custody rules apply by virtue of CASS 6.1.1R 
(1B) or (1E) must also apply the custody rules to those custody assets 
which are not safe custody investments in a manner appropriate to the 
nature and value of those custody assets. 
(2) Firms to which the custody rules apply by virtue of CASS 6.1.1R 
(1C) must also apply the custody rules: 
(a) to those custody assets which are not AIF custodial assets but are 
safe custody investments; and 
(b) in a manner appropriate to the nature and value of those custody 
assets, to those custody assets which are neither AIF custodial assets 
nor safe custody investments. 
(3) Firms to which the custody rules apply by virtue of CASS 
6.1.1R(1D) must also apply them: 
(a) to those custody assets which are not UCITS custodial assets but 
are safe custody investments; and 
(b) in a manner appropriate to the nature and value of those custody 
assets, to those custody assets which are neither UCITS custodial 
assets nor safe custody investments. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 209. 
213.   6.1.1CG 
In accordance with article 42 of the Regulated Activities Order, a firm 
("I") will not be arranging safeguarding and administration of assets if 
it introduces a client to another firm whose permitted activities 
include the safeguarding and administration of investments, or to an 
exempt person acting as such, with a view to that other firm or exempt 
person: 
 
(1) providing a safe custody service in the United Kingdom; or 
(2) arranging for the provision of a safe custody service in the United 
Kingdom by another person; 
   Same comment as in Row 209. 
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and the other firm, exempt person or other person who is to provide 
the safe custody service is not in the same group as I, and does not 
remunerate I. 
 
214.   6.1.2G 
Firms are reminded that dividends (actual or payments in lieu), stock 
lending fees and other payments received for the benefit of a client, 
and which are due to the clients, should be held in accordance with 
the client money chapter where appropriate. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 209. 
215.  Recital 51 MiFID 
 
In order to protect an investor’s ownership and 
other similar rights in respect of securities and the 
investor’s rights in respect of funds entrusted to a 
firm, those rights should in particular be kept 
distinct from those of the firm. This principle 
should not, however, prevent a firm from doing 
business in its name but on behalf of the investor, 
where that is required by the very nature of the 
transaction and the investor is in agreement, for 
example stock lending. 
 
Business in the name of the firm 
6.1.4R 
The custody rules do not apply where a firm carries on business in its 
name but on behalf of the client where that is required by the very 
nature of the transaction and the client is in agreement. 
 
[Note: recital 51 to MiFID] 
 
   Conceptually equivalent across al Rules – Irish Rules cover this in general 
introductory chapters.  
216.   6.1.5G 
For example, this chapter does not apply where a firm borrows safe 
custody assets from a client as principal under a stock lending 
agreement. 
 
   No substantial equivalent in other jurisdictions – despite some references in 
Ireland to securities financing transactions – which ties into SFTR and goes 
beyond the UK-specific use (incorrectly of the EU term) of “stock lending” in 
this context. 
217.   
Recital 52 MiFID II 
 
The requirements concerning the protection of 
client assets are a crucial tool for the protection of 
clients in the provision of services and activities. 
Those requirements can be excluded when full 
ownership of funds and financial instrument is 
transferred to an investment firm to cover any 
present or future, actual or contingent or 
prospective obligations. That broad possibility 
may create uncertainty and jeopardise the 
effectiveness of the requirements concerning the 
safeguard of client assets. Thus, at least when 
retail client assets are involved, it is appropriate 
to limit the possibility of investment firms to 
conclude title transfer financial collateral 
arrangements as defined under Directive 
2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council (24), for the purpose of securing or 
otherwise covering their obligations. 
 
Article 16(10) MiFID II 
 
An investment firm shall not conclude title 
transfer financial collateral arrangements with 
retail clients for the purpose of securing or 
covering present or future, actual or contingent or 
prospective obligations of clients. 
 
Recital 6 Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Directive 2014/65/EU requires investment firms 
to safeguard client assets. Article 16(10) of 
Directive 2014/65/EU prohibits firms from 
concluding title transfer collateral arrangements 
(TTCAs) with retail clients for the purpose of 
securing or covering present or future, actual or 
contingent or prospective obligations. Investment 
firms are, however, not prohibited from 
concluding TTCA with non-retail clients. There is 
therefore a risk that without further guidance 
investment firms could use TTCA more often 
than reasonably justified when dealing with non-
retail clients, undermining the overall regime put 
in place to protect client assets. Therefore, in light 
of the effects of TTCAs on firms' duties towards 
clients and in order to ensure the safeguarding 
and segregation rules pursuant to Directive 
2014/65/EU are not undermined, investment 
firms should consider the appropriateness of title 
Title transfer collateral arrangements 
6.1.6R 
(3) 
(a) A firm must not enter into a TTCA in respect of an asset belonging 
to a retail client. 
(b) Where a firm entered into a TTCA in respect of an asset belonging 
to a retail client (or one which would belong to a retail client but for 
the arrangement) before 3 January 2018, the firm must terminate that 
TTCA. 
[Note: article 16(10) of MiFID and article 5(5) of the MiFID 
Delegated Directive] 
(4)  
Except for CASS 6.1.6BR to CASS 6.1.9G and provided that the 
TTCA is not with a retail client, the custody rules do not apply to a 
firm in respect of an asset which is subject to a TTCA and which 
would otherwise be a safe custody asset. 
[Note: recital 52 to MiFID] 
 
Regulation 23(1)(m) MiFID Regulations 
 
(m) not conclude title transfer financial collateral 
arrangements with retail clients for the purpose of 
securing or covering present or future, actual or contingent 
or prospective obligations of clients. 
 
Para.4 of Schedule 3 of MiFID Regulations  
 
Use of client financial instruments 
 
4. (1) In respect of financial instruments held by 
investment firms on behalf of a client, investment firms 
shall not be allowed to enter into arrangements for 
securities financing transactions, or otherwise use such 
financial instruments for their own account or the account 
of any other person or client of the firm, unless the 
following conditions are met: 
 
(a) the client has given their prior express consent to the 
use of the instruments on specified terms, as clearly 
evidenced in writing and affirmatively executed by 
signature or equivalent; 
 
(b) the use of that client’s financial instruments is 
restricted to the specified terms to which the client 
consents. 
 
(2) In respect of financial instruments which are held on 
behalf of a client in an omnibus account maintained by a 
third party, investment firms shall not enter into 
arrangements for the securities financing transactions, or 
otherwise use financial instruments held in such an 
account for their own account or for the account of any 
other person, unless, in addition to the conditions set out 
in subparagraph (1), at least one of the following 
conditions are met: 
 
(a) prior express consent must be given by each client 
whose financial instruments are held together in an 
omnibus account in accordance with subparagraph (1)(a); 
 
(b) the investment firm must have in place systems and 
controls which ensure that only financial instruments 
belonging to clients who have given prior express consent 
in accordance with subparagraph (1)(a) are so used. 
 
(3) The records of the investment firm shall include details 
of the client on whose instructions the use of the financial 
instruments has been effected, as well as the number of 
financial instruments used belonging to each client who 
 When should an investment firm obtain consent in 
writing from its clients?  
 
G7 (8) The Central Bank does not specify how an 
investment firm should obtain the necessary prior 
written consent but expects that this may be included in 
an investment firm’s terms of business or investment 
agreement. The Central Bank expects an investment firm 
to maintain evidence of the required clients’ prior 
written consent.   
For existing clients (a client of the investment firm as at 
the date of commencement of the Regulations), a firm 
should review the prior written consents on file against 
the provisions of Regulation 7(16) and where such 
consents do not exist for existing clients, it should obtain 
them within three months of the commencement of the 
Regulations as provided for in Regulation 7(17). 
Conceptually equivalent save that Irish rules are somewhat more prescriptive 
when compared to EU rules.  
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transfer collateral arrangements used with non-
retail clients by means of the relationship between 
the client's obligations to the firm and the client 
assets subject to TTCA. Firms should be allowed 
to use TTCA with non-retail client only if they 
demonstrate the appropriateness of TTCA in 
relation to that client and disclose the risks 
involved as well as the effect of the TTCA on his 
assets. Firms should have a documented process 
of their use TTCA. The ability of firms to enter 
into TTCAs with non-retail clients should not 
reduce the need to obtain clients' prior express 
consent to use client assets. 
 
Article 5 Commission Delegated Directive  
 
Use of client financial instruments 
 
1. Member States shall not allow investment 
firms to enter into arrangements for securities 
financing transactions in respect of financial 
instruments held by them on behalf of a client, or 
otherwise use such financial instruments for their 
own account or the account of any other person or 
client of the firm, unless both of the following 
conditions are met: (a) the client has given his 
prior express consent to the use of the instruments 
on specified terms, as clearly evidenced in writing 
and affirmatively executed by signature or 
equivalent, and (b) the use of that client's 
financial instruments is restricted to the specified 
terms to which the client consents. 2. Member 
States shall not allow investment firms to enter 
into arrangements for securities financing 
transactions in respect of financial instruments 
which are held on behalf of a client in an omnibus 
account maintained by a third party, or otherwise 
use financial instruments held in such an account 
for their own account or for the account of any 
other person unless, in addition to the conditions 
set out in paragraph 1, at least one of the 
following conditions is met: (a) each client whose 
financial instruments are held together in an 
omnibus account must have given prior express 
consent in accordance with point (a) of paragraph 
1; (b) the investment firm must have in place 
systems and controls which ensure that only 
financial instruments belonging to clients who 
have given prior express consent in accordance 
with point (a) of paragraph 1 are so used. The 
records of the investment firm shall include 
details of the client on whose instructions the use 
of the financial instruments has been effected, as 
well as the number of financial instruments used 
belonging to each client who has given his 
consent, so as to enable the correct allocation of 
any loss. 3. Member States shall ensure that 
investment firms take appropriate measures to 
prevent the unauthorised use of client financial 
instruments for their own account or the account 
of any other person such as: (a) the conclusion of 
agreements with clients on measures to be taken 
by the investment firms in case the client does not 
have enough provision on its account on the 
settlement date, such as borrowing of the 
corresponding securities on behalf of the client or 
unwinding the position; (b) the close monitoring 
by the investment firm of its projected ability to 
deliver on the settlement date and the putting in 
place of remedial measures if this cannot be done; 
and (c) the close monitoring and prompt 
requesting of undelivered securities outstanding 
on the settlement day and beyond. 4. Member 
States shall ensure that investment firms adopt 
specific arrangements for all clients to ensure that 
the borrower of client financial instruments 
provides the appropriate collateral and that the 
firm monitors the continued appropriateness of 
such collateral and takes the necessary steps to 
has given his consent, so as to enable the correct 
allocation of any loss. 
 
(4) Investment firms shall take appropriate measures to 
prevent the unauthorised use of client financial 
instruments for their own account or the account of any 
other person such as: 
 
(a) the conclusion of agreements with clients on measures 
to be taken by the investment firms in case the client does 
not have enough provision on its account on the settlement 
date, such as borrowing of the corresponding securities on 
behalf of the client or unwinding the position; 
 
(b) the close monitoring by the investment firm of its 
projected ability to deliver on the settlement date and the 
putting in place of remedial measures if this cannot be 
done; 
 
(c) the close monitoring and prompt requesting of 
undelivered securities outstanding on the settlement day 
and beyond. 
 
(5) Investment firms shall adopt specific arrangements for 
all clients to ensure that the borrower of client financial 
instruments provides the appropriate collateral and that the 
firm monitors the continued appropriateness of such 
collateral and takes the necessary steps to maintain the 
balance with the value of client instruments. 
 
(6) Investment firms shall not enter into arrangements 
which are prohibited under Regulation 23(1)(m). 
 
 
Regulation 56 IMR 2017  
 
 
Securities financing transactions 
 
56. (1) An investment firm shall not enter into 
arrangements for securities financing transactions in 
respect of client financial instruments held by the 
investment firm on behalf of a client, or otherwise use 
such client financial instruments for its own account or the 
account of another client of the investment firm, unless 
the following condition is met: 
 
(a) the investment firm has received written confirmation 
from the client, of either the counterparty credit ratings 
acceptable to the client or that the client does not wish to 
specify such rating. 
 
Regulation 62 IMR 2017 
 
Client consent requirements 
 
62. (1) An investment firm shall obtain the prior written 
consent of a client in the following circumstances, as 
applicable: 
 
(a) where granting to another person a lien, security 
interest and/or right of set-off over client assets; 
 
(b) with respect to the arrangements for the giving and 
receiving of instructions by, or on behalf of, the client and 
any limitations to that authority, in respect of the 
provision of safe-keeping services which it provides; 
 
(c) where client assets are deposited with a third party 
outside the State; 
 
(d) where a client instructs an investment firm to deposit 
client assets with a specific third party that does not meet 
the investment firm’s internal risk assessment; 
 
(e) when client assets are to be held in a pooled account 
with a third party; 
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maintain the balance with the value of client 
instruments. 5. Member States shall ensure that 
investment firms do not enter into arrangements 
which are prohibited under Article 16(10) of 
Directive 2014/65/EU. 
 
Article 6 Commission Delegated Directive  
 
1. Member States shall require that investment 
firms properly consider, and are able to 
demonstrate that they have done so, the use of 
title transfer collateral arrangements in the 
context of the relationship between the client's 
obligation to the firm and the client assets 
subjected to title transfer collateral arrangements 
by the firm. 2. When considering, and 
documenting, the appropriateness of the use of 
title transfer collateral arrangements, investment 
firms shall take into account all of the following 
factors: (a) whether there is only a very weak 
connection between the client's obligation to the 
firm and the use of title transfer collateral 
arrangements, including whether the likelihood of 
a clients' liability to the firm is low or negligible; 
(b) whether the amount of client funds or 
financial instruments subject to title transfer 
collateral arrangements far exceeds the client's 
obligation, or is even unlimited if the client has 
any obligation at all to the firm; and (c) whether 
all clients' financial instruments or funds are 
made subject to title transfer collateral 
arrangements, without consideration of what 
obligation each client has to the firm. 3. Where 
using title transfer collateral arrangements, 
investment firms shall highlight to professional 
clients and eligible counterparties the risks 
involved and the effect of any title transfer 
collateral arrangement on the client's financial 
instruments and funds. 
 
 
(f) where interest earned on client funds in a third party 
client asset account is to be retained by the investment 
firm; 
 
(g) where client financial instruments are to be deposited 
with a third party in a third country that does not regulate 
the holding and safe-keeping of client financial 
instruments; and 
 
(h) in the case of collateral margined transactions— 
 
(i) before an investment firm deposits collateral with, 
pledges, charges or grants a security arrangement over the 
collateral to a relevant party or eligible custodian, 
 
(ii) where it proposes to use collateral in the form of client 
assets as security for the investment firm’s own 
obligations, or 
 
(iii) where it proposes to return to the client collateral 
other than the original collateral or original type of 
collateral. 
218.   6.1.6BR 
(1) A firm must ensure that any TTCA is the subject of a written 
agreement made on a durable medium between the firm and the client. 
(2) Regardless of the form of the agreement in (1) (which may have 
additional commercial purposes), it must cover the client's agreement 
to: 
(a) the terms for the arrangement relating to the transfer of the client's 
full ownership of the safe custody asset to the firm; 
(b) any terms under which the ownership of the safe custody asset is 
to transfer from the firm back to the client; and 
(c) (to the extent not covered by the terms under (b)), any terms for 
the termination of: 
(i) the arrangement under (a); or 
(ii) the overall agreement in (1). 
(3) A firm must retain a copy of the agreement under (1) from the date 
the agreement is entered into and until five years after the agreement 
is terminated. 
 
   Conceptually equivalent across all rules (see comments in Row 217). 
219.   6.1.6CG 
The terms referred to in CASS 6.1.6BR (2)(b) may include, for 
example, terms under which the arrangement relating to the transfer 
of full ownership of the safe custody asset to the firm is not in effect 
from time to time, or is contingent on some other condition. 
 
   Conceptually equivalent across all rules (see comments in Row 217). 
220.  Recital 7 Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Demonstrating a robust link between collateral 
transferred under a TTCA and client's liability 
should not preclude taking appropriate security 
against a client's obligation. Investment firms 
could thus continue to require a sufficient 
collateral and where appropriate, to do so by a 
TTCA. That obligation should not prevent 
compliance with requirements under Regulation 
(EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council ( 1 ) and should not prohibit 
the appropriate use of TTCAs in the context of 
6.1.6DR 
(1) A firm must properly consider and document the use of TTCAs in 
the context of: 
(a) the relationship between the client’s obligation to the firm; and 
(b) the safe custody assets subjected to TTCAs by the firm. 
(2) A firm must be able to demonstrate that it has complied with the 
requirement under (1). 
(3) When considering, and documenting, the appropriateness of the 
use of TTCAs, a firm must take into account the following factors: 
(a) whether there is only a very weak connection between the client’s 
obligation to the firm and the use of TTCAs, including whether the 
likelihood of a client’s liability to the firm is low or negligible; 
(b) the extent by which the amount of safe custody assets subject to a 
TTCA is in excess of the client’s obligations (including where the 
Para. 5 Schedule 3 of MiFID Regulations  
 
Inappropriate use of title transfer collateral 
arrangements 
 
5. (1) Investment firms shall properly consider, and be 
able to demonstrate that they have done so, the use of title 
transfer collateral arrangements in the context of the 
relationship between the client’s obligation to the firm and 
the client assets subjected to title transfer collateral 
arrangements by the firm. 
 
(2) When considering, and documenting, the 
appropriateness of the use of title transfer collateral 
  Broadly, conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK Rules differ in 
their prescriptiveness when compared to the Irish rules which are equally 
more prescriptive than the EU’s rules. 
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contingent liability transactions or repos for non-
retail clients 
 
 
Article 6 Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Article 6 
Inappropriate use of title transfer collateral 
arrangements 
 
1.   Member States shall require that investment 
firms properly consider, and are able to 
demonstrate that they have done so, the use of 
title transfer collateral arrangements in the 
context of the relationship between the client's 
obligation to the firm and the client assets 
subjected to title transfer collateral arrangements 
by the firm. 
 
2.   When considering, and documenting, the 
appropriateness of the use of title transfer 
collateral arrangements, investment firms shall 
take into account all of the following factors: 
 
(a) 
whether there is only a very weak connection 
between the client's obligation to the firm and the 
use of title transfer collateral arrangements, 
including whether the likelihood of a clients' 
liability to the firm is low or negligible; 
 
(b) 
whether the amount of client funds or financial 
instruments subject to title transfer collateral 
arrangements far exceeds the client's obligation, 
or is even unlimited if the client has any 
obligation at all to the firm; and 
 
(c) 
whether all clients' financial instruments or funds 
are made subject to title transfer collateral 
arrangements, without consideration of what 
obligation each client has to the firm. 
 
3.   Where using title transfer collateral 
arrangements, investment firms shall highlight to 
professional clients and eligible counterparties the 
risks involved and the effect of any title transfer 
collateral arrangement on the client's financial 
instruments and funds. 
 
TTCA applies to all safe custody assets from the point of receipt by 
the firm) and whether the client might have no obligations at all to the 
firm; and 
(c) whether all the client’s safe custody assets are made subject to 
TTCAs, without consideration of what obligation the client has to the 
firm. 
(4) Where a firm uses a TTCA, it must highlight to the client the risks 
involved and the effect of any TTCA on the client’s safe custody 
assets. 
[Note: article 6 of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
arrangements, investment firms shall take into account all 
of the following factors: 
 
(a) whether there is only a very weak connection between 
the client’s obligation to the firm and the use of title 
transfer collateral arrangements, including whether the 
likelihood of a clients liability to the firm is low or 
negligible; 
 
(b) whether the amount of client funds or financial 
instruments subject to title transfer collateral arrangements 
far exceeds the client’s obligation, or is even unlimited if 
the client has any obligation at all to the firm; 
 
(c) whether all clients’ financial instruments or funds are 
made subject to title transfer collateral arrangements, 
without consideration of what obligation each client has to 
the firm. 
 
(3) Where using title transfer collateral arrangements, 
investment firms shall emphasise to professional clients 
and eligible counterparties the risks involved and the 
effect of any title transfer collateral arrangement on the 
client’s financial instruments and funds. 
221.   6.1.6EG 
A firm may choose to combine its client communication under CASS 
6.1.6DR(4) with any communication made in order to comply with 
article 15.1(a)(ii) of the SFTR or CASS 9.3.1R(2)(d). 
 
   The UK rules are comparably more prescriptive than those EU and Irish 
rules, despite common principles being applied in a similar vein as to what the 
UK rules sets in compliance objectives.  
222.   6.1.8G 
Firms are reminded of the client's best interests rule, which requires 
them to act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the 
best interests of their clients when structuring their business 
particularly in respect of the effect of that structure on firms' 
obligations under this chapter. 
 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
223.   Termination of title transfer collateral arrangements 
6.1.8AR 
(1) If a client communicates to a firm that it wishes (whether pursuant 
to a contractual right or otherwise) to terminate a TTCA and the 
client's communication is not in writing, the firm must make a written 
record of the client's communication which also records the date the 
communication was received. 
(2) A firm must keep a client's written communication, or a written 
record of the client's communication in (1), for five years, starting 
from the date the communication was received by the firm. 
(3) 
(a) If a firm agrees to the termination of a TTCA, it must notify the 
client of its agreement in writing. The notification must state when the 
termination is to take effect and whether or not the client's safe 
custody asset will be held under the custody rules by the firm 
thereafter. 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
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(b) If a firm does not agree to terminate a TTCA, it must notify the 
client of its disagreement in writing. 
(4) A firm must keep a written record of any notification it makes to a 
client under (3) for a period of five years, starting from the date the 
notification was made. 
 
224.   6.1.8BG 
CASS 6.1.8AR (3)(a) refers only to a firm's agreement to terminate an 
existing TTCA. Such agreement by a firm does not necessarily need 
to amount to the termination of its entire agreement with the client. 
 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
225.   6.1.8CG 
When a firm notifies a client under CASS 6.1.8AR (3)(a) of when the 
termination of a TTCA is to take effect, it should take into account: 
 
(1) any relevant terms relating to such a termination that have been 
agreed with the client; and 
(2) the period of time it reasonably requires to return the safe custody 
asset to the client or to update the registration under (Holding of client 
assets) CASS 6.2and update its records under CASS 6.6 (Records, 
accounts and reconciliations). 
 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
226.   6.1.8DR 
If a TTCA is terminated, then the exemption at CASS 6.1.6R(4) no 
longer applies. 
 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
227.   6.1.8EG 
(1) Following the termination of a TTCA , where a firm does not 
immediately return the safe custody assets to the client the firm 
should consider whether the custody rules apply in respect of the safe 
custody assets pursuant to CASS 6.1.1R. 
(2) Where the custody rules apply to a firm for safe custody assets in 
these circumstances then the firm is required to comply with those 
rules and should, for example, update the registration under CASS 
6.2(Holding of client assets), update its records under CASS 6.6 
(Records, accounts and reconciliations) and treat any shortfall in 
accordance with CASS 6.6.54 R (in each case as appropriate). 
 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
228.   6.1.9G 
Firms are reminded that, in certain cases, the collateral rules apply 
where a firm receives collateral from a client in order to secure the 
obligations of the client. 
 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
229.   Prime brokerage agreements 
6.1.9AG 
A prime brokerage firm is reminded of the additional obligations in 
CASS 9.3.1 R which apply to prime brokerage agreements. 
 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
230.   Affiliated companies - MiFID business 
6.1.10G 
The fact that a client is an affiliated company in respect of MiFID 
business does not affect the operation of the custody rules in relation 
to that client. 
 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
231.   Affiliated companies - non-MiFID business 
6.1.10BR 
In respect of a firm's business falling under CASS 6.1.1R (1B), the 
custody rules do not apply to the firm when it is safeguarding and 
administering investments on behalf of an affiliated company, unless: 
 
(1) the firm has been notified that the designated investment belongs 
to a client of the affiliated company; or 
(2) the affiliated company is a client dealt with at arm's length. 
 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
232.   Delivery versus payment transaction exemption 
6.1.12R 
(1) Subject to (2) and CASS 6.1.12B R and with the written 
agreement of the relevant client, a firm need not treat this chapter as 
applying in respect of a delivery versus payment transaction through a 
commercial settlement system if: 
(a) in respect of a client's purchase, the firm intends for the asset in 
question to be due to the client within one business day following the 
client's fulfilment of its payment obligation to the firm; or 
(b) in respect of a client's sale, the firm intends for the asset in 
question to be due to the firm within one business day following the 
firm's fulfilment of its payment obligation to the client. 
(2) If the payment or delivery by the firm to the client has not 
occurred by the close of business on the third business day following 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
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the date on which a firm makes use of the exemption under (1), the 
firm must stop using that exemption for the transaction. 
(3) If the period referred to in CASS 6.1.12R (2) has expired before 
such a delivery versus payment transaction through a commercial 
settlement system has settled, a firm may, until settlement and 
provided that doing so is consistent with the firm's permissions and it 
complies with (4), segregate the firm's own money as client money (in 
accordance with the client money rules) of an amount equivalent to 
the value at which that safe custody asset is reasonably expected to 
settle instead of holding the client's safe custody assets (in accordance 
with the custody rules). 
(4) Where a firm intends to segregate money as client money instead 
of the client's safe custody asset under (3) it must, before doing so, 
ensure that this would result in money being held for the relevant 
client in respect of the shortfall under CASS 7.17.2R (statutory trust). 
(5) Where a firm segregates an amount of client money instead of the 
client's safe custody assets under (3) it must also: 
(a) ensure the money is segregated under CASS 7.13 (Segregation of 
client money) and recorded as being held for the relevant client(s) 
under CASS 7.15 (Records, accounts and reconciliations); 
(b) keep a record of the actions the firm has taken under this rule 
which includes a description of the safe custody asset in question, 
identifies the relevant affected client, and specifies the amount of 
money that the firm has appropriated as client money to cover the 
value of the safe custody asset; and 
(c) update the record made under (5)(b) when the transaction in 
question has settled and the firm has re-appropriated the money. 
 
233.   6.1.12AG 
(1) The amount of client money a firm segregates for the purposes of 
CASS 6.1.12R (3) may be determined by the previous day's closing 
mark to market valuation of the relevant safe custody asset or, if in 
relation to a particular safe custody asset none is available, the most 
recent available valuation. 
(2) Where a firm is segregating money for the purposes of CASS 
6.1.12R (3) it should, as regularly as necessary, and having regard to 
Principle 10: 
(a) review the value of the safe custody asset in question in line with 
(1); and 
(b) where the firm has found that the value of the safe custody asset 
has changed, adjust the amount of money it has appropriated to ensure 
that these monies are sufficient to cover the latest value of the safe 
custody asset. 
 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
234.   6.1.12BR 
A firm cannot, in respect of a particular delivery versus payment 
transaction, make use of the exemption under CASS 6.1.12 R in either 
or both of the following circumstances: 
 
(1) it is not a direct member or participant of the relevant commercial 
settlement system, nor is it sponsored by such a member or 
participant, in accordance with the terms and conditions of that 
commercial settlement system; 
(2) the transaction in question is being settled by another person on 
behalf of the firm through an account held at the relevant commercial 
settlement system by that other person. 
 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
235.   6.1.12CG 
Where a firm does not meet the requirements in CASS 6.1.12 R or 
CASS 6.1.12B R for use of the exemption in CASS 6.1.12 R, the firm 
is subject to the custody rules in respect of any safe custody asset it 
holds in connection with the delivery versus payment transaction in 
question. 
 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
236.   6.1.12DG 
(1) In line with CASS 6.1.12 R, where a firm receives a safe custody 
asset from a client in respect of a delivery versus payment transaction 
the firm is carrying out through a commercial settlement system in 
respect of a client's sale, and the firm has not fulfilled its payment 
obligation to the client by close of business on the third business day 
following the date of the client's fulfilment of its delivery obligation 
to the firm, the firm should consider whether the custody rules apply 
in respect of the safe custody asset pursuant to CASS 6.1.1R (1A) to 
CASS 6.1.1R (1D). 
(2) Upon settlement of a delivery versus payment transaction a firm is 
carrying out through a commercial settlement system (including when 
it is settled within the three business day period referred to in CASS 
6.1.12 R), in respect of: 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
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(a) a client's purchase, the custody rules apply to the relevant safe 
custody asset the firm receives upon settlement; and 
(b) a client's sale, the client money rules will apply to the relevant 
money received on settlement. 
 
237.   6.1.12ER 
(1) If a firm makes use of the exemption under CASS 6.1.12 R, it 
must obtain the client's written agreement to the firm's use of this 
exemption. 
(2) In respect of each client, the written agreement in (1) must be 
retained during the time that the firm makes use, or intends to make 
use, of the exemption under CASS 6.1.12 R in respect of that client's 
safe custody assets. 
 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
238.   Temporary handling of safe custody assets 
6.1.15G 
The custody rules do not apply if a firm temporarily handles a safe 
custody asset belonging to a client. A firm should temporarily handle 
a safe custody asset for no longer than is reasonably necessary. In 
most transactions this would be no longer than one business day, but 
it may be longer or shorter depending upon the transaction in 
question. For example, when a firm executes an order to sell shares 
which have not been registered on a de-materialised exchange, 
handling documents for longer periods may be reasonably necessary. 
However, in the case of safe custody assets in bearer form, the firm is 
expected to handle them for less than one business day. When a firm 
temporarily handles safe custody assets, it is still obliged to comply 
with Principle 10 (Clients' assets). 
 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
239.   6.1.16G 
When a firm temporarily handles a safe custody asset, in order to 
comply with its obligation to act in accordance with Principle 10 
(Clients' assets), the following are guides to good practice: 
 
(1) a firm should keep the safe custody asset secure, record it as 
belonging to that client, and forward it to the client or in accordance 
with the client's instructions as soon as practicable after receiving it; 
and 
(2) a firm should make and retain a record of the fact that the firm has 
handled that safe custody asset and of the details of the client 
concerned and of any action the firm has taken. 
 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
240.   Exemptions which do not apply to MiFID business 
6.1.16AR 
The exemptions in CASS 6.1.16B R to CASS 6.1.16D G do not apply 
to a MiFID investment firm which holds financial instruments 
belonging to a client in the course of MiFID business. 
 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
241.   Managers of AIFs and UCITS 
6.1.16BAG 
(1) The custody rules do not apply to a firm that is managing an AIF 
or managing a UCITS in relation to excluded custody activities, 
except where the firm is a small AIFM. 
(2) The custody rules can apply to a firm that is managing an AIF or 
managing a UCITS in relation to activities that are not excluded 
custody activities. For example, where the firm: 
(a) holds financial instruments belonging to a client in the course of 
its MiFID business (see CASS 6.1.1R (1A)); or 
(b) is safeguarding and administering investments, in the course of 
business that is not MiFID business (see CASS 6.1.1R (1B)). 
 
   Same comment as Row 221. 
242.   Personal investment firms 
6.1.16CR 
The custody rules do not apply to a personal investment firm when it 
temporarily holds a designated investment, other than in bearer form, 
belonging to a client, if the firm: 
 
(1) keeps it secure, records it as belonging to that client, and forwards 
it to the client or in accordance with the client's instructions, as soon 
as practicable after receiving it; 
(2) retains the designated investment for no longer than the firm has 
taken reasonable steps to determine is necessary to check for errors 
and to receive the final document in connection with any series of 
transactions to which the documents relate; and 
(3) makes a record, which must then be retained for a period of 5 
years after the record is made, of all the designated investments 
handled in accordance with (1) and (2) together with the details of the 
clients concerned and of any action the firm has taken. 
 
    UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
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243.   6.1.16DG 
Administrative convenience alone should not lead a personal 
investment firm to rely on CASS 6.1.16C R. Personal investment 
firms should consider what is in the client's interest and not rely on 
CASS 6.1.16C R as a matter of course. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
244.   Trustees and depositaries (except depositaries of AIFs and 
UCITS) 
6.1.16ER 
The specialist regime in CASS 6.1.16F R to CASS 6.1.16I G does not 
apply to a MiFID investment firm which holds financial instruments 
belonging to a client in the course of MiFID business. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
245.   6.1.16FR 
When a trustee firm or depositary acts as a custodian for a trust or 
collective investment scheme, (except for a firm acting as trustee or 
depositary of an AIF and a firm acting as trustee or depositary of a 
UCITS), and: 
 
(1) the trust or scheme is established by written instrument; and 
(2) the trustee firm or depositary has taken reasonable steps to 
determine that the relevant law and provisions of the trust instrument 
or scheme constitution will provide protections at least equivalent to 
the custody rules for the trust property or scheme property; 
the trustee firm or depositary need comply only with the custody rules 
listed in the table below. 
 
Reference Rule 
CASS 6.1.1 R to 
CASS 6.1.9 G and 
CASS 6.1.15 G to 
CASS 6.1.16C R 
Application 
CASS 6.1.16E R 
to CASS 6.1.16I G 
Trustees and 
depositaries 
CASS 6.1.22 G to 
CASS 6.1.24 G 
General purpose 
CASS 6.2.1 R and 
CASS 6.2.2 R 
Protection of 
clients’ safe 
custody assets 
CASS 6.2.3 R and 
CASS 6.2.3B G 
Registration and 
recording of legal 
title 
CASS 6.2.7 R Holding 
CASS 6.3.1 R to 
CASS 6.3.4B G 
Depositing sage 
custody assets with 
third parties 
CASS 6.4.1 R and 
CASS 6.4.2 G 
Use of safe 
custody assets 
CASS 6.6 Records, accounts 
and reconciliations 
 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
246.   6.1.16GG 
The reasonable steps referred in CASS 6.1.16FR (2) could include 
obtaining an appropriate legal opinion to that effect. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
247.   6.1.16IG 
A trustee firm or depositary that just arranges safeguarding and 
administration of assets may also take advantage of the exemption in 
CASS 6.1.16J R (Arrangers). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
248.   Depositaries of AIFs 
6.1.16IAR 
(1) Subject to (2), when a firm is acting as trustee or depositary of an 
AIF the firm need comply only with the custody rules in the table 
below: 
 
Reference Rule 
CASS 6.1.1 R, 
CASS 6.1.9 G, 
CASS 6.1.9A G 
and CASS 
6.1.16IB G 
Application 
CASS 6.1.22 G to 
CASS 6.1.24 G 
General purpose 
CASS 6.2.3 R and 
CASS 6.2.3B G to 
CASS 6.2.6 G 
Registration and 
recording of legal 
title 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
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CASS 6.2.7 R Holding 
CASS 6.6.2 R, 
CASS 6.6.4 R, 
CASS 6.6.6 R, 
CASS 6.6.7 R, 
CASS 6.6.57R (2) 
and CASS 6.6.58 
G 
Records, accounts 
and reconciliations 
 
(2) When a firm is acting as trustee or depositary of an AIF that is an 
authorised AIF the firm must, in addition to the custody rules in (1), 
also comply with the custody rules in the table below: 
 
 
Reference Rule 
CASS 6.1.1BR (2) Application 
CASS 6.6.8 R, 
CASS 6.6.11 R to 
CASS 6.6.32 G, 
CASS 6.6.41 G, 
CASS 6.6.43 G 
and CASS 6.6.47 
G. 
Records, accounts 
and reconciliations 
 
 
249.   6.1.16IBG 
Firms acting as trustee or depositary of an AIF are reminded of the 
obligations in FUND 3.11 (Depositaries) and Chapter IV (Depositary) 
of the AIFMD level 2 regulation which apply in addition to those in 
CASS 6. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
250.   6.1.16ICG 
A firm (Firm A) to which another firm acting as trustee or depositary 
of an AIF (Firm B) has delegated safekeeping functions in accordance 
with FUND 3.11.28 R (Delegation: safekeeping) will not itself be 
acting as trustee or depositary of an AIF for that AIF. CASS 6.1.16IA 
R will not apply to Firm A in respect of that AIF. However, Firm A 
may be safeguarding and administering investments in respect of that 
AIF. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
251.   Depositaries of UCITS 
6.1.16IDR 
When a firm is acting as trustee or depositary of a UCITS, the firm 
need comply only with the custody rules in the table below: 
 
 
Reference Rule 
CASS 6.1.1R, 
CASS 6.1.1BR(3), 
CASS 6.1.9G, 
CASS 6.1.16IEG 
Application 
CASS 6.1.22G to 
CASS 6.1.24G 
General purpose 
CASS 6.2.3R, 
CASS 6.2.3AR, 
CASS 6.2.3BG, 
CASS 6.2.7R 
Holding of client 
assets 
CASS 6.6.2R, 
CASS 6.6.4R, 
CASS 6.6.7R, 
CASS 6.6.41AG, 
CASS 
6.6.57R(2A), 
CASS 6.6.58G 
Records, accounts 
and reconciliations 
 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
252.   6.1.16IEG 
Firms acting as trustee or depositary of a UCITS are reminded of the 
obligations in COLL 6.6B (UCITS depositaries) which apply as well 
as those in CASS 6. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
253.   6.1.16IFG 
(1) A firm (Firm A) to which another firm acting as trustee or 
depositary of a UCITS (Firm B) has delegated safekeeping functions 
under COLL 6.6B.25R (Delegation: safekeeping) will not itself be 
acting as trustee or depositary of a UCITS for that UCITS scheme. 
(2) CASS 6.1.16IDR will not apply to Firm A for that UCITS scheme. 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
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(3) However, Firm A may be safeguarding and administering 
investments in respect of that UCITS scheme. 
 
254.   Arrangers 
6.1.16JR 
Only the custody rules in the table below apply to a firm when 
arranging safeguarding and administration of assets. 
 
Reference Rule 
CASS 6.1.1 R to 
CASS 6.1.9 G and 
CASS 6.1.15 G to 
CASS 6.1.16B R 
Application 
CASS 6.1.16J R Arrangers 
CASS 6.1.16K R Records 
CASS 6.1.22 G to 
CASS 6.1.24 G 
General purpose 
CASS 6.3.4A R 
and CASS 6.3.4B 
G 
Third-party 
custody 
agreements 
 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
255.   6.1.16KR 
When a firm arranges safeguarding and administration of assets, it 
must ensure that proper records of the arrangements are made and 
retained for a period of 5 years after they are made. 
 
While not explicitly mentioned see row 242.   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
256.   General purpose 
6.1.22G 
Principle 10 (Clients' assets) requires a firm to arrange adequate 
protection for clients' assets when it is responsible for them. As part of 
these protections, the custody rules require a firm to take appropriate 
steps to protect safe custody assets for which it is responsible. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
257.   6.1.23G 
The rules in this chapter are designed primarily to restrict the 
commingling of client and the firm's assets and minimise the risk of 
the client's safe custody assets being used by the firm without the 
client's agreement or contrary to the client's wishes, or being treated 
as the firm's assets in the event of its insolvency. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
258.   6.1.24G 
The custody rules also, where relevant, implement the provisions of 
MiFID which regulate the obligations of a firm when it holds 
financial instruments belonging to a client in the course of its MiFID 
business. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
259.  Article 16(8) MiFID II 
 
An investment firm shall, when holding financial 
instruments belonging to clients, make adequate 
arrangements so as to safeguard the ownership 
rights of clients, especially in the event of the 
investment firm’s insolvency, and to prevent the 
use of a client’s financial instruments on own 
account except with the client’s express consent. 
 
6.2 Holding of client assets 
 
Requirement to protect clients' safe custody assets 
6.2.1R 
A firm must, when holding safe custody assets belonging to clients, 
make adequate arrangements so as to safeguard clients' ownership 
rights, especially in the event of the firm's insolvency, and to prevent 
the use of safe custody assets belonging to a client on the firm's own 
account except with the client's express consent. 
 
[Note: article 16(8) of MiFID] 
 
Regulation 23(1)(k) MiFID Regulations  
 
(k) when holding financial instruments belonging to 
clients, make adequate arrangements to— 
 
(i) safeguard clients’ ownership rights, especially in the 
event of the investment firm’s insolvency, and 
 
(ii) prevent the use of a client’s financial instruments on 
own account, except with the client’s express consent, 
 
 
Regulation 23(1)(l) MiFID Regulations 
 
(l) when holding funds belonging to clients, make 
adequate arrangements to safeguard the clients’ rights and, 
except in the case of credit institutions, prevent the use of 
client funds for the firm’s own account, 
  Broadly, rules follow conceptual equivalence. 
260.  Article 2(1)(f) Commission Delegated Directive  
 
1.   Member States shall require that investment 
firms comply with the following requirements: 
 
 
(f) 
 
they must introduce adequate organisational 
arrangements to minimise the risk of the loss or 
diminution of client assets, or of rights in 
connection with those assets, as a result of misuse 
Requirement to have adequate organisational arrangements 
6.2.2R 
A firm must introduce adequate organisational arrangements to 
minimise the risk of the loss or diminution of clients' safe custody 
assets, or the rights in connection with those safe custody assets, as a 
result of the misuse of the safe custody assets, fraud, poor 
administration, inadequate record-keeping or negligence. 
 
[Note: article 2(1)(f) of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
   Broadly, rules follow conceptual equivalence. Irish rules accounted for as 
discussed above.  
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of the assets, fraud, poor administration, 
inadequate record-keeping or negligence. 
 
261.   Registration and recording of legal title 
6.2.3R 
Subject to CASS 6.2.3A-1R, a firm must effect appropriate 
registration or recording of legal title to a safe custody asset belonging 
to a client in the name of: 
 
(1) the client, unless the client is an authorised person acting on behalf 
of its client, in which case it may be registered in the name of the 
client of that authorised person; 
(2) a nominee company which is controlled by: 
(a) the firm; 
(b) an affiliated company; 
(c) a recognised investment exchange; or 
(d) a third party with whom financial instruments are deposited under 
CASS 6.3 (Depositing assets and arranging for assets to be deposited 
with third parties); 
(3) any other third party, if the firm is not a trustee firm but is 
prevented from registering or recording legal title in the way set out in 
(1) or (2) and provided that: 
(a) the safe custody asset is subject to the law or market practice of a 
jurisdiction outside the United Kingdom and the firm has taken 
reasonable steps to determine that it is in the client's best interests to 
register or record it in that way, or that it is not feasible to do 
otherwise, because of the nature of the applicable law or market 
practice; and 
(b) the firm has notified the client in writing; 
(4) the firm if either: 
(a) it is not a trustee firm but is prevented from registering or 
recording legal title in the way set out in (1), (2) or (3) and provided 
that: 
(i) the safe custody asset is subject to the law or market practice of a 
jurisdiction outside the United Kingdom and the firm has taken 
reasonable steps to determine that it is in the client's best interests to 
register or record it in that way, or that it is not feasible to do 
otherwise, because of the nature of the applicable law or market 
practice; and 
(ii) the firm has notified the client if a professional client, or obtained 
prior written consent if a retail client. 
(b) it is a trustee firm and is prevented from registering or recording 
legal title in the way set out in (1) or (2). 
 
Regulation 51 IMR 2017 
 
Registration of client financial instruments 
 
51. (1) In this Regulation “eligible nominee” means— 
 
(a) a person nominated in writing by the client who is not 
a related undertaking to the investment firm; 
 
(b) a nominee; 
 
(c) a nominee company of an exchange which is a 
regulated market; 
 
(d) a nominee company of a relevant party or eligible 
custodian; or 
 
(e) an eligible custodian or relevant party outside the 
State, but only where it is not feasible to do otherwise due 
to the nature of the law or market practice of the relevant 
jurisdiction outside the State; 
 
(2) An investment firm shall arrange for the registration of 
client financial instruments in the name of the client save 
where the client has given prior written consent for the 
registration of the client’s financial instruments in the 
name of an eligible nominee. 
 
Regulation 52 IMR 2017 
 
Designation 
 
52. (1) In advance of opening a third party client asset 
account, an investment firm shall— 
 
(a) designate in its own financial records each third party 
client asset account as a ‘client asset account’ or use some 
such other abbreviation in the account name that makes it 
readily identifiable as an account containing client assets, 
 
(b) ensure that the third party will designate in the 
financial records of the third party, the name of a third 
party client asset account held with it in a manner which 
makes it clear that the client assets are not assets of the 
investment firm. 
 
Regulation 53 IMR 2017  
 
Funds facilities agreement and financial instruments 
facilities agreement 
 
53. (1) In advance of opening a third party client asset 
account, an investment firm shall enter into an agreement 
with the third party (in this Part to be known as a “Funds 
Facilities Agreement”) and the terms of such Funds 
Facilities Agreement shall be that— 
 
(a) the investment firm and the third party acknowledge 
that the client funds in the third party client asset account 
are held by the investment firm in trust for the relevant 
clients, 
 
(b) the third party shall maintain a record of the client 
funds in the third party client asset account separate from 
the investment firm’s own funds and the funds of the third 
party, 
 
(c) the third party will designate the name of the third 
party client asset account in its records in such a way as to 
make it clear that the client funds do not belong to the 
investment firm, 
 
(d) the third party is not entitled to combine the third party 
client asset account with any other account and the third 
party is not entitled to exercise any right of set-off or 
counterclaim against client funds in that third party client 
  Broadly UK and Irish rules are conceptually equivalent yet more prescriptive 
than EU rules.  
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asset account in respect of any sum owed to it by any 
person, including any other account of the investment 
firm, 
 
(e) the third party will provide the investment firm with a 
statement or other form of confirmation as often as is 
required to enable the investment firm comply with 
Regulations 57(1) to 57(2) and such statement shall 
specify all client funds deposited with the third party for 
the investment firm, and 
 
(f) the third party will not make withdrawals from the 
third party client asset account other than by instruction 
received from an authorised person of the investment firm. 
 
(2) In advance of opening a third party client asset 
account, an investment firm shall enter into an agreement 
with the third party (in this Part to be known as a 
“Financial Instruments Facilities Agreement”) and the 
terms of such Financial Instruments Facilities Agreement 
shall be that— 
 
(a) the investment firm and the third party acknowledge 
that client financial instruments in the third party client 
asset account are held by the investment firm in trust for 
the relevant clients, 
 
(b) the third party shall hold and record client financial 
instruments separate from the investment firm’s own 
financial instruments and financial instruments of the third 
party, 
 
(c) the third party will designate the name of the third 
party client asset account in its records in such a way as to 
make it clear that the client financial instruments do not 
belong to the investment firm, 
 
(d) the third party is not entitled to combine the third party 
client asset account with any other account or to exercise 
any right of set-off or counterclaim against client financial 
instruments in that third party client asset account in 
respect of any sum owed to it by any person, except— 
 
(i) to the extent of any charges relating to the 
administration or safekeeping of that client’s financial 
instruments, or 
 
(ii) where that client of the investment firm has failed to 
settle a transaction by its due settlement date, 
 
(e) the third party will specify what the arrangements will 
be for registering client financial instruments if they will 
not be registered in the client’s name, 
 
(f) the third party will not make withdrawals from the 
third party client asset account other than by instruction 
from an authorised person of the investment firm, 
 
(g) the third party may only claim a lien or security 
interest over a client’s financial instruments— 
 
(i) to the extent of any charges relating to the 
administration or safekeeping of that client’s financial 
instruments, or 
 
(ii) where that client has failed to settle a transaction by its 
due settlement date, and 
 
(h) the third party will provide the investment firm with a 
statement or other form of confirmation as often as is 
required to enable the investment firm to comply with 
Regulation 57(3) and such statement shall specify all 
client financial instruments held and a description and the 
amount of all client financial instruments held in the third 
party client asset accounts. 
262.   6.2.3A-1R 
A firm need not comply with CASS 6.2.3 R for any safe custody 
asset: 
 
   UK rules, while following the spirit of the purpose of the EU law is more 
prescriptive (including when compared to the Irish rules). 
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(1) that it has deposited with a third party in accordance with CASS 
6.3 (Depositing assets and arranging for assets to be deposited with 
third parties); and 
(2) for which, because of the arrangements with that third party for 
depositing the safe custody asset, it is not practicable for the firm to 
effect appropriate registration or recording of legal title itself. 
 
263.   6.2.3AR 
If: 
(1) the safe custody asset is an emission auction product that is a 
financial instrument; and 
(2) it is not practicable or possible for a firm to effect registration or 
recording of legal title in this asset in the manner set out in CASS 
6.2.3 R, 
the firm must register or record legal title in its name provided it has 
notified the client in writing. 
 
   UK rules, while following the spirit of the purpose of the EU law is more 
prescriptive (including when compared to the Irish rules). 
264.   6.2.3BG 
A firm, when complying with CASS 6.2.3R (3) or CASS 6.2.3R 
(4)(a), will be expected to demonstrate that adequate investigations 
have been made of the jurisdiction concerned by reference to local 
sources, which may include an appropriate legal opinion. 
 
   UK rules, while following the spirit of the purpose of the EU law is more 
prescriptive (including when compared to the Irish rules). 
265.   6.2.4R 
A firm must accept the same level of responsibility to its client for 
any nominee company controlled by the firm, or any nominee 
company controlled by an affiliated company of the firm, with respect 
of any requirements of the custody rules. 
 
   UK rules, while following the spirit of the purpose of the EU law is more 
prescriptive (including when compared to the Irish rules). 
266.   6.2.5R 
A firm may only register or record legal title to its own applicable 
asset in the same name as that in which legal title to a client's safe 
custody asset is registered or recorded if the firm's applicable asset is 
separately identified from the client's safe custody asset in the firm's 
records, and either or both of the conditions in (1) and (2) are met. 
(1) The firm's holding of its own applicable asset arises incidentally 
to: 
(a) designated investment business it carries on for the account of any 
client; or 
(b) steps taken by the firm to comply with an applicable custody rule; 
and, in the case of either (a) or (b), the situation where registration or 
recording of legal title of the firm's applicable asset is in the same 
name as the client's safe custody asset under this rule remains in place 
only to the extent that it is reasonably necessary. 
(2) The registration or recording of legal title of the firm's own 
applicable asset in the same name as the client's safe custody asset is 
only as a result of the law or market practice of a jurisdiction outside 
of the United Kingdom. 
 
   UK rules, while following the spirit of the purpose of the EU law is more 
prescriptive (including when compared to the Irish rules). 
267.   6.2.6G 
(1) Consistent with a firm's requirements to protect clients' safe 
custody assets and have adequate organisation arrangements in place 
(CASS 6.2.1 R and CASS 6.2.2 R), before a firm registers or records 
legal title to its own applicable asset in the same name as that in 
which legal title to a client's safe custody asset is registered or 
recorded under CASS 6.2.5 R, it should consider whether there are 
any means to avoid doing so. 
(2) Examples of where the conditions under CASS 6.2.5R (1) might 
be met include in the course of a firm: 
(a) correcting a dealing error that relates to a transaction for the 
account of a client; or 
(b) maintaining a small balance of the firm's own applicable assets for 
purely operational or compliance purposes (eg, as a float to cover 
potential custody shortfalls) in an amount that is proportionate to the 
total amount of safe custody assets held for clients; or 
(c) allocating safe custody assets to clients following settlement of a 
bulk order; or 
(d) facilitating a client transaction that involves fractional 
entitlements; or 
(e) making good a shortfall. 
 
   UK rules, while following the spirit of the purpose of the EU law is more 
prescriptive (including when compared to the Irish rules). 
268.   6.2.7R 
A firm must ensure that any documents of title to applicable assets in 
bearer form, belonging to the firm and which it holds in its physical 
possession, are kept separately from any document of title to a client's 
safe custody assets in bearer form. 
 
   UK rules, while following the spirit of the purpose of the EU law is more 
prescriptive (including when compared to the Irish rules). 
269.   Allocated but unclaimed safe custody assets 
6.2.7AR 
   UK rules, while following the spirit of the purpose of the EU law is more 
prescriptive (including when compared to the Irish rules). 
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CASS 6.2.8G to CASS 6.2.16G do not apply to a firm following its 
failure. 
 
270.   6.2.7BG 
CASS 6.7.2R to CASS 6.7.7R (Disposal of safe custody assets) 
applies to a firm following its failure in respect of allocated but 
unclaimed safe custody assets. 
 
   UK rules, while following the spirit of the purpose of the EU law is more 
prescriptive (including when compared to the Irish rules). 
271.   6.2.8G 
The purpose of CASS 6.2.10 R is to set out the requirements a firm 
must comply with if it chooses to divest itself of a client's unclaimed 
safe custody assets. 
 
   UK rules, while following the spirit of the purpose of the EU law is more 
prescriptive (including when compared to the Irish rules). 
272.   6.2.9G 
Before acting in accordance with CASS 6.2.10 R to CASS 6.2.16 G, a 
firm should consider whether its actions are permitted by law and 
consistent with the arrangements under which the safe custody assets 
are held. These provisions relate to a firm's obligations as an 
authorised person. 
 
   UK rules, while following the spirit of the purpose of the EU law is more 
prescriptive (including when compared to the Irish rules). 
273.   6.2.10R 
A firm may either (i) liquidate an unclaimed safe custody asset it 
holds for a client, at market value, and pay away the proceeds or (ii) 
pay away an unclaimed safe custody asset it holds for a client, in 
either case, to a registered charity of its choice provided: 
 
(1) this is permitted by law and consistent with the arrangements 
under which that safe custody asset is held; 
(2) it has held that safe custody asset for at least 12 years; 
(3) in the 12 years preceding the divestment of that safe custody asset, 
it has not received instructions relating to any safe custody assets 
from or on behalf of the client concerned; 
(4) it can demonstrate that it has taken reasonable steps to trace the 
client concerned and return that safe custody asset; and 
(5) the firm complies with CASS 6.2.14 R: the undertaking 
requirement. 
 
   UK rules, while following the spirit of the purpose of the EU law is more 
prescriptive (including when compared to the Irish rules). 
274.   6.2.11E 
(1) Taking reasonable steps in CASS 6.2.10R (4) includes following 
this course of conduct: 
(a) determining, as far as reasonably possible, the correct contact 
details for the relevant client; 
(b) writing to the client at the last known address either by post or by 
electronic mail to inform it: 
(i) of the name of the firm with which the client first deposited the 
safe custody asset in question; 
(ii) of the firm's intention to pay the safe custody asset to charity 
under CASS 6.2.10 R if it does not receive instructions from the client 
within 28 days; 
(c) where the client has not responded after the 28 days referred to in 
(b) attempting to communicate the information set out in (b) to the 
client on at least one further occasion by any means other than that 
used in (b) including by post, electronic mail, telephone or media 
advertisement; 
(d) subject to (e) and (f), where the client has not responded within 28 
days following the most recent communication, writing again to the 
client at the last known address either by post or by electronic mail to 
inform them that: 
(i) as the firm received no instructions from the client, it will in 28 
days pay the safe custody asset to charity under CASS 6.2.10 R; and 
(ii) an undertaking will be provided by the firm or a member of its 
group to pay to the client concerned a sum equal to the value of the 
safe custody asset at the time it was liquidated or paid away in the 
event of the client seeking to claim the safe custody asset in future; 
(e) if the firm has carried out the steps in (b) or (c) and in response has 
received positive confirmation in writing that the client is no longer at 
a particular address, the firm should not use that address for the 
purposes of (d); 
(f) if, after carrying out the steps in (a), (b) and (c), the firm has 
obtained positive confirmation that none of the contact details it holds 
for the relevant client are accurate or, if utilised, the communication is 
unlikely to reach the client, the firm does not have to comply with (d); 
and 
(g) waiting a further 28 days following the most recent 
communication under this rule before divesting itself of the safe 
custody asset under CASS 6.2.10 R. 
(2) Compliance with (1) may be relied on as tending to establish 
compliance with CASS 6.2.10R (4). 
   UK rules, while following the spirit of the purpose of the EU law is more 
prescriptive (including when compared to the Irish rules). 
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(3) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as tending to establish 
contravention of CASS 6.2.10R (4). 
 
275.   6.2.12G 
For the purpose of CASS 6.2.11E (1)(a), a firm may use any available 
means to determine the correct contact details for the relevant client, 
including telephoning the client, searching internal records, media 
advertising, searching public records, mortality screening, using credit 
reference agencies or tracing agents. 
 
   UK rules, while following the spirit of the purpose of the EU law is more 
prescriptive (including when compared to the Irish rules). 
276.   6.2.13R 
Where a firm liquidates a safe custody asset under CASS 6.2.10 R, it 
must pay away the proceeds to charity as soon as practicable. 
 
   UK rules, while following the spirit of the purpose of the EU law is more 
prescriptive (including when compared to the Irish rules). 
277.   6.2.14R 
Where a firm divests itself of a client's safe custody asset under CASS 
6.2.10 R, it must comply with either (1)(a) or (1)(b) and, in either 
case, (2). 
 
(1) 
(a) The firm must unconditionally undertake to pay to the client 
concerned a sum equal to the value of the safe custody asset at the 
time it was liquidated or paid away in the event of the client seeking 
to claim the safe custody asset in future. 
(b) The firm must ensure that an unconditional undertaking in the 
terms set out in (1)(a) is made by a member of its group and there is 
suitable information available for relevant clients to identify the 
member of the group granting the undertaking. 
(2) Any undertaking under this rule must be: 
(a) authorised by the firm's governing body where (1)(a) applies or the 
governing body of the group member where (1)(b) applies; 
(b) legally enforceable by any person that had a legally enforceable 
claim to the unclaimed safe custody asset in question at the time it 
was divested by the firm, or by an assign or successor in title to such 
claim; and 
(c) retained by the firm, and, where (1)(b) applies, by the group 
member, indefinitely. 
 
   UK rules, while following the spirit of the purpose of the EU law is more 
prescriptive (including when compared to the Irish rules). 
278.   6.2.15R 
(1) If a firm pays away a client's unclaimed safe custody assets to 
charity or liquidates a client's unclaimed safe custody assets and pays 
the proceeds to charity under CASS 6.2.10 R it must make and retain, 
or where the firm already has such records, retain: 
(a) records of all safe custody assets divested under CASS 6.2.10 R 
(including details of the value of each asset at that time and the 
identity of the client to whom the asset was allocated); 
(b) all relevant documentation (including charity receipts); and 
(c) details of the communications the firm had or attempted to make 
with the client concerned pursuant to CASS 6.2.10R (4). 
(2) Records in (1) must be retained indefinitely. 
(3) If a member of the firm's group has provided an undertaking under 
CASS 6.2.14R (1)(b) then the records in (1) must be readily 
accessible to that group member. 
 
   UK rules, while following the spirit of the purpose of the EU law is more 
prescriptive (including when compared to the Irish rules). 
279.   Costs associated with divesting allocated but unclaimed client 
assets 
6.2.16G 
Any costs associated with the firm divesting itself of safe custody 
assets pursuant to CASS 6.2.10 R to CASS 6.2.15 R should be paid 
for from the firm's own funds, including: 
 
(1) any costs associated with the firm carrying out the steps in CASS 
6.2.10R (4) or CASS 6.2.11 E; and 
(2) the cost of any insurance purchased by a firm or the relevant 
member of its group to cover any legally enforceable claim in respect 
of the assets divested under CASS 6.2.10 R. 
 
   UK rules, while following the spirit of the purpose of the EU law is more 
prescriptive (including when compared to the Irish rules). 
280.  Recital 11 Commission Delegated Directive 
 
To maintain a high standard of investor 
protection, investment firms depositing financial 
instruments held on behalf of their clients into an 
account or accounts opened with a third party 
should exercise all due skill, care and diligence in 
the selection, appointment and periodic review of 
the third party and of the arrangements for the 
holding and safekeeping of those financial 
instruments. To ensure that financial instruments 
are subject to due care and protection at all times, 
6.3 Depositing assets and arranging for assets to be deposited with 
third parties 
 
Depositing safe custody assets with third parties 
6.3.1R 
(1) A firm may deposit safe custody assets held by it on behalf of its 
clients into an account or accounts opened with a third party, but only 
if it exercises all due skill, care and diligence in the selection, 
appointment and periodic review of the third party and of the 
arrangements for the holding and safekeeping of those safe custody 
assets. 
Para. 2 of Schedule 3 of MiFID Regulations 
 
Depositing client financial instruments 
 
2. (1) Investment firms may deposit financial instruments 
held by them on behalf of their clients into an account or 
accounts opened with a third party provided that the firms 
exercise all due skill, care, and diligence in the selection, 
appointment and periodic review of the third party and of 
the arrangements for the holding and safekeeping of those 
financial instruments. 
 
4.2 IMR Guidance  
 
Designation of third party collection accounts in the 
financial records of a third party  
 
(i) Where the third party collection accounts are 
designated in the financial records of a third party, the 
designation should be in the name field of the third 
party collection account and not in the address field or 
any other field within the third party’s financial 
records. If a third party has limited capacity to record 
the full title, an abbreviation such as “Coll a/c” is 
 The relevant rules are broadly conceptually equivalent. 
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investment firms should, as part of their due 
diligence, also take into account the expertise and 
market reputation of the other third parties to 
which the initial third-party, with whom they 
might deposit financial instruments, may have 
delegated functions concerning the holding and 
safekeeping of financial instruments. 
 
Recital 12 Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Where investment firms place client funds with a 
third party, the investment firm should exercise 
all due skill, care and diligence in the selection, 
appointment and periodic review of the third 
party and of the arrangements for holding and 
safekeeping client funds, and should consider the 
need for diversification and mitigation of risks, 
where appropriate, by placing client funds with 
more than one third party in order to safeguard 
clients' rights and minimise the risk of loss and 
misuse. Investment firms should not circumvent 
their duty to consider diversification by requiring 
clients to waive protection. Diversification 
requirement should apply to client funds 
deposited in accordance with Article 4 of this 
Directive. Diversification requirements should 
not apply to client funds placed with the third 
party merely for the purpose of executing a 
transaction for the client. Therefore where an 
investment firm has transferred client funds to a 
transaction account in order to make a specific 
transaction for the client, such funds should not 
be subject to a requirement to diversify, for 
example where a firm has transferred funds to a 
central counterparty (CCP) or exchange in order 
to pay a margin call. 
 
 
Article 3(1) Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Article 3 
Depositing client financial instruments 
 
1.   Member States shall allow investment firms 
to deposit financial instruments held by them on 
behalf of their clients into an account or accounts 
opened with a third party provided that the firms 
exercise all due skill, care and diligence in the 
selection, appointment and periodic review of the 
third party and of the arrangements for the 
holding and safekeeping of those financial 
instruments. 
 
(3) When a firm makes the selection, appointment and conducts the 
periodic review referred to under this rule, it must take into account: 
(a) the expertise and market reputation of the third party; and 
(b) any legal requirements related to the holding of those safe custody 
assets that could adversely affect clients' rights. 
[Note: article 3(1) of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
(2) Investment firms shall take into account the expertise, 
and market reputation of the third party as well as any 
legal requirements related to the holding of those financial 
instruments that could adversely affect clients’ rights. 
 
(3) Where an investment firm proposes to deposit client 
financial instruments with a third party, the investment 
firm shall only deposit financial instruments with a third 
party in a jurisdiction where the safekeeping of financial 
instruments for the account of another person is subject to 
specific regulation and supervision and that third party is 
subject to this specific regulation and supervision. 
 
(4) Investment firms shall not deposit financial 
instruments held on behalf of clients with a third party in a 
third country that does not regulate the holding and 
safekeeping of financial instruments for the account of 
another person unless one of the following conditions is 
met: 
 
(a) the nature of the financial instruments or of the 
investment services connected with those instruments 
requires them to be deposited with a third party in that 
third country; 
 
(b) where the financial instruments are held on behalf of a 
professional client, that client requests the firm in writing 
to deposit them with a third party in that third country. 
 
(5) The requirements under subparagraphs (3) and (4) 
shall also apply when the third party has delegated any of 
its functions concerning the holding and safekeeping of 
financial instruments to another third-party. 
acceptable. The Central Bank expects the verification 
of the designation to take the form of a bank statement 
or other electronic form. A fund service provider may 
hold this verification electronically.  
 
(ii) The verification process should be followed each 
time a third party collection account is opened and not 
each time investor money is deposited in that particular 
third party collection account. Arising from Regulation 
75(1), the fund service provider has up to three working 
days after the initial deposit of the money to withdraw 
the money if the third party collection account is not 
correctly designated. This process of designation 
verification is a separate process to what is required 
under Regulation 75(2)(b), which relates to ensuring 
that the third party collection account is set up in 
accordance with the provisions of the Investor Money 
Facilities Agreement. 
 
281.   6.3.2G 
In discharging its obligations under CASS 6.3.1 R, a firm should also 
consider, as appropriate, together with any other relevant matters: 
 
(1) the third party's performance of its services to the firm; 
(2) the arrangements that the third party has in place for holding and 
safeguarding the safe custody asset; 
(2A) market practices related to the holding of the safe custody asset 
that could adversely affect clients’ rights. 
(3) current industry standard reports, for example "Assurance reports 
on internal controls of services organisations made available to third 
parties" made in line with Technical Release AAF 01/06 of The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales or 
equivalent; 
(4) the capital or financial resources of the third party; 
(5) the credit-worthiness of the third party; 
(6) any other activities undertaken by the third party and, if relevant, 
any affiliated company; and 
(7) whether the third party has the appropriate regulatory permissions. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules.  
282.   6.3.2AR 
(1) A firm must make a record of the grounds upon which it satisfies 
itself as to the appropriateness of its selection and appointment of a 
third party under CASS 6.3.1 R. The firm must make the record on 
the date it makes the selection or appointment and must keep it from 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
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that date until five years after the firm ceases to use the third party to 
hold safe custody assets belonging to clients. 
(2) A firm must make a record of each periodic review of its selection 
and appointment of a third party that it conducts under CASS 6.3.1 R, 
its considerations and conclusions. The firm must make the record on 
the date it completes the review and must keep it from that date until 
five years after the firm ceases to use the third party to hold safe 
custody assets belonging to clients. 
 
283.  Article 3(2)-(4) Commission Delegated 
Directive 
 
Article 3 
Depositing client financial instruments 
 
2.   Where an investment firm proposes to deposit 
client financial instruments with a third party, 
Member States shall ensure that this investment 
firm only deposits financial instruments with a 
third party in a jurisdiction where the safekeeping 
of financial instruments for the account of another 
person is subject to specific regulation and 
supervision and that third party is subject to this 
specific regulation and supervision. 
 
3.   Member States shall ensure that investment 
firms do not deposit financial instruments held on 
behalf of clients with a third party in a third 
country that does not regulate the holding and 
safekeeping of financial instruments for the 
account of another person unless one of the 
following conditions is met: 
 
(a) 
the nature of the financial instruments or of the 
investment services connected with those 
instruments requires them to be deposited with a 
third party in that third country; 
 
(b) 
where the financial instruments are held on behalf 
of a professional client, that client requests the 
firm in writing to deposit them with a third party 
in that third country. 
 
4.   Member States shall ensure the requirements 
under paragraph 2 and 3 shall also apply when the 
third-party has delegated any of its functions 
concerning the holding and safekeeping of 
financial instruments to another third-party. 
 
6.3.4R 
(1) Subject to (2), a firm must only deposit safe custody assets with a 
third party in a jurisdiction which specifically regulates and 
supervises the safekeeping of safe custody assets for the account of 
another person with a third party who is subject to such regulation. 
(2) A firm must not deposit safe custody assets held on behalf of a 
client with a third party in a third country which does not regulate the 
holding and safekeeping of safe custody assets for the account of 
another person unless: 
(a) the nature of the safe custody assets or of the investment services 
connected with those safe custody assets requires them to be 
deposited with a third party in that third country; or 
(b) the safe custody assets are held on behalf of a professional client 
and the client requests the firm in writing to deposit them with a third 
party in that third country. 
(4) The requirements under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this rule also 
apply when the third party has delegated any of its functions 
concerning the holding and safekeeping of safe custody assets to 
another third party. 
[Note: article 3(2)-(4) of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
    
Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules.  
284.   6.3.4A-2G 
CASS 6.3.4R(4) applies to a firm which deposits a safe custody asset 
into an account opened with a third party under CASS 6.3.1R(1). It is 
therefore possible for more than one firm in a chain of custody to be 
subject to CASS 6.3.4R(4) in respect of the same safe custody asset. 
 
   Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules. 
285.  Article 2 (1)(d)  Commission Delegated 
Directive 
 
1.   Member States shall require that investment 
firms comply with the following requirements: 
(d) 
they must take the necessary steps to ensure that 
any client financial instruments deposited with a 
third party, in accordance with Article 3, are 
identifiable separately from the financial 
instruments belonging to the investment firm and 
from financial instruments belonging to that third 
party, by means of differently titled accounts on 
the books of the third party or other equivalent 
measures that achieve the same level of 
protection; 
 
6.3.4A-1R 
A firm must take the necessary steps to ensure that any client's safe 
custody assets deposited with a third party are identifiable separately 
from the applicable assets belonging to the firm and from the 
applicable assets belonging to that third party, by means of differently 
titled accounts on the books of the third party or other equivalent 
measures that achieve the same level of protection. 
 
[Note: article 2(1)(d) of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
   Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules. 
286.   Third-party custody agreements 
6.3.4AR 
A firm must have entered into a written agreement with any person 
with whom it deposits clients' safe custody assets under CASS 6.3.1 
R, or with whom it arranges safeguarding and administration of assets 
Regulation 48(3) IMR 2017 
 
(3) An investment firm shall not place in a third party 
client asset account any asset other than a client asset 
 What should an investment firm do in relation to 
depositing client funds with a third party?  
 
G3 (9) As part of this assessment, the Central Bank 
expects an investment firm to take into account how the 
Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules. 
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which are clients' safe custody assets. This agreement must, at 
minimum: 
 
(1) set out the binding terms of the arrangement between the firm and 
the third party; 
(2) be in force for the duration of that arrangement; and 
(3) clearly set out the custody service(s) that the third party is 
contracted to provide. 
 
except in accordance with Regulations 49(6), 49(7) or 
Regulation 58(3). 
clients’ rights would be affected in the event of the 
insolvency of the firm or the third party or both. An 
investment firm should ensure that any liens or 
encumbrances granted are permitted by the regulatory 
client asset protection regime.  
 
G3 (10) The Central Bank expects an investment firm to 
clearly document in its CAMP the procedures it would 
follow to carry out the reviews required by Regulations 
3(14), 3(15), 3(17) and 3(18).   
 
G3 (11) In the event of a client instructing an investment 
firm to deposit client assets with a specific third party 
that does not meet with the investment firm’s own 
internal risk assessment (refer to Regulation 3(14) and 
3(17)), the investment firm should clearly explain to the 
client, that the third party in question does not meet the 
investment firm’s internal assessment. If the client 
wishes to continue, the client’s written consent should be 
obtained prior to depositing the client’s assets with that 
specific third party (refer to Regulation 7(16)). 
287.   6.3.4BG 
A firm should consider carefully the terms of any agreement entered 
into with a third party under CASS 6.3.4A R. The following terms are 
examples of the issues that should be addressed in these agreements 
(where relevant): 
 
(1) that the title of the account in the third party's books and records 
indicates that any safe custody asset credited to it does not belong to 
the firm; 
(2) that the third party will hold or record a safe custody asset 
belonging to the firm's client separately from any applicable asset 
belonging to the firm or to the third party; 
(3) the arrangements for registration or recording of the safe custody 
asset, if this will not be registered in the firm's client's name; 
(4) the restrictions over the circumstances in which the third party 
may withdraw assets from the account; 
(5) the procedures and authorities for the passing of instructions to, or 
by, the firm; 
(6) the procedures for the claiming and receiving of dividends, 
interest payments and other entitlements accruing to the firm's client; 
and 
(7) the provisions detailing the extent of the third party's liability in 
the event of the loss of a safe custody asset caused by the fraud, wilful 
default or negligence of the third party or an agent appointed by him. 
 
Funds facilities agreement and financial instruments 
facilities agreement  
 
53. (1) In advance of opening a third party client asset 
account, an investment firm shall enter into an agreement 
with the third party (in this Part to be known as a “Funds 
Facilities Agreement”) and the terms of such Funds 
Facilities Agreement shall be that—  
 
(a) the investment firm and the third party acknowledge 
that the client funds in the third party client asset account 
are held by the investment firm in trust for the relevant 
clients,  
 
(b) the third party shall maintain a record of the client 
funds in the third party client asset account separate from 
the investment firm’s own funds and the funds of the third 
party,  
 
(c) the third party will designate the name of the third 
party client asset account in its records in such a way as to 
make it clear that the client funds do not belong to the 
investment firm,  
 
(d) the third party is not entitled to combine the third party 
client asset account with any other account and the third 
party is not entitled to exercise any right of set-off or 
counterclaim against client funds in that third party client 
asset account in respect of any sum owed to it by any 
person, including any other account of the investment 
firm,  
 
(e) the third party will provide the investment firm with a 
statement or other form of confirmation as often as is 
required to enable the investment firm comply with 
Regulations 57(1) to 57(2) and such statement shall 
specify all client funds deposited with the third party for 
the investment firm, and  
 
(f) the third party will not make withdrawals from the 
third party client asset account other than by instruction 
received from an authorised person of the investment firm.  
 
(2) In advance of opening a third party client asset 
account, an investment firm shall enter into an agreement 
with the third party (in this Part to be known as a 
“Financial Instruments Facilities Agreement”) and the 
terms of such Financial Instruments Facilities Agreement 
shall be that—  
 
(a) the investment firm and the third party acknowledge 
that client financial instruments in the third party client 
asset account are held by the investment firm in trust for 
the relevant clients,  
 
(b) the third party shall hold and record client financial 
instruments separate from the investment firm’s own 
  Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules. 
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financial instruments and financial instruments of the third 
party,  
 
(c) the third party will designate the name of the third 
party client asset account in its records in such a way as to 
make it clear that the client financial instruments do not 
belong to the investment firm,  
 
(d) the third party is not entitled to combine the third party 
client asset account with any other account or to exercise 
any right of set-off or counterclaim against client financial 
instruments in that third party client asset account in 
respect of any sum owed to it by any person, except—  
 
(i) to the extent of any charges relating to the 
administration or safekeeping of that client’s financial 
instruments, or  
(ii) where that client of the investment firm has failed to 
settle a transaction by its due settlement date,  
 
(e) the third party will specify what the arrangements will 
be for registering client financial instruments if they will 
not be registered in the client’s name,  
 
(f) the third party will not make withdrawals from the 
third party client asset account other than by instruction 
from an authorised person of the investment firm,  
 
(g) the third party may only claim a lien or security 
interest over a client’s financial instruments—  
 
(i) to the extent of any charges relating to the 
administration or safekeeping of that client’s financial 
instruments, or  
(ii) where that client has failed to settle a transaction by its 
due settlement date, and  
 
(h) the third party will provide the investment firm with a 
statement or other form of confirmation as often as is 
required to enable the investment firm to comply with 
Regulation 57(3) and such statement shall specify all 
client financial instruments held and a description and the 
amount of all client financial instruments held in the third 
party client asset accounts. 
 
288.  Recital 14 Commission Delegated Directive 
 
In order to protect client financial instruments or 
funds from appropriation by third parties seeking 
to recover debts or charges which are not client's 
debts or charges, investment firms should be able 
to agree to security interests, liens or rights of set-
off over client assets only where this is required 
by the applicable law in a third country. 
Sufficiently tailored risk disclosures should be 
made to clients in order to alert them to the 
specific risks they face in such cases. 
 
Article 2(4) Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Member States shall ensure that security interests, 
liens or rights of set-off over client financial 
instruments or funds enabling a third party to 
dispose of client's financial instruments or funds 
in order to recover debts that do not relate to the 
client or provision of services to the client are not 
permitted except where this is required by 
applicable law in a third country jurisdiction in 
which the client funds or financial instruments are 
held. 
 
6.3.6AR 
(1) A firm must not grant any security interest, lien or right of set-off 
to another person over clients’ safe custody assets that enable that 
other person to dispose of the safe custody assets in order to recover 
debts unless condition (a) or (b) is satisfied: 
(a) those debts relate to: 
(i) one or more of the firm’s clients; or 
(ii) the provision of services by that other person to one or more of the 
firm’s clients; or 
(b) to the extent those debts relate to anything else then: 
(i) the security interest, lien or right of set-off is required by 
applicable law in a third country jurisdiction in which the safe custody 
assets are held; 
(ii) the firm discloses information to the client so that the client is 
informed of the risks associated with these arrangements; and 
(iii) the firm has taken reasonable steps to determine that holding safe 
custody assets subject to that security interest, lien or right of set-off 
is in the best interests of the firm’s clients. 
(2) Where security interests, liens or rights of set-off are granted by a 
firm over safe custody assets, or where the firm has been informed 
that they are granted, these must be recorded in client contracts and 
the firm’s own books and records to make the ownership status of safe 
custody assets clear, such as in the event of an insolvency. 
[Note: article 2(4) of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
   Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules save for 
UK specific application to security interests – see comments in Annex 2 on the 
UK-specific concepts in the UK FCARs. 
289.   6.3.6BG 
Under CASS 6.3.6AR(1)(a), a security interest, lien or right of set-off 
to facilitate the clearing or settlement of transactions referring to 
clients of the firm may be regarded as being granted in order to 
recover debts that relate to the provision of services to one or more 
clients. 
 
   Same comments as in Row 288. 
290.   6.3.6CG    Same comments as in Row 288. 
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(1) Under CASS 6.3.6AR(1)(b)(i) a security interest, lien or right of 
set-off may be regarded as being required by applicable law in a third 
country for example where: 
(a) because of applicable law it is mandatory for such a security 
interest, lien or right of set-off to be given in order for the safe 
custody assets to be held in that third country; or 
(b) 
(i) in the context of the service being provided for the firm’s client the 
applicable law of that third country requires the use of a central 
securities depositary, securities settlement system or central 
counterparty; 
(ii) the rules of that central securities depositary, securities settlement 
system or central counterparty are subject to the oversight of a 
regulator that performs that function under the applicable law; and 
(iii) those rules require such a security interest, lien or right of set-off 
to be given. 
(2) But a firm should not grant a security interest, lien or right of set-
off under CASS 6.3.6AR(1)(b)(i) that is wider than that under CASS 
6.3.6AR(1)(a) where another person in a third country simply requests 
or demands this as a condition of business. 
 
291.   6.3.6DG 
To comply with CASS 6.3.6AR(2) and in relation to any security 
interests, liens or rights of set-off over safe custody assets, a firm 
should ensure that: 
 
(1) the written terms of its client contracts include the client’s 
agreement to another person having such a security interest, lien or 
right of set-off over the client’s assets; and 
(2) its books and records are able to show the safe custody assets in 
respect of which the firm is aware that such security interests, liens, or 
rights of set-off exist. 
 
   Same comments as in Row 288. 
292.   6.3.9R 
CASS 6.3.6AR does not permit a firm to agree to a third party having 
any recourse or right against client money in a client bank account or 
standing to the credit of a client transaction account of the kind 
referred to in: 
(1) paragraph (d) of CASS 7 Annex 2R; or 
(2) paragraph (e) of CASS 7 Annex 3R; or 
(3) paragraph (e) of CASS 7 Annex 4R. 
 
   Same comments as in Row 288. 
293.  Recital 8 Commission Delegated Directive 
 
While some securities financing transactions may 
require the transfer of title of clients' assets, in 
that context investment firms should not be able 
to effect arrangements prohibited under Article 
16(10) of Directive 2014/65/EU. 
 
Recital 9 Commission Delegated Directive 
 
In order to ensure appropriate protection for 
clients in relation to securities financing 
transactions (SFTs), investment firms should 
adopt specific arrangements to ensure that the 
borrower of client assets provides the appropriate 
collateral and that the firm monitors the continued 
appropriateness of such collateral. Investment 
firms' duty to monitor collateral should apply 
where they are party to an SFT agreement, 
including when acting as an agent for the 
conclusion of a SFT or in cases of tripartite 
agreement between the external borrower, the 
client and the investment firm. 
 
Recital 10 Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Prior express consent by clients should be given 
and recorded by investment firms in order to 
allow the investment firm to demonstrate clearly 
what the client agreed to and to help clarify the 
status of client assets. However, no legal 
requirement should be set out in respect of the 
form in which consent may be given, and a record 
should be understood as any evidence permissible 
under national law. Client's consent may be given 
once at the start of the commercial relationship, 
as long as it is sufficiently clear that the client has 
6.4 Use of safe custody assets 
 
6.4.1R 
(1) A firm must not enter into arrangements for securities financing 
transactions in respect of safe custody assets held by it on behalf of a 
client or otherwise use such safe custody assets for its own account or 
the account of any other person or client of the firm, unless: 
(a) the client has given express prior consent to the use of the safe 
custody assets on specified terms; and 
(b) the use of that client's safe custody assets is restricted to the 
specified terms to which the client consents. 
(2) A firm must not enter into arrangements for securities financing 
transactions in respect of safe custody assets held by it on behalf of a 
client in an omnibus account maintained by a third party, or otherwise 
use safe custody assets held in such an account for its own account or 
for the account of any other person unless, in addition to the 
conditions set out in (1): 
(a) each client whose safe custody assets are held together in an 
omnibus account has given express prior consent in accordance with 
(1)(a); or 
(b) the firm has in place systems and controls which ensure that only 
safe custody assets belonging to clients who have given express prior 
consent in accordance with (1)(a) are so used. 
(3) For the purposes of obtaining the express prior consent of a client 
under this rule, the consent must be clearly evidenced in writing and 
the signature of the client or an equivalent alternative means of 
affirmative execution is required. 
[Note: article 5(1) and (2) of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
Regulation 62 IMR 2017 
 
Client consent requirements 
62. (1) An investment firm shall obtain the prior written 
consent of a client 
in the following circumstances, as applicable: 
 
(a) where granting to another person a lien, security 
interest and/or right of set-off over client assets; 
 
(b) with respect to the arrangements for the giving and 
receiving of 
instructions by, or on behalf of, the client and any 
limitations to that 
authority, in respect of the provision of safe-keeping 
services which 
it provides; 
 
(c) where client assets are deposited with a third party 
outside the State; 
 
(d) where a client instructs an investment firm to deposit 
client assets with 
a specific third party that does not meet the investment 
firm’s internal 
risk assessment; 
 
(e) when client assets are to be held in a pooled account 
with a third party; 
 
(f) where interest earned on client funds in a third party 
client asset 
account is to be retained by the investment firm; 
 
(g) where client financial instruments are to be deposited 
with a third 
 See row 217. Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules. 
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consented to use of their securities. Where an 
investment firm is acting on a client instruction to 
lend financial instruments and where this 
constitutes consent to entering into the 
transaction, the investment firms should hold 
evidence to demonstrate this. 
 
Article 5(1) and (2) Commission Delegated 
Directive 
 
 
Article 5 
Use of client financial instruments 
 
1.   Member States shall not allow investment 
firms to enter into arrangements for securities 
financing transactions in respect of financial 
instruments held by them on behalf of a client, or 
otherwise use such financial instruments for their 
own account or the account of any other person or 
client of the firm, unless both of the following 
conditions are met: 
 
(a) 
the client has given his prior express consent to 
the use of the instruments on specified terms, as 
clearly evidenced in writing and affirmatively 
executed by signature or equivalent, and 
 
(b) 
the use of that client's financial instruments is 
restricted to the specified terms to which the 
client consents. 
 
2.   Member States shall not allow investment 
firms to enter into arrangements for securities 
financing transactions in respect of financial 
instruments which are held on behalf of a client in 
an omnibus account maintained by a third party, 
or otherwise use financial instruments held in 
such an account for their own account or for the 
account of any other person unless, in addition to 
the conditions set out in paragraph 1, at least one 
of the following conditions is met: 
 
(a) 
each client whose financial instruments are held 
together in an omnibus account must have given 
prior express consent in accordance with point (a) 
of paragraph 1; 
 
(b) 
the investment firm must have in place systems 
and controls which ensure that only financial 
instruments belonging to clients who have given 
prior express consent in accordance with point (a) 
of paragraph 1 are so used. 
 
The records of the investment firm shall include 
details of the client on whose instructions the use 
of the financial instruments has been effected, as 
well as the number of financial instruments used 
belonging to each client who has given his 
consent, so as to enable the correct allocation of 
any loss. 
 
party in a third country that does not regulate the holding 
and safekeeping of client financial instruments; and 
 
(h) in the case of collateral margined transactions— 
 
(i) before an investment firm deposits collateral with, 
pledges, charges or grants a security arrangement over the 
collateral to a relevant party or eligible custodian, 
(ii) where it proposes to use collateral in the form of client 
assets as security for the investment firm’s own 
obligations, or 
(iii) where it proposes to return to the client collateral 
other than the 
original collateral or original type of collateral. 
 
294.   6.4.1AG 
The FCA expects firms which enter into arrangements under CASS 
6.4.1 R with retail clients to only enter into securities financing 
transactions and not otherwise use retail clients' safe custody assets. 
 
   Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules. 
295.  Recital 10 Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Prior express consent by clients should be given 
and recorded by investment firms in order to 
allow the investment firm to demonstrate clearly 
what the client agreed to and to help clarify the 
status of client assets. However, no legal 
requirement should be set out in respect of the 
6.4.1BG 
(1) Prior express consent by clients should be given and recorded by 
firms in order to allow the firm to demonstrate clearly what the client 
agreed to and to help clarify the status of safe custody assets. 
(2) Clients’ consent may be given once at the start of the commercial 
relationship, as long as it is sufficiently clear that the client has 
consented to the use of their safe custody assets. 
   Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules. 
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form in which consent may be given, and a record 
should be understood as any evidence permissible 
under national law. Client's consent may be given 
once at the start of the commercial relationship, 
as long as it is sufficiently clear that the client has 
consented to use of their securities. Where an 
investment firm is acting on a client instruction to 
lend financial instruments and where this 
constitutes consent to entering into the 
transaction, the investment firms should hold 
evidence to demonstrate this. 
 
(3) Where a firm is acting on a client instruction to lend safe custody 
assets and where this constitutes consent to entering into the 
transaction, the firm should hold evidence to demonstrate this. 
[Note: recital 10 to the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
296.  Article 5(3) Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Member States shall ensure that investment firms 
take appropriate measures to prevent the 
unauthorised use of client financial instruments 
for their own account or the account of any other 
person such as: 
 
(a) 
the conclusion of agreements with clients on 
measures to be taken by the investment firms in 
case the client does not have enough provision on 
its account on the settlement date, such as 
borrowing of the corresponding securities on 
behalf of the client or unwinding the position; 
 
(b) 
the close monitoring by the investment firm of its 
projected ability to deliver on the settlement date 
and the putting in place of remedial measures if 
this cannot be done; and 
 
(c) 
the close monitoring and prompt requesting of 
undelivered securities outstanding on the 
settlement day and beyond. 
 
6.4.1CR 
A firm must take appropriate measures to prevent the unauthorised 
use of safe custody assets for its own account or the account of any 
other person, such as: 
 
(1) the conclusion of agreements with clients on measures to be taken 
by the firm in case the client does not have enough provision on its 
account on the settlement date, such as borrowing of the 
corresponding securities on behalf of the client or unwinding the 
position; 
(2) the close monitoring by the firm of its projected ability to deliver 
on the settlement date; 
(3) the putting in place of remedial measures if the firm cannot deliver 
on the settlement date; and 
(4) the close monitoring and prompt requesting of undelivered 
securities outstanding on the settlement day and beyond. 
[Note: article 5(3) of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
   Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules. 
297.   6.4.1DG 
Examples of remedial measures in CASS 6.4.1CR(3) can be found in 
CASS 6.6.54R. 
 
   Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules. 
298.  MiFID II “Best Interest” Rule as applied in 
respect of client assets and safekeeping is set out 
in Recital 71 and Articles 24(1) and 30 (1)  
MiFID II as described in sections above 
6.4.2G 
Firms are reminded of the client's best interests rule, which requires 
the firm to act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with 
the best interests of their clients. For any transactions involving retail 
clients carried out under this section the FCA expects that: 
(1) the firm ensures that relevant collateral is provided by the 
borrower in favour of the client; 
(2) the current realisable value of the safe custody asset and of the 
relevant collateral is monitored daily; and 
(3) the firm provides relevant collateral to make up the difference 
where the current realisable value of the collateral falls below that of 
the safe custody asset , unless otherwise agreed in writing by the 
client. 
 
Regulation 11 IMR 2017 – Client Borrowing 
 
11. (1) An investment business firm shall not provide 
credit to a client except where the provision of credit is in 
accordance with the investment business firm’s approved 
credit policy and is for the purpose of— 
 
(a) settling a securities transaction on a regulated market 
in the event of 
default or late payment by the client, or 
 
(b) paying an amount to cover a margin call made on a 
client. 
 
(2) Where a situation referred to paragraph (1) occurs, the 
investment business firm shall, in accordance with its 
terms of business or the relevant investment management 
agreement, close out the relevant position as soon as 
possible. 
  
(3) Before entering into a collateral margined transaction 
on behalf of a 
client, an investment business firm shall— 
 
(a) take account of— 
(i) the financial resources available to the client, and 
(ii) whether the client would be in a position to meet 
margin calls and 
fund a loss on the transaction. 
 
(4) Where an investment business firm enters into a 
collateral margined transaction on behalf of an officer or 
employee of the investment business firm and such a 
position is outstanding and shows a loss, the investment 
business firm shall— 
 
  Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules save that 
the Irish rules diverge in terms of limits on borrowing by clients.  
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(a) take immediate steps to have the loss repaid by the 
officer or employee concerned, and 
 
(b) immediately close out any unpaid position in 
accordance with the 
investment business firm’s terms of business. 
 
299.  Article 5(4) Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Member States shall ensure that investment firms 
adopt specific arrangements for all clients to 
ensure that the borrower of client financial 
instruments provides the appropriate collateral 
and that the firm monitors the continued 
appropriateness of such collateral and takes the 
necessary steps to maintain the balance with the 
value of client instruments. 
 
6.4.2AR 
A firm must adopt specific arrangements for all clients to ensure that 
the borrower of client safe custody assets provides the appropriate 
collateral and that the firm monitors the continued appropriateness of 
such collateral and takes the necessary steps to maintain the balance 
with the value of the client safe custody assets. 
 
[Note: article 5(4) of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
Collateral margined transactions  
55. (1) With respect to collateral margined transactions, an 
investment firm, in advance of depositing collateral with, 
or pledging, charging or granting a security arrangement 
over the collateral to, a relevant party or eligible 
custodian, shall—  
 
(a) notify the credit institution, relevant party or eligible 
custodian that the investment firm—  
 
(i) is under an obligation to keep the collateral separate 
from the investment firm’s collateral, and 
(ii) that the relevant party or eligible custodian must not 
claim any lien or right of retention or sale over the 
collateral except to cover the obligations to the relevant 
party or eligible custodian which gave rise to that deposit, 
pledge, charge or security arrangement, or any charges 
relating to the administration or safekeeping of the 
collateral,  
 
(b) instruct the relevant party or eligible custodian that—  
 
(i) the value of the collateral passed by the investment 
firm on behalf of clients must be credited to the 
investment firm’s third party client asset account with the 
relevant party or eligible custodian, (ii) where collateral 
has been passed and the initial margin has been liquidated 
to satisfy margin requirements, any balance of the sale 
proceeds that is not a margin requirement must be paid 
into a third party client asset account without delay, and  
(iii) where collateral is passed to an exchange or clearing 
house, any balance of the sale proceeds that is not a 
margin requirement must be dealt with in accordance with 
the rules of the relevant exchange or clearing house,  
 
(c) ensure that a client’s fully paid (non-collateral) 
financial instruments and a client’s margin financial 
instruments will be held in separate third party client asset 
accounts with the relevant party or eligible custodian and 
that no right of set-off will apply to either of these 
accounts.  
 
(2) An investment firm shall not use one client’s collateral 
as security for the obligations of another client or another 
person, unless legally enforceable agreements to do so are 
in place. 
 
  Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules. 
300.  Recital 9 Commission Delegated Directive 
 
In order to ensure appropriate protection for 
clients in relation to securities financing 
transactions (SFTs), investment firms should 
adopt specific arrangements to ensure that the 
borrower of client assets provides the appropriate 
collateral and that the firm monitors the continued 
appropriateness of such collateral. Investment 
firms' duty to monitor collateral should apply 
where they are party to an SFT agreement, 
including when acting as an agent for the 
conclusion of a SFT or in cases of tripartite 
agreement between the external borrower, the 
client and the investment firm. 
 
6.4.2BG 
The requirement to monitor collateral under CASS 6.4.2AR applies to 
a firm where it is party to a securities financing transaction, including 
when acting as an agent for the conclusion of a securities financing 
transaction or in the case of a tripartite transaction between a 
borrower, a client and the firm. 
 
[Note: recital 9 to the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
   Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules. 
301.  Article 5(2) second sub-paragraph 
Commission Delegated Directive 
 
The records of the investment firm shall include 
details of the client on whose instructions the use 
of the financial instruments has been effected, as 
well as the number of financial instruments used 
belonging to each client who has given his 
6.4.3R 
Where a firm uses safe custody assets as permitted in this section, the 
records of the firm must include details of the client on whose 
instructions the use of the safe custody assets has been effected, as 
well as the number of safe custody assets used belonging to each 
client who has given consent, so as to enable the correct allocation of 
any loss. 
 
   Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules. 
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consent, so as to enable the correct allocation of 
any loss. 
 
[Note: article 5(2), second sub-paragraph of the MiFID Delegated 
Directive] 
 
302.   6.6. Records, accounts and reconciliations 
 
Records and accounts 
6.6.1G 
This section sets out the requirements a firm must meet when keeping 
records and accounts of the safe custody assets it holds for clients. 
 
Regulation 54 IMR 2017  
 
Verification and third party confirmations 
 
54. (1) Prior to, or within one working day of the initial 
deposit of client assets in a third party client asset account, 
an investment firm shall verify that the client assets are 
held in an account which is designated as a third party 
client asset account and if the third party does not, in its 
external financial records make a designation in 
accordance with Regulation 52, the investment firm shall 
withdraw the client assets without delay, and in any event 
within 3 working days of the carrying out of the 
verification assessment. 
 
(2) Prior to, or within 3 working days of the initial deposit 
of client assets in a third party client asset account, an 
investment firm shall obtain, in writing from the third 
party— 
 
(a) confirmation of the details of the third party client 
asset account, including the account number, and 
 
(b) confirmation that the conditions applicable to the third 
party client asset account are as documented in the Funds 
Facilities Agreement or Financial Instruments Facilities 
Agreement, as the case may be. 
 
(3) Where a third party client asset account is closed, an 
investment firm shall, without delay, obtain confirmation 
in writing, from the third party that the third party client 
asset account had a nil balance on the date it was closed. 
 
Para. 1(c) Schedule 3 MiFID Regulations 
 
(c) conduct, on a regular basis, reconciliations between 
their internal accounts and records and those of any third 
parties by whom those assets are held, 
 
 How should a client asset account be designated in 
the financial records of a third party?  
 
G4 (2) The designation should be in the name field of 
the client asset bank and safe custody account and not in 
the address field or any other field within the third 
party’s financial records.    
The Central Bank expects the verification to take the 
form of a bank statement, custodian statement or other 
electronic form. An investment firm may hold this 
verification electronically. For clarity, this verification 
process should be followed each time a client asset 
account is opened and not each time client assets are 
deposited in that particular client asset account. In effect, 
an investment firm has up to four working days after the 
initial lodgement of the client assets to withdraw the 
client assets if the client asset account is not correctly 
designated. This process of designation verification is a 
separate process to what is required under Regulation 
4(8), which relates to ensuring that the client asset 
accounts are set up in accordance with the provisions of 
the Fund Facilities Letter and Financial Instrument 
Facilities Letter (refer to Regulations 4(4) & 4(5)).  
 
G4 (3) For client asset accounts that have been opened 
prior to the commencement of the Regulations, an 
investment firm should review relevant documentation 
previously received from a third party to satisfy that the 
client asset accounts are correctly designated. The 
investment firm should maintain evidence of this review. 
Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules. 
303.  Article 2(1)(a) Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Article 2 
Safeguarding of client financial instruments 
and funds 
 
1.   Member States shall require that investment 
firms comply with the following requirements: 
 
(a) 
they must keep records and accounts enabling 
them at any time and without delay to distinguish 
assets held for one client from assets held for any 
other client and from their own assets; 
 
6.6.2R 
A firm must keep such records and accounts as necessary to enable it 
at any time and without delay to distinguish safe custody assets held 
for one client from safe custody assets held for any other client, and 
from the firm's own applicable assets. 
 
[Note: article 2(1)(a) of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
   Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules. 
304.  Article 2(1)(b) Commission Delegated 
Directive 
 
1.Member States shall require that investment 
firms comply with the following requirements: 
 
(b) 
they must maintain their records and accounts in a 
way that ensures their accuracy, and in particular 
their correspondence to the financial instruments 
and funds held for clients and that they may be 
used as an audit trail; 
 
6.6.3R 
A firm must maintain its records and accounts in a way that ensures 
their accuracy, and in particular their correspondence to the safe 
custody assets held for clients and that they may be used as an audit 
trail. 
 
[Note: article 2(1)(b) of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
   Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules. 
305.   6.6.4R 
A firm must maintain a client-specific safe custody asset record. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific requirement as to type of record even if concepts are 
broadly equivalent.   
306.   6.6.5G 
(1) The requirements in CASS 6.6.2 R to CASS 6.6.4 R are for a firm 
to keep internal records and accounts of clients' safe custody assets. 
Therefore any records falling under those requirements should be 
maintained by the firm, and should be separate to any records the firm 
may have obtained from any third parties, such as those with whom it 
   Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules save that 
the UK rules are more prescriptive. 
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may have deposited, or through whom it may have registered legal 
title to, clients' safe custody assets. 
(2) The FCA expects that compliance by a firm with CASS 6.6 as a 
whole (to the extent applicable to that firm) will be sufficient to 
comply with the requirement under CASS 6.6.3R to maintain its 
records and accounts in a way that ensures they may be used as an 
audit trail. 
 
307.   Right to use agreements 
6.6.6R 
A firm must keep a copy of every executed client agreement that 
includes that firm's right to use safe custody assets for its own account 
(see CASS 6.4.1 R), including in the case of a prime brokerage 
agreement the disclosure annex referred to in CASS 9.3.1 R. 
 
   Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules save that 
the UK rules are more prescriptive. 
308.   General record-keeping 
6.6.7R 
Unless otherwise stated, a firm must ensure that any record made 
under the custody rules is retained for a period of five years starting 
from the later of: 
 
(1) the date it was created; and 
(2) (if it has been modified since the date it was created), the date it 
was most recently modified. 
CASS 6.6.8R01/06/2015 
RP 
For each internal custody record check, each physical asset 
reconciliation and each external custody reconciliation carried out by 
a firm, it must make a record including: 
 
(1) the date it carried out the relevant process; 
(2) the actions the firm took in carrying out the relevant process; and 
(3) a list of any discrepancies the firm identified and the actions the 
firm took to resolve those discrepancies. 
 
   Broadly, conceptually equivalent provisions across the relevant rules save that 
the UK rules are more prescriptive. 
309.  Article 16 (2) MiFID II 
 
An investment firm shall establish adequate 
policies and procedures sufficient to ensure 
compliance of the firm including its managers, 
employees and tied agents with its obligations 
under this Directive as well as appropriate rules 
governing personal transactions by such persons. 
 
Policies and procedures 
6.6.9G 
Firms are reminded that they must, under SYSC 6.1.1 R, establish, 
implement and maintain adequate policies and procedures sufficient 
to ensure compliance of the firm with the rules in this chapter. This 
should include, for example, establishing and maintaining policies and 
procedures concerning: 
 
(1) the frequency and method of the checks and reconciliations the 
firm is required to carry out under this section; 
(2) the frequency with which the firm is required to review its 
arrangements in compliance with this chapter; and 
(3) the resolution of discrepancies and the treatment of shortfalls 
under this section. 
 
Implied in: Article 23 (1)(a) MiFID Regulations  
 
23. (1) An investment firm shall— 
 
(a) establish adequate policies and procedures sufficient to 
ensure compliance of the investment firm and the persons 
who are its managers, employees and tied agents with— 
 
(i) the investment firm’s obligations under these 
Regulations, and 
 
(ii) the appropriate rules governing personal transactions 
by such persons (that is to say, the arrangements required 
under Article 29 of Commission Delegated Regulation 
2017/535 to be established, implemented and maintained), 
 
 
  Conceptual divergence exists in that the UK regime is much more focused on 
applying the obligation to establish, implement and maintain adequate 
policies to that as it applies to client asset and custody reconciliations and the 
identification, mitigation and management of shortfalls. 
310.   Internal custody record checks 
6.6.10G 
(1) An internal custody record check is one of the steps a firm takes to 
satisfy its obligations under: 
(a) Principle 10 (Clients' assets); 
(b) CASS 6.2.2 R (Requirement to have adequate organisational 
arrangements); 
(c) CASS 6.6.2 R to CASS 6.6.4 R (Records and accounts); and 
(d) where relevant, SYSC 4.1.1 R (General requirements) and SYSC 
6.1.1 R (Compliance). 
(2) An internal custody record check is a check as to whether the 
firm's records and accounts of the safe custody assets held by the firm 
(including, for example, those deposited with third parties under 
CASS 6.3 (Depositing safe custody assets with third parties)) 
correspond with the firm's obligations to its clients to hold those safe 
custody assets. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
311.   6.6.10AR 
CASS 6.6.11R does not apply to a firm following its failure. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
312.   6.6.10BG 
CASS 6.6.46AR (Frequency of checks and reconciliations after 
failure) applies to a firm following its failure. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
313.   6.6.11R 
(1) A firm must perform an internal custody record check: 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
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(a) subject to paragraph (2), as regularly as is necessary but without 
allowing more than one month to pass between each internal custody 
record check; and 
(b) as soon as reasonably practicable after the date to which the 
internal custody record check relates. 
(2) A firm that holds no safe custody assets other than physical safe 
custody assets must perform an internal custody record check as 
regularly as necessary but, in any case, no less often than its physical 
asset reconciliations under CASS 6.6.22 R. 
 
314.   6.6.12G 
CASS 6.6.44 R sets out the matters which a firm must have regard to 
when determining the frequency at which to undertake an internal 
custody record check. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
315.   6.6.13R 
A firm must perform an internal custody record check using either the 
internal custody reconciliation method or the internal system 
evaluation method. It must not use a combination of these methods. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
316.   6.6.14R 
A firm must only use its internal records (for example its depot and 
client-specific ledgers for safe custody assets or other internal 
accounting records) in order to perform an internal custody record 
check. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
317.   6.6.15G 
CASS 6.6.14 R means that a firm must not base its internal custody 
record checks on any records that the firm may have obtained from 
any third parties, such as those with whom it may have deposited, or 
through whom it may have registered legal title to, clients' safe 
custody assets. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
318.   The internal custody reconciliation method for internal custody 
record checks 
6.6.16R 
A firm may only use the internal custody reconciliation method if: 
 
(1) it separately maintains an aggregate safe custody asset record and 
a client-specific safe custody asset record; and 
(2) its aggregate safe custody asset record and its client-specific safe 
custody asset record are capable of being compared. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
319.   CASS 6.6.17R 
The internal custody reconciliation method requires a firm to perform 
a comparison between its aggregate safe custody asset record and its 
client-specific safe custody asset record, as at the date of the internal 
custody record check. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
320.   The internal system evaluation method for internal custody 
record checks 
6.6.18G 
(1) The internal system evaluation method is available to any firm, 
including one that is not able to use the internal custody reconciliation 
method because it does not meet the requirements at CASS 6.6.16R 
(1) and CASS 6.6.16R (2). 
(2) The purpose of the internal system evaluation method is to detect 
weaknesses in a firm's systems and controls and any recordkeeping 
discrepancies. However, this method is not designed to substitute a 
firm's other measures for ensuring compliance with the custody rules, 
such as monitoring the accuracy of its records (see also CASS 6.2.2 R 
and CASS 6.6.3 R). 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
321.   6.6.19R 
The internal system evaluation method requires a firm to: 
 
(1) establish a process that evaluates: 
(a) the completeness and accuracy of the firm's internal records and 
accounts of safe custody assets held by the firm for clients, in 
particular whether sufficient information is being completely and 
accurately recorded by the firm to enable it to: 
(i) comply with CASS 6.6.4 R; and 
(ii) readily determine the total of all the safe custody assets that the 
firm holds for its clients; and 
(b) whether the firm's systems and controls correctly identify and 
resolve all discrepancies in its internal records and accounts of safe 
custody assets held by the firm for clients; 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
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(2) run the evaluation process established under (1) on the date of 
each internal custody record check; and 
(3) promptly investigate and, without undue delay, resolve any causes 
of discrepancies that the evaluation process reveals. 
 
322.   6.6.20G 
The evaluation process under CASS 6.6.19R (1) should verify that the 
firm's systems and controls correctly identify and resolve at least the 
following types or causes of discrepancies: 
 
(1) items in the firm's records and accounts that might be erroneously 
overstating or understating the safe custody assets held by a firm (for 
example, 'test' entries and 'balancing' entries); 
(2) negative balances; 
(3) processing errors; 
(4) journal entry errors (eg, omissions and unauthorised system 
entries); and 
(5) IT errors (eg, software issues that could lead to inaccurate 
records). 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
323.   Physical asset reconciliations 
6.6.21G 
(1) A physical asset reconciliation is a separate process to the internal 
custody record check. Firms that hold physical safe custody assets for 
clients are required to perform both processes. 
(2) The purpose of a physical asset reconciliation is to check that a 
firm's internal records and accounts of the physical safe custody assets 
kept by the firm for clients are accurate and complete, and to ensure 
any discrepancies are investigated and resolved. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
324.   6.6.21AR 
CASS 6.6.22R does not apply to a firm following its failure. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
325.   6.6.21BG 
CASS 6.6.46AR (Frequency of checks and reconciliations after 
failure) applies to a firm following its failure. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
326.   6.6.22R 
A firm that holds physical safe custody assets must perform a physical 
asset reconciliation for all the physical safe custody assets it holds for 
clients: 
 
(1) as regularly as is necessary but without allowing more than six 
months to pass between each physical asset reconciliation; and 
(2) as soon as reasonably practicable after the date to which the 
physical asset reconciliation relates. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
327.   6.6.23G 
CASS 6.6.44 R sets out the matters which a firm must have regard to 
when determining the frequency at which to undertake a physical 
asset reconciliation. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
328.   6.6.24R 
When performing a physical asset reconciliation a firm must: 
 
(1) count all the physical safe custody assets held by the firm for 
clients as at the date to which the physical asset reconciliation relates; 
and 
(2) compare the count in (1) against what the firm's internal records 
and accounts state as being in the firm's possession as at the same 
date. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
329.   6.6.25R 
A firm must perform each physical asset reconciliation under CASS 
6.6.24 R using the total count method or the rolling stock method. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
330.   6.6.26G 
Regardless of the method used, a firm should ensure that all safe 
custody assets held by the firm as physical safe custody assets for 
clients are subject to a physical asset reconciliation at the frequency 
required under CASS 6.6.22 R. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
331.   6.6.27R 
If a firm completes a physical asset reconciliation in a single stage, 
such that the firm: 
 
(1) performs a single count under CASS 6.6.24R (1) which 
encompasses all the physical safe custody assets held by the firm for 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
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clients as at the date to which the physical asset reconciliation relates; 
and 
(2) compares that count against the firm's internal records and 
accounts in accordance with CASS 6.6.24R (2); 
then the firm will have used the total count method for that physical 
asset reconciliation. 
 
332.   6.6.28R 
If a firm completes a physical asset reconciliation in two or more 
stages, such that the firm: 
 
(1) performs two or more counts under CASS 6.6.24R (1) (each on a 
separate occasion and relating to a different stock line or group of 
stock lines forming part of the firm's overall holdings of physical safe 
custody assets) which, once all of the counts are complete, encompass 
all the physical safe custody assets held by the firm for clients; and 
(2) compares each of those counts against the firm's internal records 
and accounts in accordance with CASS 6.6.24R (2); 
then the firm will have used the rolling stock method for that physical 
asset reconciliation. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
333.   6.6.29G 
(1) The rolling stock method allows a firm to perform its physical 
asset reconciliation in several stages, with each stage referring to a 
line of stock or group of stock lines in a designated investment 
selected by a firm (for example, all the shares with an issuer whose 
name begins with the letter 'A' or all the stock lines held in connection 
with a particular business line). 
(2) Where a firm uses the rolling stock method to perform a physical 
asset reconciliation, all the stages in that physical asset reconciliation 
must be completed in time to ensure the firm complies with CASS 
6.6.22 R. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
334.   6.6.30R 
(1) If a firm wishes to use the rolling stock method to perform a 
physical asset reconciliation it must first establish and document in 
writing its reasons for concluding that the way in which it will carry 
out its physical asset reconciliations is adequately designed to 
mitigate the risk of the firm's records being manipulated or falsified. 
(2) A firm must retain any documents created under (1) for a period of 
at least five years after the date it ceases to use the rolling stock 
method to perform its physical asset reconciliation. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
335.   6.6.31G 
The documents under CASS 6.6.30R (1) should, for example, cover 
the systems and controls the firm will have in place to mitigate the 
risk of 'teeming and lading' in respect of all the physical safe custody 
assets held by the firm for clients and across all the firm's business 
lines. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
336.   6.6.32G 
To meet the requirement to have adequate organisational 
arrangements under CASS 6.2.2 R, a firm should consider performing 
'spot checks' as to whether title to an appropriate sample of physical 
safe custody assets that it holds is registered correctly under CASS 
6.2.3 R (Registration and recording of legal title). 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
337.   External custody reconciliations 
6.6.33G 
The purpose of an external custody reconciliation is to ensure the 
completeness and accuracy of a firm's internal records and accounts of 
safe custody assets held by the firm for clients against those of 
relevant third parties. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
338.  Article 2(1)(c) Commission Delegated Directive 
 
1.   Member States shall require that investment 
firms comply with the following requirements: 
 
(c) 
they must conduct, on a regular basis, 
reconciliations between their internal accounts 
and records and those of any third parties by 
whom those assets are held; 
 
6.6.34R 
A firm must conduct, on a regular basis, reconciliations between its 
internal records and accounts of safe custody assets held by the firm 
for clients and those of any third parties by whom those safe custody 
assets are held. 
 
[Note: article 2(1)(c) of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save for point in Row 309.  
339.   6.6.35R  7.1  IMR Guidance  
 
What a fund service provider must reconcile  
 Same comment as in Row 309 and the Irish rules in the IMR Guidance are 
jurisdiction-specific as to how it relates to “fund service providers”.  
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In CASS 6.6.34 R, the third parties whose records and accounts a firm 
is required to reconcile its own internal records and accounts with 
must include: 
 
(1) the third parties with which the firm has deposited clients' safe 
custody assets; 
(2) where the firm has not deposited a client's safe custody asset with 
a third party: 
(a) the third parties responsible for the registration of legal title to that 
safe custody asset; or 
(b) a person acting as an operator for the purposes of any of the 
relevant overseas USRs if: 
(i) the safe custody asset is an uncertificated unit of a security 
governed by any of the relevant overseas USRs; and 
(ii) the firm has reasonable grounds to be satisfied that the records of 
that person take into account all instructions issued by that person 
which require an issuer to register on a register of securities a transfer 
of title to any uncertificated units. 
 
 
(i) A fund service provider should reconcile each third 
party collection account in the currency of 
denomination; dormant accounts should also be 
included.  
 
(ii) The balance on each third party collection account 
as recorded by the fund service provider should be 
reconciled with the balance on that account as set out in 
the statement, or similar document, issued by the 
relevant third party with which those third party 
collection accounts are held. The statement or other 
form of confirmation from the third party may be 
provided in an electronic format, on condition that the 
fund service provider retains a copy, either in electronic 
or hard copy format, and can be reproduced without 
delay. A fund service provider should ensure that the 
reconciliation is performed from investor money 
records that are accurate and that the reconciliation 
itself is performed accurately. 
 
 (iii) A fund service provider should to be in a position 
to demonstrate upon request, the date on which a 
reconciliation was prepared. This evidence can be in 
electronic form.  
 
(iv) A fund service provider should ensure each 
reconciliation has relevant supporting backup material 
to facilitate the verification of figures in the 
reconciliation; the backup material should include 
statements received from third parties.  
 
(v) The manner in which the fund service provider 
exercises oversight should be documented in the fund 
service provider’s investor money management plan. 
The fund service provider should maintain a record to 
evidence the on-going oversight of the process. 
 
340.   6.6.36G 
Examples of the sorts of third parties referred to at CASS 6.6.35R 
(2)(a) include central securities depositaries, operators of collective 
investment schemes, and administrators of offshore funds. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
341.   6.6.36AR 
CASS 6.6.37R does not apply to a firm following its failure. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
342.   6.6.36BG 
CASS 6.6.46AR (Frequency of checks and reconciliations after 
failure) applies to a firm following its failure. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
343.   6.6.37R 
A firm must conduct external custody reconciliations: 
 
(1) as regularly as necessary but allowing no more than one month to 
pass between each external custody reconciliation; and 
(2) as soon as reasonably practicable after the date to which the 
external custody reconciliation relates. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
344.   6.6.38G 
CASS 6.6.44 R sets out the matters which a firm must consider when 
determining the frequency at which to undertake an external custody 
reconciliation. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
345.   6.6.39G 
Where a firm holds clients' safe custody assets electronically with a 
central securities depositary which is able to provide adequate 
information to the firm on its holdings on a daily basis, it is best 
practice under CASS 6.6.37R (1) for the firm to conduct an external 
custody reconciliation each business day in respect of those assets. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
346.   6.6.40G 
Where a firm deposits safe custody assets belonging to a client with a 
third party or where a third party is responsible for the registration of 
legal title to that asset, in complying with the requirements of CASS 
6.6.34 R, the firm should seek to ensure that the third party provides 
the firm with adequate information (for example in the form of a 
statement) as at a date specified by the firm which details the 
description and amounts of all the safe custody assets credited to the 
relevant account(s) and that this information is provided in sufficient 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
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time to allow the firm to carry out its external custody reconciliations 
under CASS 6.6.37 R. 
 
347.   6.6.41G 
If a firm acting as trustee or depositary of an AIF that is an authorised 
AIF deposits safe custody assets belonging to a client with a third 
party, under article 89(1)(c) (Safekeeping duties with regard to assets 
held in custody) of the AIFMD level 2 regulation, the firm should 
seek to ensure that the third party provides the firm with adequate 
information (for example in the form of a statement) as at a date or 
dates specified by the firm which details the description and amounts 
of all the safe custody assets credited to the account(s) and that this 
information is provided in adequate time to allow the firm to carry out 
the periodic reconciliations required under article 89(1)(c) 
(Safekeeping duties with regard to assets held in custody) of the 
AIFMD level 2 regulation. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
348.   6.6.41AG 
If a firm acting as trustee or depositary of a UCITS deposits safe 
custody assets belonging to a client with a third party, under article 
13(1)(c) (Safekeeping duties with regard to assets held in custody) of 
the UCITS level 2 regulation, the firm should seek to ensure that: 
 
(1) the third party provides the firm with adequate information (for 
example in the form of a statement): 
(a) as at a date or dates specified by the firm; and 
(b) which details the description and amounts of all the safe custody 
assets credited to the account(s); and 
(2) such information is provided in adequate time to allow the firm to 
carry out the periodic reconciliations required under article 13(1)(c) of 
the UCITS level 2 regulation. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
349.   6.6.42G 
External custody reconciliations must be performed for each safe 
custody asset held by the firm for its clients, except for physical safe 
custody assets. A reconciliation of transactions involving safe custody 
assets, rather than of the safe custody assets themselves, will not 
satisfy the requirement under CASS 6.6.34 R. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
350.   6.6.43G 
A firm acting as trustee or depositary of an AIF that is an authorised 
AIF should perform the reconciliation under article 89(1)(c) 
(Safekeeping duties with regard to assets held in custody) of the 
AIFMD level 2 regulation: 
 
(1) as regularly as is necessary having regard to the frequency, 
number and value of transactions which the firm undertakes in respect 
of safe custody assets, but with no more than one month between each 
reconciliation; and 
(2) as soon as reasonably practicable after the date to which the 
reconciliation relates; 
to ensure the accuracy of its internal records and accounts against 
those of third parties by whom client's safe custody assets are held. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
351.   Frequency of checks and reconciliations under this section 
6.6.43AR 
CASS 6.6.44R to CASS 6.6.46R do not apply to a firm following its 
failure. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
352.   6.6.43BG 
CASS 6.6.46AR (Frequency of checks and reconciliations after 
failure) applies to a firm following its failure in respect of the 
frequency at which the firm undertakes its internal custody record 
checks under CASS 6.6.11R, physical asset reconciliations under 
CASS 6.6.22R, and external custody reconciliations under CASS 
6.6.37R. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
353.   6.6.44R 
When determining the frequency at which it will undertake its internal 
custody record checks under CASS 6.6.11 R, physical asset 
reconciliations under CASS 6.6.22 R, and external custody 
reconciliations under CASS 6.6.37 R, a firm must have regard to: 
 
(1) the frequency, number and value of transactions which the firm 
undertakes in respect of clients' safe custody assets; and 
(2) the risks to which clients' safe custody assets are exposed, such as 
the nature, volume and complexity of the firm's business and where 
and with whom safe custody assets are held. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
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354.   6.6.45R 
(1) A firm must make and retain records sufficient to show and 
explain any decision it has taken under CASS 6.6.44 R when 
determining the frequency of its internal custody record checks, 
physical asset reconciliations and external custody reconciliations. 
Subject to (2), such records must be retained indefinitely. 
(2) If any decision under CASS 6.6.44 R is superseded by a 
subsequent decision under that rule then the record of that earlier 
decision retained in accordance with (1) need only be retained for a 
further period of five years from the subsequent decision. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
355.   6.6.46R 
(1) Subject to (3), a firm must review the frequency at which it 
conducts internal custody record checks, physical asset reconciliations 
and external custody reconciliations at least annually to ensure that it 
continues to comply with CASS 6.6.11 R, CASS 6.6.22 R and CASS 
6.6.37 R, respectively, and has given due consideration to the matters 
in CASS 6.6.44 R. 
(2) For each review a firm undertakes under (1), it must record the 
date and the actions it took in reviewing the frequency of its internal 
custody record checks, physical asset reconciliations and external 
custody reconciliations. 
(3) A firm need not carry out a review under (1) in respect of its 
internal custody record checks, physical asset reconciliations and 
external custody reconciliations, if it already conducts the particular 
process in respect of all relevant safe custody assets each business 
day. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
356.   Frequency of checks and reconciliations after failure 
6.6.46AR 
(1) This rule applies to a firm following its failure. 
(2) A firm must perform an internal custody record check and a 
physical asset reconciliation that relates to the time of its failure as 
soon as reasonably practicable after its failure. 
(3) 
(a) A firm must perform an external custody reconciliation that relates 
to the time of its failure as soon as reasonably practicable after its 
failure. 
(b) If any records and accounts of the relevant third parties under 
CASS 6.6.35R relating to the time of the firm’s failure are 
unavailable, the firm must use the next available records and accounts 
to perform the external custody reconciliation under sub-paragraph 
(a). 
(4) A firm must perform further internal custody record checks and 
physical asset reconciliations: 
(a) as regularly as is necessary to ensure that the firm remains in 
compliance with CASS 6.6.2R, CASS 6.6.3R and CASS 6.6.4R 
(Records and accounts); and 
(b) as soon as reasonably practicable after the date to which the 
internal custody record check or physical asset reconciliation relates. 
(5) A firm must perform further external custody reconciliations on a 
regular basis: 
(a) as regularly as is necessary; and 
(b) as soon as reasonably practicable after the date to which the 
external custody reconciliation relates. 
(6) A firm must determine the frequency at which it will undertake its 
internal custody record checks and physical asset reconciliations 
under paragraph (4), and its external custody reconciliations under 
paragraph (5) with regard to: 
(a) the frequency, number and value of transactions which the firm 
undertakes in respect of clients’ safe custody assets; 
(b) the risks to which clients’ safe custody assets are exposed, such as 
the nature, volume and complexity of the firm’s business, and where 
and with whom safe custody assets are held; and 
(c) the need to comply with CASS 6.7. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
357.   6.6.46BG 
(1) The reference point for the internal custody record check and 
physical asset reconciliation under CASS 6.6.46A(2) and the external 
custody reconciliation under 6.6.46A(3)(a) should be the precise point 
in time at which the firm’s failure occurred. 
(2) The reference point for any further internal custody record checks 
and physical asset reconciliations under CASS 6.6.46A(4) and any 
further external custody reconciliations under 6.6.46A(5) can be 
determined by the firm. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
358.   Independence of person performing checks and reconciliations 
6.6.47G 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
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Whenever possible, a firm should ensure that checks and 
reconciliations are carried out by a person (for example an employee 
of the firm) who is independent of the production or maintenance of 
the records to be checked and/or reconciled. 
 
359.   Resolution of discrepancies 
6.6.48G 
In this section, a discrepancy should not be considered to be resolved 
until it is fully investigated and corrected, and any associated shortfall 
is made good by way of the firm ensuring that: 
 
(1) it is holding (under the custody rules) each of the safe custody 
assets that the firm ought to be holding for each of its clients; and 
(2) its own records, and the records of any relevant other person (such 
as a third party with whom the firm deposited the safe custody assets) 
accurately correspond to the position under (1). 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
360.   6.6.49R 
When a firm identifies a discrepancy as a result of carrying out an 
internal custody record check, physical asset reconciliation or external 
custody reconciliation, the firm must: 
(1) promptly investigate the reason for the discrepancy and resolve it 
without undue delay; and 
(2) take appropriate steps under CASS 6.6.54 R for the treatment of 
any shortfalls until that discrepancy is resolved. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
361.   6.6.50R 
When a firm identifies a discrepancy outside of its processes for an 
internal custody record check, physical asset reconciliation or external 
custody reconciliation, the firm must: 
(1) take all reasonable steps both to investigate the reason for the 
discrepancy and to resolve it; and 
(2) take appropriate steps under CASS 6.6.54 R for the treatment of 
shortfalls until that discrepancy is resolved. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
362.   6.6.51G 
Where the discrepancy identified under CASS 6.6.49 R or CASS 
6.6.50 R has arisen as a result of a breach of the custody rules, the 
firm should ensure it takes sufficient steps to avoid a reoccurrence of 
that breach (see Principle 10 (Clients' assets), CASS 6.6.3 R and, as 
applicable, SYSC 4.1.1R (1) and SYSC 6.1.1 R). 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
363.   6.6.52G 
Items recorded or held within a suspense or error account fall within 
the scope of discrepancies in this section. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
364.   6.6.53G 
Items recorded in a firm's records and accounts that are no longer 
recorded by relevant third parties (such as 'liquidated stocks') also fall 
within the scope of discrepancies in this section. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
365.   Treatment of shortfalls 
6.6.54R 
(1) This rule applies where a firm identifies a discrepancy as a result 
of, or that reveals, a shortfall, which the firm has not yet resolved. 
(2) Subject to paragraphs (3) and (4), until the discrepancy is resolved 
a firm must do one of the following: 
(a) appropriate a sufficient number of its own applicable assets to 
cover the value of the shortfall and hold them for the relevant clients 
under the custody rules in such a way that the applicable assets, or the 
proceeds of their liquidation, will be available for distribution for the 
benefit of the relevant clients in the event of the firm's failure and, in 
doing so: 
(i) ensure that the applicable assets are clearly identifiable as separate 
from the firm's own property and are recorded by the firm in its client-
specific safe custody asset record as being held for the relevant client; 
(ii) keep a record of the actions the firm has taken under this rule 
which includes a description of the shortfall, identifies the relevant 
affected clients, and lists the applicable assets that the firm has 
appropriated to cover the shortfall; and 
(iii) update the record made under (ii) whenever the discrepancy is 
resolved and the firm has re-appropriated the applicable assets; or 
(b) (provided that doing so is consistent with the firm's permissions 
and would result in money being held for the relevant client) in 
respect of the shortfall under CASS 7.17.2 R (statutory trust) 
appropriate a sufficient amount of its own money to cover the value of 
the shortfall, hold it for the relevant client as client money under the 
client money rules and, in doing so: 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
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(i) ensure the money is segregated under CASS 7.13 (Segregation of 
client money) and recorded as being held for the relevant client under 
CASS 7.15 (Records, accounts and reconciliations); 
(ii) keep a record of the actions the firm has taken under this rule 
which includes a description of the shortfall, identifies the relevant 
affected clients, and specifies the amount of money that the firm has 
appropriated to cover the shortfall; and 
(iii) update the record made under (ii) whenever the discrepancy is 
resolved and the firm has re-appropriated the money; or 
(c) appropriate a number of applicable assets in accordance with (a) 
and an amount of money in accordance with (b) which, in aggregate, 
are sufficient to cover the value of the shortfall. 
(3) If the firm, where justified, concludes that another person is 
responsible for the discrepancy, regardless of any dispute with that 
other person, or that the discrepancy is due to a timing difference 
between the accounting systems of that other person and that of the 
firm, the firm must take all reasonable steps to resolve the situation 
without undue delay with the other person. Until the discrepancy is 
resolved the firm must consider whether it would be appropriate to 
notify the affected client of the situation, and may take steps under (2) 
for the treatment of shortfalls until that discrepancy is resolved. 
(4) A firm that has failed is not required to take steps under paragraph 
(2) in relation to the firm’s own applicable assets or money in so far 
as the legal procedure for the firm’s failure prevents the firm from 
taking any such steps. 
 
366.   6.6.55G 
In considering whether it should notify affected clients under CASS 
6.6.54R (3), a firm should have regard to its obligations under the 
client's best interests rule to act honestly, fairly and professionally in 
accordance with the best interests of its clients, and to Principle 7 
(communications with clients). 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
367.   6.6.56G 
(1) The value of a shortfall for the purposes of CASS 6.6.54 R may be 
determined by the previous day's closing mark to market valuation, or 
if in relation to a particular safe custody asset none is available, the 
most recently available valuation. 
(2) Where a firm is taking the measures under CASS 6.6.54R (2) in 
respect of a particular shortfall it should, as regularly as necessary, 
and having regard to Principle 10: 
(a) review the value of the shortfall in line with (1); and 
(b) where the firm has found that the value of the shortfall has 
changed, adjust either or both the number of own applicable assets or 
the amount of money it has appropriated to ensure that in aggregate 
the assets and monies set aside are sufficient to cover the changed 
value of the shortfall. 
6.6.56AG 
CASS 6.6.54R(4) recognises that a failed firm is required to 
investigate and resolve discrepancies, but the extent to which it is able 
to address shortfalls pending the resolution of discrepancies may be 
limited by insolvency law, for example. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
368.   Notification requirements 
6.6.57R 
A firm must inform the FCA in writing without delay if: 
 
(1) its internal records and accounts of the safe custody assets held by 
the firm for clients are materially out of date, or materially inaccurate 
or invalid, so that the firm is no longer able to comply with the 
requirements in CASS 6.6.2 R to CASS 6.6.4 R; or 
(2) it is a firm acting as trustee or depositary of an AIF and has not 
complied with, or is materially unable to comply with, the 
requirements in CASS 6.6.2 R or in article 89(1)(b) or 89(1)(c) 
(Safekeeping duties with regard to assets held in custody) of the 
AIFMD level 2 regulation; or 
(2A) it is a firm acting as trustee or depositary of a UCITS and has not 
complied with, or is materially unable to comply with, the 
requirements in: 
(a) CASS 6.6.2R; or 
(b) article 13(1)(b) or 13(1)(c) (Safekeeping duties with regard to 
assets held in custody) of the UCITS level 2 regulation; or 
(3) it will be unable, or materially fails, to take the steps required 
under CASS 6.6.54 R for the treatment of shortfalls; or 
(4) it will be unable, or materially fails, to conduct an internal custody 
record check in compliance with CASS 6.6.11 R to CASS 6.6.19 R; 
or 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
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(5) it will be unable, or materially fails, to conduct a physical asset 
reconciliation in compliance with CASS 6.6.22 R to CASS 6.6.30 R; 
or 
(6) it will be unable, or materially fails, to conduct an external custody 
reconciliation in compliance with CASS 6.6.34 R to CASS 6.6.37 R. 
 
369.   Annual audit of compliance with the custody rules 
6.6.58G 
Firms are reminded that the auditor of the firm has to confirm in the 
report submitted to the FCA under SUP 3.10 (Duties of auditors: 
notification and report on client assets) that the firm has maintained 
systems adequate to enable it to comply with the custody rules. 
 
Para. 7 of Schedule 3 of MiFID Regulations  
 
Reports by external auditors 
 
7. Investment firms shall ensure that their external 
auditors report at least annually to the Bank on the 
adequacy of the firm’s arrangements under Regulation 
23(1)(k), (l) and (m) and this Schedule. 
  Same comment as in Row 309. 
370.   6.7 Treatment of custody assets after a failure 
 
Application 
6.7.1R 
This section applies to a firm following its failure. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
371.   Disposal of safe custody assets 
6.7.2R 
(1) Before a firm takes any steps to dispose of a safe custody asset it 
must: 
(a) (subject to paragraph (2)) attempt to return it to the relevant client 
or transfer it to another person for safekeeping on behalf of the client 
in accordance with CASS 6.7.8R; and 
(b) (subject to paragraph (3)) take reasonable steps to notify the client 
of the firm’s proposed course of action for disposing of the safe 
custody asset. 
(2) A firm is not required to attempt to return or transfer a safe 
custody asset under paragraph (1)(a) where the client to whom the 
safe custody asset belongs has confirmed to the firm that it disclaims 
all its interests in the safe custody asset. 
(3) A firm is not required to notify a client under paragraph (1)(b) 
where: 
(a) the firm is able to return the safe custody asset to the relevant 
client or transfer it to another person on behalf of the client in 
accordance with CASS 6.7.8R; or 
(b) the client to whom the safe custody asset belongs has confirmed to 
the firm that it disclaims all its interests in the safe custody asset. 
 
Acquisition and disposal of assets  
5. (1) Without prejudice to any obligations arising under 
the MiFID Regulations and subject to paragraph (2), an 
investment firm shall notify the Bank, in writing, before 
any direct or indirect acquisition, or disposal, by it of 
shares or other interest in any other undertaking or 
business.  
 
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to a MiFID investment 
firm acquiring shares or other interest to be held, or 
disposing of shares or other interest held, by it in any 
undertaking or business where these are for the purpose of 
trading book activities. 
 
  Same comment as in Row 309. 
372.   6.7.3G 
(1) The disposal of a safe custody asset referred to under CASS 
6.7.2R(1) includes cases where the firm is using the procedure under 
regulation 12B of the IBSA Regulations to set a ‘hard bar date’ by 
giving a ‘hard bar date notice’, or is using another similar procedure 
in accordance with the legal procedure for the firm’s failure. 
(2) In any case, a firm should consider whether its obligations under 
law or any agreement permit it to dispose of a safe custody asset in 
the way in which it proposes to do so. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
373.   6.7.4E 
(1) Reasonable steps in CASS 6.7.2R(1)(b) include the following 
course of conduct: 
(a) determining, as far as reasonably possible, the correct contact 
details for the relevant client; 
(b) for a client for whom the firm has evidence that it was a 
professional client for the purposes of the custody rules at the time of 
the failure: 
(i) writing to the client at its last known address either by post or by 
electronic mail: 
(A) to inform it of the firm’s intention to dispose of the safe custody 
asset; 
(B) to inform it of the consequences of the firm’s proposed course of 
action in relation to the client’s ability to assert a claim in respect of 
that safe custody asset; and 
(C) to invite the client to submit a claim for that safe custody asset; 
(ii) where the client has not responded within 28 days of the 
communication under sub-paragraph (i), attempting to communicate 
the information in (i) to the client on at least one further occasion by 
any means other than that used in sub-paragraph (i) including by post, 
electronic mail, telephone or media advertisement; and 
(c) for any other client: 
(i) the same steps as under sub-paragraphs (b)(i) and (b)(ii); and 
(ii) where the client has not responded within 28 days of the second 
communication under sub-paragraph (b)(ii), attempting to 
communicate the information in sub-paragraph (b)(i) to the client on 
at least one further occasion by any means other than one in respect of 
Acquisition and disposal of assets 
  
See row 371 for text. 
  Same comment as in Row 309. 
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which the firm has obtained positive confirmation that the client is not 
receiving such communications. 
(2) Compliance with paragraph (1) may be relied on as tending to 
establish compliance with CASS 6.7.2R(1)(b). 
(3) Contravention of paragraph (1) may be relied on as tending to 
establish contravention of CASS 6.7.2R(1)(b). 
 
374.   6.7.5G 
For the purposes of CASS 6.7.4E(1)(a), a firm may use any available 
means to determine the correct contact details for the relevant client, 
including: 
 
(1) telephoning the client; 
(2) searching internal and/or public records; 
(3) media advertising; 
(4) mortality screening; and 
(5) using credit reference agencies or tracing agents. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
375.   6.7.6R 
If the firm undertook a tracing exercise for the purposes of CASS 
6.2.10R(4) (Allocated but unclaimed safe custody assets) before its 
failure but had not made the charity payment under that rule by the 
time of its failure then the findings of that exercise may be relied on 
for the purposes of CASS 6.7.4E(1)(a). 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
376.   6.7.7R 
(1) A firm must make a record of any safe custody asset disposed of 
in accordance with CASS 6.7.2R at the time of the disposal. 
(2) The record under paragraph (1) must state: 
(a) the safe custody asset that was disposed of; 
(b) the value of the consideration received for the safe custody asset 
disposed of; 
(c) the name and contact details of the client to whom the safe custody 
asset was allocated, according to the firm’s records at the time of 
making the record under this rule; and 
(d) either: 
(i) the efforts applied by the firm to determine the client’s correct 
contact details under CASS 6.7.4E(1)(a); or 
(ii) if being relied on under CASS 6.7.6R, the efforts applied by the 
firm to determine the client’s correct contact details for the purposes 
of CASS 6.2.10R(4) (Allocated but unclaimed safe custody assets). 
(3) A firm must keep the record under paragraph (1) indefinitely. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
377.   Transfers of safe custody assets 
6.7.8R 
(1) This rule applies where, instead of returning a safe custody asset 
to a client, a firm (Firm A) is able to transfer the safe custody asset to 
another person (Firm B) for safekeeping on behalf of the client. 
(2) Firm A may only effect such a transfer if, in advance of the 
transfer, it has obtained a contractual undertaking from Firm B that: 
(a) where regulation 10C(3) of the IBSA Regulations does not apply, 
Firm B will return the safe custody asset to the client at the client’s 
request; and 
(b) Firm B will notify the client, within 14 days of the transfer of that 
client’s safe custody asset having commenced: 
(i) of the applicable regulatory regime under which the safe custody 
asset will be held by Firm B; 
(ii) either: 
(A) of any relevant compensation scheme limits that may apply in 
respect of Firm B’s handling of the safe custody asset; or 
(B) of the fact that Firm B does not participate in a relevant 
compensation scheme, if that is the case; and 
(iii) where regulation 10C(3) of the IBSA Regulations does not apply, 
that the client has the option of having its safe custody asset returned 
to it by Firm B. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
378.   6.7.9G 
Where regulation 10C(3) of the IBSA Regulations does apply, Firm A 
should, in advance of the transfer under CASS 6.7.8R, obtain a 
contractual undertaking from Firm B that: 
 
(1) Firm B will comply with the client’s request for a ‘reverse 
transfer’ as defined in regulation 10C of the IBSA Regulations; and 
(2) Firm B will notify the client, within 14 days of the transfer of that 
client’s safe custody asset having commenced, that the client can 
demand a ‘reverse transfer’ as defined in regulation 10C of the IBSA 
Regulations. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
379.   Chapter 7:    Same comment as in Row 309. 
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Client money rules 
 
7.10 Application and purpose 
 
7.10.1R 
This chapter applies to a firm that receives money from or holds 
money for, or on behalf of, a client in the course of, or in connection 
with, its: 
 
(1) MiFID business; and/or 
(2) designated investment business; and/or 
(3) stocks and shares ISA business; and/or 
(4) innovative finance ISA business; and/or 
(5) lifetime ISA business, 
unless otherwise specified in this section. 
 
380.   7.10.2G 
A firm is reminded that when CASS 7.10.1 R applies it should treat 
client money in an appropriate manner so that, for example: 
 
(1) if it holds client money in a client bank account that account is 
held in the firm's name in accordance with CASS 7.13.13 R; 
(2) if it allows another person to hold client money this is effected 
under CASS 7.14; and 
(3) its internal client money reconciliation takes into account any 
client equity balance relating to its margined transaction requirements. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
381.   Opt-in to the client money rules 
7.10.3R 
(1) A firm that receives or holds money to which this chapter applies 
in relation to: 
(a) its MiFID business; or 
(b) its MiFID business and its designated investment business which 
is not MiFID business; 
and holds money in respect of which CASS 5 applies, may elect to 
comply with the provisions of this chapter in respect of all such 
money and if it does so, this chapter applies as if all such money were 
money that the firm receives and holds in the course of, or in 
connection with, its MiFID business. 
 
(2) A firm that receives or holds money to which this chapter applies 
solely in relation to its designated investment business which is not 
MiFID business and receives or holds money in respect of which the 
insurance client money chapter applies, may elect to comply with the 
provisions of this chapter in respect of all such money and if it does 
so, this chapter applies as if all such money were money that the firm 
receives and holds in the course of or in connection with its 
designated investment business. 
(2A) 
(a) A firm may elect to comply with all the provisions of this chapter 
for money that it receives or holds in respect of an ISA that only 
contains a cash deposit ISA. 
(b) Where a firm makes an election under (a), this chapter applies to it 
in the same 
 way that it applies to a firm who receives and holds money in the 
course of or in connection with its MIFID business. 
(3) A firm must make and retain a written record of any election it 
makes under this rule, including the date from which the election is to 
be effective. The firm must make the record on the date it makes the 
election and must keep it for a period of five years after ceasing to use 
it. 
(4) This rule is subject to CASS 1.2.11 R. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
382.   7.10.3AR 
Where a firm opts into this chapter under CASS 7.10.3 R (2A) it must 
notify clients for whom it holds the opted-in money that it is holding 
their money in accordance with the client money rules. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
383.   7.10.4G 
Firms are reminded that, under CASS 1.2.11 R, they must not keep 
money in respect of which the client money chapter applies in the 
same client bank account or client transaction account as money for 
which the insurance client money chapter applies. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
384.   7.10.5G 
The opt-in to the client money rules under CASS 7.10.3R does not 
apply in respect of money that a firm holds outside of either the: 
(1) scope of the insurance client money chapter; or 
(2) relevant cash deposit ISA wrapper; 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
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as the case may be. 
 
385.   7.10.6G 
If a firm has opted to comply with this chapter under CASS 7.10.3R, 
the insurance client money chapter will have no application to the 
activities to which the election applies. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
386.   7.10.7G 
(1) A firm that is only subject to the insurance client money chapter 
may not opt to comply with this chapter under either or both CASS 
7.10.3 R (1) and CASS 7.10.3 R (2). 
(2) Under CASS 7.10.3 R (2A), a firm may opt to comply with this 
chapter regardless of whether it is otherwise subject to the client 
money rules. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 309. 
387.   Loan-based crowdfunding 
7.10.7AR 
(1) If both the conditions in (a) and (b) below are met in respect of a 
firm, or the firm reasonably expects that they will all be met in the 
future, then the firm has the option to elect to comply with this 
chapter for all of the money described in those conditions: 
(a) the firm receives or holds money for one or more persons in the 
course of, or in connection with, the firm’s activity of operating an 
electronic system in relation to non-P2P agreements; and 
(b) those persons are customers of the firm in their capacity as lenders 
under non-P2P agreements or prospective lenders under non-P2P 
agreements. 
(2) A firm can only make the election under (1) by informing the FCA 
in writing of the election at least one month before the date on which 
it intends to start holding the money in accordance with the client 
money rules (“the effective date”). 
(3) The communication in (2) must specify the effective date. 
(4) The firm may change the effective date after it has made the 
communication in (2) provided that: 
(a) it informs the FCA in writing before the new effective date; and 
(b) the new effective date is not less than one month after the date of 
the communication in (2). 
 
   UK jurisdiction –specific rules. 
388.   7.10.7BR 
(1) When a firm makes an election under CASS 7.10.7AR it must 
write to any customer (“C”) with whom it has agreed to provide 
relevant electronic lending services in C’s capacity as a lender or 
prospective lender, informing C at least one month before it will start 
to hold the money in accordance with the client money rules: 
(a) that all the money it holds in the course of, or in connection with, 
operating an electronic system in relation to non-P2P agreements for 
lenders and prospective lenders under non-P2P agreements will be 
treated in accordance with the client money rules; and 
(b) of the date on which this will start. 
(2) The firm must also write to any customer (“C”) with whom, 
following the firm’s election, it agrees to provide relevant electronic 
lending services in C’s capacity as a lender or prospective lender. 
(a) The firm must make this communication in advance of it receiving 
any money from or on behalf of C. 
(b) The communication must inform C that all the money the firm 
holds in the course of, or in connection with, operating an electronic 
system in relation to non-P2P agreements for lenders and prospective 
lenders under non-P2P agreements will be treated in accordance with 
the client money rules from the date specified under (1)(b) or, if that 
date has passed, that this will be the case from the time of the 
communication onwards. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 387. 
389.   7.10.7CR 
Once an election made by a firm under CASS 7.10.7AR becomes 
effective, and until it ceases to be effective: 
 
(1) the firm must treat all the money referred to under CASS 
7.10.7AR(1) in accordance with the election; and 
(2) for the purposes of (1), this chapter applies to the firm in the same 
way that it applies to a firm that receives and holds money in the 
course of or in connection with its designated investment business, 
except that: 
(a) CASS 7.10.10R will not apply to the money referred to under 
CASS 7.10.7AR(1); and 
(b) “client” for the purposes of CASS and rules and guidance related 
to CASS and their application to the firm includes customers of the 
firm in their capacity as lenders or prospective lenders under non-P2P 
agreements. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 387. 
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390.   7.10.7DR 
If a firm that has made an election under CASS 7.10.7AR 
subsequently decides to cancel that election: 
 
(1) it can only do so by writing to the FCA, at least one month before 
the date the election ceases to be effective; 
(2) it must write to any customer with whom, as at the time of the 
cancellation, it has agreed to operate an electronic system in relation 
to non-P2P agreements in their capacity as a lender or prospective 
lender, informing them at least one month before the date the election 
ceases to be effective: 
(a) of the extent to which it will cease to hold their money in 
accordance with the client money rules; and 
(b) of the date from which those changes will take effect; and 
(3) it must write to any customer (“C”) with whom, following the 
firm’s decision to cancel the election but before the election ceases to 
be effective, it agrees to operate an electronic system in relation to 
non-P2P agreements in C’s capacity as a lender or prospective lender, 
in advance of the firm receiving any money from them or on their 
behalf, informing them: 
(a) of the period during which it will continue to hold all the money of 
lenders and prospective lenders under non-P2P agreements in 
accordance with the client money rules; 
(b) of the extent to which it will subsequently cease to hold their 
money in accordance with the client money rules; and 
(c) of the date from which those changes will take effect. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 387. 
391.   7.10.7ER 
(1) A firm must make and retain a written record of any election it 
makes under CASS 7.10.7AR including: 
(a) the date from which the election is to be effective; and 
(b) if it cancels the election, the date from which the election is to 
cease to be effective. 
(2) The firm must: 
(a) make the record on the date it makes the election; 
(b) update the record it if it decides to cancel the election or change 
the effective date; and 
(c) keep the record for a period of five years after ceasing to use the 
election. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 387. 
392.   7.10.7FG 
(1) Where a firm has made an election under CASS 7.10.7AR: 
(a) it should treat money held for a client as client money both in the 
course of or in connection with: 
(i) operating an electronic system in relation to lending; and 
(ii) operating an electronic system in relation to non-P2P agreements; 
(b) (a) is regardless of whether, at the time the firm is holding the 
money, the client could or could not be a lender under a P2P 
agreement; and 
(c) under SYSC 4.1.8ER(2) it will be not be able to accept, take, or 
receive the transfer of full ownership of money relating to non-P2P 
agreements. 
(2) Where a firm has not made an election under CASS 7.10.7AR, or 
where it has previously made an election but the election has ceased 
to be effective under CASS 7.10.7DR, any money it holds: 
(a) in the course of, or in connection with relevant electronic lending 
services, for a client who at that time will or could be a lender under a 
P2P agreement in respect of that money, should be treated as client 
money (for example because that client’s contractual investment 
criteria permit that money to be invested in a P2P agreement); and 
(b) in the course of, or in connection with, operating an electronic 
system in relation to non-P2P agreements, for a customer who at that 
time could not be a lender under a P2P agreement in respect of that 
money, should not be treated as client money (for example because 
that customer’s contractual investment criteria only permit that money 
to be invested in a non-P2P agreement). 
 
   Same comment as in Row 387. 
393.   Loan-based crowdfunding 
 
Money that is not client money: 'opt outs' for any business other 
than insurance distribution activity 
7.10.8R 
CASS 7.10.9 G to CASS 7.10.15 G do not apply to a firm in relation 
to money held in connection with its MiFID business to which this 
chapter applies or in relation to money for which the firm has made an 
election under CASS 7.10.3 R(1) or CASS 7.10.7AR. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 387. 
394.   Professional client opt-out 
7.10.9G 
   Same comment as in Row 387. 
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The 'opt out' provisions provide a firm with the option of allowing a 
professional client to choose whether their money is subject to the 
client money rules (unless the firm is conducting insurance 
distribution activity). 
 
395.   7.10.10R 
Subject to CASS 7.10.12 R, money is not client money when a firm 
(other than a sole trader) holds that money on behalf of, or receives it 
from, a professional client, other than in the course of insurance 
distribution activity, and the firm has obtained written 
acknowledgement from the professional client that: 
 
(1) money will not be subject to the protections conferred by the client 
money rules; 
(2) as a consequence, this money will not be segregated from the 
money of the firm in accordance with the client money rules and will 
be used by the firm in the course of its own business; and 
(3) the professional client will rank only as a general creditor of the 
firm. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 387. 
396.   'Opt-outs' for non-IDD business 
7.10.11G 
For a firm whose business is not governed by the IDD, it is possible to 
'opt out' on a one-way basis. However, in order to maintain a 
comparable regime to that applying to MiFID business, all 'MiFID 
type' business undertaken outside the scope of MiFID should comply 
with the client money rules or be 'opted out' on a two-way basis. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 387. 
397.   7.10.12R 
Money is not client money if a firm, in respect of designated 
investment business which is not an investment service or activity, an 
ancillary service, a listed activity or insurance distribution activity: 
 
(1) holds it on behalf of or receives it from a professional client who 
is not an authorised person; and 
(2) has sent a separate written notice to the professional client stating 
the matters set out in CASS 7.10.10 R (1) to CASS 7.10.10 R (3). 
 
   Same comment as in Row 387. 
398.   7.10.13G 
When a firm undertakes a range of business for a professional client 
and has separate agreements for each type of business undertaken, the 
firm may treat client money held on behalf of the client differently for 
different types of business; for example, a firm may, under CASS 
7.10.10 R or CASS 7.10.12 R, elect to segregate client money in 
connection with securities transactions and not segregate (by 
complying with CASS 7.10.10 R or CASS 7.10.12 R) money in 
connection with contingent liability investments for the same client. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 387. 
399.   7.10.14R 
When a firm transfers client money to another person, the firm must 
not enter into an agreement under CASS 7.10.10 R or CASS 7.10.12 
R with that other person in relation to that client money or represent 
to that other person that the money is not client money. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 387. 
400.   7.10.15G 
CASS 7.10.14 R prevents a firm, when passing client money to 
another person under CASS 7.14.2 R (Transfer of client money to a 
third party), from making use of the 'opt out' provisions under CASS 
7.10.10 R or CASS 7.10.12 R. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 387. 
401.  Article 16 MiFID II 
 
Organisational requirements 
9.   An investment firm shall, when holding funds 
belonging to clients, make adequate arrangements 
to safeguard the rights of clients and, except in 
the case of credit institutions, prevent the use of 
client funds for its own account. 
 
Recital 13 Commission Delegated Directive 
 
In order to ensure that client funds are adequately 
protected, as required by Article 16(9) of 
Directive 2014/65/EU, it is necessary to set a 
specific limit on the percentage of client funds 
that can be deposited at an intra-group credit 
institution. This should significantly reduce any 
potential conflicts with due diligence 
requirements and address the contagion risk 
Credit institutions and approved banks 
7.10.16R 
In relation to the application of the client money rules (and any other 
rule in so far as it relates to matters covered by the client money rules) 
to the firms referred to in (1) and (2), the following is not client 
money: 
 
(1) any deposits within the meaning of the CRD held by a CRD credit 
institution; and 
[Note: article 16(9) of MiFID and article 4(1) of the MiFID Delegated 
Directive] 
 
(2) any money held by an approved bank that is not a CRD credit 
institution in an account with itself in relation to designated 
investment business carried on for its clients. 
 
Para. 3 of Schedule 3 of MiFID Regulations 
 
Depositing client funds 
 
3. (1) Investment firms are required, on receiving any 
client funds, promptly to place those funds into one or 
more accounts opened with any of the following: 
 
(a) a Central Bank; 
 
(b) a credit institution authorised in accordance with 
Directive 2013/36/EU; 
 
(c) a bank authorised in a third country; 
 
(d) a qualifying money market fund. 
 
(2) Subparagraph (1) shall not apply to a credit institution 
authorised in accordance with Directive 2013/36/EU in 
  Broadly conceptually equivalent rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive.  
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inherent in depositing all client funds with a 
credit institution in the same group as the 
investment firm. While in certain circumstances it 
may be proportionate and appropriate for 
investment firms to deposit, after proper 
consideration, client funds with entities within 
their own group, national authorities should 
closely monitor the reasons for not diversifying 
client funds outside of the investment firm's 
group in order to avoid creating loopholes where 
the general intragroup limit is applied. 
 
Article 4 Commission Delegated Directive 
Depositing client funds 
 
1.   Member States shall require investment firms, 
on receiving any client funds, promptly to place 
those funds into one or more accounts opened 
with any of the following: 
 
(a) 
a central bank; 
 
(b) 
a credit institution authorised in accordance with 
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council (7); 
 
(c) 
a bank authorised in a third country; 
 
(d) 
a qualifying money market fund. 
 
The first subparagraph shall not apply to a credit 
institution authorised under Directive 2013/36/EU 
in relation to deposits within the meaning of that 
Directive held by that institution. 
 
relation to deposits within the meaning of those 
Regulations held by that institution. 
 
(3) Where investment firms do not deposit client funds 
with a central bank, they shall exercise all due skill, care 
and diligence in the selection, appointment and periodic 
review of the credit institution, bank or money market 
fund where the funds are placed and the arrangements for 
the holding of those funds and they consider the need for 
diversification of these funds as part of their due 
diligence. 
 
(4) In particular, investment firms shall take into account 
the expertise and market reputation of such institutions or 
money market funds with a view to ensuring the 
protection of clients’ rights as well as any legal or 
regulatory requirements or market practices related to the 
holding of client funds that could adversely affect clients’ 
rights. 
 
(5) Investment firms shall ensure that clients give their 
explicit consent to the placement of their funds in a 
qualifying money market fund. In order to ensure that this 
right to consent is effective, investment firms shall inform 
clients that funds placed with a qualifying money market 
fund will not be held in accordance with the requirements 
for safeguarding client funds set out in this Schedule. 
 
(6) Where investment firms deposit client funds with a 
credit institution, bank or money market fund of the same 
group as the investment firm, they shall limit the funds 
that they deposit with any such group entity or 
combination of any such group entities so that funds do 
not exceed 20% of all such funds. 
 
(7) An investment firm is not required to comply with the 
foregoing limit where it is able to demonstrate to the Bank 
that, in view of the nature, scale and complexity of its 
business, and also the safety offered by the third parties 
considered in the preceding subparagraph, and including 
in any case the small balance of client funds the 
investment firm holds the requirement under the preceding 
subparagraph is not proportionate. Investment firms shall 
periodically review the assessment made in accordance 
with this subparagraph and shall notify their initial and 
reviewed assessments to the Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
402.   7.10.17G 
A firm referred to in CASS 7.10.16 R must comply, as relevant, with 
CASS 7.10.18 G to CASS 7.10.24 R. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 401. 
403.   7.10.18G 
The effect of CASS 7.10.16 R is that, unless notified otherwise in 
accordance with CASS 7.10.20 R or CASS 7.10.22 R, clients of CRD 
credit institutions or approved banks that are not CRD credit 
institutions should expect that where they pass money to such firms in 
connection with designated investment business these sums will not 
be held as client money. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 401. 
404.   7.10.19R 
A firm holding money in either of the ways described in CASS 
7.10.16 R must, before providing designated investment business 
services to the client in respect of those sums, notify the client that: 
 
(1) the money held for that client is held by the firm as banker and not 
as a trustee under the client money rules; and 
(2) if the firm fails, the client money distribution and transfer rules 
will not apply to these sums and so the client will not be entitled to 
share in any distribution under the client money distribution and 
transfer rules. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 401. 
405.   7.10.20R 
A firm holding money in either of the ways described in CASS 
7.10.16 R in respect of a client and providing the services to it 
referred to in CASS 7.10.19 R must: 
 
(1) explain to its clients the circumstances, if any, under which it will 
cease to hold any money in respect of those services as banker and 
   Same comment as in Row 401. 
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will hold the money as trustee in accordance with the client money 
rules; and 
(2) set out the circumstances in (1), if any, in its terms of business so 
that they form part of its agreement with the client. 
 
406.   7.10.21G 
Where a firm receives money that would otherwise be held as client 
money but for CASS 7.10.16 R: 
 
(1) it should be able to account to all of its clients for sums held for 
them at all times; and 
(2) that money should, pursuant to Principle 10, be allocated to the 
relevant client promptly. This should be done no later than ten 
business days after the firm has received the money. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 401. 
407.   7.10.22R 
If a CRD credit institution or an approved bank that is not a CRD 
credit institution wishes to hold client money for a client (rather than 
hold the money in either of the ways described in CASS 7.10.16 R) it 
must, before providing designated investment business services to the 
client, disclose the following information to the client: 
 
(1) that the money held for that client in the course of or in connection 
with the business described under (2) is being held by the firm as 
client money under the client money rules; 
(2) a description of the relevant business carried on with the client in 
respect of which the client money rules apply to the firm; and 
(3) that, if the firm fails, the client money distribution and transfer 
rules will apply to money held in relation to the business in question. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 401. 
408.   7.10.23G 
Firms carrying on MiFID business are reminded of their obligation to 
supply investor compensation scheme information to clients under 
COBS 6.1.16 R or COBS 6.1ZA.22R (Compensation Information). 
 
   Same comment as in Row 401. 
409.   7.10.24R 
A CRD credit institution or an approved bank that is not a CRD credit 
institution must, in respect of any client money held in relation to its 
designated investment business that is not MiFID business, comply 
with the obligations referred to in COBS 6.1.16 R (Compensation 
information). 
 
   Same comment as in Row 401. 
410.   Affiliated companies: MiFID business 
7.10.25G 
A firm that holds money on behalf of, or receives money from, an 
affiliated company in respect of MiFID business must treat the 
affiliated company as any other client of the firm for the purposes of 
this chapter. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
411.   Affiliated companies: non-MiFID business 
7.10.26R 
A firm that holds money on behalf of, or receives money from, an 
affiliated company in respect of designated investment business which 
is not MiFID business must not treat the money as client money 
unless: 
 
(1) the firm has been notified by the affiliated company that the 
money belongs to a client of the affiliated company; or 
(2) the affiliated company is a client dealt with at arm's length; or 
(3) the affiliated company is a manager of an occupational pension 
scheme or is an overseas company; and 
(a) the money is given to the firm in order to carry on designated 
investment business for or on behalf of the clients of the affiliated 
company; and 
(b) the firm has been notified by the affiliated company that the 
money is to be treated as client money. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
412.   Coins 
7.10.27R 
The client money rules do not apply with respect to coins held on 
behalf of a client if the firm and the client have agreed that the money 
(or money of that type) is to be held by the firm for the intrinsic value 
of the metal which constitutes the coin. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
413.  MiFID Client money (minimum implementing) 
rules 
 
Solicitors 
7.10.28R 
(1) An authorised professional firm regulated by the Law Society (of 
England and Wales), the Law Society of Scotland or the Law Society 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
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of Northern Ireland that, with respect to its regulated activities, is 
subject to the following rules of its designated professional body, 
must comply with those rules and, where relevant paragraph (3), and 
if it does so, it will be deemed to comply with the client money rules. 
(2) The relevant rules are: 
(a) if the firm is regulated by the Law Society (of England and 
Wales), the SRA Accounts Rules 2011; 
(b) if the firm is regulated by the Law Society of Scotland, the Law 
Society of Scotland Practice Rules 2011; and 
(c) if the firm is regulated by the Law Society of Northern Ireland, the 
Solicitors' Accounts Regulations 1998. 
(3) If the firm in (1) is a MiFID investment firm that receives or holds 
money for, or on behalf of a client in the course of, or in connection 
with its MiFID business, it must also comply with the MiFID client 
money (minimum implementing) rules in relation to that business. 
 
414.   Long term insurers and friendly societies 
7.10.29R 
This chapter does not apply to the permitted activities of a long-term 
insurer or a friendly society, unless it is a MiFID investment firm that 
receives money from or holds money for or on behalf of a client in the 
course of, or in connection with, its MiFID business. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
415.   Contracts of insurance 
7.10.30R 
(1) Provided it complies with CASS 1.2.11 R, a firm that receives or 
holds client money in relation to contracts of insurance may elect to 
comply with the provisions of the insurance client money chapter, 
instead of this chapter, in respect of all such money. 
(2) This rule is subject to CASS 1.2.11 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
416.   7.10.31R 
A firm must make and retain a written record of any election which it 
makes under CASS 7.10.30 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
417.   Life assurance business 
7.10.32G 
(1) A firm which receives and holds client money in respect of life 
assurance business in the course of its designated investment business 
that is not MiFID business may: 
(a) under CASS 7.10.3 R (2) elect to comply with the client money 
chapter in respect of such client money and in doing so avoid the need 
to comply with the insurance client money chapter which would 
otherwise apply to the firm in respect of client money received in the 
course of its insurance distribution activity; or 
(b) under CASS 7.10.30 R, elect to comply with the insurance client 
money chapter in respect of such client money. 
(2) These options are available to a firm irrespective of whether it also 
receives and holds client money in respect of other parts of its 
designated investment business. A firm may not however choose to 
comply with the insurance client money chapter in respect of client 
money which it receives and holds in the course of any part of its 
designated investment business which does not involve an insurance 
distribution activity. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
418.   Trustee firms 
7.10.33R 
A trustee firm which holds money in relation to its designated 
investment business which is not MiFID business to which this 
chapter applies, must hold any such client money separate from its 
own money at all times. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
419.   7.10.34R 
Subject to CASS 7.10.35 R only the client money rules listed in the 
table below apply to a trustee firm in connection with money that the 
firm receives, or holds for or on behalf of a client in the course of or 
in connection with its designated investment business which is not 
MiFID business. 
 
Reference Rule 
CASS 7.10.1 R to 
CASS 7.10.6 G, 
and CASS 7.10.16 
R to CASS 7.10.27 
R 
Application 
CASS 7.10.33 R to 
CASS 7.10.40 G 
Trustee firms 
CASS 7.10.41 G General purpose 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
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CASS 7.13.3 R to 
CASS 7.13.4 G 
Depositing client 
money 
CASS 7.13.8 R to 
CASS 7.13.11 G 
Selection, 
appointment and 
review of third 
parties 
CASS 7.13.12 R to 
CASS 7.13.19 G 
Client bank 
accounts 
CASS 7.13.20 R to 
CASS 7.13.25 R 
Diversification of 
client money 
CASS 7.13.26 R to 
CASS 7.13.29 G 
Qualifying money 
market funds 
CASS 7.15.5 R 
(3), CASS 7.15.7 
R and CASS 
7.15.12 R to CASS 
7.15.34 G 
Reconciliation of 
client money 
balances 
CASS 7.16 The standard 
methods of 
internal client 
money 
reconciliation 
CASS 7.17.2 R to 
CASS 7.17.4 G 
Requirement 
 
 
420.   7.10.35R 
(1) A trustee firm to which CASS 7.10.34 R applies may, in addition 
to the client money rules set out at CASS 7.10.34 R, also elect to 
comply with: 
(a) all the client money rules in CASS 7.13 (Segregation of client 
money); 
(b) CASS 7.14 (Client money held by a third party); 
(c) all the client money rules in CASS 7.15 (Records, accounts and 
reconciliations); or 
(d) CASS 7.18 (Acknowledgement letters). 
(2) A trustee firm must make a written record of any election it makes 
under this rule, including the date from which the election is to be 
effective. The firm must make the record on the date it makes the 
election and must keep it for a period of five years after ceasing to use 
it. 
(3) Where a trustee firm has made an election under (1) which it 
subsequently decides to cease to use, it must make a written record of 
this decision, including the date from which the decision is to be 
effective, and keep that record from the date the decision is made for a 
period of five years after the date it is to be effective. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
421.   7.10.36R 
A trustee firm to which CASS 7.10.34 R applies and which is 
otherwise subject to the client money rules must ensure that any client 
money it holds other than in its capacity as trustee firm is segregated 
from client money it holds as a trustee firm. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
422.   7.10.37G 
A trustee firm to which CASS 7.10.34 R applies and which is 
otherwise subject to the client money rules should ensure that in 
designing its systems and controls it: 
 
(1) takes into account that the client money distribution rules will only 
apply in relation to any client money that the firm holds other than in 
its capacity as trustee firm; and 
(2) has regard to other legislation that may be applicable. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
423.   7.10.38R 
(1) A trustee firm to which CASS 7.10.34 R applies may elect that: 
(a) the applicable provisions of CASS 7.13 (Segregation of client 
money) and CASS 7.15 (Records, accounts and reconciliations) under 
CASS 7.10.34 R; and 
(b) any further provisions it elects to comply with under CASS 
7.10.35 R (1); 
will apply separately and concurrently for each distinct trust that the 
trustee firm acts for. 
 
(2) A trustee firm must make a written record of any election it makes 
under this rule, including the date from which the election is to be 
effective. The firm must make the record on the date it makes the 
election and must keep it for a period of five years after ceasing to use 
it. 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
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(3) Where a trustee firm has made an election under (1) which it 
subsequently decides to cease to use, it must make a written record of 
this decision, including the date from which the decision is to be 
effective, and must keep that record from the date the decision is 
made for a period of five years after the date it is to be effective. 
 
424.   7.10.39G 
A trustee firm may wish to make an election under CASS 7.10.38 R 
if, for example, it acts for a number of distinct trusts which it wishes, 
or is required, to keep operationally separate. If a firm makes such an 
election then it should: 
 
(1) establish and maintain adequate internal systems and controls to 
effectively segregate client money held for one trust from client 
money held for another trust; and 
(2) conduct internal client money reconciliations as set out in CASS 
7.16 and external client money reconciliations under CASS 7.15.20 R 
for each trust. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
425.   7.10.40G 
The provisions in CASS 7.10.34 R to CASS 7.10.39 G do not affect 
the general application of the client money rules regarding money that 
is held by a firm other than in its capacity as a trustee firm. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
426.   General purpose 
7.10.41G 
(1) Principle 10 (Clients' assets) requires a firm to arrange adequate 
protection for clients' assets when the firm is responsible for them. An 
essential part of that protection is the proper accounting and treatment 
of client money. The client money rules provide requirements for 
firms that receive or hold client money, in whatever form. 
(2) The client money rules also, where relevant, implement the 
provisions of MiFID which regulate the obligations of a firm when it 
holds client money in the course of its MiFID business. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
427.  Article 16(10) MiFID; 
Article 5(5) Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Article 16(10) 
An investment firm shall not conclude title 
transfer financial collateral arrangements with 
retail clients for the purpose of securing or 
covering present or future, actual or contingent or 
prospective obligations of clients. 
Article 5(5) 
Member States shall ensure that investment firms 
do not enter into arrangements which are 
prohibited under Article 16(10) of Directive 
2014/65/EU. 
 
7.11 Treatment of client money 
 
Title transfer collateral arrangements 
 
7.11.1R 
(3) 
(a) A firm must not enter into a TTCA in respect of money belonging 
to a retail client. 
(b) Where a firm entered into a TTCA in respect of money belonging 
to a retail client (or money which would belong to a retail client but 
for the arrangement) before 3 January 2018, the firm must terminate 
that TTCA. 
[Note: article 16(10) of MiFID and article 5(5) of the MiFID 
Delegated Directive] 
 
(4) Money that is subject to a TTCA does not amount to client money, 
provided that the TTCA is not with a retail client. 
[Note: recital 52 to MiFID] 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
428.  Recital 52 MiFID 
The requirements concerning the protection of 
client assets are a crucial tool for the protection of 
clients in the provision of services and activities. 
Those requirements can be excluded when full 
ownership of funds and financial instrument is 
transferred to an investment firm to cover any 
present or future, actual or contingent or 
prospective obligations. That broad possibility 
may create uncertainty and jeopardise the 
effectiveness of the requirements concerning the 
safeguard of client assets. Thus, at least when 
retail client assets are involved, it is appropriate 
to limit the possibility of investment firms to 
conclude title transfer financial collateral 
arrangements as defined under Directive 
2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council (24), for the purpose of securing or 
otherwise covering their obligations. 
 
7.11.3R 
(1) A firm must ensure that any TTCA is the subject of a written 
agreement made on a durable medium between the firm and the client. 
(2) Regardless of the form of the written agreement in (1) (which may 
have additional commercial purposes), it must cover the client's 
agreement to: 
(a) the terms for the arrangement relating to the transfer of the client's 
full ownership of money to the firm; 
(b) any terms under which the ownership of money is to transfer from 
the firm back to the client; and 
(c) (to the extent not covered by the terms under (b)), any terms for 
the termination of: 
(i) the arrangement under (a); or 
(ii) the overall agreement in (1). 
(3) A firm must retain a copy of the agreement under (1) from the date 
the agreement is entered into and until five years after the agreement 
is terminated. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
429.   7.11.4G 
The terms referred to in CASS 7.11.3 R (2)(b) may include, for 
example, terms under which the arrangement relating to the transfer 
of full ownership of money to the firm is not in effect from time to 
time, or is contingent on some other condition. 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
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430.  Article 6 Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Article 6 
Inappropriate use of title transfer collateral 
arrangements 
 
1.   Member States shall require that investment 
firms properly consider, and are able to 
demonstrate that they have done so, the use of 
title transfer collateral arrangements in the 
context of the relationship between the client's 
obligation to the firm and the client assets 
subjected to title transfer collateral arrangements 
by the firm. 
 
2.   When considering, and documenting, the 
appropriateness of the use of title transfer 
collateral arrangements, investment firms shall 
take into account all of the following factors: 
 
(a) 
whether there is only a very weak connection 
between the client's obligation to the firm and the 
use of title transfer collateral arrangements, 
including whether the likelihood of a clients' 
liability to the firm is low or negligible; 
 
(b) 
whether the amount of client funds or financial 
instruments subject to title transfer collateral 
arrangements far exceeds the client's obligation, 
or is even unlimited if the client has any 
obligation at all to the firm; and 
 
(c) 
whether all clients' financial instruments or funds 
are made subject to title transfer collateral 
arrangements, without consideration of what 
obligation each client has to the firm. 
 
3.   Where using title transfer collateral 
arrangements, investment firms shall highlight to 
professional clients and eligible counterparties the 
risks involved and the effect of any title transfer 
collateral arrangement on the client's financial 
instruments and funds. 
 
7.11.4AR 
(1) A firm must properly consider and document the use of TTCAs in 
the context of the relationship between the client’s obligation to the 
firm and the money subjected to TTCAs by the firm. 
(2) A firm must be able to demonstrate that it has complied with the 
requirement under (1). 
(3) When considering, and documenting, the appropriateness of the 
use of TTCAs, a firm must take into account the following factors: 
(a) whether there is only a very weak connection between the client’s 
obligation to the firm and the use of TTCAs, including whether the 
likelihood of a liability arising is low or negligible; 
(b) the extent by which the amount of money subject to a TTCA is in 
excess of the client’s obligations (including where the TTCA applies 
to all money from the point of receipt by the firm) and whether the 
client might have no obligations at all to the firm; and 
(c) whether all the client’s money is made subject to TTCAs, without 
consideration of what obligation the client has to the firm. 
(4) Where a firm uses a TTCA, it must highlight to the client the risks 
involved and the effect of any TTCA on the client’s money. 
[Note: article 6 of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
431.   7.11.6G 
Where a firm has received full title or full ownership to money under 
a collateral arrangement, the fact that it has also granted a security 
interest to its client to secure its obligation to repay that money to the 
client would not result in the money being client money. This can be 
compared to a situation in which a firm takes a charge or other 
security interest over money held in a client bank account, where that 
money would still be client money as there would be no absolute 
transfer of title to the firm. However, where a firm has received client 
money under a security interest and the security interest includes a 
"right to use arrangement", under which the client agrees to transfer 
all of its rights to money in that account to the firm upon the exercise 
of the right to use, the money may cease to be client money, but only 
once the right to use is exercised and the money is transferred out of 
the client bank account to the firm. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
432.   7.11.7G 
Firms are reminded of the client's best interest rule, which requires a 
firm to act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the 
best interests of its clients when structuring its business particularly in 
respect of the effect of that structure on firms' obligations under the 
client money rules. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
433.   Termination of title transfer collateral arrangements 
7.11.9R 
(1) If a client communicates to a firm that it wishes (whether pursuant 
to a contractual right or otherwise) to terminate a TTCA, and the 
client's communication is not in writing, the firm must make a written 
record of the client's communication, which also records the date the 
communication was received. 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules.  
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(2) A firm must keep a client's written communication, or a written 
record of the client's communication in (1), for five years starting 
from the date the communication was received by the firm. 
(3) 
(a) If a firm agrees to the termination of a TTCA, it must notify the 
client of its agreement in writing. The notification must state when the 
termination is to take effect and whether or not the client's money will 
be treated as client money by the firm thereafter. 
(b) If a firm does not agree to terminate a TTCA, it must notify the 
client of its disagreement in writing. 
(4) A firm must keep a written record of any notification it makes to a 
client under (3) for a period of five years, starting from the date the 
notification was made. 
 
434.   7.11.10G 
CASS 7.11.9 R (3)(a) refers only to a firm's agreement to terminate an 
existing TTCA. Such agreement by a firm does not necessarily need 
to amount to the termination of its entire agreement with the client. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
435.   7.11.11G 
When a firm notifies a client under CASS 7.11.9 R (3)(a) of when the 
termination of a TTCA is to take effect, it should take into account: 
 
(1) any relevant terms relating to such a termination that have been 
agreed with the client; and 
(2) the period of time it reasonably requires to return the money to the 
client, or to update its records under CASS 7.15 (Records, accounts 
and reconciliations) and to segregate the money as client money under 
CASS 7.13 (Segregation of client money). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
436.   7.11.12R 
(1) If a TTCA is terminated then, unless otherwise permitted under 
the client money rules and notified to the client under CASS 
7.11.9R(3)(a), the firm must treat that money as client money from 
the start of the next business day following the date of termination as 
set out in the firm’s notification under CASS 7.11.9R (3)(a). 
(2) Where the firm’s notification under CASS 7.11.9R(3)(a) does not 
state when the termination of the arrangement will take effect, the 
firm must treat that money as client money from the start of the next 
business day following the date on which the firm’s notification is 
made. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
437.   7.11.13G 
A firm to which CASS 7.11.12 R applies should, for example, update 
its records under CASS 7.15 (Records, accounts and reconciliations) 
and segregate the money as client money under CASS 7.13 
(Segregation of client money), from the relevant time at which the 
firm is required to treat the money as client money. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
438.   Delivery versus payment transaction exemption 
7.11.14R 
(1) Subject to (2) and CASS 7.11.16 R and with the agreement of the 
relevant client, money need not be treated as client money in respect 
of a delivery versus payment transaction through a commercial 
settlement system if: 
(a) in respect of a client's purchase the firm intends for the money 
from the client to be due to it within one business day following the 
firm's fulfilment of its delivery obligation to the client; or 
(b) in respect of a client's sale, the firm intends for the money in 
question to be due to the client within one business day following the 
client's fulfilment of its delivery obligation to the firm. 
(2) If the payment or delivery by the firm to the client has not 
occurred by the close of business on the third business day following 
the date on which the firm makes use of the exemption under (1), the 
firm must stop using that exemption for the transaction. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
439.   7.11.15G 
The exclusion from the client money rules for delivery versus 
payment transactions under CASS 7.11.14 R is an example of an 
exclusion from the client money rules which is permissible by virtue 
of recital 51 to MiFID. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
440.   7.11.16R 
A firm cannot, in respect of a particular delivery versus payment 
transaction, make use of the exemption under CASS 7.11.14 R in 
either or both of the following circumstances: 
 
(1) it is not a direct member or participant of the relevant commercial 
settlement system, nor is it sponsored by such a member or 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
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participant, in accordance with the terms and conditions of that 
commercial settlement system; 
(2) the transaction in question is being settled by another person on 
behalf of the firm through an account held at the relevant commercial 
settlement system by that other person. 
 
441.   7.11.17R 
Where a firm does not meet the requirements in CASS 7.11.14 R or 
CASS 7.11.16 R for the use of the exemption in CASS 7.11.14 R , the 
firm is subject to the client money rules in respect of any money it 
holds in connection with the delivery versus payment transaction in 
question. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
442.   7.11.18G 
(1) In line with CASS 7.11.14 R, where a firm receives money from 
the client in fulfilment of the client's payment obligation in respect of 
a delivery versus payment transaction the firm is carrying out through 
a commercial settlement system in respect of a client's purchase, and 
the firm has not fulfilled its delivery obligation to the client by close 
of business on the third business day following the date of the client's 
fulfilment of its payment obligation to the firm, the firm must treat the 
client money in accordance with the client money rules until delivery 
by the firm to the client occurs. 
(2) Upon settlement of a delivery versus payment transaction a firm is 
carrying out through a commercial settlement system (including when 
it is settled within the three business day period referred to in CASS 
7.11.14 R (2)) then, in respect of: 
(a) a client's purchase, the custody rules apply to the relevant safe 
custody asset the firm receives upon settlement; and 
(b) a client's sale, the client money rules will apply to the relevant 
money received on settlement. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
443.   7.11.19R 
A firm will not be in breach of the requirement under CASS 7.13.6 R 
to receive client money directly into a client bank account if it: 
 
(1) receives the money in question: 
(a) in accordance with CASS 7.11.14 R (1)(a) but it is subsequently 
required under CASS 7.11.14 R (2) to hold that money in accordance 
with the client money rules; or 
(b) in the circumstances referred to in CASS 7.11.18 G (2)(b); and 
(2) pays the money in question into a client bank account promptly, 
and in any event by close of business on the business day following: 
(a) the expiration of the relevant period referred to in CASS 7.11.14 R 
(2); or 
(b) receipt of the money in the circumstances referred to in CASS 
7.11.18 G (2)(b). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
444.   7.11.20R 
(1) If a firm makes use of the exemption under CASS 7.11.14 R, it 
must obtain the client's written agreement to the firm's use of the 
exemption. 
(2) In respect of each client, the record created in (1) must be retained 
during the time that the firm makes use, or intends to make use, of the 
exemption under CASS 7.11.14 R in respect of that client's monies. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
445.   7.11.21R 
(1) Subject to (2)(a), money need not be treated as client money: 
(a) in respect of a delivery versus payment transaction for the purpose 
of settling a transaction in relation to units in a regulated collective 
investment scheme in either of the following circumstances: 
(i) the authorised fund manager receives the money from a client in 
relation to the authorised fund manager's obligation to issue units, in 
an AUT or ACS, or to arrange for the issue of units in an ICVC, in 
accordance with COLL; or 
(ii) the money is held in the course of redeeming units where the 
proceeds of that redemption are paid to a client within the time 
specified in COLL. 
(2) 
(a) Where, in respect of money received in any of the circumstances 
set out in (1), the authorised fund manager has not, by close of 
business on the business day following the date of receipt of the 
money, paid this money to the depositary of an AUT or ACS, the 
ICVC or to the client as the case may be, the authorised fund manager 
must stop using the exemption under (1) for that transaction. 
(b) Paragraph (2)(a) does not prevent a firm transferring client money 
segregated under (2)(a) into the firm's own account, provided this is 
done only for the purpose of making a payment on the same day from 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
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that account in accordance with CASS 7.11.34R(1) to CASS 
7.11.34R(3) (Discharge of fiduciary duty). 
 
446.   7.11.22R 
An authorised fund manager will not be in breach of the requirement 
under CASS 7.13.6R to receive client money directly into a client 
bank account if it received the money in accordance with CASS 
7.11.21 R (1) and is subsequently required under CASS 7.11.21 R (2) 
to hold that money in accordance with the client money rules. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
447.   7.11.23G 
Where proceeds of redemption paid to the client in accordance with 
CASS 7.11.21 R (1)(a)(ii) are paid by cheque, the cheque should be 
issued from the relevant client bank account. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
448.   7.11.24R 
(1) If a firm makes use of the exemption under CASS 7.11.21 R, it 
must obtain the client's written agreement to the firm's use of the 
exemption. 
(2) In respect of each client, the record created in (1) must be retained 
for the duration of the time that the firm makes use of the exemption 
under CASS 7.11.21 R in respect of that client's money. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
449.   Money due and payable to the firm 
7.11.25R 
(1) Money is not client money when it becomes properly due and 
payable to the firm for its own account. 
(2) For these purposes, if a firm makes a payment to, or on the 
instructions of, a client, from an account other than a client bank 
account, until that payment has cleared, no equivalent sum from a 
client bank account for reimbursement will become due and payable 
to the firm. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
450.   7.11.26G 
Money will not become properly due and payable to the firm merely 
through the firm holding that money for a specified period of time. If 
a firm wishes to cease to hold client money for a client it must comply 
with CASS 7.11.34 R (Discharge of fiduciary duty) or, if the balance 
is allocated but unclaimed client money, CASS 7.11.50 R (Allocated 
but unclaimed client money) or CASS 7.11.57 R (De minimis 
amounts of unclaimed client money). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
451.   7.11.27G 
Money held as client money becomes due and payable to the firm or 
for the firm's own account, for example, because the firm acted as 
principal in the contract or the firm, acting as agent, has itself paid for 
securities in advance of receiving the purchase money from its client. 
The circumstances in which it is due and payable will depend on the 
contractual arrangement between the firm and the client. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
452.   7.11.28G 
Firms are reminded that, notwithstanding that money may be due and 
payable to them, they have a continuing obligation to segregate client 
money in accordance with the client money rules. In particular, in 
accordance with CASS 7.15.2 R, firms must ensure the accuracy of 
their records and accounts and are reminded of the requirement to 
carry out internal client money reconciliations either in accordance 
with the standard methods of internal client money reconciliation or 
the requirements for a non-standard method of internal client money 
reconciliation. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
453.   7.11.29G 
When a client's obligation or liability, which is secured by that client's 
asset, crystallises, and the firm realises the asset in accordance with an 
agreement entered into between the client and the firm, the part of the 
proceeds of the asset to cover such liability that is due and payable to 
the firm is not client money. However, any proceeds of sale in excess 
of the amount owed by the client to the firm should be paid over to 
the client immediately or be held in accordance with the client money 
rules. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
454.   Commission rebate 
7.11.30G 
When a firm has entered into an arrangement under which 
commission is rebated to a client, those rebates need not be treated as 
client money until they become due and payable to the client in 
accordance with the terms of the contractual arrangements between 
the parties. 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
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455.   7.11.31G 
When commission rebate becomes due and payable to the client, the 
firm should: 
 
(1) treat it as client money; or 
(2) pay it out in accordance with the rule regarding the discharge of a 
firm's fiduciary duty to the client (see CASS 7.11.34 R); 
unless the firm and the client have entered into an arrangement under 
which the client has agreed to transfer full ownership of this money to 
the firm as collateral against payment of future professional fees (see 
CASS 7.11 (Title transfer collateral arrangements)). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
456.   Interest 
7.11.32R 
A firm must pay a retail client any interest earned on client money 
held for that client unless it has otherwise notified him in writing. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
457.   7.11.33G 
(1) The firm may, under the terms of its agreement with the client, 
pay some, none, or all interest earned to the relevant client. 
(2) Where interest is payable on client money by a firm to clients: 
(a) such sums are client money and so, if not paid to, or to the order of 
the clients, are required to be segregated in accordance with CASS 
7.13 (Segregation of client money); 
(b) the interest should be paid to clients in accordance with the firm's 
agreement with each client; and 
(c) if the firm's agreement with the client is silent as to when interest 
should be paid to the client the firm should follow CASS 7.13.36 R 
(Allocation of client money receipts); 
irrespective of whether the client is a retail client or otherwise. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
458.   Discharge of fiduciary duty 
7.11.33AR 
(1) CASS 7.11.34R(2)(c), CASS 7.11.34R(2)(d) and CASS 
7.11.34R(10) do not apply to a firm following a primary pooling 
event. 
(2) CASS 7.11.34R(2)(e) only applies to a firm following a primary 
pooling event. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
459.   7.11.34R 
Money ceases to be client money (having regard to CASS 7.11.40 R 
where applicable) if: 
 
(1) it is paid to the client, or a duly authorised representative of the 
client; or 
(2) it is: 
(a) paid to a third party on the instruction of, or with the specific 
consent of, the client unless it is transferred to a third party in the 
course of effecting a transaction under CASS 7.14.2 R (Transfer of 
client money to a third party); or 
(b) paid to a third party pursuant to an obligation on the firm where: 
(i) that obligation arises under an enactment; and 
(ii) the obligation under that enactment is applicable to the firm as a 
result of the nature of the business being undertaken by the firm for its 
client; or 
(c) transferred in accordance with CASS 7.11.42 R; or 
(d) transferred in accordance with CASS 7.11.44 R; or 
(e) transferred in accordance with CASS 7A.2.4R(4); or 
(3) subject to CASS 7.11.39R, it is paid into a bank account of the 
client (not being an account which is also in the name of the firm); or 
(4) it is due and payable to the firm in accordance with CASS 7.11.25 
R (Money due and payable to the firm); or 
(5) it is paid to the firm as an excess in the client bank account (see 
CASS 7.15.29 R (2) (Reconciliation discrepancies)); or 
(6) it is paid by an authorised central counterparty to a clearing 
member other than the firm in connection with a porting arrangement 
in accordance with CASS 7.11.35 R; or 
(7) it is paid by an authorised central counterparty directly to the 
client in accordance with CASS 7.11.36 R; or 
(8) it is transferred by the firm to a clearing member in connection 
with a regulated clearing arrangement and the clearing member remits 
payment to another firm or to another clearing member in accordance 
with CASS 7.11.37 R (1); or 
(9) it is transferred by the firm to a clearing member in connection 
with a regulated clearing arrangement and the clearing member remits 
payment directly to the indirect clients of the firm in accordance with 
CASS 7.11.37 R (2); or 
(10) it is paid to charity under CASS 7.11.50 R or CASS 7.11.57 R. 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
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460.   7.11.35R 
Client money which the firm places at an authorised central 
counterparty in connection with a regulated clearing arrangement 
ceases to be client money for that firm if, as part of the default 
management process of that authorised central counterparty in respect 
of a default by the firm, it is ported by the authorised central 
counterparty in accordance with article 48 of EMIR. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
461.   7.11.36R 
Client money which the firm places at an authorised central 
counterparty in connection with a regulated clearing arrangement 
ceases to be client money if, as part of the default management 
process of that authorised central counterparty in respect of a default 
by the firm, it is paid directly to the client by the authorised central 
counterparty in accordance with the procedure described in article 
48(7) of EMIR. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
462.   7.11.37R 
Client money received or held by the firm and transferred to a 
clearing member who facilitates indirect clearing through a regulated 
clearing arrangement ceases to be client money for that firm and, if 
applicable, the clearing member, if the clearing member in accordance 
with the EMIR indirect clearing default management obligations or 
the MiFIR indirect clearing default management obligations (as 
applicable): 
 
(1) remits payment to another firm or to another clearing member; or 
(2) remits payment to the indirect clients of the firm. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
463.   CASS 7.11.38R01/06/2015 
RP 
Client money received or held by the firm for a sub-pool ceases to be 
client money for that firm to the extent that such client money is 
transferred by the firm to an authorised central counterparty or a 
clearing member as a result of porting. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
464.   7.11.39R 
A firm must not pay client money into a bank account of the client 
that has been opened without the consent of that client. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
465.   7.11.40R 
When a firm draws a cheque or other payable order to discharge its 
fiduciary duty to the client, it must continue to treat the sum 
concerned as client money until the cheque or order is presented and 
paid by the bank. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
466.   Transfer of business 
7.11.40AR 
CASS 7.11.41G to CASS 7.11.47R do not apply to a firm following a 
primary pooling event. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
467.   7.11.40BG 
CASS 7A.2.4R(4) (Pooling and distribution or transfer) applies to a 
firm in respect of transfers of client money to another person 
following a primary pooling event. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
468.   7.11.41G 
A firm may transfer client money to a third party as part of 
transferring all or part of its business if, in respect of each client with 
an interest in the client money that is sought to be transferred, it: 
 
(1) obtains the consent or instruction of that client at the time of the 
transfer of business (see CASS 7.11.34 R (2)(a); or 
(2) complies with CASS 7.11.42 R (see CASS 7.11.34 R (2)(c); or 
(3) complies withCASS 7.11.44 R (see CASS 7.11.34 R (2)(d)). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
469.   7.11.42R 
Subject to CASS 7.11.44 R, money ceases to be client money for a 
firm if: 
 
(1) it is transferred by the firm to another person as part of a transfer 
of business to that person where the client money relates to the 
business being transferred; 
(2) it is transferred on terms which require the other person to return a 
client's transferred sums to the client as soon as practicable at the 
client's request; 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
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(3) a written agreement between the firm and the relevant client 
provides that: 
(a) the firm may transfer the client's client money to another person; 
and 
(b) 
(i) the sums transferred will be held by the person to whom they are 
transferred in accordance with the client money rules for the clients; 
or 
(ii) if not held in accordance with (i), the firm will exercise all due 
skill, care and diligence in assessing whether the person to whom the 
client money is transferred will apply adequate measures to protect 
these sums; and 
(4) the firm complies with the requirements in (3)(b)(ii) (if 
applicable). 
 
470.   7.11.43G 
In considering how and whether to introduce the written agreement 
referred to in CASS 7.11.42 R (3), firms should have regard to any 
relevant obligations to clients, including requirements under the 
Unfair Terms Regulations. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
471.   Transfer of business: de minimis sums 
7.11.44R 
(1) Client money belonging to those categories of clients set out in (2) 
and in respect of those amounts set out in (2) ceases to be client 
money of the firm if it is transferred by the firm to another person: 
(a) as part of a transfer of business to that other person where these 
sums relate to the business being transferred; and 
(b) on terms which require the other person to return a client's 
transferred sums as soon as practicable at the client's request. 
(2) 
(a) For retail clients the amount is £25. 
(b) For all other clients the amount is £100. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
472.   7.11.45G 
For the avoidance of doubt, sums transferred under CASS 7.11.44 R 
do not, for the purposes of that rule, require the instruction or specific 
consent of each client at the time of the transfer or a written 
agreement as set out in CASS 7.11.42 R (3). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
473.   Transfer of business: client notifications 
7.11.46R 
Where a firm transfers client money belonging to its clients under 
either or both of CASS 7.11.42 R and CASS 7.11.44 R it must ensure 
that those clients are notified no later than seven days after the 
transfer taking place: 
 
(1) whether or not the sums will be held by the person to whom they 
have been transferred in accordance with the client money rules and if 
not how the sums being transferred will be held by that person; 
(2) the extent to which the sums transferred will be protected under a 
compensation scheme; and 
(3) that the client may opt to have the client's transferred sum returned 
to it as soon as practicable at the client's request. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
474.   7.11.47R 
The firm must notify the FCA of its intention to effect any transfer of 
client money under either or both of CASS 7.11.42 R and CASS 
7.11.44 R at least seven days before it transfers the client money in 
question. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
475.   Allocated but unclaimed client money 
7.11.47AR 
CASS 7.11.48G to CASS 7.11.58G do not apply to a firm following a 
primary pooling event. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
476.   7.11.47BG 
CASS 7A.2.6AR (Closing a client money pool) applies to a firm 
following a primary pooling event in respect of allocated but 
unclaimed client money. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
477.   7.11.48G 
The purpose of CASS 7.11.50 R is to set out the requirements firms 
must comply with in order to cease to treat as client money any 
unclaimed balance which is allocated to an individual client. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
478.   7.11.49G    UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
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Before acting in accordance with CASS 7.11.50 R to CASS 7.11.58 
G, a firm should consider whether its actions are permitted by law and 
consistent with the arrangements under which the client money is 
held. For the avoidance of doubt, these provisions relate to a firm's 
obligations as an authorised person and to the treatment of client 
money under the client money rules. 
 
479.   7.11.50R 
A firm may pay away to a registered charity of its choice a client 
money balance which is allocated to a client and if it does so the 
released balance will cease to be client money under CASS 7.11.34 R 
(10), provided: 
 
(1) this is permitted by law and consistent with the arrangements 
under which the client money is held; 
(2) the firm held the balance concerned for at least six years following 
the last movement on the client's account (disregarding any payment 
or receipt of interest, charges or similar items); 
(3) it can demonstrate that it has taken reasonable steps to trace the 
client concerned and to return the balance; and 
(4) the firm complies with CASS 7.11.54 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
480.   7.11.51G 
Where the client money balance held by a firm is, in aggregate, £100 
or less for a client other than a retail client or, for a retail client, £25 or 
less, the firm may comply with CASS 7.11.57 R instead of CASS 
7.11.50 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
481.   7.11.52E 
(1) Taking reasonable steps in CASS 7.11.50 R (3) includes following 
this course of conduct: 
(a) determining, as far as reasonably possible, the correct contact 
details for the relevant client; 
(b) writing to the client at the last known address either by post or by 
electronic mail to inform it of the firm's intention to no longer treat 
the client money balance as client money and to pay the sums 
concerned to charity if the firm does not receive instructions from the 
client within 28 days; 
(c) where the client has not responded after the 28 days referred to in 
(b), attempting to communicate the information set out in (b) to the 
client on at least one further occasion by any means other than that 
used in (b) including by post, electronic mail, telephone or media 
advertisement; 
(d) subject to (e) and (f), where the client has not responded within 28 
days following the most recent communication, writing again to the 
client at the last known address either by post or by electronic mail to 
inform them that: 
(i) as the firm did not receive a claim for the relevant client money 
balance, it will in 28 days pay the balance to a registered charity; and 
(ii) an undertaking will be provided by the firm or a member of its 
group to pay to the client concerned a sum equal to the balance paid 
away to charity in the event of the client seeking to claim the balance 
in future; 
(e) if the firm has carried out the steps in (b) or (c) and in response has 
received positive confirmation in writing that the client is no longer at 
a particular address, the firm should not use that address for the 
purposes of (d); 
(f) if, after carrying out the steps in (a), (b) and (c), the firm has 
obtained positive confirmation that none of the contact details it holds 
for the relevant client are accurate or, if utilised, the communication is 
unlikely to reach the client, the firm does not have to comply with (d); 
and 
(g) waiting a further 28 days following the most recent 
communication under this rule before paying the balance to a 
registered charity. 
(2) Compliance with (1) may be relied on as tending to establish 
compliance with CASS 7.11.50 R. 
(3) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as tending to establish 
contravention of CASS 7.11.50 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
482.   7.11.53G 
For the purpose of CASS 7.11.52 E (1)(a), a firm may use any 
available means to determine the correct contact details for the 
relevant client, including telephoning the client, searching internal 
records, media advertising, searching public records, mortality 
screening, using credit reference agencies or tracing agents. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
483.   7.11.54R    UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
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(1) Where a firm wishes to release a balance allocated to an individual 
client under CASS 7.11.50 R it must comply with either (a) or (b) 
and, in either case, (2): 
(a) the firm must unconditionally undertake to pay to the client 
concerned a sum equal to the balance paid away to charity in the 
event of the client seeking to claim the balance in future; 
or 
 
(b) the firm must ensure that an unconditional undertaking in the 
terms set out in (a) is made by a member of its group and there is 
suitable information available for relevant clients to identify the 
member of the group granting the undertaking. 
(2) The undertakings in this rule must be: 
(a) authorised by the firm's governing body where (1)(a) applies or by 
the governing body of the group member where (1)(b) applies; 
(b) legally enforceable by any person who had a legally enforceable 
claim to the balance in question at the time it was released by the 
firm, or by an assign or successor in title to such claim; and 
(c) retained by the firm, and where (1)(b) applies, by the group 
member indefinitely. 
 
484.   7.11.55R 
(1) If a firm pays away client money under CASS 7.11.50 R (4) it 
must make and retain, or where the firm already has such records, 
retain: 
(a) records of all balances released from client bank accounts under 
CASS 7.11.50 R (including details of the amounts and the identity of 
the client to whom the money was allocated); 
(b) all relevant documentation (including charity receipts); and 
(c) details of the communications the firm had or attempted to make 
with the client concerned pursuant to CASS 7.11.50 R (3). 
(2) The records in (1) must be retained indefinitely. 
(3) If a member of the firm's group has provided an undertaking under 
CASS 7.11.54 R (2) then the records in (1) must be readily accessible 
to that group member. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
485.   De minimis amounts of unclaimed client money 
7.11.56G 
The purpose of CASS 7.11.57 R is to allow a firm to pay away to 
charity client money balances of (i) £25 or less for retail clients or (ii) 
£100 or less for other clients when those balances remain unclaimed. 
If a firm follows this process, the money will cease to be client money 
(see CASS 7.11.34 R (10). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
486.   7.11.57R 
A firm may pay away to a registered charity of its choice a client 
money balance which is allocated to a client and if it does so the 
released balance will cease to be client money under CASS 7.11.34 R 
(10): 
 
(1) the balance in question is (i) for a retail client, in aggregate, £25 or 
less, or (ii) for a professional client, in aggregate, £100 or less; 
(2) the firm held the balance concerned for at least six years following 
the last movement on the client's account (disregarding any payment 
or receipt of interest, charges or similar items); 
(3) the firm has made at least one attempt to contact the client to 
return the balance using the most up-to-date contact details the firm 
has for the client, and the client has not responded to such 
communication within 28 days of the communication having been 
made; and 
(4) the firm makes and/or retains records of all balances released from 
client bank accounts in according with this rule. Such records must 
include the information in CASS 7.11.55 R (1)(a) and CASS 7.11.55 
R (1)(b). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
487.   Costs associated with paying away allocated but unclaimed client 
money 
7.11.58G 
Any costs associated with the firm ceasing to treat unclaimed client 
money balances as client money pursuant to CASS 7.11.50 R to 
CASS 7.11.57 R should be paid for from the firm's own funds, 
including: 
 
(1) any costs associated with the firm carrying out the steps in CASS 
7.11.50 R (3), CASS 7.11.51 G or CASS 7.11.57 R (3); and 
(2) the cost of any insurance purchased by a firm or the relevant 
member of its group to cover any legally enforceable claim in respect 
of the client money paid away. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
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488.  Article 16(9) MiFID 
An investment firm shall, when holding funds 
belonging to clients, make adequate arrangements 
to safeguard the rights of clients and, except in 
the case of credit institutions, prevent the use of 
client funds for its own account. 
 
7.12 Organisational requirements: client money 
 
Requirement to protect client money 
7.12.1R 
A firm must, when holding client money, make adequate 
arrangements to safeguard the client's rights and prevent the use of 
client money for its own account. 
 
[Note: article 16(9) of MiFID] 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules.  
489.  Article 16(2) to 10 MiFID II) 
 
[Not replicated here for reasons of space as well 
as not being fully relevant for the purposes of the 
analysis in this row.] 
 
Article 21 Commission Delegated Regulation 
 
1. Investment firms shall comply with the 
following organisational requirements: (a) 
establish, implement and maintain decision-
making procedures and an organisational 
structure which clearly and in documented 
manner specifies reporting lines and allocates 
functions and responsibilities; (b) ensure that their 
relevant persons are aware of the procedures 
which must be followed for the proper discharge 
of their responsibilities; (c) establish, implement 
and maintain adequate internal control 
mechanisms designed to secure compliance with 
decisions and procedures at all levels of the 
investment firm; (d) employ personnel with the 
skills, knowledge and expertise necessary for the 
discharge of the responsibilities allocated to them; 
(e) establish, implement and maintain effective 
internal reporting and communication of 
information at all relevant levels of the 
investment firm; (f) maintain adequate and 
orderly records of their business and internal 
organisation; (g) ensure that the performance of 
multiple functions by their relevant persons does 
not and is not likely to prevent those persons from 
discharging any particular function soundly, 
honestly, and professionally. When complying 
with the requirements set out in the this 
paragraph, investment firms shall take into 
account the nature, scale and complexity of the 
business of the firm, and the nature and range of 
investment services and activities undertaken in 
the course of that business. 2. Investment firms 
shall establish, implement and maintain systems 
and procedures that are adequate to safeguard the 
security, integrity and confidentiality of 
information, taking into account the nature of the 
information in question. 3. Investment firms shall 
establish, implement and maintain an adequate 
business continuity policy aimed at ensuring, in 
the case of an interruption to their systems and 
procedures, the preservation of essential data and 
functions, and the maintenance of investment 
services and activities, or, where that is not 
possible, the timely recovery of such data and 
functions and the timely resumption of their 
investment services and activities. 4. Investment 
firms shall establish, implement and maintain 
accounting policies and procedures that enable 
them, at the request of the competent authority, to 
deliver in a timely manner to the competent 
authority financial reports which reflect a true and 
fair view of their financial position and which 
comply with all applicable accounting standards 
and rules. 5. Investment firms shall monitor and, 
on a regular basis, evaluate the adequacy and 
effectiveness of their systems, internal control 
mechanisms and arrangements established in 
accordance with paragraphs 1 to 4, and take 
appropriate measures to address any deficiencies. 
 
 
Requirement to have adequate organisational arrangements 
7.12.2R 
A firm must introduce adequate organisational arrangements to 
minimise the risk of the loss or diminution of client money, or of 
rights in connection with client money, as a result of misuse of client 
money, fraud, poor administration, inadequate record-keeping or 
negligence. 
 
[Note: Article 2(1)(f) of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
Organisational requirements — general  
 
9. (1) An investment business firm shall, at all times, have 
in place policies, resources and systems to identify, 
monitor, report on and manage risks to which it is or may 
be exposed in respect of their activities.  
 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), 
an investment business firm shall have—  
 
(a) management resources required to conduct its 
activities in an effective manner,  
 
(b) financial resources—  
(i) required to meet its investment business objectives, and  
(ii) which reflect the risks to which its business is subject,  
 
(c) control systems and accounting procedures required to 
ensure that it is in a position to satisfy supervisory and 
regulatory requirements, and  
 
(d) robust governance arrangements, which include a clear 
organisational structure with well defined, transparent and 
clearly identifiable lines of reporting.  
 
(3) An investment business firm shall have in place 
accounting policies and procedures that enable the 
investment business firm to deliver to the Bank, in 
accordance with the reporting deadlines specified in 
column 3 of the applicable Part of the Schedule, financial 
accounts which—  
 
(a) reflect a true and fair view of the investment business 
firm’s financial position, and  
 
(b) comply with the applicable accounting framework.  
 
(4) An investment business firm shall have in place a 
business continuity policy to ensure, in the event of an 
interruption to its systems and procedures—  
 
(a) the preservation of essential data and functions or, 
where that is not possible, the timely recovery of such data 
and functions, and  
 
(b) the maintenance of services and activities or, where 
that is not possible, the timely resumption of such services 
and activities.   
 
(5) An investment business firm shall carry out, on an 
annual basis, testing on the effectiveness of the business 
continuity policy referred to in paragraph (4) in meeting 
the objectives referred to in paragraphs (4)(a) and (b). 
 
  Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
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Article 2(1)(f) Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Member States shall require that investment firms 
comply with the following requirements: 
 
(f)  
they must introduce adequate organisational 
arrangements to minimise the risk of the loss or 
diminution of client assets, or of rights in 
connection with those assets, as a result of misuse 
of the assets, fraud, poor administration, 
inadequate record-keeping or negligence. 
 
 
 
490.   7.12.3G 
The risk of loss or diminution of rights in connection with client 
money can arise where a firm's organisational arrangements give rise 
to the possibility that client money held by the firm may be paid for 
the account of a client whose money is yet to be received by the firm. 
Consistent with the requirement to hold client money as trustee (see 
CASS 7.17.5 G), a firm should ensure its organisational arrangements 
are adequate to minimise such a risk. This may include, for example, 
allowing for sufficient periods of time for payments of client money 
to the firm to become available for use (including automated 
payments, credit card payments and payments by cheque), and setting 
up safeguards to ensure that payments out of client bank accounts do 
not take effect before the relevant amount of client money has become 
available for use by the firm. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules.  
491.   7.13 Segregation of client money 
 
Application and purpose 
CASS 7.13.1G01/06/2015 
RP 
The segregation of client money from a firm's own money is an 
important safeguard for its protection. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules.  
492.   7.13.2R 
Where a firm establishes one or more sub-pools, the provisions of 
CASS 7.13 (Segregation of client money) shall be read as applying 
separately to the firm's general pool and each sub-pool in line with 
CASS 7.19.3 R and CASS 7.19.12 R. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules.  
493.  Article 4(1) Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Article 4 
Depositing client funds 
 
1.   Member States shall require investment firms, 
on receiving any client funds, promptly to place 
those funds into one or more accounts opened 
with any of the following: 
 
(a) 
a central bank; 
 
(b) 
a credit institution authorised in accordance with 
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council (7); 
 
(c) 
a bank authorised in a third country; 
 
(d) 
a qualifying money market fund. 
 
The first subparagraph shall not apply to a credit 
institution authorised under Directive 2013/36/EU 
in relation to deposits within the meaning of that 
Directive held by that institution. 
 
Depositing client money 
7.13.3R 
A firm, on receiving any client money, must promptly place this 
money into one or more accounts opened with any of the following: 
 
(1) a central bank; 
(2) a CRD credit institution; 
(3) a bank authorised in a third country; 
(4) a qualifying money market fund. 
[Note: article 4(1) of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules.  
494.   7.13.4G 
A firm should ensure that any money other than client money that is 
deposited in a client bank account is promptly paid out of that account 
unless such money is a minimum sum required to open the account, or 
to keep the account open. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules.  
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495.   Approaches for the segregation of client money 
7.13.5G 
The two approaches that a firm can adopt in discharging its 
obligations under this section are: 
 
(1) the 'normal approach'; or 
(2) the 'alternative approach' (see CASS 7.13.54 G to CASS 7.13.69 
G). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules.  
496.   The normal approach 
7.13.6R 
Unless otherwise permitted by any other rule in this chapter, a firm 
using the normal approach must ensure that all client money it 
receives is paid directly into a client bank account at an institution 
referred to in CASS 7.13.3 R (1) to CASS 7.13.3 R (3), rather than 
being first received into the firm's own account and then segregated. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules.  
497.   7.13.7G 
Firms should ensure that clients and third parties make transfers and 
payments of any money which will be client money directly into the 
firm's client bank accounts. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules.  
498.  Article 4(2) first sub-paragraph Commission 
Delegated Directive 
 
Member States shall require that, where 
investment firms do not deposit client funds with 
a central bank, they exercise all due skill, care 
and diligence in the selection, appointment and 
periodic review of the credit institution, bank or 
money market fund where the funds are placed 
and the arrangements for the holding of those 
funds and they consider the need for 
diversification of these funds as part of their due 
diligence. 
 
Selection, appointment and review of third parties 
7.13.8R 
(1) A firm that does not deposit client money with a central bank must 
exercise all due skill, care and diligence in the selection, appointment 
and periodic review of the CRD credit institution, bank or qualifying 
money market fund where the money is deposited and the 
arrangements for the holding of this money. 
(2) The firm must consider the need for diversification as part of its 
due diligence under (1). 
[Note: article 4(2) first sub-paragraph of the MiFID Delegated 
Directive] 
 
Segregation  
48. (1) In this Regulation “instruction” includes—  
 
(a) a written confirmation or recorded telephone 
confirmation by which a client has instructed the 
investment firm to transfer its client assets, or  
 
(b) a written agreement by which a client has instructed 
the investment firm to manage its client assets on a 
discretionary basis.  
 
(2) An investment firm shall take all steps as may be 
necessary to ensure that any client asset is held by it in 
trust for the benefit of the client on behalf of whom such 
client asset is being held.  
 
(3) An investment firm shall not place in a third party 
client asset account any asset other than a client asset 
except in accordance with Regulations 49(6), 49(7) or 
Regulation 58(3).  
 
(4) Except in accordance with a legally enforceable 
agreement, an investment firm shall not use the assets of a 
client for any purpose other than for the sole account of 
that client.  
 
(5) Without prejudice to Regulations 48(3), 49(6) and 
49(7), an investment firm is not required to pay into a 
third party client asset account such client assets that it 
receives on behalf of a client where to do so would result 
in the investment firm breaching any law or order of any 
court of competent jurisdiction.  
 
(6) Where, in accordance with an instruction from a client, 
a client asset is transferred to a third party, the investment 
firm shall ensure that such transfer is overseen and 
approved, prior to or at the time of transfer, by a relevant 
person other than the relevant person who is conducting 
the transfer. 
 
  Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
499.   7.13.9G 
Firms should ensure that their consideration of a CRD credit 
institution, bank or qualifying money market fund under CASS 7.13.8 
R focuses on the specific legal entity in question and not simply that 
person's group as a whole. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules.  
500.  Article 4(2) second sub-paragraph  
Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Member States shall ensure, in particular, that 
investment firms take into account the expertise 
and market reputation of such institutions or 
money market funds with a view to ensuring the 
protection of clients' rights, as well as any legal or 
regulatory requirements or market practices 
related to the holding of client funds that could 
adversely affect clients' rights 
7.13.10R 
When a firm makes the selection, appointment and conducts the 
periodic review of a CRD credit institution, a bank or a qualifying 
money market fund, it must take into account: 
 
(1) the expertise and market reputation of the third party with a view 
to ensuring the protection of clients’ rights; and 
(2) any legal or regulatory requirements or market practices related to 
the holding of client money that could adversely affect clients' rights. 
[Note: article 4(2) second sub-paragraph of the MiFID Delegated 
Directive] 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules.  
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501.   7.13.11G 
In complying with CASS 7.13.8 R and CASS 7.13.10 R, a firm 
should consider, as appropriate, together with any other relevant 
matters: 
 
(1) the capital of the CRD credit institution or bank; 
(2) the amount of client money placed, as a proportion of the CRD 
credit institution or bank's capital and deposits, and, in the case of a 
qualifying money market fund, compared to any limit the fund may 
place on the volume of redemptions in any period; 
(3) the extent to which client money that the firm deposits or holds 
with any CRD credit institution or bank incorporated outside the UK 
would be protected under a deposit protection scheme in the relevant 
jurisdiction; 
(4) the credit-worthiness of the CRD credit institution or bank; and 
(5) to the extent that the information is available, the level of risk in 
the investment and loan activities undertaken by the CRD credit 
institution or bank and affiliated companies. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules.  
502.  Article 2(1)(e) Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Member States shall require that investment firms 
comply with the following requirements: 
(e) they must take the necessary steps to 
ensure that client funds deposited, in accordance 
with Article 4 [of the Commission Delegated 
Directive], in a central bank, a credit institution or 
a bank authorised in a third country or a 
qualifying money market fund are held in an 
account or accounts identified separately from 
any accounts used to hold funds belonging to the 
investment firm; 
 
Client bank accounts 
7.13.12R 
A firm must take the necessary steps to ensure that client money 
deposited, in accordance with CASS 7.13.3 R, in a central bank, a 
credit institution, a bank authorised in a third country or a qualifying 
money market fund is held in an account or accounts identified 
separately from any accounts used to hold money belonging to the 
firm. 
 
[Note: article 2(1)(e) of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules.  
503.   7.13.13R 
(1) An account which the firm uses to deposit client money under 
CASS 7.13.3 R (1) to CASS 7.13.3 R (3) must be a client bank 
account. 
(2) In respect of each client bank account used by a firm to satisfy its 
obligation under CASS 7.13.3R(1) to (3): 
(a) the relevant bank's contractual counterparty must be the firm itself; 
and 
(b) ) subject to paragraph (3A), the firm must be able to make 
withdrawals of client money promptly and, in any event, within one 
business day of a request for withdrawal. 
Transitional provision CASS TP 1.1.10AR applies to (2). 
 
(3A) Where the requirement under sub-paragraph (2)(b) is not 
satisfied and provided that the client bank account is not included in a 
sub-pool, a firm may use a client bank account from which it will be 
unable to make a withdrawal of client money until the expiry of a 
period lasting: 
(a) up to 30 days; or 
(b) provided the firm complies with CASS 7.13.14AR, from 31 to 95 
days. 
(4) Paragraphs (2)(b) and (3A) do not apply in respect of client money 
received by a firm in its capacity as a trustee firm. 
 
Holding and depositing client funds  
49. (1) All money received from, or on behalf of, a client 
shall be held as client funds in accordance with this Part 
unless such money relates exclusively to an activity of the 
investment firm which is not a regulated financial service.  
 
(2) For the purposes of this Part, an investment firm is 
deemed to hold client funds where—  
 
(a) the funds have been deposited on behalf of a client of 
the investment firm to a third party client asset account 
with a third party or a relevant party in the name of the 
investment firm or of a nominee, and  
 
(b) the investment firm has the capacity to effect 
transactions on that third party client asset account.  
 
(3) Client funds received from, or on behalf of, a client 
shall be deposited into a third party client asset account 
without delay, and in any event not later than one working 
day after the receipt of such client funds.  
 
(4) Where an investment firm deposits client funds with a 
qualifying money market fund, the units in that qualifying 
money market fund shall be held in accordance with the 
requirements for holding and depositing client financial 
instruments.  
 
(5) Where an investment firm receives client funds from, 
or on behalf of, a client, the investment firm shall, as soon 
as practicable after receiving those client funds, send to 
the client a receipt in writing for those client funds, except 
where the client funds are received by electronic transfer 
or in settlement of a specific contract.  
 
(6) Where an investment firm receives from, or on behalf 
of, a client, money that is comprised of a mixture of client 
funds and other money, the investment firm shall first pay 
all of the client funds and other money into a third party 
client asset account and thereafter shall, without delay, 
transfer out of, or withdraw, from the third party client 
asset account the other money.  
 
(7) If an investment firm receives or identifies at any stage 
that it is holding money where—  
  Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules become 
somewhat more prescriptive. 
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(a) it is not clear if that money is client funds, or  
 
(b) there is insufficient documentation to identify the 
client who owns such money,  
 
the investment firm shall, first pay the money into a third 
party client asset account and within 5 working days of 
the initial receipt of such money, or identifying that it is 
holding money where subparagraphs (a) or (b) apply, 
either identify the client concerned or return the money.  
 
(8) Where client funds are deposited with a third party the 
investment firm shall review the arrangements for the 
holding of client funds with that third party—  
 
(a) as against the criteria set out in paragraphs 3(3) and 
3(4) of Schedule 3 to the MiFID Regulations,  
 
(b) if there is any material change to the relationship with 
the third party which affects the manner by which clients 
funds are held, and  
 
(c) in any event, at least on an annual basis.  
 
(9) An investment firm shall not hold client assets without 
the prior written approval of the Bank. 
 
504.   7.13.14G 
CASS 7.13.13 R (2)(b) and CASS 7.13.13R(3A) do not prevent a firm 
from depositing client money on terms under which a withdrawal may 
be made before the expiry of a fixed term or a notice period (whatever 
the duration), including where such withdrawal would incur a penalty 
charge to the firm. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 503. 
505.   7.13.14AR 
A firm may only use one or more client bank accounts under CASS 
7.13.13R(3A)(b) if: 
 
(1) prior to using any such client bank accounts, it: 
(a) produces a written policy that sets out: 
(i) for each of its business lines, the maximum proportion of the client 
money held by the firm that the firm considers would be appropriate 
to hold in such client bank accounts having regard to the need to 
manage the risk of the firm being unable to access client money when 
required; 
(ii) the firm’s rationale for reaching its conclusion(s) under (i); and 
(iii) the measures that it will put into place to comply with sub-
paragraph (2)(a) of this rule, having regard to CASS 7.13.14CE; and 
(b) provides each of its clients with a written explanation of the risks 
that arise as a result of the longer notice period for withdrawals that: 
(i) is clear, fair and not misleading; and 
(ii) in respect of the medium of the explanation, satisfies whichever of 
COBS 6.1.13R (Medium of disclosure) or COBS 6.1ZA.19EU 
(Medium of disclosure) applies to the firm in respect of its obligations 
to provide information to the client; and 
(2) while the firm uses any such client bank accounts, it: 
(a) takes appropriate measures to manage the risk of the firm being 
unable to access client money when required; 
(b) keeps its written policy under sub-paragraph (1)(a) under review, 
amending it where necessary; and 
(c) provides any of its clients to whom it has not previously provided 
the explanation under sub-paragraph (1)(b) with such a written 
explanation before it starts to hold or receive client money for them. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 503. 
506.   7.13.14BR 
(1) A firm must make and retain a written record of: 
(a) the written policy it produces under CASS 7.13.14AR(1)(a); and 
(b) each subsequent version of the written policy it produces as a 
result of CASS 7.13.14AR(2)(b). 
(2) The firm must make the record: 
(a) under sub-paragraph (1)(a) on the date it produces the written 
policy; and 
(b) under sub-paragraph (1)(b) on the date it produces the new version 
of the written policy. 
(3) The firm must keep each record under this rule for a period of five 
years after the earlier of: 
(a) the date on which the version of the policy to which the record 
relates was superseded; and 
   Same comment as in Row 503. 
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(b) the date on which the firm ceased to use client bank accounts 
under CASS 7.13.13R(3A)(b). 
 
507.   7.13.14CE 
(1) Appropriate measures under CASS 7.13.14AR(2)(a) include the 
firm considering the need to make, and making where appropriate, 
quarterly or more frequent adjustments to the amount of client money 
held in client bank accounts under CASS 7.13.13R(3A)(b), taking into 
consideration the following factors: 
(a) historic and expected future client money receipts and payments; 
(b) the firm’s own analysis of its exposure to the risk of being unable 
to meet instructions from its clients in relation to client money that it 
holds, applying an appropriate set of time horizons and stress 
scenarios; and 
(c) the content of the firm’s written policy under CASS 
7.13.14AR(1)(a)(i) and (ii). 
(2) Compliance with (1) may be relied on as tending to establish 
compliance with CASS 7.13.14AR(2)(a). 
(3) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as tending to establish 
contravention of CASS 7.13.14AR(2)(a). 
 
   Same comment as in Row 503. 
508.   7.13.14DG 
(1) Under CASS 7.13.14AR(2)(b) a firm should consider whether 
amendments to its written policy under CASS 7.13.14AR(1)(a) are 
needed for any reason, including in light of the firm’s analysis in the 
course of its measures under CASS 7.13.14AR(2)(a). 
(2) Each time a firm amends its written policy under CASS 
7.13.14AR(1)(a), it should also update the rationale for the amended 
policy under CASS 7.13.14AR(1)(a)(ii). 
(3) The stress scenarios under CASS 7.13.14CE(1)(b) should include 
a variety of severe yet plausible institution-specific and market-wide 
liquidity shocks. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 503. 
509.   7.13.14EG 
 (1) If a fixed term or notice period for a withdrawal from a client 
bank account is scheduled to expire on a day on which a firm would 
expect to be unable to make the withdrawal, and the result is that the 
total period for which the withdrawal is prevented is longer than that 
permitted under CASS 7.13.13R(3A)(a) or (b), then the firm would be 
in breach of that rule. 
(2) Such a situation could arise because the fixed term or notice 
period expires on a day which is not a business day for the relevant 
bank. 
(3) Firms should therefore schedule their withdrawals from client 
bank accounts under CASS 7.13.13R(3A)(a) and (b) to avoid such 
breaches. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 503. 
510.   7.13.14FG 
Firms that hold client money using a client bank account under CASS 
7.13.13R(3A)(b) and to which SUP 16.14 (Client money and asset 
return) applies may need to fill in their CMARs in the way set out at 
SUP 16.14.7R (Reporting of ‘unbreakable’ client money deposits). 
 
   Same comment as in Row 503. 
511.   7.13.15G 
CASS 7.13.13 R does not prevent a firm from depositing client 
money in overnight money market deposits which are clearly 
identified as being client money (for example, in the client bank 
account acknowledgment letter). 
 
   Same comment as in Row 503. 
512.   7.13.16G 
Firms are reminded of their obligations under CASS 7.18 
(Acknowledgment letters) for client bank accounts. Firms should also 
ensure that client bank accounts meet the requirements in the relevant 
Glossary definitions, including regarding the titles given to the 
accounts. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 503. 
513.   7.13.17G 
A firm may open one or more client bank accounts in the form of a 
general client bank account, a designated client bank account or a 
designated client fund account (see CASS 7A.2.1 G (Failure of the 
authorised firm: primary pooling event)). The requirements of CASS 
7.13.13 R (2) and CASS 7.13.13 R (3) apply for each type of client 
bank account. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 503. 
514.   7.13.18 
A designated client bank account may be used for a client only where 
that client has consented to the use of that account. If a firm deposits 
client money into a designated client bank account then, in the event 
   Same comment as in Row 503. 
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of a secondary pooling event in respect of the relevant bank, the 
account will not be pooled with any general client bank account or 
designated client fund account. 
 
515.   7.13.19G 
A designated client fund account may be used for a client only where 
that client has consented to the use of that account and all other 
designated client fund accounts which may be pooled with it. For 
example, a client who consents to the use of bank A and bank B 
should have his money held in a different designated client fund 
account at bank B from a client who has consented to the use of banks 
B and C. If a firm deposits client money into a designated client fund 
account then, in the event of a secondary pooling event in respect of 
the relevant bank, the account will not be pooled with any general 
client bank account or designated client bank account. 
 
Designation  
52. (1) In advance of opening a third party client asset 
account, an investment firm shall—  
 
(a) designate in its own financial records each third party 
client asset account as a ‘client asset account’ or use some 
such other abbreviation in the account name that makes it 
readily identifiable as an account containing client assets,  
 
(b) ensure that the third party will designate in the 
financial records of the third party, the name of a third 
party client asset account held with it in a manner which 
makes it clear that the client assets are not assets of the 
investment firm. 
 
  Same comment as in Row 503. 
516.   Diversification of client money 
7.13.20-AG 
(1) In CASS 7.13.20R to CASS 7.13.25R client money means money 
deposited under CASS 7.13.3R and therefore includes money 
deposited under CASS 7.13.3R: 
(a) in an account opened with a qualifying money market fund; or 
(b) invested in units or shares of a qualifying money market fund. 
(2) But client money held under CASS 7.14.2R does not fall within 
the scope of the diversification provisions at CASS 7.13.20R to CASS 
7.13.25R. 
 
   Same comment as in Row 503. 
517.  Article 4(3) first sub-paragraph Commission 
Delegated Directive 
 
Member States shall require that, where 
investment firms deposit client funds with a credit 
institution, bank or money market fund of the 
same group as the investment firm, they limit the 
funds that they deposit with any such group entity 
or combination of any such group entities so that 
funds do not exceed 20 % of all such funds. 
 
7.13.20R 
Notwithstanding the requirement at CASS 7.13.22 R a firm must limit 
the funds that it deposits or holds with a relevant group entity or 
combination of such entities so that the value of those funds do not at 
any point in time exceed 20 per cent of the total of all the client 
money held by the firm under CASS 7.13.3R. 
 
[Note: article 4(3) first sub-paragraph of the MiFID Delegated 
Directive] 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
518.  Article 4(3) first sub-paragraph Commission 
Delegated Directive 
 
Member States shall require that, where 
investment firms deposit client funds with a credit 
institution, bank or money market fund of the 
same group as the investment firm, they limit the 
funds that they deposit with any such group entity 
or combination of any such group entities so that 
funds do not exceed 20 % of all such funds. 
 
7.13.21R 
For the purpose of CASS 7.13.20 R an entity is a relevant group entity 
if it is: 
 
(1) 
(a) a CRD credit institution; or 
(b) a bank authorised in a third country; or 
(c) a qualifying money market fund; or 
(d) the entity operating or managing the qualifying money market 
fund; and 
(2) a member of the same group as that firm. 
 
[Note: article 4(3) first sub-paragraph of the MiFID Delegated 
Directive] 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
519.   
Article 4(3) second sub-paragraph 
Commission Delegated Directive 
 
An investment firm may not comply with this 
limit where it is able to demonstrate that, in view 
of the nature, scale and complexity of its 
business, and also the safety offered by the third 
parties considered in the previous subparagraph, 
and including in any case the small balance of 
client funds the investment firm holds the 
requirement under the previous paragraph is not 
proportionate. Investment firms shall periodically 
review the assessment made in accordance with 
this subparagraph and shall notify their initial and 
reviewed assessments to NCAs. 
 
7.13.21AR 
(1) A firm need not comply with CASS 7.13.20R if, following an 
assessment, it is able to demonstrate that the requirement under that 
rule is not proportionate, in view of: 
(a) the small balance of client money that it holds; 
(a) the nature, scale and complexity of its business; and 
(a) the safety offered by the relevant third parties referred to under 
CASS 7.13.20R. 
(2) A firm must review any assessment it makes under (1) 
periodically. 
(3) A firm must notify its assessment under (1) and its reviewed 
assessments under (2) to the FCA in accordance with CASS 
7.13.21CR. 
[Note: article 4(3) second sub-paragraph of the MiFID Delegated 
Directive] 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
520.   7.13.21BG 
(1) In relation to the requirement to take account of a firm’s “small 
balance” of client money at CASS 7.13.21AR(1)(a): 
(a) the FCA expects a firm that would not qualify to be a CASS small 
firm under the rules in CASS 1A.2, ignoring any safe custody assets 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
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that it holds, to have difficulty in justifying using the approach in 
CASS 7.13.21AR(1); 
(b) a firm should calculate its client money balance for these purposes 
in the same way required under CASS 1A.2.3R, and base its 
assessment under CASS 7.13.21AR(1)(a) on either: 
(i) the highest total amount of client money that it held during the year 
ending on the date of the assessment; or 
(ii) if it did not hold client money in the previous calendar year, the 
highest total amount of client money that the firm projects it will hold 
during the year starting on the date of the assessment; 
(c) this means that it may be possible for a CASS medium firm or a 
CASS large firm to justify using the approach in CASS 7.13.21AR(1) 
on the basis of small client money balances; and 
(d) in any case, a firm seeking to take that approach should also 
consider the points at CASS 7.13.21AR(1)(b) and (c) as part of its 
assessment. 
(2) In relation to the requirement under CASS 7.13.21AR(2) to review 
the assessment under CASS 7.13.21AR(1): 
(a) a firm should undertake a review and, where appropriate, consider 
whether to cease to use the approach in CASS 7.13.21AR(1) when it 
becomes aware of a change in the circumstances that might have led 
the firm to a different conclusion on its previous assessment; and 
(b) in any case a firm should undertake a review at least one year after 
its previous assessment until it ceases to use the approach in CASS 
7.13.21AR(1). 
(3) A firm may, subject to paragraph (2)(a), wish to perform the 
assessment and any periodic reviews under CASS 7.13.21AR when 
the obligations under CASS 1A.2.9R arise. 
(4) Firms are reminded that, independent of CASS 7.13.21AR, each 
firm is required by CASS 1A.2.2R to determine once every year 
whether it is a CASS large firm, CASS medium firm or CASS small 
firm. 
 
521.   7.13.21CR 
Where a firm decides following an assessment under CASS 
7.13.21AR(1) that it intends to use the approach under that rule, the 
firm must give the FCA notice of this upon reaching that decision and 
before it starts to use that approach. 
Where, following a review under CASS 7.13.21AR(2) a firm decides 
that it will either cease to use the approach under CASS 7.13.21AR(1) 
or continue to use it, it must give the FCA notice of this upon 
reaching that decision. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
522.  Article 4(2) first sub-paragraph Commission 
Delegated Directive 
Member States shall require that, where 
investment firms do not deposit client funds with 
a central bank, they exercise all due skill, care 
and diligence in the selection, appointment and 
periodic review of the credit institution, bank or 
money market fund where the funds are placed 
and the arrangements for the holding of those 
funds and they consider the need for 
diversification of these funds as part of their due 
diligence. 
 
 
7.13.22R 
Subject to the requirement at CASS 7.13.20 R, and in accordance with 
Principle 10 and CASS 7.12.1 R, a firm must: 
 
(1) periodically review whether it is appropriate to diversify (or 
further diversify) the third parties with which it deposits some or all of 
the client money that the firm holds; and 
(2) whenever it concludes that it is appropriate to do so, it must make 
adjustments accordingly to the third parties it uses and to the amounts 
of client money deposited with them. 
[Note: article 4(2) first sub-paragraph of the MiFID Delegated 
Directive] 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
523.   7.13.23G 
In complying with the requirement in CASS 7.13.22 R to periodically 
review whether diversification (or further diversification) is 
appropriate, a firm should have regard to: 
 
(1) whether it would be appropriate to deposit client money in client 
bank accounts opened at a number of different third parties; 
(2) whether it would be appropriate to limit the amount of client 
money the firm holds with third parties that are in the same group as 
each other; 
(3) whether risks arising from the firm's business models create any 
need for diversification (or further diversification); 
(4) the market conditions at the time of the assessment; and 
(5) the outcome of any due diligence carried out in accordance with 
CASS 7.13.8 R and CASS 7.13.10 R. 
 
    
524.   7.13.24G 
The rules in SUP 16.14 provide that CASS large firms and CASS 
medium firms must report to the FCA in relation to the identity of the 
entities with which they deposit client money and the amounts of 
client money deposited with those entities. The FCA will use that 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
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information to monitor compliance with the diversification rule in 
CASS 7.13.20 R. 
 
525.   7.13.25R 
(1) A firm must make a record of the grounds upon which it satisfies 
itself as to the appropriateness of its selection and appointment of a 
bank or a qualifying money market fund under CASS 7.13.8 R. The 
firm must make the record on the date it makes the selection or 
appointment and must keep it from that date until five years after the 
firm ceases to use that particular person for the purposes of depositing 
client money under CASS 7.13.3 R. 
(2) A firm must make a record of each periodic review of its selection 
and appointment of a bank or a qualifying money market fund that it 
conducts under CASS 7.13.8 R, its considerations and conclusions. 
The firm must make the record on the date it completes the review 
and must keep it from that date until five years after the firm ceases to 
use that particular person for the purposes of depositing client money 
under CASS 7.13.3 R. 
(3) A firm must make a record of each periodic review that it 
conducts under CASS 7.13.22 R, its considerations and conclusions. 
The firm must make the record on the date it completes out the review 
and must keep it for five years from that date. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
526.  Recital 4 Commission Delegated Directive 
Where an investment firm deposits funds it holds 
on behalf of a client with a qualifying money 
market fund, the units or shares in that money 
market fund should be held in accordance with 
the requirements for holding financial instruments 
belonging to clients. Clients should be required to 
explicitly consent to the depositing of those 
funds. When assessing the quality of money 
market instrument there should be no mechanistic 
reliance on external ratings. However a 
downgrade below the two highest short-term 
credit ratings by any agency registered and 
supervised by ESMA that has rated the 
instrument should lead the manager to undertake 
a new assessment of the credit quality of the 
money market instrument to ensure it continues to 
be of high quality. 
 
Qualifying money market funds 
7.13.26R 
Where a firm deposits client money with a qualifying money market 
fund, the firm's holding of those units or shares in that fund will be 
subject to any applicable requirements of the custody rules. 
 
[Note: recital 4 to the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
527.   7.13.27G 
A firm that places client money in a qualifying money market fund 
should ensure that it has the permissions required to invest in and hold 
units in that fund and must comply with the rules that are relevant for 
those activities. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
528.  Article 4(2) third sub-paragraph Commission 
Delegated Directive 
 
Member States shall require that investment firms 
ensure that clients give their explicit consent to 
the placement of their funds in a qualifying 
money market fund. In order to ensure this right 
to consent is effective, investment firms shall 
inform clients that funds placed with a qualifying 
money market fund will not be held in accordance 
with the requirements for safeguarding client 
funds set out in this Directive. 
 
7.13.28R 
(1) A firm must inform a client that money placed with a qualifying 
money market fund will not be held in accordance with the 
requirements for holding client money. 
(2) A firm must ensure that, having provided the information to the 
client under (1), the client gives its explicit consent to the placement 
of their money in a qualifying money market fund. 
[Note: article 4(2) third sub-paragraph to the MiFID Delegated 
Directive] 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
529.   7.13.29AG 
A firm may comply with CASS 7.13.28 R(1) by informing the client 
that the units or shares in the qualifying money market fund will be 
held as safe custody assets. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
530.   Segregation in different currency 
7.13.30R 
A firm may segregate client money in a different currency from that 
in which it was received or in which the firm is liable to the relevant 
client. If it does so the firm must ensure that the amount held is 
adjusted each day to an amount at least equal to the original currency 
amount (or the currency in which the firm has its liability to its 
clients, if different), translated at the previous day's closing spot 
exchange rate. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
531.   Mixed remittance 
7.13.31R 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
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Except in the circumstances described in CASS 7.13.72 R (1)(a), 
where a firm using the normal approach receives a mixed remittance 
it should: 
 
(1) in accordance with CASS 7.13.6 R, take necessary steps to ensure 
the mixed remittance is paid directly into a client bank account; and 
(2) promptly and, in any event no later than one business day after the 
payment of the mixed remittance into the client bank account has 
cleared, pay the money that is not client money out of the client bank 
account. 
 
532.   Physical receipts of client money 
7.13.32R 
Where a firm receives client money in the form of cash, a cheque or 
other payable order, it must: 
 
(1) pay the money in accordance with CASS 7.13.6 R, promptly, and 
no later than on the business day after it receives the money into a 
client bank account, unless either: 
(a) the money is received by a business line for which the firm uses 
the alternative approach, in which case the money must be paid into 
the firm's own bank account promptly, and no later than on the 
business day after it receives the money; or 
(b) the firm is unable to meet the requirement in (1) because of 
restrictions under the regulatory system or law regarding the receipt 
and processing of money, in which case the money must be paid in 
accordance with CASS 7.13.6 R as soon as possible; 
(2) if the firm holds the money in the meantime before paying it in 
accordance with CASS 7.13.6 R (or in the case of (1)(a), into its own 
bank account), hold it in a secure location in line with Principle 10; 
and 
(3) in any case, record the receipt of the money in the firm's books 
and records in line with CASS 7.15 (Records, accounts and 
reconciliations). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
533.   7.13.33R 
Where a firm receives client money in the form of a cheque that is 
dated with a future date, unless the firm returns the cheque it must: 
 
(1) pay the money in accordance with CASS 7.13.6 R, promptly, and 
no later than the date on the cheque if the date is a business day or the 
next business day after the date on the cheque; 
(2) in the meantime, hold it in a secure location in accordance with 
Principle 10; and 
(3) record the receipt of the money in the firm's books and records in 
accordance with CASS 7.15 (Records, accounts and reconciliations). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
534.   Appointed representatives, tied agents, field representatives and 
other agents 
7.13.34R 
A firm must ensure that client money received by its appointed 
representatives, tied agents, field representatives or other agents is: 
 
(1) received directly into a client bank account of the firm, where this 
would have been required if such client money had been received by 
the firm otherwise than through its appointed representatives, tied 
agents, field representatives or other agents (see CASS 7.13.6 R and 
CASS 7.13.7 G); or 
(2) if it is received in the form of a cheque or other payable order: 
(a) paid into a client bank account of the firm promptly and, in any 
event, no later than the next business day after receipt; or 
(b) forwarded to the firm or, in the case of a field representative, 
forwarded to a specified business address of the firm, to ensure that 
the money arrives at the specified business address promptly and, in 
any event, no later than the close of the third business day. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
535.   7.13.35G 
Under CASS 7.13.34 R (2)(b), client money received on business day 
one should be forwarded to the firm or specified business address of 
the firm promptly and, in any event, no later than the next business 
day after receipt (business day two) in order for it to reach that firm or 
specified business address by the close of the third business day. 
Procedures requiring the client money in the form of a cheque to be 
sent to the firm or the specified business address of the firm by first 
class post and, in any event, no later than the next business day after 
receipt, would fulfil CASS 7.13.34 R (2)(b). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules. 
536.   Allocation of client money receipts 
7.13.36R 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
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(1) A firm must allocate any client money it receives to an individual 
client promptly and, in any case, no later than ten business days 
following the receipt (or where subsequent to the receipt of money it 
has identified that the money, or part of it, is client money under 
CASS 7.13.37 R, no later than ten business days following that 
identification). 
(2) Pending a firm's allocation of a client money receipt to an 
individual client under (1), it must record the received client money in 
its books and records as "unallocated client money". 
 
537.   7.13.37R 
If a firm receives money (either in a client bank account or an account 
of its own) which it is unable to immediately identify as client money 
or its own money, it must: 
 
(1) take all necessary steps to identify the money as either client 
money or its own money; 
(2) if it considers it reasonably prudent to do so, given the risk that 
client money may not be adequately protected if it is not treated as 
such, treat the entire balance of money as client money and record the 
money in its books and records as "unidentified client money" while it 
performs the necessary steps under (1). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
538.   7.13.38G 
If a firm is unable to identify money that it has received as either 
client money or its own money under CASS 7.13.37 R, it should 
consider whether it would be appropriate to return the money to the 
person who sent it or to the source from where it was received (for 
example, the banking institution). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
539.   Money due to a client from a firm 
7.13.38AR 
CASS 7.13.39R and CASS 7.13.40G do not apply to a firm following 
a primary pooling event. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
540.   7.13.38BG 
CASS 7A.2.10AR and CASS 7A.2.10BG (Money due to a client from 
a firm after a primary pooling event) apply to a firm following a 
primary pooling event in respect of money due to a client from a firm. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
541.   7.13.39R 
Pursuant to the client money segregation requirements, a firm that is 
operating the normal approach and is liable to pay money to a client 
must promptly, and in any event no later than one business day after 
the money is due and payable, pay the money: 
 
(1) to, or to the order of, the client; or 
(2) into a client bank account. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
542.   7.13.40G 
Where the firm has payment instructions from the client the firm 
should pay the money to the order of the client, rather than into a 
client bank account. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all rules save that UK rules are more 
prescriptive. 
543.   Prudent segregation 
7.13.40AR 
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), CASS 7.13.41R to CASS 7.13.49R do 
not apply to a firm following a primary pooling event. 
(2) If, at the time of a primary pooling event, a firm has retained 
money in a client bank account for the purposes of CASS 7.13.41R, 
that money remains client money for the purposes of the client money 
rules and the client money distribution and transfer rules. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
544.   7.13.41R 
If it is prudent to do so to prevent a shortfall in client money on the 
occurrence of a primary pooling event, a firm may pay money of its 
own into a client bank account and subsequently retain that money in 
the client bank account (prudent segregation). Money that the firm 
retains in a client bank account under this rule is client money for the 
purposes of the client money rules and the client money distribution 
and transfer rules. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
545.   7.13.42G 
A firm must make and retain an up-to-date record of all payments 
made under CASS 7.13.41 R. (See further CASS 7.13.50 R to CASS 
7.13.53 R: the prudent segregation record.) 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
546.   7.13.43R    UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
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If a firm intends to pays its own money into a client bank account 
under CASS 7.13.41 R it must establish a written policy that is 
approved by its governing body (and retain such policy for a period of 
at least five years after the date it ceases to retain such money in a 
client bank account under CASS 7.13.41 R) detailing: 
 
(1) the specific anticipated risks in relation to which it would be 
prudent for the firm to make such payments into a client bank 
account; 
(2) why the firm considers that the use of such a payment is a 
reasonable means of protecting client money against each of the risks 
set out in the policy; and 
(3) the method that the firm will use to calculate the amount required 
to address each risk set out in the policy. 
 
547.   7.13.44R 
The firm may amend its written policy to reflect changes in the 
specific anticipated risks in relation to which it would be prudent for 
the firm to make payments into a client bank account under CASS 
7.13.41 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
548.   7.13.45R 
The firm's written policy must not conflict with the client money rules 
or the client money distribution and transfer rules. If there is a 
conflict, the client money rules and the client money distribution and 
transfer rules will prevail. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
549.   7.13.46G 
In the event the firm faces a risk not contemplated under its current 
policy it will not be prevented from prudently segregating money as 
client money in accordance with these rules but the policy must be 
created or amended, as applicable, as soon as reasonably practicable. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
550.   7.13.47G 
Examples of the types of risks that a firm may wish to provide 
protection for under CASS 7.13.41 R include systems failures and 
business that is conducted on non-business days where the firm would 
be unable to pay any anticipated shortfall into its client bank accounts. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
551.   7.13.48R 
To the extent that the firm no longer considers it prudent to retain 
money in its client bank account pursuant to CASS 7.13.41 R in order 
to ensure that client money is protected, the firm may cease to treat 
that money as client money. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
552.   7.13.49R 
Any money that the firm ceases to treat as client money pursuant to 
CASS 7.13.48 R must be withdrawn from its client bank account as 
an excess under CASS 7.15.29 R as part of its next reconciliation. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
553.   Prudent segregation record 
7.13.49AR 
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), CASS 7.13.50R to CASS 7.13.52G do 
not apply to a firm following a primary pooling event. 
(2) Where a firm holds a prudent segregation record under CASS 
7.13.53R following a primary pooling event, the prudent segregation 
record must continue to satisfy the requirements set out in CASS 
7.13.51R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
554.   7.13.50R 
A firm must create and keep up-to-date records so that the amount of 
money paid into client bank accounts and retained as client money 
pursuant to CASS 7.13.41 R or withdrawn pursuant to CASS 7.13.49 
R, and the reasons for such payment, retention and withdrawal can be 
easily ascertained (the prudent segregation record). 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
555.   7.13.51R 
The prudent segregation record must record: 
 
(1) the outcome of the firm's calculation of its prudent segregation; 
(2) the amounts paid into or withdrawn from a client bank account 
pursuant to CASS 7.13.41 R or CASS 7.13.49 R; 
(3) why each payment or withdrawal is made; 
(4) in respect of the firm's written policy required by CASS 7.13.43 R 
the firm must record, as applicable, either: 
(a) that the payment or withdrawal is made in accordance with that 
policy; or 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
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(b) that the policy will be created or amended to include the reasons 
for this payment or withdrawal; 
(5) that the money was paid by the firm in accordance with CASS 
7.13.41 R or withdrawn by the firm in accordance with CASS 7.13.49 
R; and 
(6) the up-to-date total amount of client money held pursuant to 
CASS 7.13.41 R. 
 
556.   7.13.52G 
Firms are reminded that payments and records made in accordance 
with CASS 7.13.51 R should not be used as a substitute for a firm 
keeping accurate and timely records in accordance with CASS 7.15 
(Records, accounts and reconciliations) and requirements under SYSC 
4.1.1 R (General requirements) and SYSC 6.1.1 R (Compliance). 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
557.   7.13.53R 
The prudent segregation record must be retained for five years after 
the firm ceases to retain money as client money pursuant to CASS 
7.13.41 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
558.   The alternative approach to client money segregation 
7.13.53AR 
(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), CASS 7.13.59R, CASS 
7.13.62R(3), CASS 7.13.62R(4) and CASS 7.13.63R to CASS 
7.13.67R do not apply to a firm following its failure. 
(2) If, at the time of a primary pooling event, a firm has retained 
money in a client bank account for the purposes of alternative 
approach mandatory prudent segregation under CASS 7.13.65R, that 
money remains client money for the purposes of the client money 
rules and the client money distribution and transfer rules. 
(3) Where a firm holds an alternative approach mandatory prudent 
segregation record under CASS 7.13.68R following a primary pooling 
event, the alternative approach mandatory prudent segregation record 
must continue to satisfy the requirements set out in CASS 7.13.67R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
559.   7.13.54G 
(1) In certain circumstances, use of the normal approach for a 
particular business line of a firm could lead to significant operational 
risks to client money protection. These may include a business line 
under which clients' transactions are complex, numerous, closely 
related to the firm's proprietary business and/or involve a number of 
currencies and time zones. In such circumstances, subject to meeting 
the relevant criteria and fulfilling the relevant notification and audit 
requirements, a firm may use the alternative approach to segregating 
client money for that business line. 
(2) Under the alternative approach, client money is received into and 
paid out of a firm's own bank account. A firm that adopts the 
alternative approach to segregating client money should (in line with 
CASS 7.15.16 R (2)) carry out an internal client money reconciliation 
on each business day ('T0') and calculate how much money it either 
needs to withdraw from, or place in from its own bank account or its 
client bank account as a result of any discrepancy arising between its 
client money requirement and its client money resource as at the close 
of business on the previous business day ('T-1'). 
(3) The alternative approach mandatory prudent segregation required 
under CASS 7.13.65 R is designed to address the risks that: 
(a) client money in a firm's own bank account may not be available to 
be pooled for distribution to clients on the occurrence of a primary 
pooling event; and 
(b) at the time of a primary pooling event the firm may not have 
segregated in its client bank account a sufficient amount of client 
money to meet its client money requirement. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
560.   7.13.55R 
A firm that wishes to adopt the alternative approach for a particular 
business line must first establish, and document in writing, its reasons 
for concluding, that: 
 
(1) adopting the normal approach would lead to greater operational 
risks to client money protection compared to the alternative approach; 
(2) adopting the alternative approach (including complying with the 
requirements for alternative approach mandatory prudent segregation 
under CASS 7.13.65 R), would not result in undue operational risk to 
client money protection; and 
(3) the firm has systems and controls that are adequate to enable it to 
operate the alternative approach effectively and in compliance with 
Principle 10 (Clients' assets). 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
561.   7.13.56R    UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
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A firm must retain any documents created under CASS 7.13.55 R in 
relation to a particular business line for a period of at least five years 
after the date it ceases to use the alternative approach in connection 
with that business line. 
 
562.   7.13.57R 
At least three months before adopting the alternative approach for a 
particular business line, a firm must: 
 
(1) inform the FCA in writing that it intends to adopt the alternative 
approach for that particular business line; and 
(2) if requested by the FCA, make any documents it created under 
CASS 7.13.55 R available to the FCA for inspection. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
563.   7.13.58R 
(1) In addition to the requirement under CASS 7.13.57 R, before 
adopting the alternative approach, a firm must send a written report to 
the FCA prepared by an independent auditor of the firm in line with a 
reasonable assurance engagement, stating the matters set out in (2). 
(2) The written report in (1) must state whether, in the auditor's 
opinion: 
(a) the firm's systems and controls are suitably designed to enable it to 
comply with CASS 7.13.62 R to CASS 7.13.65 R; and 
(b) the firm's calculation of its alternative approach mandatory 
prudent segregation amount under CASS 7.13.65 R is suitably 
designed to enable the firm to comply with CASS 7.13.65 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
564.   7.13.59R 
(1) A firm that uses the alternative approach must review, at least on 
an annual basis and with no more than one year between each review, 
whether its reasons for adopting the alternative approach for a 
particular business line, as documented under CASS 7.13.55 R, 
continue to be valid. 
(2) If, following the review in (1), a firm finds that its reasons for 
adopting the alternative approach are no longer valid for a particular 
business line, it must stop using the alternative approach for that 
business line as soon as reasonably practicable, and in any event 
within six months of the conclusion of its review in (1). 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
565.   7.13.60R 
A firm that uses the alternative approach must not materially change 
how it will calculate and maintain the alternative approach mandatory 
prudent segregation amount under CASS 7.13.65 R unless: 
 
(1) an auditor of the firm has prepared a report that complies with the 
requirements in CASS 7.13.58 R (2)(b) in respect of the firm's 
proposed changes; and 
(2) the firm provides a copy of the report prepared by the auditor 
under (a) to the FCA before implementing the change. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
566.   7.13.61G 
A firm is reminded that, under SUP 3.4.2 R, it must take reasonable 
steps to ensure that its auditor has the required skill, resources and 
experience to perform its function. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
567.   7.13.62R 
A firm that uses the alternative approach for a particular business line 
must, on each business day ('T0'): 
 
(1) receive any money from and pay any money to (or, in either case, 
on behalf of) clients into and out of its own bank accounts; 
(2) perform the necessary reconciliations of records and accounts 
required under CASS 7.15 (Records, accounts and reconciliations); 
(3) adjust the balances held in its client bank account (by effecting 
transfers between its own bank account and its client bank account) to 
address any difference arising between its client money requirement 
and its client money resource as at the close of business on the 
previous business day ('T-1'), so that the correct amount reflected in 
the reconciliations under (2) is segregated in its client bank account; 
and 
(4) subject to CASS 7.13.63R below, keep segregated in its client 
bank account the balance held under (3) until it has performed a 
reconciliation on the following business day ('T+1') and as a result of 
that reconciliation is undertaking further adjustments under (3). 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
568.   7.13.63R 
During the period between the adjustment in CASS 7.13.62 R (3) and 
the completion of the next reconciliations in CASS 7.13.62 R (2), a 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
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firm that uses the alternative approach for a particular business line 
may: 
 
(1) increase the balance held in its client bank account by making 
intra-day transfers (during T0) from its own bank account to its client 
bank account before the completion of the internal client money 
reconciliation under CASS 7.13.62 R (2) (that is expected sometime 
later on T0) only if: 
(a) the firm reasonably expects that the client money requirement for 
the previous business day (T-1) will increase above the client money 
resource currently (during T0) held in its client bank account; and 
(b) such reasonable expectations are based on the working calculation 
of the client money requirement relating to the previous business day 
(T-1) that the firm has already determined on that business day 
(during T0) (as part of the process of completing its internal client 
money reconciliation); or 
(2) decrease the balance held in its client bank account by making 
intra-day transfers (during T0) from its client bank account to its own 
bank account before the completion of the internal client money 
reconciliation under CASS 7.13.62 R (2) (that is expected sometime 
later on T0) only if: 
(a) the firm reasonably expects that the client money requirement for 
the previous business day (T-1) will decrease below the client money 
resource currently held (during T0) in its client bank account; and 
(b) such reasonable expectations are based on the working calculation 
of the client money requirement relating to the previous business day 
(T-1) that the firm has already determined on that business day 
(during T0) (as part of the process of completing its internal client 
money reconciliation). 
However, in doing so, a firm must act prudently and should take 
appropriate steps to manage the risk of not having segregated an 
amount that appropriately reflects its actual client money requirement 
at any given time. 
 
569.   7.13.64G 
It is anticipated that CASS 7.13.63 R may be used by firms which 
maintain client bank accounts in a number of different time zones and 
making adjustments to the balances of those client bank accounts is 
dependent on meeting cut off times for money transfers in those time 
zones. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
570.   7.13.65R 
(1) A firm that uses the alternative approach must, in addition to 
CASS 7.13.62 R, pay an amount (determined in accordance with this 
rule) of its own money into its client bank account and subsequently 
retain that money in its client bank account (alternative approach 
mandatory prudent segregation). The amount segregated by a firm in 
its client bank account under this rule is client money for the purposes 
of the client money rules and the client money distribution and 
transfer rules. 
(2) The amount required to be segregated under this rule must be an 
amount that a firm reasonably determines would be sufficient, at the 
time it makes the determination, to protect client money against the 
risk that at any time in the following three months the following 
categories of client money may not have been fully segregated in its 
client bank account or may not be (or become) available for pooling 
under CASS 7A.2.4R (1), were a primary pooling event to occur: 
(a) client money that is received and held by the firm in its own bank 
account during the period between: 
(i) the firm's adjustment of client bank account balances under CASS 
7.13.62 R (3) on a particular business day; and 
(ii) the firm's subsequent adjustments under CASS 7.13.62 R (3) on 
the following business day; and 
(b) money received and held by the firm in its own bank account 
which the firm does not initially identify as part of its client money 
requirement, but which subsequently does become part of its client 
money requirement; 
with the effect that the firm's alternative approach mandatory prudent 
segregation under this rule will reduce, as far as possible, any shortfall 
that might have been produced as a result of (a) or (b) on the 
occurrence of a primary pooling event. 
 
(3) 
(a) Subject to (c), in reaching its determination under (2) of the 
amount of money that would be sufficient to address the risks referred 
to in (2) for the forthcoming three months, a firm must take into 
account the following in respect of each business line for which it 
uses the alternative approach, and for at least the previous three 
months: 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
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(i) the firm's client money requirement over the course of that prior 
period (excluding any amount that was required to be segregated 
under this rule during that prior period for the purposes of alternative 
approach mandatory prudent segregation); 
(ii) the daily adjustment payments that the firm made into its client 
bank account under CASS 7.13.62 R (3) during that prior period; and 
(iii) the amount of money received by the firm in its own bank 
account which it did not initially identify as part of its client money 
requirement, but which subsequently, and during that prior period, 
became part of its client money requirement; 
as shown in its internal records. 
(b) In reaching its determination under (2) a firm must also take into 
account, but at all times having regard to the requirement under (2), 
any impact that particular events, the seasonal nature of each relevant 
business line, or any other aspect of those business lines may have on: 
(i) the firm's client money requirement during the forthcoming three 
months for which the amount of alternative approach mandatory 
prudent segregation required under this rule is being determined; 
(ii) the daily adjustment payments that the firm is likely to make into 
its client bank account under CASS 7.13.62 R (3) in that same period; 
and 
(iii) the amount of unidentified receipts of money that the firm is 
likely to receive into its own bank account and which will 
subsequently, in that same period, become part of its client money 
requirement. 
(c) If, at the time of its determination under (2), the firm has not been 
trading for three months in a business line for which it is using the 
alternative approach, then it must use the records that are available to 
it and must also factor in reasonable forecasts, as required under (b), 
to establish a three-month reference period. 
(4) 
(a) A firm must, at regular intervals that are at least quarterly, repeat 
and complete the combined process of: 
(i) determining the amount that it is required to segregate for the 
purposes of alternative approach mandatory prudent segregation 
under (2) and (3); 
(ii) making necessary adjustments to its records to reflect any changes 
to its client money requirement (in accordance with CASS 7.16.16 R 
(3) and CASS 7.16.17 R (2)); and 
(iii) paying any additional amounts of its own money into its client 
bank account to increase the firm's alternative approach mandatory 
prudent segregation or withdrawing any excess amounts from its 
client bank account to decrease the firm's alternative approach 
mandatory prudent segregation after it has adjusted its records under 
(ii). 
(b) The combined process of (a)(i) to (iii) must take no longer than ten 
business days. 
(c) To the extent that a firm's compliance with (a)(i) and (ii) results in 
there being an excess in the firm's client bank account, the firm may 
cease to treat that money as client money. 
(5) A firm must ensure that the individual responsible for CASS 
oversight under CASS 1A.3.1 R, CASS 1A.3.1A R or CASS 1A.3.1C 
R (as appropriate) reviews the adequacy of the amount of the firm's 
alternative approach mandatory prudent segregation maintained under 
this rule at least annually. 
 
571.   7.13.66R 
A firm must create and keep up-to-date records so that any amount of 
money that is, pursuant to CASS 7.13.65 R: 
 
(1) paid into a client bank account and retained as client money; or 
(2) withdrawn from a client bank account; 
can be easily ascertained (the alternative approach mandatory prudent 
segregation record). 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
572.   7.13.67R 
The alternative approach mandatory prudent segregation record under 
CASS 7.13.66 R must record: 
 
(1) the date of the first determination under CASS 7.13.65 R (2) and 
each subsequent review undertaken under CASS 7.13.65 R (4), and 
the total amount that the firm determined was required to be 
segregated under CASS 7.13.65 R (2) as at that date; 
(2) the date of any payment of the firm's own money into a client bank 
account, or withdrawal of any excess from a client bank account 
under CASS 7.13.65 R, and for each such occasion: 
(a) the amount of the payment or withdrawal; 
(b) the fact that the money was paid or withdrawn by the firm in 
accordance with CASS 7.13.65 R; and 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
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(c) as at that date, the total amount actually segregated by the firm 
under CASS 7.13.65 R. 
 
573.   7.13.68R 
The alternative approach mandatory prudent segregation record must 
be retained for five years after the firm ceases to segregate any money 
in accordance with CASS 7.13.65 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
574.   7.13.69G 
Nothing in CASS 7.13.54 G to CASS 7.13.68 R prevents a firm from 
also making use of the prudent segregation rule in CASS 7.13.41 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
575.   Use of the normal approach in relation to certain regulated 
clearing arrangements 
7.13.70G 
CASS 7.13.72 R sets out the circumstances under which a firm, that 
would otherwise be required to comply with the requirement in CASS 
7.13.6 R to receive client money directly into a client bank account, 
must receive (or is permitted to receive) client money into its own 
bank account. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
576.   7.13.71R 
A firm that is also a clearing member that is using the normal 
approach in connection with regulated clearing arrangements must use 
reasonable endeavours to ensure it is not required under its 
arrangements with an authorised central counterparty to receive mixed 
remittances from or pay mixed remittances to the authorised central 
counterparty through a single bank account. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
577.   7.13.72R 
(1) If, notwithstanding its reasonable endeavours in accordance with 
CASS 7.13.71 R, the firm is required under its arrangements with an 
authorised central counterparty to: 
(a) receive mixed remittances from the authorised central counterparty 
into a single bank account and pay mixed remittances to the 
authorised central counterparty from that bank account; or 
(b) pay mixed remittances to the authorised central counterparty using 
a single bank account; 
then such arrangements for client money are permitted if the firm 
complies, as applicable, with (2) and CASS 7.13.73 R. 
 
(2) 
(a) In either or both of the circumstances described in (1): 
(i) the firm must pay any mixed remittances to the authorised central 
counterparty from its own bank account; and 
(ii) the firm is permitted to pay any remittances to the authorised 
central counterparty that consist only of client money from that same 
bank account. 
(aa) In the circumstances described in (1)(a), the firm is permitted to 
receive any remittances that consist only of client money from the 
authorised central counterparty into the same bank account that it uses 
under (2)(a), if it complies with (b). 
(b) Where, in the circumstances described in (1)(a), a mixed 
remittance or a remittance that consists only of client money from an 
authorised central counterparty is received into a firm's own account, 
the firm must transfer any client money element of the remittance to 
its client bank account promptly and, in any event, no later than the 
next business day after receipt. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
578.   7.13.72AR 
(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), CASS 7.13.73R to CASS 
7.13.75R do not apply to a firm following a primary pooling event. 
(2) If, at the time of a primary pooling event, a firm has retained 
money in a client bank account for the purposes of clearing 
arrangement mandatory prudent segregation under CASS 7.13.73R, 
that money remains client money for the purposes of the client money 
rules and the client money distribution and transfer rules. 
(3) Where a firm holds a clearing arrangement mandatory prudent 
segregation record under CASS 7.13.76R following a primary pooling 
event, the clearing arrangement mandatory prudent segregation record 
must continue to satisfy the requirements set out in CASS 7.13.75R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
579.   7.13.73R 
(1) Where the circumstances described in CASS 7.13.72 R (1)(a) 
apply to a firm it must pay an amount (determined in accordance with 
this rule) of its own money into its client bank account and retain that 
money in its client bank account (clearing arrangement mandatory 
prudent segregation). The amount segregated by a firm in its client 
bank account under this rule will be client money for the purposes of 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
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the client money rules and the client money distribution and transfer 
rules. 
(2) The amount required to be segregated under this rule must be an 
amount that a firm reasonably determines would be sufficient, at the 
time it makes the determination, to protect client money against the 
risk that at any time in the following three months client money 
received from the authorised central counterparty and held by the firm 
in its own bank account following receipt of these monies underCASS 
7.13.72 R (1)(a) and until their transfer in accordance with CASS 
7.13.72 R (2)(b) may not have been fully segregated in its client bank 
account or may not be (or become) available for pooling under CASS 
7A.2.4R (1), were a primary pooling event to occur with the effect 
that the firm's clearing arrangement mandatory prudent segregation 
under this rule will reduce, as far as possible, any shortfall that might 
have been produced as a result of this risk on the occurrence of a 
primary pooling event. 
(3) 
(a) Subject to (c), in reaching its determination under (2) of the 
amount of money that would be sufficient to address the risks referred 
to in (2) for the forthcoming three months, a firm must take into 
account the following for at least the previous three months: 
(i) the firm's client money requirement over the course of that prior 
period (excluding any amount that was required to be segregated 
under this rule during that prior period for the purposes of clearing 
arrangement mandatory prudent segregation); and 
(ii) the payments that the firm made into its client bank account under 
CASS 7.13.72 R (2)(b) during that prior period; 
as shown in its internal records. 
(b) In reaching its determination under (2) a firm must also take into 
account, at all times having regard to the requirement under (2), any 
impact that particular events, the seasonal nature of each relevant 
business line, or any other aspect of those business line(s) may have 
on: 
(i) the firm's client money requirement during the forthcoming three 
months for which the amount of clearing arrangement mandatory 
prudent segregation required under this rule is being determined; and 
(ii) the payments that the firm is likely to make into its client bank 
account under CASS 7.13.72 R (2)(b). 
(c) If, at the time of its determination under (2), the firm has not been 
trading for three months in a business line for which it is using the 
normal approach in connection with regulated clearing arrangements, 
then it must use the records that are available to it and must also factor 
in reasonable forecasts, as required under (b), to make up a three-
month reference period. 
(4) 
(a) A firm must, at regular intervals that are at least quarterly, repeat 
and complete the combined process of: 
(i) determining the amount that it is required to segregate for the 
purposes of clearing arrangement mandatory prudent segregation 
under (2) and (3); 
(ii) making necessary adjustments to its records to reflect any changes 
to its client money requirement in accordance with CASS 7.16.16 R 
(3) and CASS 7.16.17 R (1); and 
(iii) paying any additional amounts of its own money into its client 
bank account to increase the firm's clearing arrangement mandatory 
prudent segregation or withdrawing any excess amounts from its 
client bank account to decrease the firm's clearing arrangement 
mandatory prudent segregation after it has adjusted its records under 
(ii). 
(b) The combined process of (a)(i) to (iii) must take no longer than ten 
business days. 
(c) To the extent that a firm's compliance with (a)(i) and (ii) results in 
there being an excess in the firm's client bank account, the firm may 
cease to treat that money as client money. 
(5) A firm must ensure that the individual responsible for CASS 
oversight under CASS 1A.3.1 R, CASS 1A.3.1A R or CASS 1A.3.1C 
R (as appropriate) reviews the adequacy of the amount of the firm's 
clearing arrangement mandatory prudent segregation maintained 
under this rule at least annually. 
 
580.   Clearing arrangement mandatory prudent segregation record 
7.13.74R 
A firm must create and keep up-to-date records so that any amount of 
money that is, pursuant to CASS 7.13.73 R: 
 
(1) paid into a client bank account and retained as client money; or 
(2) withdrawn from a client bank account; 
can be easily ascertained (the clearing arrangement mandatory 
prudent segregation record). 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
  
 
 
 
  
 421  
 
 
  
 
  
 
581.   7.13.75R 
The clearing arrangement mandatory prudent segregation record 
under CASS 7.13.74 R must record: 
 
(1) the date of the first determination under CASS 7.13.73 R (2) and 
each subsequent review undertaken under CASS 7.13.73 R (4), and 
the total amount that the firm determined was required to be 
segregated under CASS 7.13.73 R (2) as at that date; 
(2) the date of any payment of the firm's own money into a client bank 
account, or withdrawal of any excess from a client bank account 
under CASS 7.13.73 R (4)(a)(iii), and for each such occasion: 
(a) the amount of the payment or withdrawal; 
(b) the fact that the money was paid or withdrawn by the firm in 
accordance with CASS 7.13.73 R; and 
(c) as at that date, the total amount actually segregated by the firm 
under CASS 7.13.73 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
582.   7.13.76R 
The clearing arrangement mandatory prudent segregation record must 
be retained for five years after the firm ceases to segregate any money 
in accordance with CASS 7.13.73 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
583.   7.13.77G 
Nothing in CASS 7.13.73 R to CASS 7.13.76 R prevents a firm from 
making use of the prudent segregation rule in CASS 7.13.41 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
584.   7.13.78G 
The obligation to use reasonable endeavours referred to in CASS 
7.13.71 R is a continuing obligation. Firms should at least on an 
annual basis, whether it is possible for payments of client money 
between the firm and the authorised central counterparties to be made 
separately from house monies and for such payments to be received 
into and made from its client bank accounts. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
585.   7.13.79G 
Where a firm operates a sub-pool in accordance with CASS 7.19 
(Clearing member client money sub-pools), the references to client 
bank accounts in CASS 7.13.70 G to CASS 7.13.78 G should be read 
as client bank accounts pertaining to the relevant sub-pool. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
586.   7.14 Client money held by a third party 
 
7.14.1G 
This section sets out the requirements a firm must comply with when 
it allows another person to hold client money, other than under CASS 
7.13.3 R, without discharging its fiduciary duty to that client. Such 
circumstances arise when, for example, a firm passes client money to 
a clearing house in the form of margin for the firm's obligations to the 
clearing house that are referable to transactions undertaken by the 
firm for the relevant clients. They may also arise when a firm passes 
client money to an intermediate broker for contingent liability 
investments in the form of initial or variation margin on behalf of a 
client. In these circumstances, the firm remains responsible for that 
client equity balance held at the intermediate broker until the contract 
is terminated and all of that client's positions at that broker closed. 
Similarly, this section applies where a firm allows a broker to hold 
client money in respect of the firm's client's non-margined 
transactions, again without the firm discharging its fiduciary duty to 
that client. In all cases, if a firm wishes to discharge itself from its 
fiduciary duty, it should do so in accordance with the rule regarding 
the discharge of a firm's fiduciary duty to the client (CASS 7.11.34 
R). 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
587.   7.14.2R 
A firm may allow another person, such as an exchange, a clearing 
house or an intermediate broker, to hold client money, but only if: 
 
(1) the firm allows that person to hold the client money: 
(a) for the purpose of one or more transactions for a client through or 
with that person; or 
(b) to meet a client's obligation to provide collateral for a transaction 
(for example, an initial margin requirement for a contingent liability 
investment); and 
(2) in the case of a retail client, that client has been notified that the 
firm may allow the other person to hold its client money. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
588.   7.14.3G    UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
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Client money that a firm allows another person to hold under CASS 
7.14.2 R: 
 
(1) should only be held for transactions which are likely to occur (and 
for which the other person needs to receive client money) or have 
recently settled (and such that the other person has received client 
money); and 
(2) should be recorded in client transaction accounts by that other 
person. 
 
589.   7.14.4G 
Apart from client money held by a firm in an individual client account 
or an omnibus client account at an authorised central counterparty, a 
firm should not hold excess client money in its client transaction 
accounts. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
590.   Client money arising from, or in connection with, safe custody 
assets 
7.14.5G 
(1) Money arising from, or in connection with, the holding of a safe 
custody assets by a firm which is due to clients should, unless treated 
otherwise under the client money rules, be treated as client money by 
the firm. 
(2) Firms are reminded of the guidance in CASS 6.1.2 G. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
591.   7.14.6R 
If a firm has deposited safe custody assets with a third party under 
CASS 6.3 and client money arises from, or in connection with, those 
safe custody assets then the firm must ensure that the third party either 
deposits the money in a client bank account of the firm or records it in 
a client transaction account for the benefit of the firm clients as 
appropriate. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
592.   7.14.7G 
Firms are reminded of the guidance in CASS 7.14.4 G which is 
applicable to client transaction accounts. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
593.   7.14.8G 
If the third party holding the safe custody assets under CASS 7.14.6 R 
is a bank with which the firm is permitted to deposit client money 
under CASS 7.13.3 R, then the client bank account referred to in 
CASS 7.14.6 R may be an account with that bank. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
594.   7.14.9G 
Firms are reminded of the requirements under CASS 7.18 for 
acknowledgement letters, which must be complied with before using 
client bank accounts and client transaction accounts. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rule. 
595.   7.15 Records, accounts and reconciliations  
 
7.15.1G 
(1) This section sets out the requirements a firm must meet when 
keeping records and accounts of the client money it holds. 
(2) Where a firm establishes one or more sub-pools, the provisions of 
CASS 7.15 (Records, accounts and reconciliations) shall be read as 
applying separately to the firm's general pool and each sub-pool in 
line with CASS 7.19.3 R and CASS 7.19.4 R. 
 
 
Internal audit requirements  
 
6. Where an internal audit function exists within an 
investment firm, or within a group of which the 
investment firm is a member, the investment firm shall 
provide the Bank, as soon as practicable, with a copy of 
any internal audit report which refers to the investment 
firm. 
 
  Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules 
596.  Article 2(1)(a) Commission Delegated 
Directive 
 
 
Member States shall require that investment firms 
comply with the following requirements: 
 
(a) 
they must keep records and accounts enabling 
them at any time and without delay to distinguish 
assets held for one client from assets held for any 
other client and from their own assets; 
 
7.15.2R 
A firm must keep such records and accounts as are necessary to 
enable it, at any time and without delay, to distinguish client money 
held for one client from client money held for any other client, and 
from its own money. 
 
[Note: article 2(1)(a) of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules 
597.  Article 2(1)(b) Commission Delegated 
Directive 
 
(b) 
they must maintain their records and accounts in a 
way that ensures their accuracy, and in particular 
7.15.3R 
A firm must maintain its records and accounts in a way that ensures 
their accuracy, and in particular their correspondence to the client 
money held for clients and that they may be used as an audit trail. 
 
[Note: article 2(1)(b) of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules 
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their correspondence to the financial instruments 
and funds held for clients and that they may be 
used as an audit trail; 
 
 
598.   7.15.4G 
(1) The requirements in CASS 7.15.2R to CASS 7.15.3R are for a 
firm to keep internal records and accounts of client money. Therefore, 
any records falling under those requirements should be maintained by 
the firm and should be separate to any records the firm may have 
obtained from any third parties, such as those with or through whom it 
may have deposited, or otherwise allowed to hold, client money. 
(2) Where a firm complies with CASS 7.15 as a whole (to the extent 
applicable to that firm) this will be sufficient to comply with the 
specific duty in CASS 7.15.3R to maintain its records and accounts in 
a way that ensures that they can be used as an audit trail. 
 
Internal audit requirements  
 
6. Where an internal audit function exists within an 
investment firm, or within a group of which the 
investment firm is a member, the investment firm shall 
provide the Bank, as soon as practicable, with a copy of 
any internal audit report which refers to the investment 
firm. 
 
  Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules 
599.   Record keeping 
7.15.5R 
(1) A firm must maintain records so that it is able to promptly 
determine the total amount of client money it should be holding for 
each of its clients. 
(2) A firm must ensure that its records are sufficient to show and 
explain its transactions and commitments for its client money. 
(3) Unless otherwise stated, a firm must ensure that any record made 
under the this chapter is retained for a period of five years starting 
from the later of: 
(a) the date it was created; and 
(b) (if it has been modified since the date it was created), the date it 
was most recently modified. 
 
Regulation 23(1) MiFID Regulations 
 
An investment firm shall arrange for records to be kept of 
all services, activities and transactions undertaken by the 
investment firm and ensure that the records are sufficient 
to enable the Bank to fulfil its supervisory tasks and take 
enforcement action under these Regulations, Regulation 
(EU) No 596/2014, Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 and the 
European Union (Market Abuse) Regulations 2016 ( S.I. 
No. 349 of 2016 ) and, in particular, to ascertain whether 
the firm has complied with all obligations including those 
with respect to clients or potential clients and to the 
integrity of the market. 
 
Para. 1(1) (a) and (b) of  Schedule 3 MiFID 
Regulations  
 
Safeguarding client financial instruments and funds 
 
1. (1) Investment firms shall— 
 
(a) keep records and accounts enabling them at any time 
and without delay to distinguish assets held for one client 
from assets held for any other client and from their own 
assets, 
 
(b) maintain their records and accounts in a way that 
ensures their accuracy, and in particular their 
correspondence to the financial instruments and funds 
held for clients and that they may be used as an audit trail, 
 
General reporting requirements for investment firms  
 
8. (1) In this Regulation “data item” means an account, 
record, report, return or other information referred to in 
column 1 of each of the Parts of the Schedule;  
 
(2) A fund administrator shall submit to the Bank all data 
items specified—  
 
(a) in Part 1 of the Schedule, and  
 
(b) on the Online Reporting System in respect of the fund 
administrator.  
 
(3) An investment business firm who is not a fund 
administrator shall submit to the Bank all data items 
specified—  
 
(a) in Part 2 of the Schedule, and  
 
(b) on the Online Reporting System in respect of the 
investment business firm.  
 
(4) A MiFID investment firm which is subject to the CRD 
Regulations and is authorised for investment service 3 or 
investment service 6 and does not apply Article 96(1) of 
the Capital Requirement Regulation shall submit to the 
Bank all data items specified—  
 
(a) in Part 3 of the Schedule, and  
 
  Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules. 
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(b) on the Online Reporting System in respect of the 
MiFID investment firm.  
 
(5) A MiFID investment firm which is subject to the CRD 
Regulations and is authorised for investment service 3 or 
investment service 6 and applies Article 96(1) of the 
Capital Requirement Regulation shall submit to the Bank 
all data items specified—  
 
(a) in Part 4 of the Schedule, and  
 
(b) on the Online Reporting System in respect of the 
MiFID investment firm.  
 
(6) A MiFID investment firm which is subject to the CRD 
Regulations but not authorised for investment service 3 or 
investment service 6 shall submit to the Bank all data 
items specified—  
 
(a) in Part 5 of the Schedule, and  
 
(b) on the Online Reporting System in respect of the 
MiFID investment firm.  
 
(7) A MiFID investment firm not subject to the CRD 
Regulations but authorised for investment service 2 or 
investment service 4 shall submit to the Bank all data 
items specified—  
 
(a) in Part 6 of the Schedule, and  
 
(b) on the Online Reporting System in respect of the 
MiFID investment firm.  
 
(8) A MiFID investment firm not subject to the CRD 
Regulations and authorised only for investment service 1 
or investment service 5, or both, shall submit to the Bank 
all data items specified–  
 
(a) in Part 7 of the Schedule, and  
 
(b) on the Online Reporting System in respect of the 
MiFID investment firm.  
 
(9) An investment firm subject to reporting requirements 
under these Regulations shall-  
 
(a) submit data items to the Bank—  
(i) through the Online Reporting System,  
(ii) in such form and manner as may be specified on the 
Online Reporting System from time to time,  
(iii) as frequently as is specified in column 2 of the 
applicable Part of the Schedule, and  
(iv) by—  
(I) the day specified in column 3 of the applicable Part of 
the Schedule, or 
(II) where the day specified in column 3 of the applicable 
Part of the Schedule is not a working day, the next 
working day, and  
 
(b) ensure that data items submitted to the Bank pursuant 
to this Regulation are— 
(i) complete, and  
(ii) in the case of an estimate or a judgement, supported by 
adequate evidence which evidence includes documents or 
information—  
(I) relied upon during the formulation of the estimate or 
judgement, and  
(II) describing the manner in which the documents or 
information referred to in subclause (I) were applied or 
relied upon when formulating the estimate or judgement. 
 
Regulation 67 IMR 2017 
 
Record-keeping — general requirements 
  
67. (1) An investment firm shall—  
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(a) keep an accurate record of each transaction on a client 
asset account in such a manner and form that:  
(i) the client for or in respect of whom the transaction was 
conducted is identified, and  
(ii) the transaction is accounted for by the investment firm 
separate from all other transactions of the investment firm;  
 
(b) keep the records required under paragraph (a) separate 
from records relating to transactions which are not related 
to the third party client asset account.  
 
(2) An investment firm shall maintain the following, in a 
readily accessible form, for a period of at least 6 years:  
 
(a) a record of the verification referred to in Regulation 
54(1);  
 
(b) every Funds Facilities Agreement and Financial 
Instruments Facilities Agreement between the investment 
firm and a third party;  
 
(c) a record of the date upon which—  
(i) the reconciliation referred to in Regulation 57(5) was 
prepared, and (ii) the daily calculation, referred to in 
Regulation 58(5) was prepared;  
 
(d) a record to evidence the review process referred to in 
Regulations 57(6) and 58(6);  
 
(e) evidence of the review referred to in Regulation 
63(2)(b);  
 
(f) a record of each reconciliation required by Regulation 
57 including— (i) the information upon which the 
reconciliation is based,  
(ii) the relevant person who carried out such 
reconciliation, and  
(iii) the relevant person who reviewed such reconciliation;  
 
(g) a record of each daily calculation required by 
Regulation 58 including— (i) the information upon which 
the daily calculation is based,  
(ii) the relevant person who carried out such daily 
calculation, and  
(iii) the relevant person who reviewed such daily 
calculation;  
 
(h) a record of the client asset management plan review 
referred to in Regulation 64(2);  
(i) all records required to demonstrate compliance with 
this Part.  
 
(3) Where under or in relation to this Part, an investment 
firm holds or another party holds a record on behalf of an 
investment firm electronically, the investment firm shall 
ensure that it can produce these records without delay. 
 
 
Regulation 12 IMR 2017 
 
Books, records, financial control and management 
information  
 
12. (1) An investment business firm shall maintain the 
following, in a readily accessible form, for a period of at 
least 6 years:  
 
(a) a full record of each transaction entered into by it 
whether on its own behalf or on behalf of clients;  
 
(b) a complete written record of all investment advice, 
including oral advice, given to clients;  
 
(c) all records required to demonstrate compliance with 
these Regulations;  
 
(d) details of all money received and expended by the 
investment business firm whether on its own behalf or on 
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behalf of clients, together with details of how such 
receipts and payments arose;  
 
(e) a record of all assets and liabilities of the investment 
business firm including long and short positions, off-
balance sheet items and any commitments or contingent 
liabilities;  
 
(f) a record of all investment instruments or documents of 
title held by the investment business firm setting out—  
(i) the physical or electronic location,  
(ii) the beneficial owner, (iii) the purpose for which they 
are held, and  
(iv) whether they are subject to any charge;   
 
(g) records that are adequate for the purposes of financial 
control and management information and which are 
maintained in such a manner which discloses or is capable 
of disclosing the financial and business information which 
will enable the investment business firm’s senior 
management to—  
(i) identify, quantify, control and manage the risk 
exposures,  
(ii) make timely and informed decisions,  
(iii) monitor the performance of all aspects of the 
business,  
(iv) monitor the asset quality, and  
(v) safeguard the assets of the investment business firm, 
including any client assets and investor money;  
 
(h) the records referred to in Regulations 44 to 46.  
 
(2) An investment business firm shall have adequate 
procedures for the maintenance, security, privacy and 
preservation of records, working papers and documents of 
title held by the investment business firm, including the 
documents referred to in paragraph (1), so that they are 
reasonably safeguarded against loss, unauthorised access, 
alteration or destruction.  
 
(3) Where an investment business firm contracts all or part 
of its recordkeeping activities to another person, it shall 
only do so in accordance with the provisions of a written 
agreement entered into with that other person. 
 
 
600.   7.15.6G 
Unless required sooner under another rule in this chapter, in 
complying with CASS 7.15.5 R (1) a firm should ensure it is able to 
determine the total amount of client money it should be holding for 
each client within two business days of having taken a decision to do 
so or at the request of the FCA. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules. 
601.   7.15.7R 
For each internal client money reconciliation and external client 
money reconciliation the firm conducts, it must ensure that it records: 
 
(1) the date it carried out the relevant process; 
(2) the actions the firm took in carrying out the relevant process; and 
(3) the outcome of its calculation of its client money requirement and 
client money resource. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules. 
602.   Policies and procedures 
7.15.8G 
Firms are reminded that they must, under SYSC 6.1.1 R, establish, 
implement and maintain adequate policies and procedures sufficient 
to ensure compliance of the firm with the rules under this chapter. 
This should include, for example, establishing and maintaining 
policies and procedures concerning: 
 
(1) the frequency and method of the reconciliations the firm is 
required to carry out under this section; 
(2) the resolution of reconciliation discrepancies under this section; 
and 
(3) the frequency at which the firm is required to review its 
arrangements in compliance with this chapter. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules. 
603.   Receipts of client money 
7.15.9R 
 1.2  
 
 Irish rules diverge conceptually from EU and UK rules in being more 
prescriptive. 
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A firm must maintain appropriate records that account for all receipts 
of client money in the form of cash, cheque or other payable order 
that are not yet deposited in a client bank account (see CASS 7.13.32 
R and CASS 7.13.33 R). 
 
Examples of circumstances in which money is investor 
money  
 
(i) Cheques, electronic transfers and other payable 
orders Cheques and other payable orders received from 
investors will be investor money from the time of 
receipt of the cheque or other payable order by the fund 
service provider. Money sent to an investor by way of, 
cheque, electronic transfers or other payable order does 
not cease to be investor money until the cheque, 
electronic transfers or other payable order is presented 
and paid by the third party (as defined in Part 7). 
 
604.   7.15.10G 
Firms following one of the standard methods of internal client money 
reconciliation in CASS 7.16 are also reminded that they must, as part 
of their internal client money reconciliation, take into account all 
receipts of client money in the form of cash, cheque or other payable 
order that are not yet deposited in a client bank account (see CASS 
7.13.32 R and CASS 7.13.33 R). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules. 
605.   Payments made to discharge fiduciary duty 
7.15.11R01/06/2015 
RP 
If a firm draws a cheque, or other payable order, to discharge its 
fiduciary duty to its clients (see CASS 7.11.40 R), it must continue to 
record its obligation to its clients until the cheque, or other payable 
order, is presented and paid by the bank. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules. 
606.   Internal client money reconciliations 
7.15.12R 
An internal client money reconciliation requires a firm to carry out a 
reconciliation of its internal records and accounts of the amount of 
client money that the firm holds for each client with its internal 
records and accounts of the client money the firm should hold in 
client bank accounts or has placed in client transaction accounts. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
607.   7.15.13R 
In carrying out an internal client money reconciliation, a firm must 
use the values contained in its internal records and ledgers (for 
example, its cash book or other internal accounting records) rather 
than the values contained in the records it has obtained from banks 
and other third parties with whom it has placed client money (for 
example, bank statements). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
608.   7.15.14G 
An internal client money reconciliation should: 
 
(1) be one of the steps a firm takes to arrange adequate protection for 
clients' assets when the firm is responsible for them (see Principle 10 
(Clients' assets), as it relates to client money); 
(2) be one of the steps a firm takes to satisfy its obligations under 
CASS 7.12.2 R and CASS 7.15.3 R and, where relevant, SYSC 
4.1.1R (1) and SYSC 6.1.1 R, to ensure the accuracy of the firm's 
records and accounts; 
(3) for the normal approach to segregating client money (CASS 7.13.6 
R), check whether the amount of client money recorded in the firm's 
records as being segregated in client bank accounts meets the firm's 
obligations to its clients under the client money rules on a daily basis; 
and 
(4) for the alternative approach to segregating client money (CASS 
7.13.62 R), calculate the amount of client money to be segregated in 
client bank accounts which meets the firm's obligations to its clients 
under the client money rules on a daily basis. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
609.   7.15.15R 
(1) Subject to paragraph (4), a firm must perform an internal client 
money reconciliation: 
(a) each business day; and 
(b) based on the records of the firm as at the close of business on the 
previous business day. 
(2) When performing an internal client money reconciliation, a firm 
must, subject to (3), follow one of the standard methods of internal 
client money reconciliation in CASS 7.16. 
(3) A firm proposing to follow a non-standard method of internal 
client money reconciliation must comply with the requirements in 
CASS 7.15.17 R to CASS 7.15.19 G. 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
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(4) Following a primary pooling event, and in addition to any 
obligations of a special administrator under regulation 10H of the 
IBSA Regulations: 
(a) a firm must perform an internal client money reconciliation that 
relates to the time of the primary pooling event as soon as reasonably 
practicable after the primary pooling event; and 
(b) the firm must perform further internal client money reconciliations 
as regularly as required under paragraph (5), based on the records of 
the firm as at the close of business on the business day before the day 
on which the reconciliation takes place. 
(5) A firm must determine when and how often to perform an internal 
client money reconciliation under paragraph (4)(b) so as to ensure 
that: 
(a) the firm remains in compliance with CASS 7.15.2R, CASS 
7.15.3R and CASS 7.15.5R(1) and (2) (Record keeping); and 
(b) the correct amounts of client money are returned to clients or 
transferred on behalf of clients under the client money distribution 
and transfer rules. 
 
610.   7.15.15AG 
(1) The reference point for the internal client money reconciliation 
under CASS 7.15.15R(4)(a) should be the precise point in time at 
which the primary pooling event occurred. 
(2) When a firm decides whether it is necessary at any particular point 
in time to perform an internal client money reconciliation under 
CASS 7.15.15R(4)(b), it should have particular regard to the need to 
maintain its books and accounts in order to ensure that: 
(a) each notional pool of client money formed under CASS 
7A.2.4R(1) and (1A) (Pooling and distribution or transfer) is correctly 
composed and maintained, and is treated separately; 
(b) client money that is required under CASS 7A.2.4R(3) (Pooling 
and distribution or transfer) and CASS 7A.2.7-AR (Client money 
received after a primary pooling event) to be treated as outside of any 
notional pool is treated accordingly; and 
(c) where applicable, clients’ entitlements to their client money are 
calculated in accordance with CASS 7A.2.5R(-2)(b) (Client money 
entitlements). 
(4) Depending on the circumstances of the firm and the scale, 
frequency and nature of activity after a primary pooling event that 
affects client money, a firm may conclude that it is necessary to 
continue performing internal client money reconciliations each 
business day for a period of time after the primary pooling event. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
611.   7.15.16R 
(1) A firm which has adopted the normal approach to segregating 
client money (see CASS 7.13.6 R) must use the internal client money 
reconciliation to check whether its client money resource, as at the 
close of business on the previous business day, was equal to its client 
money requirement at the close of business on that previous day. 
(2) A firm that adopts the alternative approach to segregating client 
money (see CASS 7.13.54 G) must use the internal client money 
reconciliation to ensure that its client money resource as at the close 
of business on any day it carries out an internal client money 
reconciliation is equal to its client money requirement at the close of 
business on the previous day. 
Non-standard method of internal client money reconciliation 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
612.   7.15.17R 
A non-standard method of internal client money reconciliation is a 
method of internal client money reconciliation which does not meet 
the requirements in CASS 7.16 (The standard methods of internal 
client money reconciliation). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
613.   7.15.18R 
(1) Before using a non-standard method of internal client money 
reconciliation, a firm must: 
(a) establish and document in writing its reasons for concluding that 
the method of internal client money reconciliation it proposes to use 
will: 
(i) (for the normal approach to segregating client money) check 
whether the amount of client money recorded in the firm's records as 
being segregated in client bank accounts meets the firm's obligation to 
its clients under the client money rules on a daily basis; or 
(ii) (for the alternative approach to segregating client money) 
calculate the amount of client money to be segregated in client bank 
accounts which meets the firm's obligations to its clients under the 
client money rules on a daily basis; 
(b) notify the FCA of its intentions to use a non-standard method of 
internal client money reconciliation; and 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
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(c) send a written report to the FCA prepared by an independent 
auditor of the firm in line with a reasonable assurance engagement 
and stating the matters set out in (2). 
(2) The written report in (1)(c) must state whether in the auditor's 
opinion: 
(a) the method of internal client money reconciliation which the firm 
will use is suitably designed to enable it to (as applicable): 
(i) (for the normal approach to segregating client money) check 
whether the amount of client money recorded in the firm's records as 
being segregated in client bank accounts meets the firm's obligation to 
its clients under the client money rules on a daily basis; or 
(ii) (for the alternative approach to segregating client money) 
calculate the amount of client money to be segregated in client bank 
accounts which meets the firm's obligations to its clients under the 
client money rules on a daily basis; and 
(b) the firm's systems and controls are suitably designed to enable it to 
carry out the method of internal client money reconciliation the firm 
will use. 
(3) A firm using a non-standard method of internal client money 
reconciliation must not materially change its method of undertaking 
internal client money reconciliations unless: 
(a) the firm has established and documented in writing it reasons for 
concluding that the changed methodology will meet the requirements 
in (1)(a)(i) and (ii), as applicable; 
(b) an auditor of the firm has prepared a report that complies with the 
requirements in (1)(c) and (2) in respect of the firm's proposed 
changes; and 
(c) the firm provides a copy of the report prepared by the auditor 
under (2) to the FCA before implementing the change. 
 
614.   7.15.19G 
A firm is reminded that, under SUP 3.4.2 R, it must take reasonable 
steps to ensure that its auditor has the required skill, resources and 
experience to perform its function. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
615.  Article 2(1)(c) Commission  Delegated 
Regulation 
 
Member States shall require investment firms 
comply with the following requirements:  
(c)  
they must conduct, on a regular basis, 
reconciliations between their internal accounts 
and records and those of any third parties by 
whom those assets are held; 
 
External client money reconciliations 
7.15.20R 
A firm must conduct, on a regular basis, reconciliations between its 
internal records and accounts and those of any third parties which 
hold client money. 
 
[Note: article 2(1)(c) of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
616.   7.15.21G 
The purpose of an external client money reconciliation is to ensure the 
accuracy of a firm's internal records and accounts against those of any 
third parties by whom client money is held. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
617.   Frequency of external client money reconciliations 
7.15.21AR 
CASS 7.15.22R to 7.15.26R do not apply to a firm following a 
primary pooling event. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
618.   7.15.21BG 
CASS 7.15.26AR applies to a firm following a primary pooling event. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
619.   7.15.22R 
A firm must perform an external client money reconciliation: 
 
(1) as regularly as is necessary but without allowing more than one 
month to pass between each external client money reconciliation; and 
(2) as soon as reasonably practicable after the date to which the 
external client money reconciliation relates. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
620.   7.15.23R 
When determining the frequency at which it will undertake external 
client money reconciliations, a firm must have regard to: 
 
(1) the frequency, number and value of transactions which the firm 
undertakes in respect of client money; and 
(2) the risks to which the client money is exposed, such as the nature, 
volume and complexity of the firm's business and where and with 
whom client money is held. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
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621.   7.15.24R 
(1) A firm must make and retain records sufficient to show and 
explain any decision it has taken under CASS 7.15.23 R when 
determining the frequency of its external client money reconciliation. 
Subject to (2), any such records must be retained indefinitely. 
(2) If any decision under CASS 7.15.23 R is superseded by a 
subsequent decision under that rule then the record of that earlier 
decision retained in accordance with (1) need only be retained for a 
further period of five years from the subsequent decision. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
622.   7.15.25G 
In most circumstances, firms which undertake transactions on a daily 
basis should conduct an external client money reconciliation each 
business day. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
623.   7.15.26R 
(1) Subject to (3), a firm must review the frequency it conducts its 
external client money reconciliations at least annually to ensure that it 
continues to comply with CASS 7.15.22 R and has given due 
consideration to the matters in CASS 7.15.23 R. 
(2) For each review a firm undertakes under (1), it must record the 
date and the actions it took in reviewing the frequency of its external 
client money reconciliations. 
(3) A firm need not carry out a review under (1) if it is conducting 
external client money reconciliations each business day. 
Frequency of external reconciliations after a primary pooling event 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
624.   7.15.26AR 
Following a primary pooling event, and in addition to any obligations 
of a special administrator under regulation 10H of the IBSA 
Regulations: 
 
(1) a firm must perform an external client money reconciliation that 
relates to the time of the primary pooling event as soon as reasonably 
practicable after the primary pooling event, based on the next 
available statements or other form of confirmation after the primary 
pooling event from: 
(a) the banks with which the firm holds a client bank account; and 
(b) the persons with which the firm holds a client transaction account; 
and 
(2) the firm must perform further external client money 
reconciliations on a regular basis: 
(a) with a suitable frequency to ensure that the correct amounts of 
client money are returned to clients or transferred on behalf of clients 
under the client money distribution and transfer rules; and 
(b) as soon as reasonably practicable after the date to which the 
external client money reconciliation relates. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
625.   7.15.26BG 
The reference point for the external client money reconciliation under 
CASS 7.15.26AR(1) should be the precise point in time at which the 
primary pooling event occurred. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
626.   7.15.26CR 
When determining the frequency with which it will undertake external 
client money reconciliations under CASS 7.15.26AR(2) after a 
primary pooling event, a firm must have regard to: 
 
(1) the frequency, number and value of transactions which the firm 
undertakes in respect of client money; 
(2) the risks to which the client money is exposed, such as the nature, 
volume and complexity of the firm’s business and where and with 
whom client money is held; and 
(3) the need to be able to verify that: 
(a) client money within each notional pool formed under CASS 
7A.2.4R(1) and (1A) (Pooling and distribution or transfer), and client 
money that is required under CASS 7A.2.4R(3) (Pooling and 
distribution or transfer) and CASS 7A.2.7-AR (Client money received 
after a primary pooling event) to be treated as outside of any notional 
pool, has not been incorrectly distributed, transferred or dissipated; 
and 
(b) the proceeds of any payments and transactions that settle after the 
primary pooling event and which involve client money, including 
interest payments and other amounts included in the client money 
resource, have been received correctly. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
627.   Method of external client money reconciliations 
7.15.27R 
An external client money reconciliation requires a firm to: 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
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(1) compare: 
(a) the balance, currency by currency, on each client bank account 
recorded by the firm, as set out in the most recent statement or other 
form of confirmation issued by the bank with which those accounts 
are held; and 
(b) the balance, currency by currency, on each client transaction 
account as recorded by the firm, as set out in the most recent 
statement or other form of confirmation issued by the person with 
whom the account is held; and 
(2) promptly identify and resolve any discrepancies between those 
balances under CASS 7.15.31 R and CASS 7.15.32 R. 
 
628.   7.15.28R 
A firm must ensure it includes the following items within its external 
client money reconciliation: 
 
(1) any client's approved collateral a firm holds which secures an 
individual negative client equity balance (see CASS 7.16.32 R); and 
(2) any of its own approved collateral a firm holds which is used to 
meet the total margin transaction requirement in CASS 7.16.33 R. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
629.   Reconciliation discrepancies 
7.15.29R 
When a discrepancy arises between a firm's client money resource and 
its client money requirement identified by a firm's internal client 
money reconciliations, the firm must determine the reason for the 
discrepancy and, subject to CASS 7.15.29AR, ensure that: 
 
(1) any shortfall is paid into a client bank account by the close of 
business on the day that the reconciliation is performed; or 
(2) any excess is withdrawn from a client bank account within the 
same time period. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
630.   7.15.29AR 
A firm that has failed is not required to make a payment or 
withdrawal under CASS 7.15.29R(1) or CASS 7.15.29R(2) 
respectively in so far as the legal procedure for the firm’s failure 
restricts the firm from doing so. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
631.   7.15.30G 
Where the discrepancy identified under CASS 7.15.29 R has arisen as 
a result of a breach of the client money segregation requirements, the 
firm should ensure it takes sufficient steps to avoid a reoccurrence of 
that breach (see Principle 10 (Clients' assets), as it relates to client 
money, CASS 7.15.3 R and, where relevant, SYSC 4.1.1R (1) and 
SYSC 6.1.1 R). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
632.   7.15.31R 
If any discrepancy is identified by an external client money 
reconciliation, the firm must investigate the reason for the discrepancy 
and take all reasonable steps to resolve it without undue delay, unless 
the discrepancy arises solely as a result of timing differences between 
the accounting systems of the party providing the statement or 
confirmation and that of the firm. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
633.   7.15.32R 
While a firm is unable to immediately resolve a discrepancy identified 
by an external client money reconciliation, and one record or set of 
records examined by the firm during its external client money 
reconciliation indicates that there is a need to have a greater amount 
of client money or, if appropriate, approved collateral than is the case, 
the firm must assume, until the matter is finally resolved, that that 
record or set of records is accurate and, subject to CASS 7.15.32AR, 
pay its own money into a relevant account. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
634.   7.15.32AR 
A firm that has failed is not required to pay its own money into a 
relevant account under CASS 7.15.32R in so far as the legal 
procedure for the firm’s failure restricts the firm from doing so. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
635.   7.15.32BG 
(1) CASS 7.15.29AR and CASS 7.15.32AR recognise that a failed 
firm is required to investigate discrepancies, but the extent to which it 
is able to resolve discrepancies may be limited by insolvency law, for 
example. 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
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(2) CASS 7.15.29AR and CASS 7.15.32AR would not prevent a 
failed firm from making any transfers required under regulation 
10H(3) or (4) of the IBSA Regulations. 
 
636.   Notification requirements 
7.15.33R 
A firm must inform the FCA in writing without delay if: 
 
(1) its internal records and accounts of client money are materially out 
of date, inaccurate or invalid so that the firm is no longer able to 
comply with the requirements in CASS 7.15.2 R, CASS 7.15.3 R or 
CASS 7.15.5 R (1); 
(2) it will be unable to, or materially fails to, pay any shortfall into a 
client bank account or withdraw any excess from a client bank 
account so that the firm is unable to comply with CASS 7.15.29 R 
after having carried out an internal client money reconciliation; 
(3) it will be unable to, or materially fails to, identify and resolve any 
discrepancies under CASS 7.15.31 R to CASS 7.15.32 R after having 
carried out an external client money reconciliation; 
(4) it will be unable to, or materially fails to, conduct an internal client 
money reconciliation in compliance with CASS 7.15.12 R and CASS 
7.15.15 R; 
(5) it will be unable to, or materially fails to, conduct an external 
client money reconciliation in compliance with CASS 7.15.20 R to 
CASS 7.15.28 R; and 
(6) it becomes aware that, at any time in the preceding 12 months, the 
amount of client money segregated in its client bank accounts 
materially differed from the total aggregate amount of client money 
the firm was required to segregate in client bank accounts under the 
client money segregation requirements. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
637.   Annual audit of compliance with the client money rules 
7.15.34G 
Firms are reminded that the auditor of the firm has to confirm in the 
report submitted to the FCA under SUP 3.10 (Duties of auditors: 
notification and report on client assets) that the firm has maintained 
systems adequate to enable it to comply with the client money rules. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive. 
638.   7.16 The standard methods of internal client money reconciliation 
 
7.16.1G 
(1) Firms are required to carry out an internal client money 
reconciliation each business day (CASS 7.15.12 R and CASS 
7.15.15R(1)) or as required by CASS 7.15.15R(4) after a primary 
pooling event. This section sets out methods of reconciliation that are 
appropriate for these purposes (the standard methods of internal client 
money reconciliation). 
(2) Where a firm establishes one or more sub-pools, the provisions of 
CASS 7.16 (The standard methods of internal client money 
reconciliation) shall be read as applying to the firm's general pool and 
each sub-pool individually, in line with CASS 7.19.3 R and CASS 
7.19.4 R. 
 
Regulation 57 IMR 2017  
 
Reconciliation  
 
57. (1) In relation to third party client asset accounts, other 
than fixed term deposit accounts, which hold client funds, 
an investment firm shall reconcile daily, the balance of all 
client funds held, as recorded by the investment firm with 
the balance of all client funds deposited, as recorded by 
the third party as set out in a statement or other form of 
confirmation from the third party and such reconciliation 
shall be carried out by the end of the working day 
immediately following the working day to which the 
reconciliation relates.  
 
(2) In relation to third party client asset accounts which 
hold fixed term deposits, an investment firm shall 
reconcile, at least monthly, the balance of all client funds 
deposited, as recorded by the investment firm with the 
balance of all client funds held, as recorded by the third 
party as set out in a statement or other form of 
confirmation from the third party and such a reconciliation 
shall be carried out within 3 working days of the date to 
which the reconciliation relates.  
 
(3) In relation to third party client asset accounts which 
hold client financial instruments, an investment firm shall 
reconcile, at least monthly, the balance of client financial 
instruments held, as recorded by the investment firm, with 
the balance of all client financial instruments held, as 
recorded by the third party as set out in a statement or 
other form of confirmation from the third party, and such 
a reconciliation shall be carried out within 10 working 
days of the date to which the reconciliation relates.  
 
(4) An investment firm shall ensure that the quantity and 
type of client financial instruments held by the investment 
firm or nominee, are the same quantity and type as those 
which the investment firm should be holding on behalf of 
the clients.  
 
  Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK and Irish 
rules are more prescriptive than EU rules. 
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(5) Each reconciliation shall be carried out by a relevant 
person who is independent of the production and 
maintenance of the records used for the purpose of 
carrying out the reconciliation.  
 
(6) Each reconciliation shall be reviewed by a relevant 
person who is independent of the person who carried out 
the reconciliation and of the person who produced and 
maintained the records used for the purpose of carrying 
out the reconciliation.  
 
(7) An investment firm shall—  
 
(a) ensure that the reconciliations required pursuant to 
Regulations 57(1), 57(2) and 57(3) are performed using 
client asset records that are accurate and the reconciliation 
itself is performed accurately,  
 
(b) investigate within one working day the cause of any 
reconciliation difference in the reconciliation required 
pursuant to Regulations 57(1), 57(2) and 57(3),  
 
(c) identify the cause of any reconciliation difference 
identified in Regulation 57(7)(b) within 5 working days, 
and  
 
(d) resolve any reconciliation difference identified in 
Regulation 57(7)(b) as soon as practicable. 
 
639.   7.16.2G 
(1) A non-standard method of internal client money reconciliation is a 
method of internal client money reconciliation which does not meet 
the requirements of this section. 
(2) Where a firm uses a non-standard method of internal client money 
reconciliation it is reminded that it must comply with the requirements 
in CASS 7.15.18 R. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
640.   7.16.3G 
Regardless of whether a firm is following one of the standard methods 
of internal client money reconciliation or a non-standard method of 
internal client money reconciliation, it is reminded that it must 
maintain its records so that it is able to promptly calculate the total 
amount of client money it should be holding for each client (see 
CASS 7.15.15 R (1)). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
641.   7.16.4G 
Firms are reminded that the internal client money reconciliation 
should achieve the purposes set out in CASS 7.15.14 G. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
642.   7.16.5G 
(1) A firm that adopts the normal approach to segregating client 
money (CASS 7.13.6 R) will be using the methods in this section to 
check whether it has correctly segregated client money in its client 
bank accounts. 
(2) A firm that adopts the alternative approach to segregating client 
money (CASS 7.13.54 G) will be using the methods in this section to 
calculate how much money it needs to withdraw from, or place in, 
client bank accounts as a result of any discrepancy arising between its 
client money requirement and its client money resource at the close of 
business on the previous business day. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
643.   7.16.6G 
Unless otherwise stated, firms are reminded that they are required to 
receive all client money receipts directly into a client bank account 
(see CASS 7.13.6 R). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
644.   7.16.7G 
A firm that receives client money in the form of cash, a cheque or 
other payable order is reminded that it must pay that money (eg, into a 
client bank account) no later than on the business day after it receives 
the money (see CASS 7.13.32 R). Once deposited into a client bank 
account, that receipt of client money should form part of the firm's 
client money resource (see CASS 7.16.8 R). In calculating its client 
money requirement, a firm will need to take into account any client 
money received as cash, cheques or payment orders but not yet 
deposited into a client bank account (see CASS 7.16.25 R (3) and 
CASS 7.16.26 G). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
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645.   Client money resource 
7.16.8R 
The client money resource is the aggregate balance on the firm's client 
bank accounts. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
646.   7.16.9G 
(1) A firm should ensure that the amount it reflects in its internal 
client money reconciliation as its client money resource is equal to the 
aggregate balance on its client bank accounts. For example, if: 
(a) a firm holds client money received as cash, cheques or payment 
orders but not yet deposited in a client bank account (in accordance 
with CASS 7.13.32 R); and 
(b) that firm records all receipts from clients, whether or not yet 
deposited with a bank, in its cashbook (see CASS 7.16.26 G (1)(a)); 
its client money resource should not include the cash, cheques or 
payment orders received but not yet deposited in a client bank 
account. 
 
(2) The guidance in (1) is consistent with a firm's obligations to 
maintain its internal records in an accurate way, particularly their 
correspondence to the client money held for clients. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
647.   Client money requirement 
7.16.10R 
Subject to CASS 7.16.12 R, the client money requirement must be 
calculated by one, but not both, of the following of two methods: 
 
(1) the individual client balance method (CASS 7.16.16 R); or 
(2) the net negative add-back method (CASS 7.16.17 R). 
 
Regulation 58 IMR 2017  
 
Daily calculation  
 
58. (1) An investment firm shall, each working day, 
ensure that the client funds resource as at the close of 
business on the previous working day is equal to the client 
funds requirement.  
 
(2) For the purposes of Regulation 58(1), an investment 
firm shall use values in its own accounting records which 
may have been reconciled with statements from a third 
party rather than values contained in statements received 
from a third party.  
 
(3) In the event of a shortfall of client funds, an 
investment firm shall deposit into a third party client asset 
account, without delay and in any event within one 
working day from the date to which the calculation 
relates, such money from the investment firm’s own assets 
as is necessary to ensure that the client funds resource is 
equal to the client funds requirement.  
 
(4) In the event of an excess of client funds, an investment 
firm shall withdraw from a third party client asset account, 
without delay and in any event within one working day 
from the date to which the calculation relates, such money 
from a third party client asset account as is necessary to 
ensure that the client funds resource is equal to the client 
funds requirement.  
 
(5) The daily calculation shall be carried out by a relevant 
person who is independent of the production and 
maintenance of the records used for the purpose of 
carrying out the daily calculation.  
 
(6) The daily calculation shall be reviewed by a relevant 
person who is independent of the person who carried out 
the daily calculation and of the person who produced and 
maintained the records used for the purpose of carrying 
out the calculation. 
 
  Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
648.   7.16.11R 
The net negative add-back method may only be used, under this 
section, by a CASS 7 asset management firm or a CASS 7 loan-based 
crowdfunding firm and only if such firms do not undertake any 
margined transactions for, or on behalf of, their clients. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
649.   7.16.12R 
A CASS 7 loan-based crowdfunding firm must not use the individual 
client balance method under this section. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
650.   7.16.13G 
(1) The client money requirement should represent the total amount of 
client money a firm is required to have segregated in client bank 
accounts under the client money rules. 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
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(2) CASS 7.16.11 R does not prevent a firm from adopting a net 
negative add-back method as part of a non-standard method of 
internal client money reconciliation. 
(3) CASS 7.16.12 R does not prevent a CASS loan-based 
crowdfunding firm from adopting the individual client balance 
method as part of a non-standard method of internal client money 
reconciliation. 
(4) If a firm uses the individual client balance method in respect of 
some of its business lines and the net negative add-back method in 
respect of others it will be conducting a non-standard method of 
internal client money reconciliation. 
 
651.   7.16.14G 
(1) The individual client balance method (CASS 7.16.16 R) may be 
applied by any firm except a CASS 7 loan-based crowdfunding firm. 
This method requires a firm to calculate the total amount of client 
money it should be segregating in client bank accounts by reference to 
how much the firm should be holding in total (ie, across all its client 
bank accounts and businesses) for each of its individual clients for: 
(a) non-margined transactions (CASS 7.16.16 R (1) and CASS 
7.16.21 R); 
(b) margined transactions (CASS 7.16.16 R (2) and CASS 7.16.32 R); 
and 
(c) certain other matters (CASS 7.16.16 R (3) and CASS 7.16.25 R). 
(2) 
(a) CASS 7.16.22 E is an evidential provision which sets out a method 
firms should use for calculating how much they should be holding in 
total for each individual client for non-margined transactions. 
(b) The calculation in CASS 7.16.22 E permits a firm to calculate 
either one individual client balance across all its products and 
business lines for each client or a number of individual client balances 
for each client equal to the number of products or business lines 
operated by the firm in connection with that client (see CASS 7.16.22 
E (1)). 
(c) The calculation referred to in (2)(b) may also be applied by 
different types of firms and, as a result, each firm will need to apply 
the calculation in way which recognises the business model under 
which that firm operates. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
652.   7.16.15G 
The net negative add-back method (CASS 7.16.17 R) is available to 
CASS 7 asset management firms and CASS 7 loan-based 
crowdfunding firms, many of whom may operate internal ledger 
systems on a bank account by bank account, not client-by-client, 
basis. This method allows a firm to calculate the total amount of client 
money it is required to have segregated in client bank accounts by 
reference to: 
 
(1) the balances in each client bank account (see CASS 7.16.17 R (1) 
and CASS 7.16.18 G (2)); 
(2) whether any individual client's net position in a specific client 
bank account is negative (see CASS 7.16.17 R (2) and CASS 7.16.18 
G (2)); and 
(3) certain other matters (see CASS 7.16.17 R (2) and CASS 7.16.25 
R). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
653.   Client money requirement calculation: individual client balance 
method 
7.16.16R 
Subject to CASS 7.16.25 R and CASS 7.16.37 R, under this method 
the client money requirement must be calculated by taking the sum of, 
for all clients and across all products and accounts: 
 
(1) the individual client balances calculated under CASS 7.16.21 R, 
excluding: 
(a) individual client balances which are negative (ie, debtors); and 
(b) clients' equity balances; 
(2) the total margined transaction requirement (calculated under 
CASS 7.16.32 R); and 
(3) any amounts that have been segregated as client money according 
to the firm's records under any of the following: CASS 7.13.51 R (1) 
(prudent segregation record), CASS 7.13.66 R (alternative approach 
mandatory prudent segregation record) and/or CASS 7.13.74 R 
(clearing arrangement mandatory prudent segregation record). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
654.   Client money requirement calculation: net negative add-back 
method 
7.16.17R 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
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Subject to CASS 7.16.25 R, under this method the client money 
requirement must be calculated by taking the sum of, for each client 
bank account: 
 
(1) the amount which the firm's internal records show as held on that 
account; and 
(2) an amount that offsets each negative net amount which the firm's 
internal records show attributed to that account for an individual 
client. 
 
655.   7.16.18G 
(1) A firm which utilises the net negative add-back method is 
reminded that it must do so in a way which allows it to maintain its 
records so that, at any time, the firm is able to promptly determine the 
total amount of client money it should be holding for each client (see 
CASS 7.15.5 R (1)). 
(2) For the purposes of CASS 7.16.17 R, a firm should be able to 
readily use the figures previously recorded in its internal records and 
ledgers (for example, its cashbook or other internal accounting 
records) as at the close of business on the previous business day 
without undertaking any additional steps to determine the balances in 
the firm's client bank accounts. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
656.   7.16.19G 
(1) A firm which utilises the net negative add-back method may 
calculate its client money requirement and client money resource on a 
bank account by bank account basis; 
(2) For the purposes of CASS 7.16.17 R, a firm should take into 
account any amounts that have been segregated as client money 
according to the firm's records under either or both CASS 7.13.50 R 
(prudent segregation record) and CASS 7.13.66 R (alternative 
approach mandatory prudent segregation record). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
657.   Non-margined transactions (eg, securities): individual client 
balance 
7.16.20G 
The sum of positive individual client balances for each client should 
represent the total amount of all money the firm holds, has received or 
is obligated to have received or be holding as client money in a client 
bank account for that client for non-margined transactions. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
658.   7.16.21R 
A firm must calculate a client's individual client balances in a way 
which captures the total amount of all money the firm should be 
holding as client money in a client bank account for that client for 
non-margined transactions under the client money rules. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
659.   7.16.22E 
(1) A firm may calculate either: 
(a) one individual client balance for each client, based on the total of 
the firm's holdings for that client; or 
(b) a number of individual client balances for each client, equal to the 
number of products or business lines the firm operates for that client 
and each balance based on the total of the firm's holdings for that 
client in respect of the particular product or business line. 
(2) Each individual client balance for a client should be calculated in 
accordance with this table: 
 
Individual client balance 
calculation 
 
 Free money (sums held for a 
client free of sale or purchase 
(eg, see (3)(a)) and 
A 
 sale proceeds due to the client:  
 (a) for principal deals 
when the client has 
delivered the 
designated 
investments; and 
B 
 (b) for agency deals 
when: 
 
  (i) the sale 
proceeds 
have been 
received by 
the firm and 
the client has 
delivered the 
C1 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
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designated 
investments; 
or 
  (ii) the firm 
holds the 
designated 
investment 
for the 
client; and 
C2 
the cost of purchases:  
 (c) for principal deals, 
paid for by the client 
when the firm has not 
delivered the 
designated  
D 
 (d) for agency deals, paid 
for by the client 
when: 
 
  (i) the firm has 
not remitted 
the money 
to, or to the 
order of, the 
counterparty; 
or 
E1 
  (ii) the 
designated 
investments 
have been 
received by 
the firm but 
have not 
been 
delivered to 
the client; 
E2 
Less  
 money owed by the client for 
unpaid purchases by, or for, the 
client if delivery of those 
designated investments has 
been made to the client; and 
F 
 proceeds remitted to the client 
for sales transactions by, or for, 
the client if the client has not 
delivered the designated 
investments.  
G 
Individual client balance ‘X’ = 
(A+B+C1+C2+D+E1+E2)-F-G 
X 
 
(3) When calculating an individual client balance for each client, a 
firm should also: 
(a) ensure it includes: 
(i) client money consisting of dividends received and interest earned 
and allocated (see CASS 7.11.32 R); 
(ii) client money consisting of dividends (actual or payments in lieu), 
stock lending fees and other payments received and allocated (see 
CASS 6.1.2 G); 
(iii) money the firm appropriates and segregates as client money to 
cover an unresolved shortfall in safe custody assets it identifies in its 
internal records which is attributable to an individual client (see 
CASS 6.6.54R (2)); and 
(iv) money the firm segregates as client money instead of an 
individual client's safe custody asset until such time as the relevant 
delivery versus payment transaction settles under CASS 6.1.12R (2); 
and 
(b) deduct any amounts due and payable by the client to the firm (see 
CASS 7.11.25 R). 
(4) Compliance with (1), (2) and (3) may be relied on as tending to 
establish compliance with CASS 7.16.21 R. 
 
660.   7.16.23R 
A firm must calculate an individual client balance using the contract 
value of any client purchases or sales, being the value to which the 
client would be contractual entitled to receive or contractually 
obligated to pay. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
661.   7.16.24G    Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
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If a firm calculates each individual client balance on a product-by-
product or business line-by-business line basis under CASS 7.16.22 E 
(1)(b), the result should be that the firm does not net client positions 
across all products and accounts. 
 
662.   Other requirements for calculating the client money requirement 
7.16.25R 
When calculating the client money requirement under either of the 
methods in CASS 7.16.10 R, a firm must: 
 
(1) include any unallocated client money (see CASS 7.13.36 R) and 
unidentified receipts of money it considers prudent to segregate as 
client money (see CASS 7.13.37 R); 
(2) include any money the firm appropriates and holds as client 
money to cover an unresolved shortfall in safe custody assets 
identified in its internal records which is not attributable, or cannot be 
attributed to, an individual client (see CASS 6.6.49 R, CASS 6.6.50 R 
and CASS 6.6.54 R); 
(3) take into account any client money received as cash, cheques or 
payment orders but not yet deposited into a client bank account under 
CASS 7.13.32 R (see also CASS 7.15.9 R); 
(4) if it has drawn any cheques or other payable orders, to discharge 
its fiduciary duty to its clients and continue to treat the sum concerned 
as forming part of its client money requirement until the cheque or 
order is presented and paid by the bank (see CASS 7.11.40 R); and 
(5) ensure it has taken into account all client money the firm should 
be holding in connection with clients' non-margined transactions. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
663.   7.16.26G 
(1) Under CASS 7.16.25 R (3), where a firm holds client money 
received as cash, cheques or payment orders but not yet deposited in a 
client bank account under CASS 7.13.32 R, it may: 
(a) include these balances when calculating its client money 
requirement (eg, where the firm records all receipts from clients, 
whether or not yet deposited with a bank, in its cashbook); or 
(b) exclude these balances when calculating its client money 
requirement (eg, where the firm only records client receipts to its 
cashbook once deposited with a bank). 
(2) In line with (1)(a), the firm will need to ensure that, before 
finalising the calculation of its client money requirement within this 
section, it deducts these balances, to ensure that they do not give rise 
to a discrepancy between the firm's client money requirement and 
client money resource (see CASS 7.15.29 R). 
(3) In line with (1)(b), although the balances concerned do not form 
part of the firm's client money requirement, the firm must continue to 
account for all receipts of client money as cash, cheques or payment 
orders but not yet deposited in a client bank account in its records and 
accounts (see CASS 7.13.32 R and CASS 7.15.9 R). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
664.   7.16.27G 
(1) In accordance with CASS 7.16.25 R (5), where a firm has allowed 
another person to hold client money in connection with a client's non-
margined transaction (eg, in a client transaction account under CASS 
7.14 (Client money held by a third party)), the firm should include 
these balances when calculating its client money requirement. 
(2) If a firm is utilising the individual client balance method (CASS 
7.16.16 R) to calculate its client money requirement, CASS 7.16.21 R 
requires the firm to include the sums its holds for each client that are 
placed with another person in connection with a client's non-margined 
transaction when calculating a client's individual client balance (eg, 
see CASS 7.16.22 E and items C1 and E2). 
(3) Under (1) and (2), the firm will need to ensure that, before 
finalising the calculation of its client money requirement within this 
section, it deducts positive balances held for clients adding back 
negative balances attributable to clients' non-margined transactions in 
client transaction accounts, to ensure that they do not give rise to a 
discrepancy between the firm's client money requirement and client 
money resource (see CASS 7.15.29 R). 
(4) Under (1), (2) and (3), in determining the balances of client money 
a firm has allowed another person to hold in connection with a client's 
non-margined transaction or the balances held for clients' non-
margined transactions in client transaction accounts, a firm should use 
the values contained in its internal records and ledgers (see CASS 
7.15.13 R). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
665.   Margined transactions (eg, derivatives): equity balances 
7.16.28R 
Subject to CASS 7.16.30 R, a client's equity balance is the amount 
which the firm would be liable to pay to the client (or the client to the 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
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firm) under the client money rules for margined transactions if each of 
the open positions were liquidated at the closing or settlement prices 
published by the relevant exchange or other appropriate pricing 
source and the account with the firm were closed. This notional 
balance should include any unrealised losses or profits associated with 
that client's open positions, and any margin the firm has received from 
the client in connection with those positions. 
 
666.   7.16.29R 
Subject to CASS 7.16.30 R, a firm's equity balance is the amount 
which the firm would be liable to pay to the exchange, clearing house, 
intermediate broker or OTC counterparty (or vice-versa) for the firm's 
margined transactions if each of the open positions of those of the 
firm's clients that are entitled to protection under the client money 
rules were liquidated at the closing or settlement prices published by 
the relevant exchange or other appropriate pricing source and the 
firm's client transaction accounts with that exchange, clearing house, 
intermediate broker or OTC counterparty were closed. This notional 
balance should include any unrealised losses or profits associated with 
the open positions the firm holds for clients and any margin the firm 
holds for clients in the relevant client transaction accounts. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
667.   7.16.30R 
The terms 'client's equity balance' and 'firm's equity balance' refer to 
cash values and do not include non-cash collateral or other designated 
investments (including approved collateral) the firm holds for a 
margined transaction. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
668.   Margined transactions (eg, derivatives): margined transaction 
requirement 
7.16.31G 
The margined transaction requirement should represent the total 
amount of client money a firm is required under the client money 
rules to segregate in client bank accounts for margined transactions. 
The calculation in CASS 7.16.33 R is designed to ensure that an 
amount of client money is held in client bank accounts which equals 
at least the difference between the equity the firm holds at exchanges, 
clearing houses, intermediate brokers and OTC counterparties for 
margined transactions for clients entitled to protection under the client 
money rules, and the amount due to clients under the client money 
rules for those same margined transactions. With this calculation, a 
firm's margined transaction requirement should represent, if positions 
were unwound, the firm's gross liabilities to clients entitled to 
protection under the client money rules for margined transactions. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
669.   7.16.32R 
The total margined transaction requirement is: 
 
(1) the sum of each of the client's equity balances which are positive; 
less 
(2) the proportion of any individual negative client equity balance 
which is secured by client approved collateral; and 
(3) the net aggregate of the firm's equity balance (negative balances 
being deducted from positive balances) on client transaction accounts 
for customers with exchanges, clearing houses, intermediate brokers 
and OTC counterparties. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
670.   7.16.33R 
(1) To meet the total margin transaction requirement, a firm may 
appropriate and use its own approved collateral, provided it meets the 
requirements in (2). 
(2) The firm must hold the approved collateral in a way which ensures 
that, in accordance with CASS 7A.2.3A R, the approved collateral 
will be liquidated on the occurrence of a primary pooling event and 
the proceeds paid into a client bank account, and in so doing: 
(a) ensure the approved collateral is clearly identifiable as separate 
from the firm's own property and is recorded by the firm in its records 
as being held for its clients; 
(b) keep a record of the actions the firm has taken under this rule 
which includes a description of the terms on which the firm holds the 
approved collateral, identifies that the approved collateral is held for 
the benefit of its clients and specifies the approved collateral that the 
firm has appropriated for the purposes of this rule; and 
(c) update the record made under (b) whenever the firm ceases to 
appropriate and use approved collateral under this rule. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
671.   7.16.34G 
Where CASS 7.16.33 R applies, the firm will be reducing the 
requirement arising from CASS 7.16.16 R (2) and, as such, 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
  
 
 
 
  
 440  
 
 
  
 
  
simultaneously reducing its overall client money requirement (ie, the 
amount of money the firm is required to segregate in client bank 
accounts). 
 
672.   7.16.35R 
If a firm's total margined transaction requirement is negative, the firm 
must treat it as zero for the purposes of calculating its client money 
requirement. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across relevant rules save that UK rules are 
more prescriptive than EU and Irish rules. 
673.   LME bond arrangements 
7.16.36R 
A firm with a Part 30 exemption order which also operates an LME 
bond arrangement for the benefit of US-resident investors must 
exclude the client equity balances for transactions undertaken on the 
LME on behalf of those US-resident investors from the calculation of 
the margined transaction requirement, to the extent those transactions 
are provided for by an LME bond arrangement (see CASS 12.2.3 G). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
674.   Reduced client money requirement option 
7.16.37R 
Where appropriate, a firm may: 
 
(1) when, in respect of a client, there is a positive individual client 
balance and a negative client equity balance, offset the credit against 
the debit and, therefore, have a reduced individual client balance in 
CASS 7.16.21 R for that client; and 
(2) when, in respect of a client, there is a negative individual client 
balance and a positive client equity balance, offset the credit against 
the debit and, therefore, have a reduced client equity balance (CASS 
7.16.28 R) for that client. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
675.   7.16.38G 
The effect of CASS 7.16.37 R is to allow a firm to offset, on a client-
by-client basis, a negative amount with a positive amount arising out 
of the calculations in CASS 7.16.21 R and CASS 7.16.28 R and, 
therefore, reduce its overall client money requirement. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
676.   7.17 Statutory trust 
 
7.17.1G 
Section 137B(1) of the Act (Miscellaneous ancillary matters) provides 
that rules may make provision which result in client money being held 
by a firm on trust (England and Wales and Northern Ireland) or as 
agent (Scotland only). This section creates a fiduciary relationship 
between the firm and its client under which client money is in the 
legal ownership of the firm but remains in the beneficial ownership of 
the client. In the event of failure of the firm, costs relating to the 
distribution of client money may have to be borne by the trust. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
677.   Requirement 
7.17.2R 
Subject to CASS 7.17.3 R in respect of a trustee firm, a firm receives 
and holds client money as trustee on the following terms: 
 
(1) for the purposes of, and on the terms of, the client money rules and 
the client money distribution and transfer rules; 
(2) 
(a) where a firm maintains only a general pool of client money, 
subject to (4), for the clients (other than clients which are insurance 
undertakings when acting as such with respect to client money 
received in the course of insurance distribution activity and that was 
opted in to this chapter) for whom that money is held, according to 
their respective interests in it; 
(b) where a firm has established one or more pools of client money, 
subject to (4): 
(i) the general pool is held for all the clients of the firm for whom the 
firm receives or holds client money (other than clients which are 
insurance undertakings when acting in regard to client money 
received during insurance distribution activity and that was opted in to 
this chapter) according to their respective interests; and 
(ii) each sub-pool is for the clients of the firm who are identified as 
beneficiaries of the sub-pool in question, in accordance with CASS 
7.19.6 R (2), according to their respective interests in it; 
(3) after all valid claims in (2) have been met, for clients which are 
insurance undertakings with respect of client money received in the 
course of insurance distribution activity according to their respective 
interests in it; 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
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(4) for the payment of the costs properly attributable to the 
distribution of the client money in (2) if such distribution takes place 
following the failure of the firm; and 
(5) after all valid claims and costs under (2) to (4) have been met, for 
the firm itself. 
 
678.   7.17.3R 
A trustee firm which is subject to the client money rules by virtue of 
CASS 7.10.1 R (2) receives and holds client money as trustee on the 
terms in CASS 7.17.2 R, subject to its obligations to hold client 
money as trustee under the relevant instrument of trust. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
679.   7.17.4G 
If a trustee firm holds client money, the firm should follow the 
provisions in CASS 7.10.33 R to CASS 7.10.40 G. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
680.   7.17.5G 
The statutory trust under CASS 7.17.2 R does not permit a firm, in its 
capacity as trustee, to use client money to advance credit to the firm's 
clients, itself, or any other person. For example, if a firm wishes to 
undertake a transaction for a client in advance of receiving client 
money from that client to fund that transaction, it should not advance 
credit to that client or itself using other clients' client money (ie, it 
should not 'pre-fund' the transaction using other clients' client money). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
681.   7.18 Acknowledgement letters 
 
Purpose 
7.18.1G 
The main purposes of an acknowledgement letter are: 
 
(1) to put the bank, exchange, clearing house, intermediate broker, 
OTC counterparty or other person (as the case may be) on notice of a 
firm's clients' interests in client money that has been deposited with, 
or has been allowed to be held by, such person; 
(2) to ensure that the client bank account or client transaction account 
has been opened in the correct form (eg, whether the client bank 
account is being correctly opened as a general client bank account, a 
designated client bank account or a designated client fund account), 
and is distinguished from any account containing money that belongs 
to the firm; and 
(3) to ensure that the bank, exchange, clearing house, intermediate 
broker, OTC counterparty or other person (as the case may be) 
understands and agrees that it will not have any recourse or right 
against money standing to the credit of the client bank account or 
client transaction account, in respect of any sum owed to such person, 
or to any other third person, on any other account. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that are echoed but not mirrored by Irish 
requirements. 
682.   Client bank account acknowledgment letters 
7.18.2R 
(1) For each client bank account, a firm must, in accordance with 
CASS 7.18.6 R, complete and sign a client bank account 
acknowledgement letter clearly identifying the client bank account, 
and send it to the bank with whom the client bank account is, or will 
be, opened, requesting the bank to acknowledge and agree to the 
terms of the letter by countersigning it and returning it to the firm. 
(2) Subject to CASS 7.18.14 R and CASS 7.18.15 R, a firm must not 
hold or receive any client money in or into a client bank account 
unless it has received a duly countersigned client bank account 
acknowledgement letter from the relevant bank that has not been 
inappropriately redrafted (see CASS 7.18.8 R) and clearly identifies 
the client bank account. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that are echoed but not mirrored by Irish 
requirements. 
683.   Client transaction account acknowledgement letters 
7.18.3R 
(1) This rule does not apply to a firm to which CASS 7.18.4 R (1) 
applies. 
(2) For each client transaction account, a firm must, in accordance 
with CASS 7.18.6 R, complete and sign a client transaction account 
acknowledgement letter clearly identifying the client transaction 
account. That letter must be sent to the person with whom the client 
transaction account is, or will be, opened, requesting such person to 
acknowledge and agree to the terms of the letter by countersigning it 
and returning it to the firm. 
(3) Subject to CASS 7.18.14 R and CASS 7.18.15 R, a firm must not 
allow the relevant person to hold any client money in a client 
transaction account maintained by that person for the firm, unless the 
firm has received a duly countersigned client transaction account 
acknowledgement letter from that person that has not been 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that are echoed but not mirrored by Irish 
requirements. 
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inappropriately redrafted (see CASS 7.18.8 R) and that clearly 
identifies the client transaction account. 
 
684.   Authorised central counterparty acknowledgment letters 
7.18.4R 
(1) A firm which places client money at an authorised central 
counterparty in connection with a regulated clearing arrangement 
must, in accordance with CASS 7.18.6 R, complete and sign an 
authorised central counterparty acknowledgement letter clearly 
identifying the relevant client transaction account. That letter must be 
sent to the authorised central counterparty with whom the client 
transaction account is, or will be, opened, requesting such authorised 
central counterparty to acknowledge receipt of the letter by 
countersigning it and returning it to the firm. 
(2) A firm which has complied with CASS 7.18.4 R (1) may allow the 
authorised central counterparty to hold client money on the relevant 
client transaction account, whether or not the authorised central 
counterparty has countersigned and returned the authorised central 
counterparty acknowledgement letter it received from the firm. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that are echoed but not mirrored by Irish 
requirements. 
685.   Acknowledgement letters in general 
7.18.5G 
In drafting acknowledgement letters under CASS 7.18.2 R, CASS 
7.18.3 R or CASS 7.18.4 R, a firm is required to use the relevant 
template in CASS 7 Annex 2 R, CASS 7 Annex 3 R or CASS 7 
Annex 4 R, respectively. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that are echoed but not mirrored by Irish 
requirements. 
686.   7.18.6R 
When completing an acknowledgment letter under CASS 7.18.2 R 
(1), CASS 7.18.3 R (1) or CASS 7.18.4 R (1), a firm: 
 
(1) must not amend any of the acknowledgement letter fixed text; 
(2) subject to (3), must ensure the acknowledgement letter variable 
text is removed, included or amended as appropriate; and 
(3) must not amend any of the acknowledgement letter variable text in 
a way that would alter or otherwise change the meaning of the 
acknowledgement letter fixed text. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that are echoed but not mirrored by Irish 
requirements. 
687.   7.18.7G 
CASS 7 Annex 5 G contains guidance on using the template 
acknowledgment letters, including when and how firms should amend 
the acknowledgement letter variable text that is in square brackets. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that are echoed but not mirrored by Irish 
requirements. 
688.   7.18.8R 
(1) If, on countersigning and returning the acknowledgement letter to 
a firm, the relevant person has also: 
(a) made amendments to any of the acknowledgement letter fixed 
text; or 
(b) made amendments to any of the acknowledgement letter variable 
text in a way that would alter or otherwise change the meaning of the 
acknowledgement letter fixed text; 
the acknowledgement letter will have been inappropriately redrafted 
for the purposes of CASS 7.18.2 R (2) or CASS 7.18.3 R (3) (as 
applicable). 
 
(2) For the purposes of CASS 7.18.2 R (2) or CASS 7.18.3 R (3), 
amendments made to the acknowledgement letter variable text in the 
acknowledgement letter returned to a firm by the relevant person, will 
not have the result that the letter has been inappropriately redrafted if 
those amendments do not affect the meaning of the acknowledgement 
letter fixed text, have been specifically agreed with the firm and do 
not cause the acknowledgement letter to be inaccurate. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that are echoed but not mirrored by Irish 
requirements. 
689.   7.18.9R 
A firm must use reasonable endeavours to ensure that any individual 
that has countersigned an acknowledgement letter that has been 
returned to the firm was authorised to countersign the letter on behalf 
of the relevant person. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that are echoed but not mirrored by Irish 
requirements. 
690.   7.18.10R 
(1) A firm must retain each countersigned client bank account 
acknowledgement letter and client transaction account 
acknowledgement letter it receives, from the date of receipt until the 
expiry of five years from the date on which the last client bank 
account or client transaction account to which the acknowledgement 
letter relates is closed. 
(2) A firm must retain a copy of each authorised central counterparty 
acknowledgment letter it sends to an authorised central counterparty 
under CASS 7.18.4 R (1), from the date it was sent until the expiry of 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that are echoed but not mirrored by Irish 
requirements. 
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five years from the date the last client transaction account to which 
the acknowledgement letter relates is closed. 
 
691.   7.18.11R 
A firm must also retain any other documentation or evidence it 
believes is necessary to demonstrate that it has complied with each of 
the applicable requirements in this section (such as any evidence it 
has obtained to ensure that the individual that has countersigned an 
acknowledgment letter returned to the firm was authorised to 
countersign the letter on behalf of the relevant person). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that are echoed but not mirrored by Irish 
requirements. 
692.   7.18.12R 
(1) This rule applies to: 
(a) any countersigned client bank account acknowledgement letter or 
client transaction account acknowledgement letter received by a firm 
under CASS 7.18.2 R (2) or CASS 7.18.3 R (3) respectively; and 
(b) any authorised central counterparty acknowledgement letter sent 
by a firm under CASS 7.18.4 R (1), whether or not it has been 
countersigned by the relevant authorised central counterparty and 
received by the firm. 
(2) A firm must, periodically (at least annually, and whenever it is 
aware that something referred to in an acknowledgement letter has 
changed) review each of its acknowledgement letters to ensure that 
they all remain accurate. 
(3) Whenever a firm finds an inaccuracy in an acknowledgement 
letter, it must promptly draw up a replacement acknowledgement 
letter under CASS 7.18.2 R or CASS 7.18.3 R or CASS 7.18.4 R, as 
applicable, and, if it is an acknowledgement letter required to be sent 
under CASS 7.18.2 R, CASS 7.18.3 R, ensure that the new 
acknowledgement letter is duly countersigned and returned by the 
relevant person. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that are echoed but not mirrored by Irish 
requirements. 
693.   7.18.13G 
Under CASS 7.18.12 R, a firm should draw up and send out a 
replacement acknowledgement letter whenever: 
 
(1) there has been a change in any of the parties' names or addresses 
as set out in the letter; or 
(2) the firm becomes aware of an error or misspelling in the drafting 
of the letter. 
 
Regulation 12 IMR 2017 
 
Books, records, financial control and management 
information  
 
12. (1) An investment business firm shall maintain the 
following, in a readily accessible form, for a period of at 
least 6 years:  
 
(a) a full record of each transaction entered into by it 
whether on its own behalf or on behalf of clients;  
 
(b) a complete written record of all investment advice, 
including oral advice, given to clients;  
 
(c) all records required to demonstrate compliance with 
these Regulations;  
 
(d) details of all money received and expended by the 
investment business firm whether on its own behalf or on 
behalf of clients, together with details of how such 
receipts and payments arose;  
 
(e) a record of all assets and liabilities of the investment 
business firm including long and short positions, off-
balance sheet items and any commitments or contingent 
liabilities;  
 
(f) a record of all investment instruments or documents of 
title held by the investment business firm setting out—  
(i) the physical or electronic location,  
(ii) the beneficial owner, (iii) the purpose for which they 
are held, and  
(iv) whether they are subject to any charge;  
 
(g) records that are adequate for the purposes of financial 
control and management information and which are 
maintained in such a manner which discloses or is capable 
of disclosing the financial and business information which 
will enable the investment business firm’s senior 
management to—  
(i) identify, quantify, control and manage the risk 
exposures,  
(ii) make timely and informed decisions,  
(iii) monitor the performance of all aspects of the 
business,  
(iv) monitor the asset quality, and  
  Broadly equivalent rules between UK and Irish rules.  
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(v) safeguard the assets of the investment business firm, 
including any client assets and investor money;  
 
(h) the records referred to in Regulations 44 to 46.  
 
(2) An investment business firm shall have adequate 
procedures for the maintenance, security, privacy and 
preservation of records, working papers and documents of 
title held by the investment business firm, including the 
documents referred to in paragraph (1), so that they are 
reasonably safeguarded against loss, unauthorised access, 
alteration or destruction.  
 
(3) Where an investment business firm contracts all or part 
of its recordkeeping activities to another person, it shall 
only do so in accordance with the provisions of a written 
agreement entered into with that other person. 
 
Regulation 67 IMR 2017 
 
67. (1) An investment firm shall— 
 
(a) keep an accurate record of each transaction on a client 
asset account in such a manner and form that: 
 
(i) the client for or in respect of whom the transaction was 
conducted is identified, and 
 
(ii) the transaction is accounted for by the investment firm 
separate from all other transactions of the investment firm; 
 
(b) keep the records required under paragraph (a) separate 
from records relating to transactions which are not related 
to the third party client asset account. 
 
(2) An investment firm shall maintain the following, in a 
readily accessible form, for a period of at least 6 years: 
 
(a) a record of the verification referred to in Regulation 
54(1); 
 
(b) every Funds Facilities Agreement and Financial 
Instruments Facilities Agreement between the investment 
firm and a third party; 
 
(c) a record of the date upon which— 
 
(i) the reconciliation referred to in Regulation 57(5) was 
prepared, and 
 
(ii) the daily calculation, referred to in Regulation 58(5) 
was prepared; 
 
(d) a record to evidence the review process referred to in 
Regulations 57(6) and 58(6); 
 
(e) evidence of the review referred to in Regulation 
63(2)(b); 
 
(f) a record of each reconciliation required by Regulation 
57 including— 
 
(i) the information upon which the reconciliation is based, 
 
(ii) the relevant person who carried out such 
reconciliation, and 
 
(iii) the relevant person who reviewed such reconciliation; 
 
(g) a record of each daily calculation required by 
Regulation 58 including— 
 
(i) the information upon which the daily calculation is 
based, 
 
(ii) the relevant person who carried out such daily 
calculation, and 
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(iii) the relevant person who reviewed such daily 
calculation; 
 
(h) a record of the client asset management plan review 
referred to in Regulation 64(2); 
 
(i) all records required to demonstrate compliance with 
this Part. 
 
(3) Where under or in relation to this Part, an investment 
firm holds or another party holds a record on behalf of an 
investment firm electronically, the investment firm shall 
ensure that it can produce these records without delay. 
 
694.   7.18.14R 
If a firm's client bank account or client transaction account is 
transferred to another person, the firm must promptly draw up a new 
acknowledgement letter under CASS 7.18.2 R, CASS 7.18.3 R or 
CASS 7.18.4 R, as applicable, and, if it is an acknowledgement letter 
required to be sent under CASS 7.18.2 R or CASS 7.18.3 R, ensure 
that the new acknowledgement letter is duly countersigned and 
returned by the relevant person within 20 business days of the firm 
sending it to that person. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that are echoed but not mirrored by Irish 
requirements. 
695.   7.18.15R 
If a firm opens a client bank account after a primary pooling event, 
the firm must: 
 
(1) promptly draw up and send out a new acknowledgement letter 
under CASS 7.18.2 R; 
(2) not hold or receive any client money in or into the client bank 
account unless it has sent the acknowledgement letter to the relevant 
person; and 
(3) if the firm has not received a duly countersigned 
acknowledgement letter that has not been inappropriately redrafted 
(see CASS 7.18.8 R) within 20 business days of the firm sending the 
acknowledgement letter, withdraw all money standing to the credit of 
the account and deposit it in a client bank account with another bank 
as soon as possible. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that are echoed but not mirrored by Irish 
requirements. 
696.   7.19 Clearing member client money sub-pools 
 
7.19.1G 
(1) Under CASS 7.17.2R(2), a firm acts as trustee for all client money 
received or held by it for the benefit of the clients for whom that client 
money is held, according to their respective interests in it. 
(2) A firm that is also a clearing member of an authorised central 
counterparty may wish to segregate client money specifically for the 
benefit of a group of clients who have chosen to clear positions 
through a net margined omnibus client account maintained by the firm 
with that authorised central counterparty, where that segregation 
might facilitate the porting of client positions recorded in that net 
margined omnibus client account. To segregate client money (that 
would otherwise be held in the general pool) for a specific group of 
clients clearing positions through a particular net margined omnibus 
client account, a clearing member firm may, in accordance with these 
rules, create a sub-pool of client money. 
(3) Upon the occurrence of a primary pooling event, the client money 
for: 
(a) the general pool, should be distributed in accordance with CASS 
7A to the clients for whom the firm receives or holds client money in 
that general pool; and 
(b) a sub-pool, should either be: 
(i) transferred to facilitate porting; or 
(ii) distributed to the clients who are beneficiaries of that sub-pool, 
according to their respective interests under CASS 7A.2.4R (2)(a). 
(4) All client money is received or held by the firm as trustee for the 
clients of the firm. However, a clearing member of an authorised 
central counterparty who clears client positions through a net 
margined omnibus client account may organise its affairs (with the 
consent of the relevant clients) in such a way that those clients need 
not share in the general pool of client money following a primary 
pooling event, save to the extent that such clients otherwise have an 
interest in the general pool. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
697.   7.19.2R 
Where a firm creates a sub-pool for a particular net margined omnibus 
client account, it must not clear positions through that omnibus client 
account for clients who are not beneficiaries of that sub-pool. 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
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698.   Internal controls 
7.19.3R 
A firm wishing to establish a sub-pool must establish and maintain 
adequate internal controls necessary to comply with the firm's 
obligations under CASS 7 for the general pool and each sub-pool that 
it may establish. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
699.   Records 
7.19.4R 
Where a firm establishes one or more sub-pools, CASS 7.15 
(Records, accounts and reconciliations) shall be read as applying 
separately to the firm's general pool and each sub-pool. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
700.   7.19.5G 
A firm that establishes one or more sub-pools must establish and 
maintain adequate internal controls and records in accordance with 
CASS 7.15 (Records, accounts and reconciliations) to conduct 
internal and external reconciliations for each sub-pool and the general 
pool individually. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
701.   7.19.6R 
(1) The records maintained for a sub-pool under CASS 7.19.4 R must 
identify all the client beneficiaries of that sub-pool. 
(2) The beneficiaries of each sub-pool are those clients: 
(a) from whom the firm has received a signed sub-pool disclosure 
document in accordance with CASS 7.19.11 R; 
(b) for whom the firm maintains, previously maintained or is in the 
process of establishing a margined transaction(s) in the relevant net 
margined omnibus client account at the authorised central 
counterparty; and 
(c) to whom any client equity balance or other client money is 
required to be segregated for the client by the firm in respect of the 
margined transactions under (2)(b) from that sub-pool. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
702.   7.19.7R 
(1) For each sub-pool that the firm establishes, it must maintain a 
record of: 
(a) the name of the sub-pool; 
(b) the particular net margined omnibus client account at an 
authorised central counterparty to which the sub-pool relates; 
(c) each client bank account and each client transaction account (other 
than the net margined omnibus client account) maintained for the sub-
pool, including the unique identifying reference or descriptor under 
CASS 7.19.13 R (2); and 
(d) the applicable sub-pool disclosure document for the sub-pool. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
703.   7.19.8R 
The firm must maintain an up-to-date list of all the sub-pools it has 
created. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
704.   Sub-pool disclosure document 
7.19.9R 
(1) A firm wishing to establish a sub-pool must prepare a sub-pool 
disclosure document for each sub-pool. 
(2) The sub-pool disclosure document for each sub-pool must: 
(a) identify the sub-pool by name, as stated in its records under CASS 
7.19.7 R, the net margined omnibus client account and the authorised 
central counterparty to which the sub-pool disclosure document 
relates; 
(b) contain a statement that the client consents to the firm receiving 
and holding the client's client money in the sub-pool; 
(c) contain a statement that, in the event of the failure of the firm, the 
firm is directed by the client to use any client money held by the firm 
in the sub-pool to facilitate the porting of the positions recorded in 
that net margined omnibus client account; and 
(d) a statement reminding the client that, in the event of the failure of 
the firm, if porting is not effected or if porting is effected but any 
money in the sub-pool is not used to facilitate porting, the client 
beneficiaries of the sub-pool will be entitled to a distribution of any 
client money held for that sub-pool in line with CASS 7A. However, 
the client beneficiaries will not have a claim on any other pool of 
client money, except to the extent that the client is a beneficiary of 
another pool. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
705.   7.19.10G 
In preparing a sub-pool disclosure document under CASS 7.19.9 R 
(1), a firm may use the template in CASS 7 Annex 6. 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
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706.   7.19.11R 
(1) Before receiving or holding client money for a client for a sub-
pool, a firm must: 
(a) provide to the client a copy of the sub-pool disclosure document 
applicable to that sub-pool; and 
(b) obtain a signed copy of that sub-pool disclosure document from 
the client. 
(2) A firm must provide the beneficiary of a sub-pool with a copy of 
its signed sub-pool disclosure document applicable to that sub-pool 
upon the beneficiary's request. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
707.   Segregation and operation of sub-pools 
7.19.12R 
Where a firm establishes one or more sub-pools, CASS 7.13 
(Segregation of client money) is to be read as applying separately to 
the firm's general pool and each sub-pool. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
708.   7.19.13R 
(1) A firm must not hold client money for a sub-pool in a client bank 
account or a client transaction account used for holding client money 
for any other sub-pool or the general pool. 
(2) A firm that establishes a sub-pool must ensure that the name of 
each client bank account and each client transaction account (other 
than the net margined omnibus client account) maintained for that 
sub-pool includes a unique identifying reference or descriptor that 
enables the account to be identified with that sub-pool. 
(3) Where a client of the firm is a beneficiary of the general pool and 
wishes to become a beneficiary of a sub-pool, the client in question 
shall become a beneficiary of the relevant sub-pool when: 
(a) the firm has obtained the signed sub-pool disclosure document 
from that client in accordance with CASS 7.19.11 R (1); and 
(b) the firm has either: 
(i) transferred the relevant amount of client money for that client from 
a client bank account maintained for the general pool to a client bank 
account maintained for the relevant sub-pool; or 
(ii) if the firm is not making a transfer of client money from the 
general pool, when it has received that client's money in a client bank 
account maintained for the relevant sub-pool. 
(4) Where a client of the firm is a beneficiary of the general pool and 
wishes to become a beneficiary of a sub-pool, the firm must ensure 
that it does not transfer client money from a client bank account 
maintained for the general pool to a client bank account maintained 
for a sub-pool in accordance with CASS 7.19.13 R (3)(b)(i), unless 
the amount of client money held for the general pool is sufficient, 
immediately after that transfer, to satisfy the firm's client money 
obligations to the remaining beneficiaries of the general pool. 
(5) A client of the firm who is a beneficiary of a sub-pool ceases to be 
a beneficiary of that sub-pool when: 
(a) the firm has settled the amount owing to that client for all of the 
margined transactions cleared through the related net margined 
omnibus client account and no longer holds any client money for that 
client in that sub-pool, and so CASS 7.19.6 R (2)(b) and CASS 7.19.6 
R (2)(c) no longer apply for that client; or 
(b) the firm has complied with (i) or (ii), and in either case (iii): 
(i) the firm has received a written instruction from the client stating 
that the client no longer wishes to have its positions cleared through 
the net margined omnibus client account or its client money held in 
that sub-pool, or the firm has notified the client under CASS 7.19.18 
R that it is making a material change to a sub-pool; or 
(ii) the firm has closed or moved that client's positions to an account 
other than the net margined omnibus client account referable to that 
sub-pool; and 
(iii) the firm has either transferred the relevant amount of client 
money for that client from a client bank account maintained for the 
relevant sub-pool to a client bank account maintained by the firm for 
the general pool (or, if applicable, another sub-pool), or transferred 
the amount owing to that client for all of the margined transactions 
cleared through the related net margined omnibus client account and 
no longer holds any client money for that client in that sub-pool. 
(6) In relation to the transfer of client money under CASS 7.19.13 R 
(5)(b)(iii), a firm must ensure that it does not transfer client money 
from a client bank account maintained for a sub-pool, unless the 
amount of client money held for the sub-pool is sufficient, 
immediately after that transfer, to satisfy the firm's client money 
obligations to the remaining beneficiaries of that sub-pool. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
709.   7.19.14R    UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
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Save to the extent permitted under CASS 7.13.70 G a firm that 
receives client money to be credited in part to the general pool or one 
sub-pool and in part to another sub-pool must: 
 
(1) take the necessary steps to ensure that the full sum is paid directly 
into a client bank account maintained for the general pool; and 
(2) promptly, and in any event no later than one business day after 
receipt, pay the money that is not client money for the general pool 
out of that client bank account and into a client bank account 
maintained for the appropriate sub-pool. 
710.   7.19.15G 
(1) If a primary pooling event occurs before client money is 
transferred from a client bank account maintained for the general pool 
to a client bank account maintained for the appropriate sub-pool in 
accordance with CASS 7.19.14 R (2), the amount in question will not 
form part of that sub-pool, including for the purposes of CASS 
7A.2.4R (1). 
(2) If a primary pooling event occurs before client money is 
transferred from a client bank account maintained for a sub-pool to a 
client bank account maintained for the general pool or another sub-
pool in accordance with CASS 7.19.13 R (5), the amount in question 
will not form part of the general pool or that other sub-pool, including 
for the purposes of CASS 7A.2.4R (1), but will remain part of the 
original sub-pool. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
711.   7.19.16R 
A client for whom a firm receives or holds client money for a sub-
pool has no claim to or interest in client money received or held for 
the general pool or any other sub-pool unless: 
 
(1) that client is a beneficiary of that other sub-pool; or 
(2) the firm receives or holds client money for that client for other 
business which does not relate to any sub-pool (and thus the client is a 
beneficiary of the firm's general pool). 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
712.   7.19.17R 
A client for whom a firm receives or holds client money in more than 
one pool as described in CASS 7.19.16 R (1) and/or CASS 7.19.16 R 
(2) has an interest in a distribution from each such pool, and each 
interest is separate and distinct. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
713.   Material changes to sub-pools 
7.19.18R 
Before making a material change to a sub-pool, a firm must: 
 
(1) notify the then current beneficiaries of that sub-pool in writing, not 
less than two months before the date on which the firm intends the 
change to take effect; and 
(2) include in the notification an explanation of the consequences for 
the beneficiaries of the proposed change and the options available to 
them, such as the option of a beneficiary of the affected sub-pool to 
cease to be a beneficiary of that sub-pool and to become a beneficiary 
of the firm's general pool or, if applicable, another sub-pool. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
714.   7.19.19G 
A firm should keep in mind its obligations under CASS 7.19.11 R 
(1)(b) (before receiving or holding client money for a client in a sub-
pool, a firm must obtain a signed copy of the sub-pool disclosure 
document from the client) when making a material change to a sub-
pool. A firm is also reminded of the conditions under CASS 7.19.13 R 
(5)(b) (when a client of the firm who is a beneficiary of a sub-pool 
ceases to be a beneficiary of that sub-pool) if a material change 
proposed to a sub-pool results in a client ceasing to be a beneficiary of 
that sub-pool. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
715.   7.19.20G 
The FCA would normally consider the dissolution of a sub-pool, such 
that the firm no longer operates the sub-pool or no longer uses the 
relevant net margined omnibus client account or transfers the business 
to another authorised central counterparty, to be examples of material 
changes to a sub-pool. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
716.   7.19.21R 
Before materially changing a sub-pool, a firm must provide a copy of 
the notice provided to clients under CASS 7.19.18 R R to the FCA not 
less than two months before the date on which the firm intends the 
change to take place. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
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717.   Notifications 
7.19.22R 
A firm that wishes to establish a sub-pool of client money must notify 
the FCA in writing not less than two months before the date on which 
the firm intends to receive or hold client money for that sub-pool. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
718.   7.19.23R 
Upon request, a firm must deliver to the FCA a copy of the sub-pool 
disclosure document for any sub-pool established by the firm. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
719.   7.19.24R 
A firm must inform the FCA in writing, without delay, if it has not 
complied, or is unable to comply with the requirements in CASS 
7.19.11 R or the requirements in CASS 7.19.18 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
720.   Record-keeping 
7.19.25R 
The records maintained under this section, including the sub-pool 
disclosure documents, are a record of the firm that must be kept in a 
durable medium for at least five years following the date on which 
client money was last held by the firm for a sub-pool to which those 
records or the sub-pool disclosure document applied. 
 
7 Annex 2 Client bank account acknowledgement 
[insert?] 
 
7 Annex 3 Client transaction account acknowledgement letter 
template 
[insert]? 
 
7 Annex 4 Authorised central counterparty acknowledgement letter 
template 
[insert]? 
 
7 Annex 5 guidance notes for acknowledgement letter (7.18) 
[insert]? 
 
7 Annex 6 Sub-pool disclosure document 
[insert]? 
 
Regulation 12 IMR 2017 
 
Books, records, financial control and management 
information  
 
See row 693 for text. 
 
  UK jurisdiction specific rules. 
721.   CHAPTER 7A 
Client money distribution and transfer 
 
7A.1 Application and purpose 
 
Application 
7A.1.1R 
Subject to CASS 7A.1.1A R, this chapter (the client money 
distribution and transfer rules) applies to a firm that holds client 
money which is subject to the client money rules when a pooling 
event occurs. 
 
   UK jurisdiction specific rules that goes beyond EU conceptual equivalent and 
Irish rules.  
722.   7A.1.1AR 
The client money distribution and transfer rules do not apply to any 
client money held by a trustee firm under CASS 7.10.34R to CASS 
7.10.40G. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
723.   7A.1.1BG 
As a result of CASS 7A.1.1A R, the client money distribution and 
transfer rules relating to primary pooling events and secondary 
pooling events will not affect any client money held by a firm in its 
capacity as trustee firm. Instead, the treatment of that client money 
will be determined by the terms of the relevant instrument of trust or 
by applicable law. However, the client money distribution and 
transfer rules do apply to a firm for any client money that it holds 
other than in that capacity which is subject to the client money rules. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
724.   Purpose 
7A.1.2G 
The client money distribution and transfer rules set out the required 
treatment of client money on the occurrence of a pooling event so that 
where: 
(1) for example, a firm fails (but also in other situations where a 
primary pooling event occurs), the rules in CASS 7A.2 (Primary 
pooling events) facilitate the return or transfer of client money; and 
(2) a person at which the firm holds client money fails, the rules in 
CASS 7A.3 (Secondary pooling events) allocate any loss of client 
money among certain of the firm’s clients. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
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725.   7A.2 Primary pooling events 
 
Failure of the authorised firm: primary pooling event 
7A.2.2R 
A primary pooling event occurs: 
 
(1) on the failure of the firm; 
(2) on the vesting of assets in a trustee in accordance with an 'assets 
requirement' imposed under section 55P(1)(b) or (c) (as the case may 
be) of the Act; 
(3) on the coming into force of a requirement or requirements which, 
either separately or in combination: 
(a) is or are for all client money held by the firm; and 
(b) require the firm to take steps to cease holding all client money; or 
(4) when the firm notifies the FCA, in accordance with CASS 7.15.33 
R (Notification requirements), that it is unable correctly to identify 
and allocate in its records all valid claims arising as a result of a 
secondary pooling event. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
726.   7A.2.3R 
CASS 7A.2.2R (4) does not apply so long as: 
 
(1) the firm is taking steps, in consultation with the FCA, to establish 
those records; and 
(2) there are reasonable grounds to conclude that the records will be 
capable of rectification within a reasonable period. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
727.   7A.2.3AR 
If a primary pooling event occurs in circumstances where the firm 
had, before the primary pooling event, reduced its margined 
transaction requirement by utilising approved collateral under CASS 
7.16.33 R , it must immediately liquidate this approved collateral and 
place the proceeds in a client bank account that relates to the relevant 
notional pool under CASS 7A.2.4R(1) (Pooling and distribution or 
transfer) 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
728.   7A.2.3BR 
CASS 7A.2.7-AR (Client money received after the failure of the firm) 
does not apply to the proceeds under CASS 7A.2.3A R. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
729.   7A.2.3CG 
The proceeds of the assets realised under CASS 7A.2.3A R: 
 
(1) will form part of the relevant notional pool of client money (see 
CASS 7A.2.4R(1A)(a)(i) (Pooling and distribution or transfer); and 
(2) must be distributed or transferred on behalf of clients in 
accordance with this chapter. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
730.   Client money reconciliations after a primary pooling event 
7A.2.3DG 
(1) If a special administrator has been appointed to the firm under the 
IBSA Regulations then they will be required to carry out a 
reconciliation under regulation 10H of the IBSA Regulations. 
(2) Notwithstanding regulation 10H of the IBSA Regulations, CASS 
7.15 has application to a firm after a primary pooling event, meaning, 
for example, that ongoing compliant record-keeping is required (see 
CASS 7.15.15R(4) (Internal client money reconciliations) and CASS 
7.15.26AR (Frequency of external reconciliations after a primary 
pooling event)). 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
731.   Pooling and distribution or transfer 
7A.2.4R 
If a primary pooling event occurs, then: 
 
(1) 
(a) in respect of a sub-pool, the following is treated as a single 
notional pool of client money for the beneficiaries of that pool: 
(i) any client money held in a client bank account of the firm relating 
to that sub-pool; and 
(ii) any client money held in a client transaction account of the firm 
relating to that sub-pool, except for client money held in a client 
transaction account at an authorised central counterparty or a clearing 
member which is, in either case, held as part of a regulated clearing 
arrangement; 
(b) in respect of the general pool, the following is treated as a single 
notional pool of client money for the beneficiaries of the general pool: 
(i) any client money held in any client bank account of the firm; 
(ii) any client money held in a client transaction account of the firm, 
except for client money held in a client transaction account at an 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
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authorised central counterparty, or a clearing member which is, in 
either case, held as part of a regulated clearing arrangement; and 
(iii) any client money identifiable in any other account held by the 
firm into which client money has been received; 
except, in each case, for client money relating to a sub-pool which 
falls under sub-paragraphs (1)(a)(i) or (ii); and 
(1A) 
(a) a notional pool under paragraph (1) shall also include any client 
money that is: 
(i) transferred by the firm under regulation 10H(3) of the IBSA 
Regulations to a client bank account that is included in that pool under 
paragraph (1); 
(ii) paid under CASS 7A.2.3AR into a client bank account that is 
included in that pool under paragraph (1); 
(iii) paid under CASS 7A.2.4R(3)(b) or CASS 7A.2.4R(3)(d) into a 
client bank account or client transaction account that is included in 
that pool under paragraph (1); 
(iv) (subject to sub-paragraph (b)) otherwise received after the 
primary pooling event into a client transaction account that is included 
in that pool under paragraph (1) where the receipt is in relation to a 
margined transaction that the firm had entered into through the use of 
that client transaction account and which had not closed out before 
primary pooling event; and 
(v) paid under CASS 7.15.29R(1) (Reconciliation discrepancies) after 
the primary pooling event into a client bank account that is included 
in that pool under paragraph (1); and 
(b) the firm must not transfer any client money in a notional pool 
under sub-paragraphs (1)(a) or (b) to a client transaction account 
except where necessary to comply with sub-paragraph (2)(b); 
(c) a notional pool under paragraph (1) shall cease to include client 
money from the point at which it is: 
(i) transferred by the firm under regulation 10H(4) of the IBSA 
Regulations from a client bank account that is included in that pool 
under paragraph (1); or 
(i) paid out after the primary pooling event from a client transaction 
account that is included in that pool under paragraph (1) where the 
payment is in relation to a margined transaction that the firm had 
entered into through the use of that client transaction account and 
which had not closed out before primary pooling event. 
(2) the firm must, as soon as reasonably practicable: 
(a) (subject to paragraph (4)) distribute client money comprising a 
notional pool in accordance with CASS 7.17.2 R , so that each client 
who is a beneficiary of that pool receives a sum which is rateable to 
the client money entitlement calculated in accordance with CASS 
7A.2.5R (Client money entitlements); or 
(b) (where applicable) transfer client money comprising a sub-pool to 
effect or facilitate porting of positions held for the clients who are 
beneficiaries of that sub-pool; and 
(3) if, in connection with a regulated clearing arrangement, client 
money is remitted directly to the firm either from an authorised 
central counterparty or from a clearing member as part of that 
person’s default management procedures, then, as soon as reasonably 
practicable: 
(a) any such remittance in respect of a client transaction account that 
is an individual client account does not form a part of any notional 
pool under CASS 7A.2.4R(1) and must be distributed to the relevant 
client subject to CASS 7.17.2R (4) ; 
(b) subject to sub-paragraphs (3)(c) and (d), any such remittance in 
respect of a client transaction account that is an omnibus client 
account must form part of the notional pool under CASS 
7A.2.4R(1)(b) and be subject to distribution in accordance with CASS 
7A.2.4R(2)(a); 
(c) any such remittance in respect of a client transaction account that 
is an omnibus client account must be distributed to the relevant clients 
for whom that omnibus client account is held if: 
(i) no client money in excess of the amount recorded in that omnibus 
client account is held by the firm as margin in relation to the positions 
recorded in that omnibus client account; and 
(ii) the amount of such remittance attributable to each client of the 
omnibus client account is readily apparent from information provided 
to the firm by the authorised central counterparty or, in the case of 
indirect clients, the clearing member; 
in which case the amount of such remittance does not form a part of 
any notional pool under CASS 7A.2.4R(1) and must be distributed to 
each such client in accordance with the information provided by the 
authorised central counterparty or clearing member subject to CASS 
7.17.2R (4) ; and 
(d) any such remittance in respect of a client transaction account that 
is a net margined omnibus client account in respect of which the firm 
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maintains a sub-pool must form part of such sub-pool under CASS 
7A.2.4R(1)(a) to be distributed in accordance with CASS 7A.2.4R 
(2)(a); and 
(4) as an alternative to distributing a client’s client money in a 
notional pool to the relevant client under CASS 7A.2.4R(2)(a) and in 
respect of client money that that is not required to be transferred under 
CASS 7A.2.4R(2)(b), a firm (Firm A) may on its own initiative 
transfer some or all of that client’s client money in the relevant 
notional pool to any other person (Firm B) for safekeeping on behalf 
of the client provided that: 
(a) as a consequence of any such transfer, Firm A does not distribute 
to any other client whose client money is in that notional pool, or 
transfer on behalf of any such other client to another person, an 
amount of money that would be less than that which such other client 
was entitled to have distributed or transferred under this rule; 
(b) unless Firm A is able to rely on regulation 10B(3)(b) of the IBSA 
Regulations for the transfer to Firm B to have effect without the 
consent of the client, either: 
(i) Firm A has the specific consent of the client to the transfer to Firm 
B; or 
(ii) 
(A) there is a written agreement between Firm A and the client which 
provides that Firm A may transfer the client’s client money to another 
person; and 
(B) Firm A can lawfully rely on that provision to achieve the transfer 
under this rule; 
(c) Firm A has, in advance of the transfer under this rule, either: 
(i) obtained a contractual undertaking from Firm B that the money 
transferred will be held by Firm B as client money in accordance with 
the client money rules; or 
(ii) where the client money rules do not apply to Firm B, or where 
they do apply but Firm B is able to hold the money transferred other 
than as client money, satisfied itself, having exercised all due skill 
care and diligence in its assessment, that Firm B will apply adequate 
measures to protect the money transferred; 
(d) where regulation 10C(3) of the IBSA Regulations does not apply, 
Firm A has, in advance of the transfer under this rule, obtained a 
contractual undertaking from Firm B that Firm B will return the 
money to the client at the client’s request; and 
(e) Firm A has, in advance of the transfer under this rule, obtained a 
contractual undertaking from Firm B that Firm B will notify the 
client, within 14 days of the transfer of that client’s balance having 
commenced: 
(i) of the applicable regulatory regime under which the money will be 
held by Firm B; 
(ii) either: 
(A) of any relevant compensation scheme limits that may apply in 
respect of Firm B’s handling of the transferred money; or 
(B) of the fact that Firm B does not participate in a relevant 
compensation scheme, if that is the case; and 
(iii) where regulation 10C(3) of the IBSA Regulations does not apply, 
that the client has the option of having its money returned to it by 
Firm B. 
 
732.   7A.2.4A-2G 
Where regulation 10C(3) of the IBSA Regulations does apply, Firm A 
should, in advance of the transfer under CASS 7A.2.4R(4), obtain a 
contractual undertaking from Firm B that: 
 
(1) Firm B will comply with the client’s request for a ‘reverse 
transfer’ as defined in regulation 10C of the IBSA Regulations; and 
(2) Firm B will notify the client, within 14 days of the transfer of that 
client’s safe custody asset having commenced, that the client can 
demand a ‘reverse transfer’ as defined in regulation 10C of the IBSA 
Regulations. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
733.   7A.2.4A-1G 
Under CASS 7A.2.4R(1)(b)(i) a firm should include the balances of 
client money referred to at CASS 7.13.40AR(2), CASS 7.13.53AR(2) 
and CASS 7.13.72AR(2) in the relevant pool. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
734.   7A.2.4AG 
(1) Under EMIR, where a firm that is a clearing member of an 
authorised central counterparty defaults, the authorised central 
counterparty may: 
(a) port client positions where possible; and 
(b) after the completion of the default management process: 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
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(i) return any balance due directly to those clients for whom the 
positions are held, if they are known to the authorised central 
counterparty; or 
(ii) remit any balance to the firm for the account of its clients if the 
clients are not known to the authorised central counterparty. 
(1A) Under the EMIR L2 Regulation or the MiFIR indirect clearing 
RTS, where a firm acting in connection with a regulated clearing 
arrangement for a client (who is also an indirect client) defaults, the 
clearing member with whom the firm has placed client money of the 
indirect client, may, in accordance with the EMIR indirect clearing 
default management obligations or MiFIR indirect clearing default 
management obligations: 
(a) transfer the positions and assets either to another clearing member 
of the relevant authorised central counterparty or to another firm 
willing to act for the indirect client; or 
(b) liquidate the assets and positions of the indirect clients and remit 
all monies due to the indirect clients. 
(1B) For the avoidance of doubt, 'relevant clients' in the case of CASS 
7A.2.4R (3)(a) and CASS 7A.2.4R (3)(c) includes a client who is also 
an indirect client. 
(2) Where any balance remitted from an authorised central 
counterparty or, in the case of indirect clients, a clearing member, to a 
firm is client money, CASS 7A.2.4R (3) provides for the distribution 
of remittances from either an individual client account or an omnibus 
client account. 
(3) Remittances received by the firm falling within CASS 7A.2.4R 
(3)(a) and CASS 7A.2.4R (3)(c) should not be pooled with client 
money held in any client bank account operated by the firm at the 
time of the primary pooling event. Those remittances should be 
segregated and promptly distributed to each client on whose behalf 
the remittance was received. 
(4) For the avoidance of doubt, in respect of a regulated clearing 
arrangement, any client money remitted by the authorised central 
counterparty or, in the case of indirect clients, the clearing member, to 
the firm pursuant to CASS 7A.2.4R (3) should not be treated as client 
money received after the failure of the firm under CASS 7A.2.7-AR 
(Client money received after a primary pooling event). 
(5) The firm's obligation to its client in respect of client money held in 
a sub-pool is discharged to the extent that the firm transfers that client 
money to facilitate porting in accordance with CASS 7.11.34R (8). 
 
735.   7A.2.4BG 
(1) The restrictions on transfers of client money at CASS 7A.2.4R(4) 
are each of the type referred to at regulation 10B(4) of the IBSA 
Regulations as “a restriction in client money rules”. 
(2) Where Firm A has complied with the restrictions at CASS 
7A.2.4R(4) for any transfers to Firm B, any money transferred to Firm 
B ceases to be client money held by Firm A (see CASS 
7.11.34R(2)(e) (Discharge of fiduciary duty)). 
(3) But any money returned by Firm B to Firm A in the event of a 
‘reverse transfer’ will be subject to the client money rules and client 
money distribution and transfer rules as applied to Firm A, and should 
be treated by Firm A in accordance with CASS 7A.2.7-AR (Client 
money received after the failure of the firm). 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
736.   Client money entitlements 
7A.2.5R 
(-2) 
(a) Subject to paragraph (-2)(b), each client’s entitlement to client 
money in a notional pool is calculated with reference to the client 
money requirement as shown by an internal client money 
reconciliation carried out in accordance with CASS 7.15.15R(4)(a) 
(Internal client money reconciliations) as at the primary pooling 
event. 
(b) If, as at the primary pooling event, the firm had entered in to one 
or more cleared margined transactions through the use of a client 
transaction account at a clearing house that had not closed out as at 
the primary pooling event, the client money requirement under (-2)(a) 
must be calculated as follows: 
(i) CASS 7.16.28R does not apply in respect of those cleared 
margined transactions; and 
(ii) subject to CASS 7.16.30R, in respect of those cleared margined 
transactions a client’s equity balance is instead the amount which the 
firm is liable to pay to the client (or the client to the firm) under the 
client money rules for margined transactions following the close out 
of those margined transactions. This balance should include any cash 
margin the firm has received from the client in connection with those 
transactions. 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
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(-1) Each client's client equity balance following any adjustments 
under paragraph (-2) must be reduced by: 
(a) any amount paid by: 
(i) an authorised central counterparty to a clearing member other than 
the firm in connection with a porting arrangement in accordance with 
CASS 7.11.34R (6) in respect of that client; and 
(ii) a clearing member to another clearing member or firm (other than 
the firm) in connection with a transfer in accordance with CASS 
7.11.34R (8); 
(b) any amount paid by: 
(i) an authorised central counterparty directly to that client, in 
accordance withCASS 7.11.34R (7); and 
(ii) a clearing member directly to an indirect client in accordance with 
CASS 7.11.34R (9); and 
(c) any amount that must be distributed to that client by the firm in 
accordance with CASS 7A.2.4R (3)(a) or (c). 
(1) When, in respect of a client who is a beneficiary of a pool and 
following any adjustments under paragraph (-2) and reductions under 
paragraph (-1), there is a positive individual client balance and a 
negative client equity balance in relation to that pool, the credit for 
that pool must be offset against the debit for that pool reducing the 
individual client balance for that client. 
(2) When, in respect of a client who is a beneficiary of a pool and 
following any adjustments under paragraph (-2) and reductions under 
paragraph (-1), there is a negative individual client balance and a 
positive client equity balance in relation to that pool, the credit for 
that pool must be offset against the debit for that pool reducing the 
client equity balance for that client. 
 
737.   7A.2.5AG 
(1) 
(a) The effect of CASS 7A.2.5R(-2)(b) is that the client equity 
balance for the relevant cleared margined transaction is with reference 
to the eventual close out or ‘hindsight’ value of the transaction, 
instead of being a notional balance as at the primary pooling event 
under CASS 7.16.28R. 
(b) CASS 7A.2.5R(-2)(b) applies in respect of cleared margined 
transactions that a firm had entered into for any client, including for 
indirect clients where the firm is itself a client of a clearing member. 
(2) In cases where CASS 7A.2.5R(-2)(b) does not apply, the client 
equity balance for a margined transaction will be the notional balance 
as at the primary pooling event under CASS 7.16.28R. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
738.   Closing a client money pool 
7A.2.6AR 
(1) Before a firm ceases to treat a balance of client money in a 
notional pool as client money by transferring it to itself under CASS 
7.17.2R(5) it must: 
(a) (subject to paragraph (2)) attempt to distribute the balance to the 
relevant client or transfer it to another person for safekeeping on 
behalf of the client in accordance with CASS 7A.2.4R (Pooling and 
distribution or transfer); 
(b) (subject to paragraph (3)) take reasonable steps to notify any client 
in respect of whom the firm has evidence that the money may belong, 
of the firm’s proposed course of action; 
(c) where the firm has failed, apply any of the following types of 
balances of client money in the notional pool towards any costs 
incurred in accordance with CASS 7.17.2R(4), including any costs 
incurred under paragraph (1)(d): 
(i) client money allocated to a client for which, following the steps 
taken by the firm to satisfy paragraph (1)(b), the client to whom the 
client money belongs has not provided the firm with instructions that 
would enable the firm to make a distribution or transfer under 
paragraph (1)(a); or 
(ii) client money belonging to a client who, in response to a 
notification made under paragraph (1)(b), has confirmed to the firm 
that it disclaims the benefit of the statutory trust under CASS 7.17.2R 
in relation to the client money; or 
(iii) client money that, following the steps taken by the firm to satisfy 
paragraph (1)(b), is unallocated to any client in the firm’s records and 
accounts; and 
(d) immediately before transferring the balances of client money 
under paragraph (1)(c) to the firm itself, apply them towards making 
good any outstanding shortfall in the notional pool, and subsequently 
distribute or transfer them in accordance with CASS 7A.2.4R to or on 
behalf of clients for whom the firm is able to make such distributions 
or transfers. 
(2) A firm is not required to attempt to return or transfer the balance 
of client money under paragraph (1)(a) where the client to whom the 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
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balance belongs has confirmed to the firm that it disclaims the benefit 
of the statutory trust under CASS 7.17.2R in relation to the balance 
client money. 
(3) A firm is not required to notify a client under paragraph (1)(b) 
where: 
(a) the firm is able to distribute the client money to the relevant client 
or transfer it to another person on behalf of the client in accordance 
with CASS 7A.2.4R (Pooling and distribution or transfer); 
(b) the client to whom the balance of client money belongs has 
confirmed to the firm that it disclaims the benefit of the statutory trust 
under CASS 7.17.2R in relation to the balance client money; 
(c) in respect of a client for whom the firm has evidence that they 
were a retail client for the purposes of the client money rules at the 
time of the primary pooling event, the entitlement of that client in the 
notional pool is £25 or less when calculated under CASS 7A.2.5R 
(Client money entitlements); or 
(d) in respect of a client for whom the firm has evidence that they 
were a professional client for the purposes of the client money rules at 
the time of the primary pooling event, the entitlement of that client is 
£100 or less when calculated under CASS 7A.2.5R (Client money 
entitlements). 
 
739.   7A.2.6BG 
(1) A firm may propose to cease to treat a balance of money as client 
money under CASS 7A.2.6AR(1) where the firm is using the 
procedure under regulation 12C of the IBSA Regulations to set a 
‘hard bar date’ by giving a ‘hard bar date notice’, or another similar 
procedure in accordance with the legal procedure for the firm’s 
failure. 
(2) In any case, a firm should consider the whether its obligations 
under law (including trust law) or any agreement permit it to cease to 
treat a balance of money as client money in the way in which it 
proposes to do so. 
(3) Balances of client money under CASS 7A.2.6AR(1)(c)(iii) include 
any remaining amount of those that the firm is holding to comply 
with: 
(a) CASS 7.13.41R (Prudent segregation); 
(b) CASS 7.13.65R(1) (The alternative approach to client money 
segregation); and 
(c) CASS 7.13.73R(1) (Use of the normal approach in relation to 
certain regulated clearing arrangements). 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
740.   7A.2.6CE 
(1) Reasonable steps in CASS 7A.2.6AR(1)(b) include the following 
course of conduct: 
(a) determining, as far as reasonably possible, the correct contact 
details for the relevant client; 
(b) for a client for whom the firm has evidence that it was a 
professional client for the purposes of the client money rules at the 
time of the primary pooling event: 
(i) writing to the client at the last known address either by post or by 
electronic mail: 
(A) to inform it of the firm’s intention to no longer treat the balance as 
client money; 
(B) to inform it of the consequences of the firm’s proposed course of 
action in relation to the client’s ability to assert an ownership right to 
that money; and 
(C) to invite the client to submit a claim for the money; and 
(ii) where the client has not responded within 28 days of the 
communication under sub-paragraph (i), attempting to communicate 
the information in sub-paragraph (i) to the client on at least one 
further occasion by any means other than that used in (i) including by 
post, electronic mail, telephone or media advertisement; and 
(c) for any other client: 
(i) the same steps as under sub-paragraphs (b)(i) and (b)(ii); and 
(ii) where the client has not responded within 28 days of the second 
communication under sub-paragraph (b)(ii), attempting to 
communicate the information in sub-paragraph (b)(i) to the client on 
at least one further occasion by any means other than one in respect of 
which the firm has obtained positive confirmation that the client is not 
receiving such communications. 
(2) Compliance with paragraph (1) may be relied on as tending to 
establish compliance with CASS 7A.2.6AR(1)(b). 
(3) Contravention of paragraph (1) may be relied on as tending to 
establish contravention of CASS 7A.2.6AR(1)(b). 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
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741.   7A.2.6DG 
For the purpose of CASS 7A.2.6CE(1)(a), a firm may use any 
available means to determine the correct contact details for the 
relevant client, including: 
 
(1) telephoning the client; 
(2) searching internal and/or public records; 
(3) media advertising; 
(4) mortality screening; and 
(5) using credit reference agencies or tracing agents. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
742.   7A.2.6ER 
If the firm undertook a tracing exercise for the purposes of CASS 
7.11.50R(3) (Allocated but unclaimed client money) before the 
primary pooling event but had not made the charity payment under 
that rule by the time of the primary pooling event then the findings of 
that exercise may be relied on for the purposes of CASS 
7A.2.6CE(1)(a). 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
743.   7A.2.6FR 
(1) A firm must make a record of any balance under CASS 
7A.2.6AR(1)(c)(i) or (ii) which is to be applied towards any costs or 
towards any shortfall in the relevant notional pool in accordance with 
CASS 7A.2.6AR(1)(c) or (d) respectively, immediately before taking 
such steps. 
(2) The record under paragraph (1) must state: 
(a) the amount of the balance of client money; 
(b) the name and contact details of any client to whom that balance 
was allocated according to the firm’s records at the time of making 
the record under this rule; and 
(c) either: 
(i) the efforts applied by the firm to determine the client’s correct 
contact details under CASS 7A.2.6CE(1)(a); or 
(ii) if being relied on under CASS 7A.2.6ER, the efforts applied by 
the firm to determine the client’s correct contact details for the 
purposes of CASS 7.11.50R(3) (Allocated but unclaimed client 
money). 
(3) A firm must keep the record under (1) indefinitely. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
744.   Client money received after a primary pooling event 
7A.2.7-AR 
(1) This rule applies in respect of client money received by a firm 
after a primary pooling event that does not form part of a notional 
pool. 
(2) Where the firm is using the normal approach under CASS 7.13.6R 
(The normal approach), client money to which this rule applies must 
be received into a client bank account that does not contain any client 
money forming part of a notional pool under CASS 7A.2.4R(1) 
(Pooling and distribution or transfer). 
(3) 
(a) This paragraph applies in respect of client money that is received 
by a firm into an account other than a client bank account as required 
under CASS 7.13.62R (The alternative approach to client money 
segregation) or as permitted under CASS 7.13.72R (Use of the normal 
approach in relation to certain regulated clearing arrangements). 
(b) To the extent the firm makes any transfers from its own account to 
a client bank account under CASS 7.13.62R(3) (The alternative 
approach to client money segregation) or CASS 7.13.72R(2)(b) (Use 
of the normal approach in relation to certain regulated clearing 
arrangements), such transfers must be made into a client bank account 
that does not contain any client money forming part of a notional pool 
under CASS 7A.2.4R(1) (Pooling and distribution or transfer). 
(4) Subject to paragraphs (5) and (6), a firm must promptly return to 
each relevant client all client money to which this rule applies. 
(5) To the extent that client money relates to a transaction for a client 
that was concluded before the primary pooling event but had not yet 
settled at the time of the primary pooling event, the firm may use that 
client money to settle that transaction. 
(6) 
(a) This paragraph applies where client money which is not received 
by the firm into a client transaction account relates to one or more 
cleared margined transactions entered into by the firm through the use 
of a client transaction account at a clearing house. 
(b) Where such transactions have not closed out as at the primary 
pooling event, then provided that the firm has not failed, it may 
transfer that client money to a client transaction account with the 
relevant clearing house in accordance with CASS 7.14 (Client money 
held by a third party) for the purpose of collateralising those margined 
transactions. 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
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745.   7A.2.7AG 
A firm may open a client bank account after a primary pooling event 
for the purposes of complying with CASS 7A.2.7-AR(2) and CASS 
7A.2.10AR(2). If it does so it must comply with CASS 7.18.15R 
regarding acknowledgement letters. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
746.   7A.2.7BG 
Following a failure, CASS 7.17.2R(4) applies in respect of costs 
properly attributable to the return of a client’s client money under 
CASS 7A.2.7-AR(4). 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
747.   7A.2.9R 
If a firm receives a mixed remittance after a primary pooling event 
other than where using the alternative approach under CASS 7.13.62R 
or under a regulated clearing arrangement to which CASS 7.13.72R 
applies, it must: 
 
(1) pay the full sum into a client bank account that meets the 
requirements of CASS 7A.2.7-AR(2); and 
(2) pay the money that is not client money out of that client bank 
account into a firm's own bank account within one business day of the 
day on which the firm would normally expect the remittance to be 
cleared. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
748.   7A.2.10G 
Whenever possible the firm should seek to split a mixed remittance 
before the relevant accounts are credited. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
749.   Money due to a client from a firm after a primary pooling event 
7A.2.10AR 
A firm that is operating the normal approach to segregation under 
CASS 7.13 (Segregation of client money) which becomes liable to 
pay money to a client after a primary pooling event must promptly, 
and in any event no later than one business day after the money is due 
and payable, pay the money: 
 
(1) to, or to the order of, the client; or 
(2) into a client bank account that does not contain any client money 
forming part of a notional pool under CASS 7A.2.4R(1). 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
750.   7A.2.10BG 
Where the firm has payment instructions from the client, the firm 
should pay the money to the order of the client, rather than into a 
client bank account. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
751.   Secondary pooling events 
7A.2.11R 
If both a primary pooling event and a secondary pooling event occur, 
the provisions of this section relating to a primary pooling event 
apply. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
752.   7A.3 Secondary pooling events 
 
7A.3.1R 
A secondary pooling event occurs on the failure of a person to which 
client money held by the firm has been transferred underCASS 
7.13.3R (1) to CASS 7.13.3R (3) (Depositing client money) or CASS 
7.14.2 R (Client money held by a third party). 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
753.   7A.3.2R 
CASS 7A.3.6 R to CASS 7A.3.12AR do not apply if, on the failure of 
the relevant person: 
(1) there is no secondary pooling shortfall; or 
(2) where there is a secondary pooling shortfall, the firm pays an 
amount equal to the amount of client money which would have been 
held at that person if a secondary pooling shortfall had not occurred 
either: 
(a) to its clients in the appropriate amounts such that they are 
compensated by the amount of the secondary pooling shortfall that 
they would otherwise be required to bear under this section; or 
(b) into a client bank account at an unaffected bank with the effect 
that any shortfall that would otherwise arise for the purposes of CASS 
7.15 (Records, accounts and reconciliations) is avoided. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
754.   7A.3.4G 
When a person to which client money held by the firm has been 
transferred under CASS 7.13.3R(1) to CASS 7.13.3R(3) (Depositing 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
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client money) or CASS 7.14.2R (Client money held by a third party) 
fails, and the firm decides not to make good any secondary pooling 
shortfall in the amount of client money held at that person (see CASS 
7A.3.2R(2)), a secondary pooling event will occur. The firm should 
reflect the secondary pooling shortfall that arises in the general pool 
(where the firm maintains only a general pool) and, where relevant, in 
a particular sub-pool (where the firm maintains both a general pool 
and one or more sub-pools) in its records of the entitlement of clients 
and of money held with third parties under CASS 7.15 (Records, 
accounts and reconciliations). 
 
755.   7A.3.5G 
The client money distribution and transfer rules seek to ensure that 
clients who have previously specified that they are not willing to 
accept the risk of the bank that has failed, and who therefore 
requested that their client money be placed in a designated client bank 
account at a different bank, should not suffer the loss of the bank that 
has failed. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
756.   Failure of a bank: pooling 
7A.3.6R 
If a secondary pooling event occurs as a result of the failure of a bank 
where one or more general client bank accounts are held, and/or 
where one or more designated client bank accounts or designated 
client fund accounts are held, for the general pool or a particular sub-
pool, then: 
 
(1) in relation to every general client bank account of the firm 
maintained in respect of that pool, the provisions of CASS 7A.3.8 R, 
CASS 7A.3.13 R and CASS 7A.3.14 R will apply; 
(2) in relation to every designated client bank account held by the firm 
with the failed bank for the relevant pool, the provisions of CASS 
7A.3.10 R, CASS 7A.3.13 R and CASS 7A.3.14 R will apply; 
(3) in relation to each designated client fund account held by the firm 
with the failed bank for the relevant pool, the provisions of CASS 
7A.3.11 R, CASS 7A.3.13 R and CASS 7A.3.14 R will apply; 
(4) any money held at a bank, other than the bank that has failed, in 
designated client bank accounts for the relevant pool, is not pooled 
with any other client money held for that pool or any other pool; and 
(5) any money held in a designated client fund account in respect of 
that pool, no part of which is held by the bank that has failed, is not 
pooled with any other client money held for that pool or any other 
pool. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
757.   7A.3.6AG 
Depending on the person at which the secondary pooling event 
occurs, the types of client bank accounts and client transaction 
accounts that are affected by the secondary pooling shortfall, and the 
nature of a firm’s business with a particular client, it is possible that 
the client’s overall entitlement to client money held by the firm may 
be affected by a combination of CASS 7A.3.8R, CASS 7A.3.8AR, 
CASS 7A.3.10R and CASS 7A.3.11R. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
758.   Failure of an exchange, clearing house, intermediate broker, 
settlement agent or OTC counterparty: pooling 
7A.3.7AR 
If a secondary pooling event occurs as a result of the failure of an 
exchange, clearing house, intermediate broker, settlement agent or 
OTC counterparty, then, in relation to every general client bank 
account and client transaction account of the firm, CASS 7A.3.8R and 
CASS 7A.3.13R will apply, and CASS 7A.3.8AR will additionally 
apply in the case of the failure of an authorised central counterparty. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
759.   Failure of a bank, intermediate broker, settlement agent, OTC 
counterparty, exchange or clearing house: treatment of general 
client bank accounts and client transaction accounts 
7A.3.8R 
Money Subject to CASS 7A.3.8AR, if a secondary pooling event 
occurs as a result of the failure of a bank, intermediate broker, 
settlement agent, OTC counterparty, exchange or clearing house, 
money held in each general client bank account and client transaction 
account of the firm for the general pool or a sub-pool must be treated 
as pooled and: 
 
(1) any secondary pooling shortfall in client money held, or which 
should have been held, in general client bank accounts and client 
transaction accounts for the relevant pool, that has arisen as a result of 
the failure of the bank, exchange, clearing house, intermediate broker, 
settlement agent or OTC counterparty, must be borne by all the clients 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
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of that pool whose client money is held in such general client bank 
account or client transaction account of the firm, rateably in 
accordance with their entitlements; 
(2) a new client money entitlement must be calculated for each client 
of the relevant pool by the firm, to reflect the requirements in 
paragraph (1), and the firm's records must be amended to reflect the 
reduced client money entitlement; 
(3) the firm must make and retain a record of each client's share of the 
secondary pooling shortfall until the client is repaid; and 
(4) the firm must use the new client money entitlements, calculated in 
accordance with paragraph (2), for the purposes of reconciliations 
pursuant to CASS 7.15.3 R (Records and accounts) for that pool. 
 
760.   7A.3.8AR 
If a secondary pooling event occurs as a result of the failure of an 
authorised central counterparty: 
 
(1) any money held in a client transaction account that is an individual 
client account at the failed authorised central counterparty is not 
pooled by the firm with any of its other client money; 
(2) any money held in a client transaction account that is an omnibus 
client account at the failed authorised central counterparty is not 
pooled by the firm with any of its other client money provided that: 
(a) no client money in excess of the amount recorded in that omnibus 
client account is held by the firm as margin in relation to the positions 
recorded in that omnibus client account; and 
(b) the client or clients of the firm to whom the amount recorded in 
that omnibus client account relates is or are readily apparent from 
information provided to the firm by the authorised central 
counterparty or, in the case of indirect clients, the clearing member; 
(3) any money held in a client transaction account that is a net 
margined omnibus client account at the failed authorised central 
counterparty in respect of which the firm maintains a sub-pool is not 
pooled by the firm with any of its other client money; 
(4) the proportion of any secondary pooling shortfall that arises as a 
result of client money held, or which should have been held, in an 
individual client account to which paragraph (1) applies must be 
borne by the client whose client money was held in that individual 
client account; 
(5) the proportion of any secondary pooling shortfall that arises as a 
result of client money held, or which should have been held, in an 
omnibus client account to which paragraph (2) applies must either: 
(a) be borne by all the clients whose client money is held in that 
account, rateably in accordance with their entitlements; or 
(b) if the firm is required under applicable law to allocate the 
secondary pooling shortfall other than as under (a), be allocated as 
required by applicable law; 
(6) the proportion of any secondary pooling shortfall that arises as a 
result of client money held, or which should have been held, in a net 
margined omnibus client account to which paragraph (3) applies must 
be borne by all the clients whose client money is held in the relevant 
sub-pool, rateably in accordance with their entitlements; 
(7) a new client money entitlement must be calculated for each 
relevant client of the relevant pool, to reflect the requirements in 
paragraphs (1), (2) and (3), and the firm’s records must be amended to 
reflect the reduced client money entitlement; 
(8) the firm must make and retain a record of each client’s share of the 
secondary pooling shortfall until the client is repaid; and 
(9) the firm must use the new client money entitlements calculated 
under paragraph (7) for the purposes of reconciliations pursuant to 
CASS 7.15.3R (Records and accounts) for the relevant pool. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
761.   7A.3.9G 
The term "which should have been held" is a reference to the relevant 
failed person’s failure to hold the client money at the time of its 
failure. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
762.   7A.3.9AG 
(1) CASS 7A.3.8AR(5)(b) enables a firm to allocate the relevant part 
of a secondary pooling shortfall that arises in an omnibus client 
account under CASS 7A.3.8AR(2) other than on a “pro rata” basis, 
where this is required by applicable law. 
(2) This would include, for example, where applicable law requires 
the firm to attribute a secondary pooling shortfall only to a particular 
client or clients. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
763.   Failure of a bank: treatment of designated client bank accounts 
and designated client fund accounts 
7A.3.10R 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
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For each client with a designated client bank account maintained by 
the firm for the general pool or a particular sub-pool and held at the 
failed bank: 
 
(1) any secondary pooling shortfall in client money held, or which 
should have been held, in designated client bank accounts that has 
arisen as a result of the failure, must be borne by all the clients of the 
relevant pool whose client money is held in a designated client bank 
account of the firm at the failed bank, rateably in accordance with 
their client money entitlements; 
(2) a new client money entitlement must be calculated for each of the 
relevant clients of the relevant pool by the firm, and the firm's records 
must be amended to reflect the reduced client money entitlement; 
(3) the firm must make and retain a record of each client's share of the 
secondary pooling shortfall at the failed bank until the client is repaid; 
and 
(4) the firm must use the new client money entitlements, calculated in 
accordance with paragraph (2), for the purposes of reconciliations 
pursuant to CASS 7.15.3 R (Records and accounts) in respect of the 
relevant pool. 
 
764.   7A.3.11R 
Money held by the firm in each designated client fund account for the 
general pool or a particular sub-pool with the failed bank must be 
treated as pooled with any other designated client fund accounts for 
the general pool or a particular sub-pool as the case may be which 
contain part of the same designated fund and: 
 
(1) any secondary pooling shortfall in client money held, or which 
should have been held, in designated client fund accounts that has 
arisen as a result of the failure, must be borne by each of the clients of 
the relevant pool whose client money is held in that designated fund, 
rateably in accordance with their entitlements; 
(2) a new client money entitlement must be calculated for each client 
of the relevant pool by the firm, in accordance with paragraph (1), and 
the firm's records must be amended to reflect the reduced client 
money entitlement; 
(3) the firm must make and retain a record of each client's share of the 
secondary pooling shortfall at the failed bank until the client is repaid; 
and 
(4) the firm must use the new client money entitlements, calculated in 
accordance with paragraph (2), for the purposes of reconciliations 
pursuant to CASS 7.15.3 R (Records and accounts) for the relevant 
pool. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
765.   7A.3.12R 
A client whose money was held, or which should have been held, in a 
designated client bank account with a bank that has failed is not 
entitled to claim in respect of that money against any other client bank 
account or client transaction account of the firm. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
766.   7A.3.12AR 
A client whose money was held, or which should have been held, in a 
designated client fund account with a bank that has failed is not 
entitled to claim in respect of that money against any other client bank 
account of the firm that is not part of the same designated fund or 
against any client transaction account of the firm. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
767.   Client money received after the secondary pooling event 
7A.3.13R 
Client money received by the firm after the failure of a bank, 
exchange, clearing house, intermediate broker, settlement agent or 
OTC counterparty, that would otherwise have been paid into a client 
bank account or client transaction account at that bank, exchange, 
clearing house, intermediate broker, settlement agent or OTC 
counterparty, as the case may be, for either the general pool or a 
particular sub-pool: 
 
(1) must not be transferred to the failed person unless specifically 
instructed by the client in order to settle an obligation of that client to 
the failed person; and 
(2) must be, subject to paragraph (1), placed in a client bank account 
or client transaction account relating to the general pool or the 
particular sub-pool as the case may be other than an account at the 
failed person. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
768.   7A.3.14R 
If a firm receives a mixed remittance after the secondary pooling 
event which consists of client money that would have been paid into a 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
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general client bank account, a designated client bank account or a 
designated client fund account maintained at the bank that has failed, 
it must: 
 
(1) pay the full sum into a client bank account other than one operated 
at the bank that has failed; and 
(2) pay the money that is not client money out of that client bank 
account within one business day of the day on which the firm would 
normally expect the remittance to be cleared. 
 
769.   7A.3.15G 
Whenever possible the firm should seek to split a mixed remittance 
before the relevant accounts are credited. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
770.   Notification to the FCA of secondary pooling event 
7A.3.19R 
A firm must notify the FCA as soon as reasonably practical after it 
becomes aware of the failure of any bank, exchange, clearing house, 
intermediate broker, settlement agent, OTC counterparty or other 
entity with which it has placed, or whom it has allowed to hold, client 
money: 
 
(3) whether it intends to make good any secondary pooling shortfall 
that has arisen or may arise; and 
(4) the amount of that secondary pooling shortfall, or the expected 
amount if the actual amount is not known. 
 
   Same comment as Row 721.  
771.  Article 24(4) MiFID II 
 
[Not replicated here for reasons of space as well 
as not being fully relevant for the purposes of the 
analysis in this row.] 
 
Article 25(5) MIFID II 
 
The investment firm shall establish a record that 
includes the document or documents agreed 
between the investment firm and the client that 
set out the rights and obligations of the parties, 
and the other terms on which the investment firm 
will provide services to the client. The rights and 
duties of the parties to the contract may be 
incorporated by reference to other documents or 
legal texts. 
 
Article 58 Commission Delegated Regulation 
 
Investment firms providing any investment 
service or the ancillary service referred to in 
Section B(1) of Annex I to Directive 2014/65/EU 
to a client after the date of application of this 
Regulation shall enter into a written basic 
agreement with the client, in paper or another 
durable medium, with the client setting out the 
essential rights and obligations of the firm and the 
client. Investment firms providing investment 
advice shall comply with this obligation only 
where a periodic assessment of the suitability of 
the financial instruments or services 
recommended is performed. The written 
agreement shall set out the essential rights and 
obligations of the parties, and shall include the 
following: (a) a description of the services, and 
where relevant the nature and extent of the 
investment advice, to be provided; (b) in case of 
portfolio management services, the types of 
financial instruments that may be purchased and 
sold and the types of transactions that may be 
undertaken on behalf of the client, as well as any 
instruments or transactions prohibited; and (c) a 
description of the main features of any services 
referred to in Section B(1) of Annex I to 
Directive 2014/65/EU to be provided, including 
where applicable the role of the firm with respect 
to corporate actions relating to client instruments 
and the terms on which securities financing 
transactions involving client securities will 
generate a return for the client. 
 
CHAPTER 8  
Mandates 
 
8.1 Application 
 
8.1.1R 
This chapter (the mandate rules) applies to a firm when it has a 
mandate in the course of, or in connection with, the firm's: 
 
(1) designated investment business (including MiFID business); or 
(2) insurance distribution activity, except where it relates to a 
reinsurance contract; 
(3) debt management activity. 
 
Regulation 48(1) IMR 2017 
 
See row 489 for text.  
5 IMR Guidance  
 
Investor Money Facilities Agreement  
 
(i) The Investor Money Facilities Agreement 
(refer to Regulation 74 for detail of the 
agreement content) should be regarded 
as the master agreement obtained at the 
outset of the business relationship 
between the fund service provider and 
the third party. If such a relationship 
changes, the Investor Money Facilities 
Agreement may need to be reviewed and 
amended accordingly.  
 
(ii) Where a fund service provider prints the 
Investor Money Facilities Agreement on 
its own headed paper and provides these 
agreements to the relevant third party for 
signature, the fund service provider 
should ensure that the third party clearly 
signs, dates and stamps the agreements 
with the third party’s official stamp.  
 
(iii) The Agreement should be reviewed 
annually and may need to be amended in 
the event of any change in the 
relationship between a fund service 
provider and the relevant third party. 
See row 36. Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive. 
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Article 73 Commission Delegated Regulation 
 
Records which set out the respective rights and 
obligations of the investment firm and the client 
under an agreement to provide services, or the 
terms on which the firm provides services to the 
client, shall be retained for at least the duration of 
the relationship with the client. 
 
772.   8.1.2AR 
The mandate rules do not apply to a firm: 
 
(1) in relation to client money that the firm is holding in accordance 
with CASS 5 or CASS 7 (including client money that the firm has 
allowed another person to hold or control in accordance with CASS 
7.14.2R) or CASS 11; or 
(2) in relation to custody assets that the firm is holding, or in respect 
of which the firm is carrying on safeguarding and administration of 
assets (without arranging), acting as trustee or depositary of an AIF or 
acting as trustee or depositary of a UCITS in accordance with CASS 
6; or 
(2A) in relation to custody assets for which a small AIFM is: 
(a) carrying on those excluded custody activities that would amount to 
safeguarding and administration of assets (without arranging) but for 
the exclusion in article 72AA of the RAO; and 
(b) is doing so in accordance with CASS 6; or 
(3) in relation to a client's assets that the firm is holding or has 
received under an arrangement to which CASS 3 applies; or 
(4) when it acts as the operator of a regulated collective investment 
scheme in relation to property held for or within the scheme. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
773.   8.1.2BG 
(1) CASS 8.1.2A R is not an absolute exemption, but it excludes the 
application of the mandate rules in relation to money or assets that a 
firm has received, is holding, or is responsible for (as appropriate and 
in the circumstances described in CASS 8.1.2A R). 
(2) This means that, for example in respect of CASS 8.1.2A R (1), a 
firm holding client money in accordance with CASS 5 or CASS 7 
does not also need to comply with the mandate rules in relation to the 
client money which it actually holds, but the mandate rules would 
apply if the firm has a mandate under which it can receive a client's 
money from another person in the course of, or in connection with, 
the activities set out at CASS 8.1.1 R (1) and CASS 8.1.1 R (2). 
(3) Similarly, in respect of CASS 8.1.2A R (4), the mandate rules 
apply to a firm that is the operator of a regulated collective investment 
scheme if, for example, it has a mandate under which it can receive a 
client's money from another person for the purposes of investing it in 
the scheme. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
774.   8.1.3G 
Firms are reminded that the mandate rules do not apply to an 
incoming EEA firm, other than an insurer, with respect to its 
passported activities. The application of the mandate rules is also 
dependent on the location from which the activity is undertaken (see 
CASS 1.3). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
775.   Purpose 
8.1.4G 
The mandate rules require firms to establish and maintain records and 
internal controls to prevent the misuse of a mandate. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
776.   8.1.4AG 
The mandate rules only apply to a firm that has a mandate, and do not 
affect the duties of any other person to whom the firm is able to give 
the types of instructions referred to in CASS 8.2.1R (4). For example, 
if a person (A) has accepted a deposit from a client, and a firm (B) has 
a mandate in respect of that client's deposit held by A, the mandate 
rules only apply to B, and do not affect the duties of A in relation to 
the deposit. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
777.   8.2 Definition of mandate 
 
8.2.1R 
A mandate is any means that give a firm the ability to control a 
client's assets or liabilities, which meet the conditions in (1) to (5): 
 
(1) they are obtained by the firm from the client, and with the client's 
consent; 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
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(2) where those means are obtained in the course of, or in connection 
with, the firm's insurance distribution activity, they are in written 
form at the time they are obtained from the client; 
(3) they are retained by the firm; 
(4) they put the firm in a position where it is able to give any or all of 
the types of instructions described in (a) to (d): 
(a) instructions to another person in relation to the client's money that 
is credited to an account maintained by that other person for the 
client; 
(b) instructions to another person in relation to any money to which 
the client has an entitlement, where that other person is responsible to 
the client for that entitlement (including where that other person is 
holding client money for the client in accordance with CASS 5 or 
CASS 7); 
(c) instructions to another person in relation to an asset of the client, 
where that other person is responsible to the client for holding that 
asset (including where that other person is safeguarding and 
administering investments, acting as trustee or depositary of an AIF or 
acting as trustee or depositary of a UCITS); 
(d) instructions to another person such that the client incurs a debt or 
other liability to that other person or any other person (other than the 
firm); and 
(5) their circumstances are such that the client's further involvement 
would not be necessary for the firm's instructions described in 4(a) to 
4(d) to be given effect. 
 
778.   The form of a mandate 
8.2.2G 
A mandate can take any form and need not state that it is a mandate. 
For example it could take the form of: 
(1) a standalone document containing certain information conferring 
authority to control a client's assets or liabilities on the firm; 
(2) a specific provision within a document or agreement that also 
relates to other matters; or 
(3) an authority provided by a client orally. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
779.   Retention by the firm 
8.2.3G 
(1) If a firm receives information that puts it in the position described 
in CASS 8.2.1 R (4) in order to effect transactions immediately on 
receiving that information, then such information could only amount 
to a mandate if the firm retained it (for example by not destroying the 
relevant document, electronic record or telephone recording): 
(a) after it uses it to effect those immediate transactions; or 
(b) because those transactions are not, for whatever reason, effected 
immediately. 
(2) If a firm receives information that puts it in the position described 
in CASS 8.2.1 R (4) and the firm retains that information (for 
example in accordance with its record-keeping procedures or in order 
to effect transactions in the future or over a period of time) then such 
information could amount to a mandate. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
780.   Ability to give instructions to another person 
8.2.4G 
The instructions referred to at CASS 8.2.1 R (4) are all instructions 
given by a firm to another person who also has a relationship with the 
firm's client. For example, the other person may be the client's bank, 
intermediary, custodian or credit card provider. This means, for 
example, that any means by which a firm can control a client's money 
or assets for which it is itself responsible to the client (rather than any 
other person) would not amount to a mandate. This includes where the 
firm is holding a client's money or assets other than in accordance 
with CASS 5, CASS 6 or CASS 7 (for example, because of an 
exemption in those rules). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
781.   8.2.5G 
A mandate in relation to the type of instructions referred to in CASS 
8.2.1R (4)(a) could include a direct debit instruction over a client's 
bank account in favour of the firm. The fact that the instruction was 
given by the client in the form of a paperless direct debit would not 
prevent it from being a mandate. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
782.   8.2.6G 
A mandate in relation to the type of instructions referred to in CASS 
8.2.1 R (4)(d) could include the client's credit card details. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
783.   Conditions on use of mandate and client’s further involvement 
8.2.7G 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
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(1) If a firm obtains the means by which it can give the types of 
instructions referred to in CASS 8.2.1 R (4), but its use of those 
means is subject to any limits or conditions, then this does not 
necessarily prevent those means from being a mandate. For example, 
a client might require that a firm uses a mandate only in connection 
with transactions up to a certain value. 
(2) However, if a firm obtains the means by which it can give the 
types of instructions referred to in CASS 8.2.1 R (4), but the firm 
cannot, in practice, use those means without the client's further 
involvement, then the condition in CASS 8.2.1 R (5) would not be 
met. For example, a firm might have the means by which it can give 
instructions of the type referred to in CASS 8.2.1 R (4)(a) in relation 
to an account maintained by another person for a client, but that other 
person might require the client's signature or other authorisation 
before it gives effect to those instructions. 
 
784.   8.3 Records and internal control 
 
8.3.1R 
A firm that has mandates must establish and maintain adequate 
records and internal controls in respect of its use of the mandates. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
785.   8.3.2R 
The records and internal controls required by CASS 8.3.1 R must 
include: 
 
(1) an up-to-date list of each mandate that the firm has obtained, 
including a record of any conditions placed by the client or the firm's 
management on the use of the mandate and, where a mandate was 
received in non-written form in the course of, or in connection with, 
its designated investment business, the details required under CASS 
8.3.2C R; 
(2) a record of each transaction entered into under each mandate that 
the firm has; 
(3) internal controls to ensure that each transaction entered into under 
each mandate that the firm has is carried out in accordance with any 
conditions placed by the client or the firm's management on the use of 
the mandate; 
(4) the details of the procedures and internal controls around the 
giving of instructions under the mandates that the firm has (such 
instructions being those referred to in CASS 8.2.1 R (4)); and 
(5) where the firm holds a passbook or similar documents belonging 
to the client, internal controls for the safeguarding (including against 
loss, unauthorised destruction, theft, fraud or misuse) of any passbook 
or similar document belonging to the client held by the firm. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
786.   A firm’s list of mandates 
8.3.2AR 
(1) A firm's up-to-date list of mandates under CASS 8.3.2 R (1) must 
be maintained in a medium that allows the storage of information in a 
way accessible for future reference by the FCA or by an auditor 
preparing a report under SUP 3.10.4 R. 
(2) It must be possible for any corrections or other amendments, and 
the contents of the list prior to such corrections and amendments, to 
be easily ascertained. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
787.   8.3.2BG 
A firm may use version control to comply with CASS 8.3.2A R (2). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
788.   8.3.2CR 
An entry in a firm's list of mandates under CASS 8.3.2 R (1) that 
relates to a mandate that was received in non-written form (eg in a 
telephone call) in the course of, or in connection with, its designated 
investment business must, as well as the information referred to at 
CASS 8.3.2 R (1), include the following details: 
 
(1) the nature of the mandate (eg debit card details); 
(2) the purpose of the mandate (eg collecting insurance premiums); 
(3) how the mandate was obtained (eg by telephone); 
(4) the name of the relevant client; and 
(5) the date on which the mandate was obtained. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
789.   8.3.2DG 
If a firm receives information through a telephone call in the course 
of, or in connection with, its designated investment business that 
amounts to a mandate as a result of the firm retaining a recording of 
the call (see CASS 8.2.3 G), the requirements at CASS 8.3.2 R (1) 
apply, regardless of whether or not the firm intends to use the 
mandate in the future. The firm will meet the requirements of CASS 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
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8.3.2 R (1) if the firm's list of mandates is updated with the details of 
the mandate that the firm obtained as a result of the call. 
 
790.   8.3.2EG 
A firm should not reproduce information meeting the conditions 
under CASS 8.2.1 R as a separate record (eg by including such 
information in its list of mandates under CASS 8.3.2 R (1)) unless the 
firm considers this necessary, as this creates additional risk of misuse. 
Making a record of the details concerning the mandate described in 
CASS 8.3.2C R would be appropriate. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
791.   8.3.2FG 
When keeping its list of mandates under CASS 8.3.2 R (1) up to date: 
 
(1) a firm should create a new entry in the list each time the firm 
obtains a new mandate; 
(2) if, for an existing entry on its list, a firm obtains the same 
information meeting the conditions in CASS 8.2.1 R again (eg in a 
written confirmation following a paperless direct debit), the additional 
mandate is not a new mandate and the firm should not create another 
entry on the list; but 
(3) the firm should, for every entry on its list, identify each of the 
locations in which it has retained the information that meets the 
conditions in CASS 8.2.1 R (eg a client's debit card details retained in 
a telephone recording and also the firm's written log of the call, or two 
separate documents containing the same information). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
792.  Article 16(6) MiFID II 
 
Investment firms providing any investment 
service or the ancillary service referred to in 
Section B(1) of Annex I to Directive 2014/65/EU 
to a client after the date of application of this 
Regulation shall enter into a written basic 
agreement with the client, in paper or another 
durable medium, with the client setting out the 
essential rights and obligations of the firm and the 
client. Investment firms providing investment 
advice shall comply with this obligation only 
where a periodic assessment of the suitability of 
the financial instruments or services 
recommended is performed. The written 
agreement shall set out the essential rights and 
obligations of the parties, and shall include the 
following: (a) a description of the services, and 
where relevant the nature and extent of the 
investment advice, to be provided; (b) in case of 
portfolio management services, the types of 
financial instruments that may be purchased and 
sold and the types of transactions that may be 
undertaken on behalf of the client, as well as any 
instruments or transactions prohibited; and (c) a 
description of the main features of any services 
referred to in Section B(1) of Annex I to 
Directive 2014/65/EU to be provided, including 
where applicable the role of the firm with respect 
to corporate actions relating to client instruments 
and the terms on which securities financing 
transactions involving client securities will 
generate a return for the client. 
 
Article 72 Commission Delegated Regulation 
 
1. The records shall be retained in a medium that 
allows the storage of information in a way 
accessible for future reference by the competent 
authority, and in such a form and manner that the 
following conditions are met: (a) the competent 
authority is able to access them readily and to 
reconstitute each key stage of the processing of 
each transaction; (b) it is possible for any 
corrections or other amendments, and the 
contents of the records prior to such corrections 
or amendments, to be easily ascertained; (c) it is 
not possible for the records otherwise to be 
manipulated or altered; (d) it allows IT or any 
other efficient exploitation when the analysis of 
the data cannot be easily carried out due to the 
volume and the nature of the data; and (e) the 
Retention of records 
8.3.2GR 
A firm must retain the records required under CASS 8.3.1 R in 
relation to a particular mandate for the following period after it ceases 
to have the mandate (e.g. because the firm has destroyed the relevant 
document, electronic record or telephone recording), as applicable: 
 
(1) subject to (2), a minimum of one year; 
(2) a minimum of five years, where the relevant mandate was held by 
the firm in the course of, or in connection with, its MiFID business. 
 
Regulation 9(1) IMR 2017 
 
9. (1) An investment business firm shall, at all times, have 
in place policies, resources and systems to identify, 
monitor, report on and manage risks to which it is or may 
be exposed in respect of their activities. 
 
 
Regulation 12 IMR 2017 
 
Books, records, financial control and management 
information  
 
See row 693 for text. 
 
 
Record retention pursuant to MiFID Regulations are 
set out in:  
 
Article 23(11) MiFID Regulations  
 
(11) The records kept in accordance with this Regulation 
shall be retained by the investment firm— 
 
(a) for a period of 5 years, or 
 
(b) for such longer period not exceeding 7 years as the 
[Central] Bank [of Ireland] requires. 
 
  Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive.  
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firm's arrangements comply with the record 
keeping requirements irrespective of the 
technology used. 
 
2. Investment firms shall keep at least the records 
identified in Annex I to this Regulation 
depending upon the nature of their activities. The 
list of records identified in Annex I to this 
Regulation is without prejudice to any other 
record-keeping obligations arising from other 
legislation. 3. Investment firms shall also keep 
records of any policies and procedures they are 
required to maintain pursuant to Directive 
2014/65/EU, Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, 
Directive 2014/57/EU and Regulation (EU) No 
596/2014 and their respective implementing 
measures in writing. Competent authorities may 
require investment firms to keep additional 
records to the list identified in Annex I to this 
Regulation. 
 
793.  Article 16(7) MiFID II 
 
Records shall include the recording of telephone 
conversations or electronic communications 
relating to, at least, transactions concluded when 
dealing on own account and the provision of 
client order services that relate to the reception, 
transmission and execution of client orders. Such 
telephone conversations and electronic 
communications shall also include those that are 
intended to result in transactions concluded when 
dealing on own account or in the provision of 
client order services that relate to the reception, 
transmission and execution of client orders, even 
if those conversations or communications do not 
result in the conclusion of such transactions or in 
the provision of client order services. For those 
purposes, an investment firm shall take all 
reasonable steps to record relevant telephone 
conversations and electronic communications, 
made with, sent from or received by equipment 
provided by the investment firm to an employee 
or contractor or the use of which by an employee 
or contractor has been accepted or permitted by 
the investment firm. An investment firm shall 
notify new and existing clients that telephone 
communications or conversations between the 
investment firm and its clients that result or may 
result in transactions will be recorded. Such a 
notification may be made once, before the 
provision of investment services to new and 
existing clients. An investment firm shall not 
provide, by telephone, investment services and 
activities to clients who have not been notified in 
advance about the recording of their telephone 
communications or conversations, where such 
investment services and activities relate to the 
reception, transmission and execution of client 
orders. Orders may be placed by clients through 
other channels, however such communications 
must be made in a durable medium such as mails, 
faxes, emails or documentation of client orders 
made at meetings. In particular, the content of 
relevant face-to-face conversations with a client 
may be recorded by using written minutes or 
notes. Such orders shall be considered equivalent 
to orders received by telephone. An investment 
firm shall take all reasonable steps to prevent an 
employee or contractor from making, sending or 
receiving relevant telephone conversations and 
electronic communications on privately owned 
equipment which the investment firm is unable to 
record or copy. The records kept in accordance 
with this paragraph shall be provided to the client 
involved upon request and shall be kept for a 
period of five years and, where requested by the 
competent authority, for a period of up to seven 
years. 
8.3.2HG 
Where a firm has an obligation under CASS 8.3.2G R to retain 
records after it ceases to have a particular mandate, it may keep the 
mandate on the firm's list under CASS 8.3.2 R (1) for the relevant 
period, but the list should be updated to reflect the fact that it ceased 
to have the relevant mandate at the relevant date. 
 
Regulations 23(5), (6) and (7) MiFID Regulations 
 
(5) The records that must be kept include recordings of 
telephone conversations or electronic communications 
relating to at least— 
 
(a) transactions concluded when dealing on own account, 
 
(b) the provision of client order services that relate to the 
reception, transmission and execution of client orders, and 
 
(c) telephone conversations and electronic 
communications that are intended to result in transactions 
concluded when dealing on own account or in the 
provision of client order services that relate to the 
reception, transmission and execution of client orders, 
even if those conversations or communications do not 
result in the conclusion of such transactions or in the 
provision of client order services. 
 
(6) An investment firm shall take all reasonable steps to 
record relevant telephone conversations and electronic 
communications made with, sent from or received by 
equipment provided by the investment firm to an 
employee or contractor or the use of which by an 
employee or contractor has been accepted or permitted by 
the investment firm. 
 
(7) An investment firm shall not, by telephone, provide 
investment services or perform other activities which 
relate to the reception, transmission and execution of 
client orders to or for new and existing clients who have 
not, on at least one occasion before the provision of 
investment services or performance of other activities, 
been notified that telephone communications or 
conversations between the investment firm and its clients 
that result, or may result, in transactions, will be recorded. 
 
 
Regulation 13 IMR 2017 
 
Telephone recordings  
13. (1) Where an investment business firm records a 
telephone conversation, it shall retain such recording for a 
period of at least 6 months.  
 
(2) Where an investment business firm has reasonable 
cause to believe that a telephone recording referred to in 
paragraph (1) is, or might be, relevant to a complaint, 
disciplinary action or investigation, it shall retain the 
telephone recording until it ceases to be of relevance to 
such complaint, disciplinary action or investigation. 
 
  Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK and 
Irish rules are more prescriptive. 
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Article 76 (1) Commission Delegated 
Regulation 
 
1. Investment firms shall establish, implement 
and maintain an effective recording of telephone 
conversations and electronic communications 
policy, set out in writing, and appropriate to the 
size and organisation of the firm, and the nature, 
scale and complexity of its business. The policy 
shall include the following content: (a) the 
identification of the telephone conversations and 
electronic communications, including relevant 
internal telephone conversations and electronic 
communications, that are subject to the recording 
requirements in accordance with Article 16(7) of 
Directive 2014/65/EU; and 31.3.2017 EN Official 
Journal of the European Union L 87/63 (b) the 
specification of the procedures to be followed and 
measures to be adopted to ensure the firm's 
compliance with the third and eighth 
subparagraphs of Article 16(7) of Directive 
2014/65/EU where exceptional circumstances 
arise and the firm is unable to record the 
conversation/communication on devices issued, 
accepted or permitted by the firm. Evidence of 
such circumstances shall be retained and shall be 
accessible to competent authorities. 
 
794.   8.3.3G 
A firm should distinguish between conditions placed by a client on 
the firm's use of a mandate, and criteria to which transactions effected 
by a firm with or for a client may be subject. 
 
(1) The requirements in CASS 8.3.2 R (1) and CASS 8.3.2 R (3) 
apply only in respect of conditions placed around the firm's use of a 
mandate itself or around the instructions described in CASS 8.2.1 R 
(4). Examples of these include conditions under which a mandate may 
only be used by the firm in connection with transactions up to a 
certain value, or under which instructions under a mandate may only 
be given by certain personnel within the firm. 
(2) The requirements in CASS 8.3.2 R (1) and CASS 8.3.2 R (3) do 
not apply in respect of criteria which relate to the nature and 
circumstances of transactions effected by a firm with or for a client. 
Examples of those criteria include investment restrictions or exposure 
limits for a managed portfolio, and required or preferred execution 
prices or execution venues. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive. 
795.  Article 24 (1) MiFID II 
 
Member States shall require that, when providing 
investment services or, where appropriate, 
ancillary services to clients, an investment firm 
act honestly, fairly and professionally in 
accordance with the best interests of its clients 
and comply, in particular, with the principles set 
out in this Article and in Article 25. 
 
Article 24(4) MiFID II 
 
[Not replicated here for reasons of space as well 
as not being fully relevant for the purposes of the 
analysis in this row.] 
 
Article 49 Commission Delegated Regulation 
 
1. Investment firms holding financial instruments 
or funds belonging to clients shall provide those 
clients or potential clients with the information 
specified in paragraphs 2 to 7 where relevant. 2. 
The investment firm shall inform the client or 
potential client where the financial instruments or 
funds of that client may be held by a third party 
on behalf of the investment firm and of the 
responsibility of the investment firm under the 
applicable national law for any acts or omissions 
of the third party and the consequences for the 
client of the insolvency of the third party. 3. 
Where financial instruments of the client or 
CHAPTER 9 
Information to clients 
 
9.1 Application 
 
9.1.1R 
This chapter applies as follows: 
(1) CASS 9.2 and CASS 9.3 apply to a prime brokerage firm to which 
CASS 6 (Custody rules) applies; 
(2) subject to paragraphs (3) and (4), CASS 9.4 and CASS 9.5 apply 
to a firm to which either or both CASS 6 (Custody rules) and CASS 7 
(Client money rules) applies; 
(3) CASS 9.4 and CASS 9.5 do not apply to a firm which only 
arranges safeguarding and administration of assets; and 
(4) for a firm to which CASS 7 (client money rules) applies as well as 
either or both of CASS 5 (Client money: insurance distribution 
activity) and CASS 11 (Debt management client money chapter) 
apply, this chapter does not apply to client money that a firm holds in 
accordance with CASS 5 or CASS 11. 
 
Regulation 59 IMR 2017 
 
Information to be provided to clients in the terms of 
business 
 
59. (1) Prior to first receiving client assets an investment 
firm shall disclose to clients or potential clients in the 
terms of business— 
 
(a) its arrangements relating to the receipt of client assets, 
 
(b) if applicable, a statement detailing its exchange rate 
policy, 
 
(c) whether interest is payable in respect of client funds 
and the terms on which such interest is payable, 
 
(d) where applicable, its arrangements relating to— 
 
(i) the registration of client financial instruments and 
collateral, if these are not to be registered in the client’s 
name, 
 
(ii) claiming and receiving dividends, interest payments 
and other rights accruing to the client, 
 
(iii) the exercise of conversion, subscription and 
redemption rights, 
 
(iv) dealing with take-overs and capital re-organisations, 
 
 What information should an investment firm provide 
to clients regarding arrangements for holding client 
assets prior to first receiving client assets?  
 
G7 (1) The Central Bank expects the information in 
respect of Regulations 7(2) to 7(4) will be disclosed in 
an investment firm’s term of business or investment 
agreement. An investment firm should ensure this 
information is clearly documented.  
Note, “prior to first receiving client assets” refers to the 
initial receiving of client assets from the client and not to 
each time an investment firm receives client assets from 
the same client. Additional disclosures may be required 
if there is a change in a service offered to the client or 
type of asset received, e.g., securities financing.   
 
 
What information should an investment firm provide 
to clients regarding collateral arrangements?  
 
G7 (4) The Central Bank expects that, in the ordinary 
course of business, an investment firm will provide this 
information in its terms of business or investment 
agreement.  
 
How should the Client Assets Key Information 
Document be presented to retail clients?   
 
G7 (9) An investment firm should document in its 
CAMP, the medium it will use to provide the Client 
Assets Key Information Document (“CAKID”) to its 
Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive. 
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potential client may, if permitted by national law, 
be held in an omnibus account by a third party, 
the investment firm shall inform the client of this 
fact and shall provide a prominent warning of the 
resulting risks. 4. The investment firm shall 
inform the client or potential client where it is not 
possible under national law for client financial 
instruments held with a third party to be 
separately identifiable from the proprietary 
financial instruments of that third party or of the 
investment firm and shall provide a prominent 
warning of the resulting risks. 5. The investment 
firm shall inform the client or potential client 
where accounts that contain financial instruments 
or funds belonging to that client or potential client 
are or will be subject to the law of a jurisdiction 
other than that of a Member State and shall 
indicate that the rights of the client or potential 
client relating to those financial instruments or 
funds may differ accordingly. 
 
 
6. An investment firm shall inform the client 
about the existence and the terms of any security 
interest or lien which the firm has or may have 
over the client's financial instruments or funds, or 
any right of set-off it holds in relation to those 
instruments or funds. Where applicable, it shall 
also inform the client of the fact that a depository 
may have a security interest or lien over, or right 
of set-off in relation to those instruments or 
funds. 7. An investment firm, before entering into 
securities financing transactions in relation to 
financial instruments held by it on behalf of a 
client, or before otherwise using such financial 
instruments for its own account or the account of 
another client shall in good time before the use of 
those instruments provide the client, in a durable 
medium, with clear, full and accurate information 
on the obligations and responsibilities of the 
investment firm with respect to the use of those 
financial instruments, including the terms for 
their restitution, and on the risks involved. 
 
 
Pay attention to Article 49 MiFID Org Regulation 
Article 49 
 
Information concerning safeguarding of client 
financial instruments or client funds 
 
(Article 24(4) of Directive 2014/65/EU) 
 
1.   Investment firms holding financial 
instruments or funds belonging to clients shall 
provide those clients or potential clients with the 
information specified in paragraphs 2 to 7 where 
relevant. 
 
2.   The investment firm shall inform the client or 
potential client where the financial instruments or 
funds of that client may be held by a third party 
on behalf of the investment firm and of the 
responsibility of the investment firm under the 
applicable national law for any acts or omissions 
of the third party and the consequences for the 
client of the insolvency of the third party. 
 
3.   Where financial instruments of the client or 
potential client may, if permitted by national law, 
be held in an omnibus account by a third party, 
the investment firm shall inform the client of this 
fact and shall provide a prominent warning of the 
resulting risks. 
 
4.   The investment firm shall inform the client or 
potential client where it is not possible under 
national law for client financial instruments held 
with a third party to be separately identifiable 
(v) the exercise of voting rights, 
 
(e) where client assets are to be held in a pooled account, 
the nature of a pooled account and the risks of client assets 
being held in a pooled account, 
 
(f) the trading name, registered address and website 
address of any third party with whom the client assets are 
to be deposited, 
 
(g) if client assets are to be deposited with a third party 
outside of the State— 
 
(i) that in the event of a default of a third party outside of 
the State, those client assets may be treated differently 
from the position which would apply if the client assets 
were deposited with a third party in the State, and 
 
(ii) any additional risks that may arise where client assets 
are deposited with a third party outside of the State, 
 
(h) in the case of collateral margined transactions, where 
an investment firm is to deposit collateral with, pledge, 
charge or grant a security arrangement over the collateral 
to a relevant party or eligible custodian— 
 
(i) that the collateral will not be registered in the client’s 
name if this is the case, 
 
(ii) of the procedure which will apply in the event of the 
client’s default, where the proceeds of sale of the 
collateral exceed the amount owed by the client to the 
investment firm, 
 
(iii) of the circumstances in which the investment firm 
shall use a client’s financial instruments in this manner. 
 
Regulation 60 IMR 2017 
 
Client assets key information document  
 
60. (1) Prior to a retail client signing an investment 
agreement to open an account with an investment firm, an 
investment firm shall provide the retail client with a Client 
Assets Key Information Document, which shall be— 
 
(a) written in a language and a style that is clear, succinct 
and comprehensible,  
 
(b) a separate and stand-alone document to any other 
document,  
 
(c) accurate and relevant, and  
 
(d) provided in a durable medium.  
 
(2) The Client Assets Key Information Document shall 
provide—  
 
(a) an explanation of the key features of the regulatory 
regime that applies to the safeguarding of client assets,  
 
(b) an explanation of what constitutes client assets under 
that regime,  
 
(c) the circumstances in which that regime applies and 
does not apply,  
 
(d) an explanation of the circumstances in which the 
investment firm will hold client assets itself, deposit client 
assets with a third party and deposit client assets with a 
third party outside the State,  
 
(e) the arrangements applying to the holding of client 
assets and the relevant risks associated with these 
arrangements.  
 
(3) An investment firm shall—  
 
retail clients. An investment firm should be able to 
demonstrate, when requested to do so, evidence that it 
provided the CAKID to its retail clients.   
 
What information is an investment firm required to 
include in the Client Assets Key Information 
Document?  
 
G7 (10) For the avoidance of doubt, Regulation 7(19) 
applies to all new retail clients; for existing retail clients 
(a retail client of the investment firm as at the date of 
commencement of the Regulations), Regulation 7(20) 
applies. For the purpose of Regulation 7(20), an 
investment firm may provide this document on its 
website. An investment firm should include in its annual 
statement to such retail clients, a notice that the CAKID 
is on its website.  
  
G7 (11) The CAKID should at least contain the 
following where applicable:  
 
a) An explanation of the Regulations An investment firm 
should refer to the Regulations outlining what the 
Regulations mean. The investment firm should also refer 
the retail client to the Guidance explaining the purpose 
of such Guidance. A link to the Regulations and 
Guidance on the Central Bank’s website should also be 
provided.  
  
An investment firm should also point out that, while the 
purpose of the client asset regime is to regulate and 
safeguard the handling of client assets, it can never fully 
eliminate all risks relating to client assets, e.g., fraud, 
negligence. 
 
b) An explanation of what constitutes clients assets 
under the Regulations  
An investment firm should explain that, under the client 
asset regime, client assets mean client funds and client 
financial instruments; the CAKID should define what 
client funds and client financial instruments are, using 
‘plain English’ to the greatest extent possible. The 
investment firm should also state that the client asset 
regime does not relate to the value of a client 
investment.    
 
c) The circumstances in which the Regulations apply 
and do not apply  
An investment firm should state the circumstances 
where the client asset regime applies and explain any 
limitations (e.g., the client asset regime will not apply in 
respect of funds received for an activity that is not a 
regulated financial service).    
An investment firm should explain when assets cease to 
be clients assets, and any relevant situations where client 
assets may not be subject to the client asset regime due 
to the nature of how the asset is being held (e.g., where 
the retail client holds the asset in a share certificate in 
the retail client’s own name, and the investment firm is 
not holding it in safe custody arrangements).   
An investment firm should explain which financial 
instruments held by the investment firm are subject to 
the client asset regime and which are not (e.g., when the 
asset held is in respect of an activity that is not a 
regulated financial service and therefore not subject to 
the client asset regime). An investment firm should 
explain any unique circumstances where the client asset 
regime may/may not apply. For example, the investment 
firm should set out that the client asset regime will not 
apply when a cheque or payable order is made out by the 
retail client in the name of another investment firm, 
eligible credit institution or relevant party and the 
investment firm transmits that cheque or other payable 
order to that party.    
 
d) An explanation of the circumstances in which an 
investment firm will hold client assets itself, hold client 
assets with a third party and hold client assets in another 
jurisdiction  
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from the proprietary financial instruments of that 
third party or of the investment firm and shall 
provide a prominent warning of the resulting 
risks. 
 
5.   The investment firm shall inform the client or 
potential client where accounts that contain 
financial instruments or funds belonging to that 
client or potential client are or will be subject to 
the law of a jurisdiction other than that of a 
Member State and shall indicate that the rights of 
the client or potential client relating to those 
financial instruments or funds may differ 
accordingly. 
 
6.   An investment firm shall inform the client 
about the existence and the terms of any security 
interest or lien which the firm has or may have 
over the client's financial instruments or funds, or 
any right of set-off it holds in relation to those 
instruments or funds. Where applicable, it shall 
also inform the client of the fact that a depository 
may have a security interest or lien over, or right 
of set-off in relation to those instruments or 
funds. 
 
7.   An investment firm, before entering into 
securities financing transactions in relation to 
financial instruments held by it on behalf of a 
client, or before otherwise using such financial 
instruments for its own account or the account of 
another client shall in good time before the use of 
those instruments provide the client, in a durable 
medium, with clear, full and accurate information 
on the obligations and responsibilities of the 
investment firm with respect to the use of those 
financial instruments, including the terms for 
their restitution, and on the risks involved. 
 
(a) review, at least annually, the content of the Client 
Assets Key Information Document, which has been 
provided to all retail clients, and  
 
(b) ensure that the information contained therein is 
accurate and relevant having regard to Regulation 60(2).  
 
(4) An investment firm shall inform all retail clients in 
good time of any material changes to the Client Assets 
Key Information Document in a durable medium, and in 
any event within one month of such changes having been 
issued.  
 
 
Regulation 61 IMR 2017 
 
Statement of client financial instruments or client 
funds  
 
61. (1) The statement of client financial instruments or 
client funds referred to in Article 63 of the 25 April 
Commission Delegated Regulation shall, in addition to the 
information to be provided under Article 63(2) of that 
Regulation, include the following information:  
 
(a) the amounts of cash balances (which may be shown on 
a separate statement) held by the investment firm as of the 
statement date;  
 
(b) identification of those client financial instruments 
registered in the client’s name which are held in custody 
by, or on behalf of, the investment firm separately from 
those registered in any other name; and  
 
(c) the market value of any collateral held as at the date of 
the statement. 
 
An investment firm should disclose to the retail client 
the circumstances under which it will:  
 hold the client assets itself (or through a 
related company), e.g., a nominee; and/or   
 hold the client assets through a third party, 
e.g., an eligible credit institution or a 
custodian; and/or  
 hold the client assets in another 
jurisdiction.   
An investment firm should set out the circumstances 
under which client assets may be held under any of these 
options. Where the client assets are held outside the 
State, the investment firm should set out what investor 
compensation scheme applies. Where client assets are 
held by a third party on behalf of an investment firm, the 
investment firm should set out what regulations that 
entity is subject to, or whether other similar 
requirements apply and any applicable risks or 
limitations. The investment firm should also set out the 
basis on which the third party was chosen to hold the 
client assets and whether it is a related or independent 
party of the investment firm. The above information 
would form part of an investment firm’s considerations 
when deciding on where to deposit its client assets and 
assessing the consequences, if any, of deciding on a 
particular third party. 
 
e) The arrangements applying to the holding of client 
assets and the relevant risks associated with these 
arrangements  An investment firm should set out and 
explain:  
 its arrangements in regard to the holding 
of client assets;  
 the possible risks involved; and  
 the controls in place to mitigate these 
possible risks.  
An investment firm should draft their own responses 
under the headings in a) to e) above tailored to suit their 
particular business. It is essential that the investment 
firm drafts this document in a comprehensible manner, 
in order to ensure that retail clients can fully understand 
how their assets will be held and can consequently make 
informed decisions. As each document will be tailored to 
suit the business model of the investment firm and the 
services offered to its retail clients, the Central Bank 
does not intend to provide a CAKID template. 
 
How should an investment firm inform retail clients 
of any material change to the Client Assets Key 
Information Document?  
 
G7 (12) An investment firm should document in its 
CAMP how it will notify retail clients of any material 
change to the CAKID. For clarity, the CAKID may be 
provided to existing retail clients on an investment 
firm’s website. However, for any subsequent changes to 
the CAKID arising from Regulation 7(21), the 
investment firm has to provide such notification in a 
durable medium. A website is not a durable medium for 
this purpose. Note, it is only the subsequent changes that 
are required to be provided and not the complete CAKID 
document. 
796.   9.2 Prime broker’s daily report to clients 
 
9.2.1R 
(1) A firm must make available to each of its clients to whom it 
provides prime brokerage services a statement in a durable medium: 
(a) showing the value at the close of each business day of the items in 
(3); and 
(b) detailing any other matters which that firm considers are necessary 
to ensure that a client has up-to-date and accurate information about 
the amount of client money and the value of safe custody assets held 
by that firm for it. 
(2) The statement must be made available to those clients not later 
than the close of the next business day to which it relates. 
(3) The statement must include: 
(a) the total value of safe custody assets and the total amount of client 
money held by that prime brokerage firm for a client; 
Information to be provided to clients in the terms of 
business  
 
See row 785 for text. 
 
 
Regulation 60 IMR 2017 
 
Client assets key information document  
 
See row 795 for text.  
 
 
Regulation 61 IMR 2017 
 
 See row 795. Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive in detail and that UK specific rules apply as to concept 
of “prime broker” as a type of supervised role for the purposes of CASS.  
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(b) the cash value of each of the following: 
(i) Cash loans made to that client and accrued interest; 
(ii) securities to be redelivered by that client under open short 
positions entered into on behalf of that client; 
(iii) current settlement amount to be paid by that client under any 
futures contracts; 
(iv) short sale cash proceeds held by the firm in respect of short 
positions entered into on behalf of that client; 
(v) cash margin held by the firm in respect of open futures contracts 
entered into on behalf of that client; 
(vi) mark-to-market close-out exposure of any OTC transaction 
entered into on behalf of that client secured by safe custody assets or 
client money; 
(vii) total secured obligations of that client against the prime 
brokerage firm; and 
(viii) all other safe custody assets held for that client. 
(c) total collateral held by the firm in respect of secured transactions 
entered into under a prime brokerage agreement, including where the 
firm has exercised a right of use in respect of that client's safe custody 
assets; 
(d) the location of all of a client's safe custody assets, including assets 
held with a sub-custodian; and 
(e) a list of all the institutions at which the firm holds or may hold 
client money, including money held in client bank accounts and client 
transaction accounts. 
 
Statement of client financial instruments or client 
funds  
 
See row 795 for text. 
 
797.   9.2.2G 
Where a firm has entered into an agreement with a client under article 
91 (Reporting obligations for prime brokers) of the AIFMD level 2 
regulation, and to the extent that the firm makes available to the client 
the same statements as specified by that article that it is required to 
provide to the relevant depositary, the FCA will treat the obligations 
under CASS 9.2.1 R as satisfied by the firm. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive in detail and that UK specific rules apply as to concept 
of “prime broker” as a type of supervised role for the purposes of CASS.  
798.   9.3 Prime brokerage agreement disclosure annex 
 
9.3.1R 
(1) A firm must ensure that every prime brokerage agreement that 
includes its right to use safe custody assets for its own account 
includes a disclosure annex. 
(2) A firm must ensure that the disclosure annex sets out a summary 
of the key provisions within the prime brokerage agreement 
permitting the use of safe custody assets, including: 
(a) the contractual limit, if any, on the safe custody assets which a 
prime brokerage firm is permitted to use; 
(b) all related contractual definitions upon which that limit is based; 
(c) a list of numbered references to the provisions within that prime 
brokerage agreement which permit the firm to use the safe custody 
assets; and 
(d) a statement of the key risks to that client's safe custody assets if 
they are used by the firm, including but not limited to the risks to the 
safe custody assets on the failure of the firm. 
(3) A firm must ensure that it sends to the client in question an 
updated disclosure annex if the terms of the prime brokerage 
agreement are amended after completion of that agreement such that 
the original disclosure annex no longer accurately records the key 
provisions of the amended agreement. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive in detail and that UK specific rules apply as to concept 
of “prime broker” as a type of supervised role for the purposes of CASS.  
799.   9.3.2G 
(1) Principle 10 (Clients’ assets) requires a firm to arrange adequate 
protection for client's assets when it is responsible for them. As part of 
these protections, the custody rules require a firm to take appropriate 
steps to protect safe custody assets for which it is responsible. 
(2) Subject to paragraph (3), a prime brokerage firm should not enter 
into “right to use arrangements” for a client's safe custody assets 
unless: 
(a) in the case of a CASS small firm or a firm to which CASS 
1A.3.1C R applies, the person in that firm to whom the 
responsibilities set out in CASS 1A.3.1 R or in CASS 1A.3.1C R (2) 
respectively have been allocated; or 
(b) in the case of any other firm, the person who carries out the CASS 
operational oversight function; and 
(c) those of that firm’s managers who are responsible for those safe 
custody assets; 
are each satisfied that the firm has adequate systems and controls to 
discharge its obligations under Principle 10 which include (where 
applicable): 
(i) the daily reporting obligation in CASS 9.2.1 R; and 
(ii) the record-keeping obligations in CASS 6.3.6AR. 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive in detail and that UK specific rules apply as to concept 
of “prime broker” as a type of supervised role for the purposes of CASS.  
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(3) Paragraph (2) does not apply where the prime brokerage firm is 
also acting as trustee or depositary of an AIF which is an unauthorised 
AIF and exercises a right of reuse for a safe custody asset of that 
unauthorised AIF under FUND 3.11.24 R (Reuse of assets). 
 
800.   9.4 Information to clients concerning custody assets and client money 
 
9.4.1G 
(1) Firms to which COBS 6.1 applies are reminded that, under COBS 
6.1.7R, a firm that holds client designated investments or client 
money must provide its clients with specific information about how 
the firm holds those client designated investments and client money 
and how certain arrangements might give rise to specific 
consequences or risks for those client designated investments and 
client money. 
(2) COBS 6.1 (Information about the firm and compensation 
information (non-MiFID and non-insurance distribution provisions)) 
applies to a firm in relation to its designated investment business, 
other than MiFID, equivalent third country or optional exemption 
business or insurance distribution activities, for a retail client. 
9.4.2R 
A firm to which COBS 6.1 applies that holds custody assets or client 
money must, in relation to its business for which COBS 6.1 applies: 
 
(1) provide the information in COBS 6.1.7 R for any custody assets 
the firm may hold for a client, including any custody assets which are 
not designated investments; and 
(2) provide the information in COBS 6.1.7 R and in (1) to each of its 
clients. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive in detail and that UK specific rules apply as to concept 
of “prime broker” as a type of supervised role for the purposes of CASS.  
801.  Pay attention to Article 49 para(2)-(7) MiFID Org 
Regulation 
 
Article 49 
 
Information concerning safeguarding of client 
financial instruments or client funds 
 
(Article 24(4) of Directive 2014/65/EU) 
 
2.   The investment firm shall inform the client or 
potential client where the financial instruments or 
funds of that client may be held by a third party 
on behalf of the investment firm and of the 
responsibility of the investment firm under the 
applicable national law for any acts or omissions 
of the third party and the consequences for the 
client of the insolvency of the third party. 
 
3.   Where financial instruments of the client or 
potential client may, if permitted by national law, 
be held in an omnibus account by a third party, 
the investment firm shall inform the client of this 
fact and shall provide a prominent warning of the 
resulting risks. 
 
4.   The investment firm shall inform the client or 
potential client where it is not possible under 
national law for client financial instruments held 
with a third party to be separately identifiable 
from the proprietary financial instruments of that 
third party or of the investment firm and shall 
provide a prominent warning of the resulting 
risks. 
 
5.   The investment firm shall inform the client or 
potential client where accounts that contain 
financial instruments or funds belonging to that 
client or potential client are or will be subject to 
the law of a jurisdiction other than that of a 
Member State and shall indicate that the rights of 
the client or potential client relating to those 
financial instruments or funds may differ 
accordingly. 
 
6.   An investment firm shall inform the client 
about the existence and the terms of any security 
interest or lien which the firm has or may have 
over the client's financial instruments or funds, or 
9.4.2AR 
(1) Firms to which COBS 6.1ZA applies are reminded of the 
requirements under article 49 of the MiFID Org Regulation (which 
are directly applicable to some firms and which are also applied to 
firms in other circumstances under COBS 6.1ZA.3R) to provide 
certain information to a client when the firm is holding the client’s 
financial instruments or funds (see COBS 6.1ZA.9EU) and the 
requirement under COBS 6.1ZA.10AR when a firm doing insurance 
distribution activities is holding client money and has elected to 
comply with the client money chapter. 
(2) COBS 6.1ZA (Information about the firm and compensation 
information (MiFID and insurance distribution provisions)) applies to 
a firm in relation to its MiFID, equivalent third country or optional 
exemption business or its insurance distribution activities for a client. 
 
Holding and depositing client financial instruments  
 
50.  
 
See row 11 for text. 
  Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive in detail and that UK specific rules apply as to concept 
of “prime broker” as a type of supervised role for the purposes of CASS.  
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any right of set-off it holds in relation to those 
instruments or funds. Where applicable, it shall 
also inform the client of the fact that a depository 
may have a security interest or lien over, or right 
of set-off in relation to those instruments or 
funds. 
 
7.   An investment firm, before entering into 
securities financing transactions in relation to 
financial instruments held by it on behalf of a 
client, or before otherwise using such financial 
instruments for its own account or the account of 
another client shall in good time before the use of 
those instruments provide the client, in a durable 
medium, with clear, full and accurate information 
on the obligations and responsibilities of the 
investment firm with respect to the use of those 
financial instruments, including the terms for 
their restitution, and on the risks involved. 
 
802.   9.4.2BR 
A firm to which COBS 6.1ZA applies that holds custody assets or 
client money must, in relation to its business for which COBS 6.1ZA 
applies: 
 
(1) provide the information referred to in paragraphs 2 to 7 of article 
49 of the MiFID Org Regulation for any custody asset that the firm 
may hold for a client, including: 
(a) any custody asset which is a designated investment but not a 
financial instrument; and 
(b) any custody asset which is neither a designated investment nor a 
financial instrument; and 
(2) provide the information in (1) to each of its clients. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive in detail and that UK specific rules apply as to concept 
of “prime broker” as a type of supervised role for the purposes of CASS.  
803.   9.4.3G 
A firm should provide the information required in CASS 9.4.2 R or 
CASS 9.4.2BR (as applicable) to any client for whom it holds custody 
assets or client money, including a retail client, a professional client 
and an eligible counterparty. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules save that UK rules 
are more prescriptive in detail and that UK specific rules apply as to concept 
of “prime broker” as a type of supervised role for the purposes of CASS.  
804.  Article 44 Commission Delegated Regulation 
 
 
Article 44 
Fair, clear and not misleading information 
requirements 
(Article 24(3) of Directive 2014/65/EU) 
 
1.   Investment firms shall ensure that all 
information they address to, or disseminate in 
such a way that it is likely to be received by, retail 
or professional clients or potential retail or 
professional clients, including marketing 
communications, satisfies the conditions laid 
down in paragraphs 2 to 8. 
 
2.   Investment firm shall ensure that the 
information referred to in paragraph 1 complies 
with the following conditions: 
 
(a) the information includes the name of the 
investment firm, 
 
(b) the information is accurate and always gives a 
fair and prominent indication of any relevant risks 
when referencing any potential benefits of an 
investment service or financial instrument, 
 
(c) the information uses a font size in the 
indication of relevant risks that is at least equal to 
the predominant font size used throughout the 
information provided, as well as a layout ensuring 
such indication is prominent, 
 
(d) the information is sufficient for, and presented 
in a way that is likely to be understood by, the 
average member of the group to whom it is 
directed, or by whom it is likely to be received, 
 
9.4.4G 
(1) Firms are reminded of their obligation, under COBS 4.2.1 R, to be 
fair, clear and not misleading in their communications with clients. 
(2) Firms are also reminded of the requirements in respect of 
communications made to retail clients under COBS 4.5 and clients 
under article 44 of the MiFID Org Regulation and COBS 4.5A (as 
applicable). 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules. 
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(e) the information does not disguise, diminish or 
obscure important items, statements or warnings, 
 
(f) the information is consistently presented in the 
same language throughout all forms of 
information and marketing materials that are 
provided to each client, unless the client has 
accepted to receive information in more than one 
language, 
 
(g) the information is up-to-date and relevant to 
the means of communication used. 
 
3.   Where the information compares investment 
or ancillary services, financial instruments, or 
persons providing investment or ancillary 
services, investment firms shall ensure that the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
 
(a) the comparison is meaningful and presented in 
a fair and balanced way; 
 
(b) the sources of the information used for the 
comparison are specified; 
 
(c) the key facts and assumptions used to make 
the comparison are included. 
 
4.   Where the information contains an indication 
of past performance of a financial instrument, a 
financial index or an investment service, 
investment firms shall ensure that the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
 
(a) that indication is not the most prominent 
feature of the communication; 
 
(b) the information must include appropriate 
performance information which covers the 
preceding 5 years, or the whole period for which 
the financial instrument has been offered, the 
financial index has been established, or the 
investment service has been provided where less 
than five years, or such longer period as the firm 
may decide, and in every case that performance 
information is based on complete 12-month 
periods; 
 
(c) the reference period and the source of 
information is clearly stated; 
 
(d) the information contains a prominent warning 
that the figures refer to the past and that past 
performance is not a reliable indicator of future 
results; 
 
(e) where the indication relies on figures 
denominated in a currency other than that of the 
Member State in which the retail client or 
potential retail client is resident, the currency is 
clearly stated, together with a warning that the 
return may increase or decrease as a result of 
currency fluctuations; 
 
(f) where the indication is based on gross 
performance, the effect of commissions, fees or 
other charges are disclosed. 
 
5.   Where the information includes or refers to 
simulated past performance, investment firms 
shall ensure that the information relates to a 
financial instrument or a financial index, and the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
 
(a) the simulated past performance is based on the 
actual past performance of one or more financial 
instruments or financial indices which are the 
same as, or substantially the same as, or underlie, 
the financial instrument concerned; 
  
 
 
 
  
 474  
 
 
  
 
  
 
(b) in respect of the actual past performance 
referred to in point (a), the conditions set out in 
points (a) to (c), (e) and (f) of paragraph 4 are 
satisfied; 
 
(c) the information contains a prominent warning 
that the figures refer to simulated past 
performance and that past performance is not a 
reliable indicator of future performance. 
 
6.   Where the information contains information 
on future performance, investment firms shall 
ensure that the following conditions are satisfied: 
 
(a) the information is not based on or refer to 
simulated past performance; 
 
(b) the information is based on reasonable 
assumptions supported by objective data; 
 
(c) where the information is based on gross 
performance, the effect of commissions, fees or 
other charges is disclosed; 
 
(d) the information is based on performance 
scenarios in different market conditions (both 
negative and positive scenarios), and reflects the 
nature and risks of the specific types of 
instruments included in the analysis; 
 
(e) the information contains a prominent warning 
that such forecasts are not a reliable indicator of 
future performance. 
 
7.   Where the information refers to a particular 
tax treatment, it shall prominently state that the 
tax treatment depends on the individual 
circumstances of each client and may be subject 
to change in the future. 
 
8.   The information shall not use the name of any 
competent authority in such a way that would 
indicate or suggest endorsement or approval by 
that authority of the products or services of the 
investment firm. 
 
805.  Article 25(6) MiFID II 
 
The investment firm shall provide the client with 
adequate reports on the service provided in a 
durable medium. Those reports shall include 
periodic communications to clients, taking into 
account the type and the complexity of financial 
instruments involved and the nature of the service 
provided to the client and shall include, where 
applicable, the costs associated with the 
transactions and services undertaken on behalf of 
the client. When providing investment advice, the 
investment firm shall, before the transaction is 
made, provide the client with a statement on 
suitability in a durable medium specifying the 
advice given and how that advice meets the 
preferences, objectives and other characteristics 
of the retail client. Where the agreement to buy or 
sell a financial instrument is concluded using a 
means of distance communication which prevents 
the prior delivery of the suitability statement, the 
investment firm may provide the written 
statement on suitability in a durable medium 
immediately after the client is bound by any 
agreement, provided both the following 
conditions are met: (a) the client has consented to 
receiving the suitability statement without undue 
delay after the conclusion of the transaction; and 
(b) the investment firm has given the client the 
option of delaying the transaction in order to 
receive the statement on suitability in advance. 
Where an investment firm provides portfolio 
9.5 Reporting to clients on request 
 
9.5.1G 
(1) Firms to which COBS 16.4 applies are reminded that, under 
COBS 16.4, they are required to send to each of their clients at least 
once a year a statement in a durable medium of those designated 
investments and/or client money they hold for that client. A firm 
which manages investments may provide this statement in its periodic 
statement, as required under COBS 16.3. 
(2) COBS 16.4 (Statements of client designated investments or client 
money) applies, in accordance with COBS 16.1.2R, to a firm carrying 
on designated investment business other than MiFID, equivalent third 
country or optional exemption business. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules. 
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management or has informed the client that it will 
carry out a periodic assessment of suitability, the 
periodic report shall contain an updated statement 
of how the investment meets the client’s 
preferences, objectives and other characteristics 
of the retail client. 
 
 
Article 63 Commission Delegated Regulation  
Statements of client financial instruments or 
client funds 
 
(Article 25(6) of Directive 2014/65/EU) 
 
1.   Investment firms that hold client financial 
instruments or client funds shall send at least on a 
quarterly basis, to each client for whom they hold 
financial instruments or funds, a statement in a 
durable medium of those financial instruments or 
funds unless such a statement has been provided 
in any other periodic statement. Upon client 
request, firms shall provide such statement more 
frequently at a commercial cost. 
 
The first subparagraph shall not apply to a credit 
institution authorised under Directive 2000/12/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(26) in respect of deposits within the meaning of 
that Directive held by that institution. 
 
2.   The statement of client assets referred to in 
paragraph 1 shall include the following 
information: 
 
(a) details of all the financial instruments or funds 
held by the investment firm for the client at the 
end of the period covered by the statement; 
 
(b) the extent to which any client financial 
instruments or client funds have been the subject 
of securities financing transactions; 
 
(c) the extent of any benefit that has accrued to 
the client by virtue of participation in any 
securities financing transactions, and the basis on 
which that benefit has accrued; 
 
(d) a clear indication of the assets or funds which 
are subject to the rules of Directive 2014/65/EU 
and its implementing measures and those that are 
not, such as those that are subject to Title 
Transfer Collateral Agreement; 
 
(e) a clear indication of which assets are affected 
by some peculiarities in their ownership status, 
for instance due to a security interest; 
 
(f) the market or estimated value, when the 
market value is not available, of the financial 
instruments included in the statement with a clear 
indication of the fact that the absence of a market 
price is likely to be indicative of a lack of 
liquidity. The evaluation of the estimated value 
shall be performed by the firm on a best effort 
basis. 
 
In cases where the portfolio of a client includes 
the proceeds of one or more unsettled 
transactions, the information referred to in point 
(a) may be based either on the trade date or the 
settlement date, provided that the same basis is 
applied consistently to all such information in the 
statement. 
 
The periodic statement of client assets referred to 
in paragraph 1 shall not be provided where the 
investment firm provides its clients with access to 
an online system, which qualifies as a durable 
medium, where up-to-date statements of client's 
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financial instruments or funds can be easily 
accessed by the client and the firm has evidence 
that the client has accessed this statement at least 
once during the relevant quarter. 
 
3.   Investment firms which hold financial 
instruments or funds and which carry out the 
service of portfolio management for a client may 
include the statement of client assets referred to in 
paragraph 1 in the periodic statement it provides 
to that client pursuant to Article 60(1). 
 
806.   9.5.2G 
Firms are reminded that the requirements in COBS 16.4, article 63 of 
the MiFID Org Regulation and COBS 16A.4 only set out the 
minimum frequency at which firms must report to their clients on 
their holdings of designated investments and/or client money. Firms 
may choose to report to their clients more frequently. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules. 
807.   9.5.3G 
Subject to CASS 9.5.5AR and CASS 9.5.6 R, CASS 9.5.4R, CASS 
9.5.4BR and CASS 9.5.5 R require firms to comply with a client's 
request for information on the custody assets and/or client money the 
firm holds for a client under CASS 6 and/or CASS 7, and such request 
may be made by a client at any time. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules. 
808.   9.5.4R 
When a firm to which COBS 16.4 applies receives a request, made by 
a client, or on a client's behalf, for a statement of the custody assets 
and/or client money that the firm holds for that client, the firm must 
provide the client with the statement requested in a durable medium. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules. 
809.   9.5.4AR 
(1) Firms to which COBS 16A applies are reminded of the 
requirements under article 63 of the MiFID Org Regulation (which 
are directly applicable to some firms and which are also applied to 
firms in other circumstances under COBS 16A.1.2R) in relation to 
quarterly statements when the firm is holding a client’s financial 
instruments or funds (see COBS 16A.4.1EU and COBS 16A.5.1EU). 
(2) COBS 16A (Reporting information to clients (MiFID provisions) 
applies to a firm in relation to its MiFID, equivalent third country or 
optional exemption business. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules. 
810.   9.5.4BR 
When a firm to which COBS 16A applies receives a request, made by 
a client, or on a client’s behalf, for a statement of the custody assets 
that the firm holds for that client, it must provide the client with a 
statement in a durable medium in relation to any custody assets that 
are not financial instruments. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules. 
811.   9.5.4CG 
A firm to which COBS 16A applies may combine the statement 
required under CASS 9.5.4BR with a statement issued in response to 
a request made under the last sentence of the first sub-paragraph of 
article 63(1) of the MiFID Org Regulation. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules. 
812.   9.5.5R 
When a firm receives a request, made by a client, or on a client's 
behalf, for a copy of any statement of custody assets and/or client 
money previously provided to that client, the firm must provide the 
client with the copy of the statement requested in a durable medium 
and within five business days following the receipt of the request. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules. 
813.   9.5.5AR 
A firm is not required to provide a client with a statement under 
CASS 9.5.4R or CASS 9.5.4BR, or a copy of a statement under CASS 
9.5.5R (as applicable) where the following conditions are met: 
 
(1) the firm provides the client with access to an online system, which 
qualifies as a durable medium; 
(2) up-to-date statements of the client’s custody assets and/or client 
money can be easily accessed by the client via the system under (1); 
and 
(3) the firm has evidence that the client has accessed this statement at 
least once during the relevant quarter. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules. 
814.   9.5.6R    Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules. 
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Any charge agreed between the firm and the client for providing the 
statements in CASS 9.5.4R, CASS 9.5.4BR or CASS 9.5.5R (as 
applicable) must be at a commercial cost. 
 
815.   9.5.7G 
Any statement provided to a client under CASS 9.5.4 R or CASS 
9.5.5 R (as applicable) may, although it is not required to, be in the 
same form as the statement a firm is required to provide to a client 
under COBS 16.4 or, if appropriate, COBS 16.3. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules. 
816.   9.5.8G 
Consistent with the fair, clear and not misleading rule, a firm should 
ensure that, in any statements of custody assets and/or client money it 
provides to its clients, it is clear from the statement which assets 
and/or monies the firm reports as holding for the client are, or are not, 
protected under CASS 6 and/or CASS 7 (e.g. if the statement also 
includes information regarding assets and/or monies which are held 
by the firm for that client which are not subject to the custody rules 
and/or client money rules) . 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules. 
817.   9.5.9G 
Firms are reminded that under CASS 3.2.4 G firms that enter into 
arrangements with retail clients covered by CASS 3 (Collateral) 
should, when appropriate, identify in any statement of custody assets 
sent to the client under COBS 16.4 (Statements of client designated 
investments or client money), article 63 of the MiFID Org Regulation 
or COBS 16A.4 (as applicable) or this section the details of the assets 
which form the basis of that collateral arrangement. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent across all relevant rules. 
818.   CHAPTER 10 
CASS resolution pack 
 
10.1 Application, purpose and general provisions 
 
Application 
10.1.1R 
(1) Subject to (2) this chapter applies to a firm when it: 
(a) holds financial instruments, is safeguarding and administering 
investments, is acting as trustee or depositary of an AIF or is acting as 
trustee or depositary of a UCITS, in accordance with CASS 6; 
(aa) is acting as a small AIFM and carries on excluded custody 
activities in accordance with CASS 6; and/or 
(b) holds client money in accordance with CASS 7. 
(2) This chapter does not apply to a firm to which CASS 6 applies 
merely because it is: 
(a) a firm which arranges safeguarding and administration of assets; 
or 
(b) a small AIFM carrying on those excluded custody activities that 
would amount to arranging safeguarding and administration of assets 
but for the exclusion in article 72AA of the RAO. 
 
   Broadly conceptually equivalent between UK (CASS 10) and Irish rules 
(CAMP and IMP) which are “only” implied by EU level legislation in BRRD 
II and SRM II. 
819.   Purpose 
10.1.2G 
The purpose of the CASS resolution pack is to ensure that a firm 
maintains and is able to retrieve information that would: 
(1) in the event of its insolvency, assist an insolvency practitioner in 
achieving a timely return of client money and safe custody assets held 
by the firm to that firm’s clients; and 
(2) in the event of its or another firm’s resolution, assist the Bank of 
England in its capacity as resolution authority under the RRD; and 
(3) in either case, assist the FCA. 
 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
820.   General provisions 
10.1.3R 
A firm falling within CASS 10.1.1 R must maintain and be able to 
retrieve, in the manner described in this chapter, a CASS resolution 
pack. 
 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
821.   10.1.4G 
A firm is required to maintain a CASS resolution pack at all times 
when CASS 10.1.1 R applies to it. 
 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
822.   10.1.5G 
(1) The rules in this chapter specify the types of documents and 
records that must be maintained in a firm's CASS resolution pack and 
the retrieval period for the pack. The firm should maintain the 
component documents of the CASS resolution pack in order for them 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
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to be retrieved in accordance with CASS 10.1.7 R, and should not use 
the retrieval period to start producing these documents. 
(2) The contents of the documents that constitute the CASS resolution 
pack will change from time to time (for example, because daily 
reconciliations must be included in the pack). 
(3) A firm is only required to retrieve the CASS resolution pack in the 
circumstances prescribed in CASS 10.1.7 R. 
 
823.   10.1.6R 
For the purpose of this chapter, a firm will be treated as satisfying a 
rule in this chapter requiring it to include a document in its CASS 
resolution pack if a member of that firm's group includes that 
document in its own CASS resolution pack, provided that: 
 
(1) that group member is subject to the same rule; and 
(2) the firm is still able to comply with CASS 10.1.7 R. 
 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
824.  Article 2(5) Commission Delegated Directive 
 
 
Member States shall require that investment firms 
make information pertaining to clients' financial 
instruments and funds readily available to the 
following entities: competent authorities, 
appointed insolvency practitioners and those 
responsible for the resolution of failed 
institutions. The information to be made available 
shall include the following: 
 
(a) related internal accounts and records that 
readily identify the balances of funds and 
financial instruments held for each client; 
 
(b) where client funds are held by investment 
firms in accordance with Article 4, details on the 
accounts in which client funds are held and on the 
relevant agreements with those firms; 
 
(c) where financial instruments are held by 
investment firms in accordance with Article 3, 
details on the accounts opened with third parties 
and on the relevant agreements with those third 
parties, as well as details on the relevant 
agreements with those investment firms; 
 
(d) details of third parties carrying out any related 
(outsourced) tasks and details of any outsourced 
tasks 
 
(e) key individuals of the firm involved in related 
processes, including those responsible for 
oversight of the firm's requirements in relation to 
the safeguarding of client assets; and 
 
(f) agreements relevant to establish client 
ownership over assets. 
 
10.1.7R 
In relation to each document in a firm's CASS resolution pack a firm 
must: 
 
(1) put in place adequate arrangements to ensure that an administrator, 
receiver, trustee, liquidator or analogous officer appointed in respect 
of it or any material part of its property is able to retrieve each 
document as soon as practicable and in any event within 48 hours of 
that officer’s appointment; and 
(2) ensure that it is able to retrieve each document as soon as 
practicable, and in any event within 48 hours, where it has taken a 
decision to do so or as a result of an FCA or Bank of England request. 
[Note: article 2(5) of the MiFID Delegated Directive] 
 
Regulation 66 IMR 2017 
 
Outsourcing requirements 
 
66. (1) If an investment firm outsources to another party, 
the performance of the reconciliation referred to in 
Regulation 57 or the daily calculation referred to 
Regulation 58, the investment firm shall take reasonable 
steps to ensure that the other party has appropriate 
processes, systems and controls in place to ensure 
continuity in the effective performance of the outsourced 
activity. 
 G5 (6) Where an investment firm outsources the 
performance of reconciliations, it should have 
appropriate oversight of the process to ensure that the 
third party has appropriate processes, systems and 
controls for the performance of this activity. This would 
also apply where the outsourced provider is part of the 
same group. The manner in which the investment firm 
exercises oversight should be documented in the 
investment firm’s CAMP. The investment firm should 
maintain a record to evidence the oversight of the 
process. 
 
G6 (9) Where an investment firm outsources the 
performance of the daily calculation, it should have 
adequate oversight of the process to ensure that the third 
party has appropriate processes, systems and controls for 
the performance of this activity. This would also apply 
where the outsourced provider is part of the same group. 
The manner in which the investment firm oversees this 
activity should be documented in the investment firm’s 
CAMP. The investment firm should maintain a record to 
evidence the oversight of the process. 
Same comment as Row 818. 
825.   10.1.8R 
Where documents are held by members of a firm's group in 
accordance with CASS 10.1.6 R, the firm must have adequate 
arrangements in place with its group members which allow for 
delivery of the documents within the timeframe referred to in CASS 
10.1.7 R. 
 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
826.   10.1.9E 
(1) For the purpose of CASS 10.1.7 R, the following documents and 
records should be retrievable immediately: 
(a) the document identifying the institutions referred to in CASS 
10.2.1R (2); 
(b) the document identifying individuals pursuant to CASS 10.2.1R 
(4); 
(c) any written notification or acknowledgement letters referred to in 
CASS 10.2.1R (5); 
(d) the most recent internal custody records checks referred to in 
CASS 10.3.1R (3); 
(e) the most recent external custody reconciliations referred to in 
CASS 10.3.1R (5); 
(f) the most recent internal client money reconciliations referred to in 
CASS 10.3.1R (7) and CASS 10.3.1R (7A); and 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
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(g) the most recent external client money reconciliations referred to in 
CASS 10.3.1R(7A). 
(2) Where a firm is reliant on the continued operation of certain 
systems for the provision of component documents in its CASS 
resolution pack, it should have arrangements in place to ensure that 
these systems will remain operational and accessible to it after its 
insolvency. 
(3) Contravention of (1) or (2) may be relied upon as tending to 
establish contravention of CASS 10.1.7 R. 
 
827.   10.1.10G 
Where a firm anticipates that it might be the subject of an insolvency 
order, it is likely to have sought advice from an external adviser. The 
firm should make the CASS resolution pack available promptly, on 
request, to such an adviser. 
 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
828.   10.1.11R 
(1) A firm must ensure that it reviews the content of its CASS 
resolution pack on an ongoing basis to ensure that it remains accurate 
(2) In relation to any change of circumstances that has the effect of 
rendering inaccurate, in any material respect, the content of a 
document specified in CASS 10.2.1 R, a firm must ensure that any 
inaccuracy is corrected promptly and in any event no more than five 
business days after the change of circumstances arose. 
 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
829.   10.1.12G 
For the purpose of CASS 10.1.11R (2), an example of a change that 
would render a document inaccurate in a material respect is a change 
of institution identified pursuant to CASS 10.2.1R (2). 
 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
830.   10.1.13G 
A firm may hold in electronic form any document in its CASS 
resolution pack provided that it continues to be able to comply with 
CASS 10.1.7 R and CASS 10.1.11 R in respect of that document. 
 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
831.   10.1.14R 
The individual to whom responsibility for CASS operational oversight 
has been allocated under CASS 1A.3.1 R, CASS 1A.3.1A R or, as the 
case may be, CASS 1A.3.1CR (2), must report at least annually to the 
firm's governing body in respect of compliance with the rules in this 
chapter. 
 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
832.   10.1.15G 
Individuals allocated functions relating to CASS operational oversight 
pursuant to CASS 1A.3.1 R, CASS 1A.3.1A R or, as the case may be, 
CASS 1A.3.1CR (2), are reminded that their responsibilities include 
compliance with the provisions in this chapter. 
 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
833.   10.1.16R 
A firm must notify the FCA in writing immediately if it has not 
complied with, or is unable to comply with, CASS 10.1.3 R. 
 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
834.   10.2 Core content requirements 
 
10.2.1R 
A firm must include within its CASS resolution pack: 
 
(1) a master document containing information sufficient to retrieve 
each document in the firm's CASS resolution pack; 
(2) a document which identifies the institutions the firm has appointed 
(including through an appointed representative, tied agent, field 
representative or other agent): 
(a) in the case of client money, for the placement of money in 
accordance with CASS 7.13.3 R or to hold client money in 
accordance with CASS 7.14.2 R; and 
(b) in the case of safe custody assets, for the deposit of those assets in 
accordance with CASS 6.3.1 R; 
(3) a document which identifies each appointed representative, tied 
agent, field representative or other agent of the firm which receives 
client money or safe custody assets in its capacity as the firm's agent; 
(4) a document which identifies: 
(a) each senior manager and director and any other individual and the 
nature of their responsibility within the firm who is critical or 
important to the performance of operational functions related to any 
of the obligations imposed on the firm by CASS 6 or CASS 7; and 
(b) the individual to whom responsibility for CASS operational 
oversight has been allocated under CASS 1A.3.1 R or, as the case 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
  
 
 
 
  
 480  
 
 
  
 
  
may be, to whom the CASS operational oversight function has been 
allocated under CASS 1A.3.1A R; 
(5) for each institution identified in CASS 10.2.1R (2), a copy of each 
executed agreement, including any side letters or other agreements 
used to clarify or modify the terms of the executed agreement, 
between that institution and the firm that relates to the holding of 
client money or safe custody assets including any written notification 
or acknowledgement letterssent or received pursuant to CASS 7.18; 
(6) a document which: 
(a) identifies each member of the firm's group involved in operational 
functions related to any obligations imposed on the firm under CASS 
6 or CASS 7, including in the case of a member that is a nominee 
company, identification as such; and 
(b) identifies each third party which the firm uses for the performance 
of operational functions related to any of the obligations imposed on 
the firm by CASS 6 or CASS 7; and 
(c) for each group member identified in (a), the type of entity (such as 
branch, subsidiary and or nominee company) the group member is, its 
jurisdiction of incorporation if applicable, and a description of its 
related operational functions; 
(7) a copy of each executed agreement, including any side letters or 
other agreements used to clarify or modify the terms of the executed 
agreement, between the firm and each third party identified in (6)(b); 
(8) where the firm relies on a third party identified in (6)(b), a 
document which describes how to: 
(a) gain access to relevant information held by that third party; and 
(b) effect a transfer of any of the client money or safe custody assets 
held by the firm, but controlled by that third party; and 
(9) a copy of the firm's manual in which are recorded its procedures 
for the management, recording and transfer of the client money and 
safe custody assets that it holds. 
 
835.   10.2.2G 
For the purpose of CASS 10.2.1R (4), examples of individuals within 
the firm who are critical or important to the performance of 
operational functions include: 
 
(1) those necessary to carry out both internal and external client 
money and safe custody asset reconciliations and record checks; and 
(2) those in charge of client documentation for business involving 
client money and safe custody assets. 
 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
836.   10.2.3R 
For the purpose of CASS 10.2.1R (2), a firm must ensure that the 
document records: 
 
(1) the full name of the individual institution in question; 
(2) the postal and email address and telephone number of that 
institution; and 
(3) the numbers of all accounts opened by that firm with that 
institution. 
 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
837.   10.3 Existing records forming part of the CASS resolution pack 
 
10.3.1R 
A firm must include, as applicable, within its CASS resolution pack 
the records required under: 
 
(1) CASS 6.3.2A R (safe custody assets: appropriateness of the firm’s 
selection of a third party); 
(1A) CASS 6.3.6AR (third party rights over client assets); 
(2) CASS 6.4.3 R (firm’s use of safe custody assets); 
(3) CASS 6.6.2 R and CASS 6.6.3 R (safe custody assets held for 
each client); 
(4) CASS 6.6.6 R (client agreements: firm’s right to use); 
(4A) CASS 6.6.8 R (internal custody record checks, physical asset 
reconciliations and external custody reconciliations); 
(5A) SYSC 6.1.1 R (policy and procedures for carrying out record 
checks and reconciliations); 
(5B) CASS 7.13.14BR (policy for use of client bank accounts under 
CASS 7.13.13R(3A)(b)); 
(6) CASS 7.13.25 R (client money: appropriateness of the firm’s 
selection of a third party); 
(7) CASS 7.15.2 R, CASS 7.15.3 R and CASS 7.15.5 R (client money 
held for each client); 
(7A) CASS 7.15.7 R (internal client money reconciliations and 
external client money reconciliations); 
(10) COBS 3.8.2 R (2)(a) and COBS 3.8.2 R (2)(c) (client 
categorisation); and 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
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(11) COBS 8.1.4 R or COBS 8A.1.9R (retail and professional client 
agreements). 
 
838.   10.3.2G 
CASS 10.3.1 R does not change the record keeping requirements of 
the rules referred to therein. 
 
   Same comment as Row 818. 
839.   CHAPTER 11 
Debt management client money chapter 
 
11.1 Application 
 
11.1.1R 
This chapter (the debt management client money chapter) applies to a 
CASS debt management firm that receives or holds client money as 
set out in this chapter. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
840.   11.1.2G 
The requirements imposed on a CASS debt management firm that 
holds client money vary depending on whether a firm is classified as a 
CASS small debt management firm or a CASS large debt 
management firm in CASS 11.2.3 R (CASS debt management firm 
types). CASS 11.1.4 R to CASS 11.1.6 R indicate which rules in the 
debt management client money chapter apply to which category of 
firm. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
841.   11.1.3G 
The debt management client money chapter applies (to the extent 
indicated by CASS 11.1.4 R to CASS 11.1.6 R) to a CASS debt 
management firm, even if at the date of the determination or, as the 
case may be, the notification, referred to in CASS 11.2.4 R, the CASS 
debt management firm is not holding client money, provided that: 
 
(1) it held client money in the previous calendar year; or 
(2) it projects to hold client money in the current calendar year. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
842.   Application to CASS small debt management firms 
11.1.4R 
Subject to CASS 11.1.6 R, only the rules and guidance in the debt 
management client money chapter listed in the table below apply to 
CASS small debt management firms. 
 
Reference Rule 
CASS 11.1.1 R to 
CASS 11.1.4 R 
and CASS 11.1.6 
R 
Application 
CASS 11.2.1 R to 
CASS 11.2.9 G 
Firm classification 
CASS 11.3.1 R to 
CASS 11.3.2 R 
and CASS 11.3.6 
R 
Responsibility for 
CASS operational 
oversight 
CASS 11.4.1 G to 
CASS 11.4.4 G 
Definition of client 
money and 
discharge of 
fiduciary duty 
CASS 11.5.1 R 
and CASS 11.5.2 
R 
Organisational 
requirements 
CASS 11.6.1 R 
and CASS 11.6.2 
G 
Statutory trust 
CASS 11.7.1 G 
and CASS 11.7.5 
G 
Selecting an 
approved bank at 
which to hold 
client money 
CASS 11.8.1 G to 
CASS 11.8.13 R 
Client bank 
account 
acknowledgement 
letters 
CASS 11.9.1 R to 
CASS 11.9.13 G 
Segregation and 
the operation of 
client money 
accounts 
CASS 11.10.1 R to 
CASS 11.10.7 G 
Payment to 
creditors 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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CASS 11.11.1 R to 
CASS 11.11.12 R , 
CASS 11.11.30 R 
and CASS 
11.11.32 G 
Records, accounts 
and reconciliations 
CASS 11.12.1 G 
to CASS 11.12.7 R 
CASS 11 
resolution pack 
CASS 11.13.1 R to 
CASS 11.13.14 R 
Client money 
distribution in the 
event of a failure 
of a firm or 
approved bank 
 
 
843.   Application to CASS large debt management firms 
11.1.5R 
Subject to CASS 11.1.6 R, the rules and guidance in the debt 
management client money chapter apply to CASS large debt 
management firms, except where indicated otherwise in the relevant 
rule. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
844.   Solicitors 
11.1.6R 
(1) An authorised professional firm regulated by the Law Society of 
England and Wales, the Law Society of Scotland or the Law Society 
of Northern Ireland that, with respect to its regulated activities, is 
subject to the following rules of its designated professional body, 
must comply with those rules and, if it does so, it will be deemed to 
comply with the debt management client money chapter. 
(2) The relevant rules are: 
(a) if the firm is regulated by the Law Society of England and Wales, 
the SRA Accounts Rules 2011; 
(b) if the firm is regulated by the Law Society of Scotland, the Law 
Society of Scotland Practice Rules 2011; and 
(c) if the firm is regulated by the Law Society of Northern Ireland, the 
Solicitors' Accounts Regulations 1998. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
845.   11.2 Firm classification 
 
11.2.1R 
(1) A CASS debt management firm must, once every year and by the 
time it is required to make a notification in accordance with CASS 
11.2.4 R, determine whether it is a CASS large debt management firm 
or a CASS small debt management firm according to the amount of 
client money which it held during the previous year or, if it did not 
hold client money during the previous year, according to the amount 
of client money it projects to hold in the following year, in each case 
using the limits set out in the table in CASS 11.2.3 R. 
(2) For the purpose of determining its 'CASS debt management firm 
type' in accordance with CASS 11.2.3 R, a CASS debt management 
firm must: 
(a) if it currently holds client money, calculate the highest total 
amount of client money held during the previous calendar year ending 
on 31 December and use that figure to determine its 'CASS debt 
management firm type'; 
(b) if it did not hold client money in the previous calendar year but 
projects that it will do so in the current calendar year, calculate the 
highest total amount of client money that it projects that it will hold 
during that year and use that figure to determine its 'CASS debt 
management firm type'. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
846.   11.2.2R 
For the purpose of calculating the value of the total amounts of client 
money that it holds on any given day during a calendar year (in 
complying with CASS 11.2.1 R) a CASS debt management firm must 
base its calculation on accurate internal records of client money 
holdings. A CASS large debt management firm must do this using the 
internal reconciliations performed during the previous year that are 
prescribed in CASS 11.11.13 R. A CASS small debt management 
firm must use the records used in carrying out checks required of it 
under CASS 11.11.8 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
847.   11.2.3RCASS debt management firm types 
 
CASS debt 
management firm 
type 
Highest total 
amount of client 
money held during 
the CASS debt 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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management firm's 
last calendar year 
or as the case may 
be that it projects 
that it will hold 
during the current 
calendar year 
CASS large debt 
management firm 
An amount equal 
to or greater than 
£1 million 
CASS small  debt 
management firm 
Less than £1 
million 
 
 
848.   Notification 
11.2.4R 
Once every calendar year, a CASS debt management firm must notify 
the FCA, in writing, of the information in (1), (2) or (3), as applicable, 
and the information in (4), in each case no later than the day specified 
in (1) to (4): 
 
(1) if it held client money in the previous calendar year, the highest 
total amount of client money held during the previous calendar year, 
notification of which must be made no later than the fifteenth business 
day of January; or 
(2) if it did not hold client money in the previous calendar year but at 
any point up to the fifteenth business day of January the firm projects 
that it will do so in the current calendar year, the highest total amount 
of client money that the firm projects that it will hold during the 
current calendar year, notification of which must be made no later 
than the fifteenth business day of January; or 
(3) in any other case, the highest total amount of client money that the 
firm projects that it will hold during the remainder of the current 
calendar year, notification of which must be made no later than the 
business day before the firm begins to hold client money; and 
(4) in every case, of its 'CASS debt management firm type' 
classification, notification of which must be made at the same time the 
firm makes the notification under (1), (2) or (3). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
849.   11.2.5R 
For the purpose of the annual notification in CASS 11.2.4 R, a CASS 
debt management firm must apply the calculation rule in CASS 11.2.2 
R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
850.   Option to be treated as a CASS large debt management firm 
11.2.6G 
CASS 11.2.7 R provides a CASS debt management firm with the 
ability to opt in to a higher category of 'CASS debt management firm 
type'. This may be useful for a CASS debt management firm whose 
holding of client money is near the upper categorisation limit for a 
CASS small debt management firm. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
851.   11.2.7R 
(1) Notwithstanding CASS 11.2.3 R, provided that the conditions in 
(2) are satisfied, a CASS debt management firm that would otherwise 
be classified as a CASS small debt management firm under the limits 
provided for in CASS 11.2.3 R may elect to be treated as a CASS 
large debt management firm. 
(2) The conditions to which (1) refers are that in either case: 
(a) the election is notified to the FCA in writing; 
(b) the notification in accordance with (a) is made at least one week 
before the election is intended to take effect; and 
(c) the FCA has not objected. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
852.   Effective date of firm type 
11.2.8R 
A firm's 'CASS debt management firm type' and any change to it 
takes effect: 
 
(1) if the firm notifies the FCA in accordance with CASS 11.2.4 R (1) 
or CASS 11.2.4 R (2), on 1 February following the notification; or 
(2) if the firm notifies the FCA in accordance with CASS 11.2.4 R 
(3), on the day it begins to hold client money; or 
(3) if the firm makes an election under CASS 11.2.7 R and provided 
the conditions in CASS 11.2.7 R (2) are satisfied, on the day the 
notification made under CASS 11.2.7 R (2)(a) states that the election 
is intended to take effect. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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853.   11.2.9G 
Any written notification made to the FCA under this chapter should 
be marked for the attention of: "Debt Management Client Assets Firm 
Classification". 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
854.   11.3 Responsibility for CASS operational oversight 
CASS small debt management firm other than a not-for-profit 
debt advice body 
11.3.1R 
(1) A CASS small debt management firm, other than a not-for-profit 
debt advice body, must allocate to a director or senior manager 
responsibility for: 
(a) oversight of the firm's operational compliance with CASS 11; 
(b) reporting to the firm's governing body in respect of that oversight; 
and 
(c) completing and submitting a CCR005 return in accordance with 
SUP 16.12.29CR. 
(2) A firm that is not an SMCR firm must make the allocation in (1) 
to a director or senior manager approved to perform a significant 
influence function in relation to that firm. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
855.   11.3.1AG 
CASS 11.3.3G(5) to (11) also apply to a CASS small debt 
management firm that is an SMCR firm and the function in CASS 
11.3.1R. However: 
 
(1) the function in CASS 11.3.1R is not a separate FCA certification 
function; and 
(2) the person performing that function will not necessarily be subject 
to the employee certification regime described in SYSC 27 (Senior 
managers and certification regime: Certification regime). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
856.   CASS small debt management firm that is a not-for-profit debt 
advice body 
11.3.2R 
A CASS small debt management firm that is a not-for-profit debt 
advice body must allocate to a director or senior manager: 
 
(1) oversight of the firm's operational compliance with CASS 11; 
(2) reporting to the firm's governing body in respect of that oversight; 
and 
(3) completing and submitting a CCR005 return in accordance with 
SUP 16.12.29C R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
857.   CASS large debt management firm: the CASS operational 
oversight function (CF10a) 
11.3.3G 
(1) CASS 11.3.4R describes the FCA controlled function known as 
the CASS operational oversight function (CF10a) in relation to CASS 
large debt management firms, including not-for-profit debt advice 
bodies. 
(2) As a consequence of CASS 11.3.4R (in conjunction with SUP 
10A.4.1R and SUP 10A.7.10R), in a CASS large debt management 
firm (including a not-for-profit debt advice body fitting into that 
category) the function described in CASS 11.3.4R is required to be 
discharged by a director or senior manager. 
(3) In the case of a firm that is not an SMCR firm, the director or 
senior manager in (2) should be an approved person under the 
approved persons regime provided for in SUP 10A (FCA Approved 
Persons). 
(4) However, the CASS operational oversight function does not apply 
to an SMCR firm. 
(4A) For an SMCR firm, the function in CASS 11.3.4R is not a 
separate controlled function and performing that function does not 
require approval as an approved person. Paragraphs (5) to (11) 
describe how CASS 11.3.4R applies to such firms. 
(4B) There are three elements of the regime for SMCR firms that are 
particularly relevant to CASS 11.3, although they do not all apply to 
all SMCR firms: 
(a) a firm’s obligation to allocate certain responsibilities to its SMF 
managers (see SYSC 24 (Senior managers and certification regime: 
Allocation of prescribed responsibilities)); 
(b) a firm’s obligation to ensure that one or more of its SMF managers 
have overall responsibility for each of its activities, business areas and 
management functions (see SYSC 26 (Senior managers and 
certification regime: Overall and local responsibility)); and 
(c) the certification regime (see SYSC 27 (Senior managers and 
certification regime: Certification regime)). 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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(5) Paragraphs (6) to (9) explain how CASS 11.3.4R applies to an 
SMCR firm to which SYSC 24 and SYSC 26 apply. 
(6) The SMCR firm must allocate responsibility for the firm’s 
compliance with CASS to one of its SMF managers (see SYSC 
24.2.1R). That responsibility is an “FCA-prescribed senior 
management responsibility”. The full list of FCA-prescribed senior 
management responsibilities is in the table in SYSC 24.2.6R. 
(7) Although the CASS function in SYSC 24.2.1R is different from 
the function in CASS 11.3.4R, the SMCR firm may allocate the 
function in CASS 11.3.4R to the SMF manager in (6). 
(8) The SMCR firm may allocate the CASS FCA-prescribed senior 
management responsibility described in (6) to an SMF manager who 
does not perform any other function coming within the FCA regime 
for SMF managers in SMCR firms. See SUP 10C.7 (Other overall 
responsibility function (SMF18)) and SUP 10C.8.1R (Other local 
responsibility function (SMF22)) for details. 
(9) The SMCR firm may choose to allocate the function in CASS 
11.3.4R to someone who is not an approved person and SMF 
manager. If so: 
(a) that person will be subject to the employee certification regime 
described in SYSC 27 (Senior managers and certification regime: 
Certification regime); 
(b) that person will be subject to supervision by the SMF manager in 
(6); and 
(c) the function in CASS 11.3.4R will be the CASS oversight FCA 
certification function in SYSC 27.8.1R. 
(10) In relation to an SMCR firm to which SYSC 24 applies but 
SYSC 26 does not apply the guidance in paragraphs (6), (7) and (9) 
applies, but the guidance in paragraph (8) does not apply. 
(11) 
(a) The position of an SMCR firm to which neither SYSC 24 nor 
SYSC 26 apply is slightly different. 
(b) The firm may choose to allocate the function in CASS 11.3.4R to 
an SMF manager. 
(c) The firm may instead choose to allocate the CASS function to 
someone who is not an SMF manager. 
(d) Where (c) applies, the person performing the function in CASS 
11.3.4R will fall into the certification regime. The function in CASS 
1A.3.1AR will be the CASS oversight FCA certification function in 
SYSC 27.8.1R. 
 
858.   11.3.4R 
A CASS large debt management firm must allocate to a director or 
senior manager the function of: 
 
(1) oversight of the operational effectiveness of that CASS debt 
management firm's systems and controls that are designed to achieve 
compliance with CASS 11; 
(2) reporting to the CASS debt management firm's governing body in 
respect of that oversight; and 
(3) completing and submitting a CCR005 return to the FCA in 
accordance with SUP 16.12.29C R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
859.   11.3.5R 
If, at the time a CASS debt management firm that is not an SMCR 
firm becomes a CASS large debt management firm in accordance 
with CASS 11.2.8 R, the firm is not able to comply with CASS 11.3.4 
R because it has no director or senior manager who is an approved 
person in respect of the CASS operational oversight function, the firm 
must: 
 
(1) take the necessary steps to ensure that it complies with CASS 
11.3.4 R as soon as practicable, which must at least include 
submitting an application for a candidate in respect of the CASS 
operational oversight function within 30 business days of the firm 
becoming a CASS large debt management firm; and 
(2) until such time as it is able to comply with CASS 11.3.4 R, 
allocate to a director or senior manager performing a significant-
influence function responsibility for: 
(a) oversight of the firm's operational compliance with CASS 11; 
(b) reporting to the firm's governing body in respect of that oversight; 
and 
(c) completing and submitting a CCR005 return to the FCA in 
accordance with SUP 16.12.29C R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
860.   11.3.5AG 
(1) CASS 11.3.5R provides a grace period for a firm that is not an 
SMCR firm to apply for someone to be approved to perform the 
CASS operational oversight function. 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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(2) There is no equivalent to CASS 11.3.5R for an SMCR firm, 
because a person does not need specific FCA approval before carrying 
out the function. This is explained in (3) to (5), below. 
(3) As explained in CASS 11.3.3G, the function in CASS 11.3.5R is 
not, by itself, a controlled function. 
(4) Therefore, if an approved person is to perform the function for an 
SMCR firm, it can be allocated to any director or senior manager who 
is already an approved person who is suitable to carry it out. 
However, if the firm wishes to allocate the function to someone as 
described in CASS 11.3.3G(8), it will need to get FCA approval 
before the firm appoints them. 
(5) If the function is to be carried out by a certification employee: 
(a) FCA approval is not needed because performance of a role that 
falls into the certification regime does not require FCA approval; 
(b) the firm should: 
(i) either issue them with a certificate under SYSC 27 (Senior 
managers and certification regime: Certification regime) before the 
firm becomes a CASS large debt management firm; or 
(ii) give the function to a suitable approved person pending issue of 
the certificate. 
 
861.   Record of responsibility for CASS operational oversight 
11.3.6R 
(1) Subject to (2), a CASS debt management firm must make and 
retain an appropriate record of the person to whom responsibility is 
allocated in accordance with, as applicable, CASS 11.3.1 R, CASS 
11.3.2 R, and CASS 11.3.4 R. 
(2) A CASS small debt management firm must make and retain such a 
record only where it allocates responsibility to a person other than the 
person in that firm who performs the compliance oversight function. 
(3) A CASS debt management firm must ensure that a record made 
under this rule is retained for a period of five years after it is made. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
862.   11.4 Definition of client money and discharge of fiduciary duty 
 
11.4.1G 
CASS 11 provides important safeguards for the protection of client 
money held by CASS debt management firms that sit alongside the 
fiduciary duty owed by firms in relation to client money. CASS 11.4.2 
R to CASS 11.4.4 G provide guidance and rules for when money 
ceases to be client money for the purposes of both those rules and of 
the fiduciary duty which CASS debt management firms owe to clients 
in relation to client money. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
863.   11.4.2R 
Money ceases to be client money if: 
 
(1) it is paid to the client, or a duly authorised representative of the 
client; or 
(2) it is: 
(a) paid to a third party on the instruction of the client, or with the 
specific consent of the client; or 
(b) paid to a third party further to an obligation on the firm under any 
applicable law; or 
(3) it is paid into an account of the client (not being an account which 
is also in the name of the firm) on the instruction, or with the specific 
consent, of the client; 
(4) it is due and payable to the firm for its own account; 
(5) it is paid to the firm as an excess in the client bank account (see 
CASS 11.11.12 R (2) and CASS 11.11.23 R (3)). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
864.   11.4.3R 
When a CASS debt management firm draws a cheque or other 
payable order to discharge its fiduciary duty to the client, it must 
continue to treat the sum concerned as client money until the cheque 
or order is presented and paid. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
865.   11.4.4G 
Money is not client money when it is properly due and payable to the 
firm for its own account. The circumstances in which money may 
become due and payable to the firm could include when fees have 
become due and payable from the client to the firm under the 
agreement between the client and the firm. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
866.   11.5 Organisational requirements 
 
11.5.1R 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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A CASS debt management firm must, when holding client money, 
make adequate arrangements to safeguard the client's rights and 
prevent the use of client money for its own account. 
 
867.  Article 2(1)(f) Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Member States shall require that investment firms 
comply with the following requirements: 
 
(f)  
they must introduce adequate organisational 
arrangements to minimise the risk of the loss or 
diminution of client assets, or of rights in 
connection with those assets, as a result of misuse 
of the assets, fraud, poor administration, 
inadequate record-keeping or negligence. 
 
11.5.2R 
A CASS debt management firm must introduce adequate 
organisational arrangements to minimise the risk of the loss or 
diminution of client money, or of rights in connection with client 
money, as a result of misuse of client money, fraud, poor 
administration, inadequate record-keeping or negligence. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
868.   11.6 Statutory trust 
 
11.6.1R 
A CASS debt management firm receives and holds client money as 
trustee on the following terms: 
 
(1) for the purposes and on the terms of the debt management client 
money rules and the debt management client money distribution rules; 
(2) subject to (3), for the clients for whom that money is held, 
according to their respective interests in it; 
(3) on failure of the CASS debt management firm, for the payment of 
the costs properly attributable to the distribution of the client money 
in accordance with (2); and 
(4) after all valid claims and costs under (2) and (3) have been met, 
for the CASS debt management firm itself. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
869.   11.6.2G 
Section 137B(1) of the Act provides that rules may make provisions 
which result in client money being held by a firm on trust. CASS 
11.6.1 R creates such a rule in relation to client money held by a 
CASS debt management firm. The consequence of this rule is there is 
a fiduciary relationship between a CASS debt management firm and 
its client, under which client money is in the legal ownership of the 
firm but remains in the beneficial ownership of the client. In the event 
of failure of the CASS debt management firm, costs relating to the 
distribution of client money may have to be borne by the trust. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
870.   11.7 Selecting an approved bank at which to hold client money 
 
11.7.1G 
A CASS debt management firm owes a duty of care as a trustee to its 
clients in relation to client money and has to exercise that duty of care 
in deciding where to hold client money. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
871.   11.7.2R 
Before a CASS large debt management firm opens a client bank 
account and as often as is appropriate on a continuing basis (such 
frequency being no less than once in each financial year) it must take 
reasonable steps to establish that it is appropriate for the firm to hold 
client money at the approved bank concerned. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
872.   11.7.3R 
A CASS large debt management firm must consider the risks 
associated with holding all client money with one approved bank and 
should consider whether it would be appropriate to hold client money 
in client bank accounts at a number of different approved banks. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
873.   11.7.4G 
In complying with CASS 11.7.3 R a CASS large debt management 
firm should consider as appropriate, together with any other relevant 
matters: 
 
(1) the amount of client money held by the firm; 
(2) the amount of client money the firm anticipates holding at the 
approved bank; and 
(3) the credit worthiness of the approved bank. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
874.   11.7.5G 
A CASS small debt management firm can demonstrate compliance 
with CASS 11.7.1 G by checking that the person it proposes to hold 
client money with is an approved bank and that nothing has come to 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
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the firm's attention to cause it to believe that such person is not an 
appropriate place at which to hold client money. 
 
875.   11.7.6R 
A CASS large debt management firm must make a record of the 
grounds upon which it satisfies itself as to the appropriateness of its 
selection of an approved bank. The firm must make the record on the 
date it makes the selection and must keep it from the date of such 
selection until five years after the firm ceases to use the approved 
bank to hold client money. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules. 
876.   11.8 Client bank account acknowledgement letters 
 
11.8.1G 
The main purposes of a client bank account acknowledgement letter 
are: 
 
(1) to put the approved bank on notice of a firm's clients' interests in 
client money that has been deposited with such person; 
(2) to ensure that the client bank account has been opened in 
accordance with CASS 11.9.3 R, and is distinguished from any 
account containing money that belongs to the firm; and 
(3) to ensure that the approved bank understands and agrees that it 
will not have any recourse or right against money standing to the 
credit of the client bank account, in respect of any liability of the firm 
to such person (or person connected to such person). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extend spirt of EU principles.  
877.   11.8.2R 
(1) For each client bank account, a CASS debt management firm 
must, in accordance with CASS 11.8.4 R, complete and sign a client 
bank account acknowledgement letter clearly identifying the client 
bank account, and send it to the approved bank with whom the client 
bank account is, or will be, opened, requesting the bank to 
acknowledge and agree to the terms of the letter by countersigning it 
and returning it to the firm. 
(2) Subject to CASS 11.8.6 R, a CASS debt management firm must 
not hold or receive any client money in or into a client bank account 
unless it has received a duly countersigned client bank account 
acknowledgement letter from the approved bank that has not been 
inappropriately redrafted and clearly identifies the client bank 
account. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
878.   11.8.3R 
In drafting client bank account acknowledgement letters under CASS 
11.8.2 R a CASS debt management firm is required to use the relevant 
template in CASS 11 Annex 1 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
879.   11.8.4R 
When completing a client bank account acknowledgement letter under 
CASS 11.8.2 R (1) a CASS debt management firm: 
 
(1) must not amend any of the acknowledgement letter fixed text; 
(2) subject to (3), must ensure the acknowledgement letter variable 
text is removed, included or amended as appropriate; and 
(3) must not amend any of the acknowledgement letter variable text in 
a way that would alter or otherwise change the meaning of the 
acknowledgement letter fixed text. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
880.   11.8.5G 
CASS 11 Annex 2 contains guidance on using the template client 
bank account acknowledgement letters, including on when and how 
firms should amend the acknowledgement letter variable text that is in 
square brackets. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
881.   11.8.6R 
(1) If, on countersigning and returning the client bank account 
acknowledgement letter to a firm, the relevant approved bank has 
also: 
(a) made amendments to any of the acknowledgement letter fixed 
text; or 
(b) made amendments to any of the acknowledgement letter variable 
text in a way that would alter or otherwise change the meaning of the 
acknowledgement letter fixed text; 
the client bank account acknowledgement letter will have been 
inappropriately redrafted for the purposes of CASS 11.8.2 R (2). 
 
(2) Amendments made to the acknowledgement letter variable text, in 
the client bank account acknowledgement letter returned to a firm by 
the relevant approved bank, will not have the result that the letter has 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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been inappropriately redrafted if those amendments do not affect the 
meaning of the acknowledgement letter fixed text, have been 
specifically agreed with the firm and do not cause the client bank 
account acknowledgement letter to be inaccurate. 
 
882.   11.8.7R 
A CASS debt management firm must use reasonable endeavours to 
ensure that any individual that has countersigned a client bank 
account acknowledgement letter that has been returned to the firm 
was authorised to countersign the letter on behalf of the relevant 
approved bank. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
883.   11.8.8R 
A CASS debt management firm must retain each countersigned client 
bank account acknowledgement letter it receives from the date of 
receipt until the expiry of a period of five years starting on the date on 
which the last client bank account to which the acknowledgment letter 
relates is closed. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
884.   11.8.9R 
A CASS debt management firm must also retain any other 
documentation or evidence it believes is necessary to demonstrate that 
it has complied with each of the applicable requirements in this 
section (such as any evidence it has obtained to ensure that the 
individual that has countersigned a client bank account 
acknowledgement letter that has been returned to the firm was 
authorised to countersign the letter on behalf of the relevant approved 
bank). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
885.   11.8.10R 
A CASS debt management firm must, periodically (at least annually, 
and whenever it becomes aware that something referred to in a client 
bank account acknowledgement letter has changed) review each of its 
countersigned client bank account acknowledgement letters to ensure 
that they remain accurate. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
886.   11.8.11R 
Whenever a CASS debt management firm finds a countersigned client 
bank account acknowledgement letter to contain an inaccuracy, the 
firm must promptly draw up a new replacement client bank account 
acknowledgement letter under CASS 11.8.2 R and ensure that the new 
client bank account acknowledgement letter is duly countersigned and 
returned by the relevant approved bank. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
887.   11.8.12G 
Under CASS 11.8.10 R, a CASS debt management firm should obtain 
a replacement client bank account acknowledgement letter whenever: 
 
(1) there has been a change in any of the parties' names or addresses 
or a change in any of the details of the relevant account(s) as set out in 
the letter; or 
(2) it becomes aware of an error or misspelling in the letter. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
888.   11.8.13R 
If a CASS debt management firm's client bank account is transferred 
to another approved bank, the firm must promptly draw up a new 
client bank account acknowledgement letter under CASS 11.8.2 R 
and ensure that the new client bank account acknowledgement letter is 
duly countersigned and returned by the relevant approved bank within 
20 business days of the firm sending it to that person. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
889.   11.9 Segregation and the operation of client money accounts 
 
Requirement to segregate 
 
11.9.1R 
A CASS debt management firm must take all reasonable steps to 
ensure that all client money it receives is paid directly into a client 
bank account at an approved bank, rather than being first received into 
the firm's own account and then segregated. 
 
Regulation 48(1) IMR 2017 
Segregation  
 
See row 489 for text.  
  UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
890.   11.9.2G 
A CASS debt management firm should arrange for clients and third 
parties to make transfers and payments of any money which will be 
client money directly into the firm's client bank accounts. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
891.   11.9.3R    UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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A CASS debt management firm must ensure that client money is held 
in a client bank account at one or more approved banks. 
 
892.   11.9.4R 
Cheques received by a CASS debt management firm, made out to the 
firm, representing client money or a mixed remittance must be treated 
as client money from receipt by the firm. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
893.   11.9.5R 
Where a CASS debt management firm receives client money in the 
form of cash, a cheque or other payable order, it must: 
 
(1) pay the money into a client bank account in accordance with 
CASS 11.9.1 R promptly and no later than on the business day after it 
receives the money; 
(2) if the firm holds the money overnight, hold it in a secure location 
in line with Principle 10; and 
(3) record the receipt of the money in the firm's books and records 
under the applicable requirements of CASS 11.11 (Records, accounts 
and reconciliations). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
894.   Mixed remittance 
11.9.6R 
If a CASS debt management firm receives a mixed remittance it must: 
 
(1) pay the full sum into a client bank account promptly and in 
accordance with CASS 11.9.1 R to CASS 11.9.5 R; and 
(2) no later than one business day after the payment of the mixed 
remittance into the client bank account has cleared, pay the money 
that is not client money out of the client bank account. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
895.   Allocation of client money receipts 
11.9.7R 
(1) A CASS debt management firm must allocate in its books and 
records any client money it receives to an individual client promptly 
and, in any case, no later than five business days following the 
receipt. 
(2) Pending a CASS debt management firm's allocation of a client 
money receipt to an individual client under (1), it must record the 
received client money in its books and records as "unallocated client 
money". 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
896.   11.9.8R 
If a CASS debt management firm receives money (either in a client 
bank account or an account of its own) which it is unable immediately 
to identify as client money or its own money, it must: 
 
(1) take all necessary steps to identify the money as either client 
money or its own money; 
(2) if it considers it reasonably prudent to do so, given the risk that 
client money may not be adequately protected if it is not treated as 
such, treat the entire balance of money as client money and record the 
money in its books and records as "unidentified client money" while it 
performs the necessary steps under (1). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
897.   11.9.9G 
If a CASS debt management firm is unable to identify money that it 
has received as either client money or its own money under CASS 
11.9.8 R (1), it should consider whether it would be appropriate to 
return the money to the person who sent it (or, if that is not possible, 
to the source from where it was received, for example, the bank). A 
firm should have regard to its fiduciary duties when considering such 
matters. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
898.   Money received by appointed representatives, tied agents, field 
representatives and other agents 
11.9.10R 
A CASS debt management firm must ensure that client money 
received by its appointed representatives, field representatives or 
other agents is: 
 
(1) received directly into a client bank account of the firm; or 
(2) if it is received in the form of a cheque or other payable order: 
(a) paid into a client bank account of the CASS debt management firm 
promptly and, in any event, no later than the next business day after 
receipt; or 
(b) forwarded to the firm or, in the case of a field representative, 
forwarded to a specified business address of the CASS debt 
management firm, to ensure that the money arrives at the specified 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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business address promptly and, in any event, no later than the close of 
the third business day following the receipt of the money from the 
client; or 
(3) if it is received in the form of cash, paid into a client bank account 
of the CASS debt management firm promptly and, in any event, no 
later than the next business day after receipt. 
 
899.   Interest 
11.9.11R 
A CASS debt management firm must pay a client any interest earned 
on client money held for that client. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
900.   Returning money to clients 
11.9.12R 
A CASS debt management firm must, on receipt of a written request 
to withdraw from a debt management plan, promptly return to the 
client any client money held by it for the client. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
901.   11.9.13G 
The FCA would expect compliance with the requirement in CASS 
11.9.12 R to return client money promptly to require client money to 
be returned to a client within five business days of the date on which a 
client's withdrawal from a debt management plan takes effect. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
902.   11.10 Payments to creditors 
 
11.10.1R 
Where a CASS debt management firm receives client money from a 
client in relation to a debt management plan or for the purpose of 
distribution to the client's creditors, the firm must pay that money to 
creditors as soon as reasonably practicable, save in the circumstances 
in CASS 11.10.3 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
903.   11.10.2G 
In the FCA's view, the payment to creditors under CASS 11.10.1 R 
should normally be within five business days of the receipt of cleared 
funds. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
904.   11.10.3R 
The circumstances referred to in CASS 11.10.1 R are: 
 
(1) the contract between the client and the CASS debt management 
firm expressly provides that client money might be held for more than 
five business days without being distributed to creditors; 
(2) the existence of such a term expressly providing that client money 
might be held for more than five business days without being 
distributed to creditors has been separately brought to the attention of 
the client prior to his entering into the contract; and 
(3) the CASS debt management firm has explained to the client the 
risks and implications, if any, of payment to creditors being delayed 
prior to the entry into the contract. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
905.   11.10.4R 
On each occasion that a CASS debt management firm receives client 
money from a client in relation to a debt management plan, or for the 
purpose of distribution to the client's creditors, and it is proposed not 
to make a client's payment to creditors within five business days of 
receipt of the client money in the circumstances described in CASS 
11.10.3 R (1), it must: 
 
(1) as soon as reasonably practicable and within the five business day 
period, inform the client's creditors of the fact that it has received 
client money from the client for the purpose of distribution to his or 
her creditors and that it will not distribute that client money to the 
creditors within the five business-day period; and 
(2) perform daily reconciliations of the money held for the client 
concerned in accordance with the provisions of CASS 11.11. 
 
  
3. Holding and Depositing Investor Money  
 
(i) As part of the assessment provided for in Regulation 
72(6), the Central Bank expects a fund service provider 
to take into account how investor rights would be 
affected in the event of the insolvency of the fund 
service provider, or the third party, or both.  
(ii) The Central Bank expects a fund service provider to 
clearly document in its investor money management 
plan the procedures it would follow to carry out the 
review required by Regulations 72(6) and 72(7). 
 
 UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
906.   11.10.5R 
On each occasion a CASS debt management firm receives client 
money from a client in relation to a debt management plan, or for the 
purpose of distribution to the client's creditors, and is unable for any 
reason other than in the circumstances described in CASS 11.10.3 R 
(1) to make a payment to the client's creditors within five business 
days of receipt, it must: 
 
(1) inform the client of the delay and the reason for the delay; 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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(2) inform the client of the risks and implications of the late 
payments; 
(3) inform the client's creditors of this delay as soon as reasonably 
practicable and within the period of five business days of the receipt 
of the relevant client money; and 
(4) perform daily checks of its records of the money held for the client 
concerned in accordance with the provisions of CASS 11.11. 
 
907.   11.10.6R 
(1) Subject to (2), where a CASS debt management firm receives 
client money from a client in relation to a debt management plan or 
for the purpose of distribution to the client's creditors, and it fails to 
pay that money to creditors as soon as reasonably practicable 
following its receipt (see CASS 11.10.1 R and CASS 11.10.2 G), it 
must put the client into the financial position he would have been in 
had the delay not occurred. 
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply in the circumstances described in 
CASS 11.10.3 R or where the delay is due to circumstances beyond 
the firm's control. 
 
 3. Holding and Depositing Investor Money  
 
(i) As part of the assessment provided for in Regulation 
72(6), the Central Bank expects a fund service provider 
to take into account how investor rights would be 
affected in the event of the insolvency of the fund 
service provider, or the third party, or both.  
 
(ii) The Central Bank expects a fund service provider to 
clearly document in its investor money management 
plan the procedures it would follow to carry out the 
review required by Regulations 72(6) and 72(7). 
 
 
 UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
908.   11.10.7G 
Putting a client into the position he would have been in had the delay 
not occurred under CASS 11.10.6 R should include paying to the 
client a sum equivalent to the amount of any additional interest which 
would not have accrued but for the delay and any default charges that 
have been applied to the account as a result of the delay. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
909.   11.11 Records, accounts and reconciliations 
 
Records and accounts 
11.11.1R 
A CASS debt management firm must keep such records and accounts 
as are necessary to enable it, at any time and without delay, to 
distinguish client money held for one client from client money held 
for any other client, and from its own money. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
910.   11.11.2G 
In accordance with CASS 11.11.1 R, a CASS debt management firm 
must maintain internal records and accounts of the client money it 
holds (for example, a cash book). These internal records are separate 
to any external records it has obtained from approved banks with 
whom it has deposited client money (for example, bank statements). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
911.   11.11.3R 
A CASS debt management firm must maintain its records and 
accounts in a way that ensures their accuracy and, in particular, their 
correspondence to the client money held for individual clients. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
912.   11.11.4R 
A CASS debt management firm must maintain up-to-date records that 
detail all payments to, from, or made on behalf of, clients and written 
and oral contact with clients and their creditors. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
913.   Policies and procedures 
11.11.5G 
CASS debt management firms are reminded that they must, under 
SYSC 6.1.1 R, establish, implement and maintain adequate policies 
and procedures sufficient to ensure compliance of the firm with the 
rules in this chapter. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
914.   Checks and reconciliations of internal records 
11.11.6G 
So that a CASS debt management firm may check that it has 
sufficient money segregated in its client bank accounts to meet its 
obligations to clients for whom it is undertaking debt management 
activity, it is required periodically to carry out reconciliations of its 
internal records and accounts to check that the total amount of client 
money that it should have segregated in client bank accounts is equal 
to the total amount of client money it actually has segregated in client 
bank accounts. CASS 11.11.8 R to CASS 11.11.23 R provide rules 
that the different types of CASS debt management firm are obliged to 
follow to meet this obligation. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
915.   Checks of internal records: CASS small debt management firm 
11.11.7G 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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For a CASS small debt management firm to demonstrate it has 
maintained its records and accounts in a way envisaged by CASS 
11.11.3 R, it should carry out checks of its internal records and 
accounts that are reasonable and proportionate to its business. CASS 
11.11.8 R provides a rule that a CASS small debt management firm is 
obliged to follow to meet this obligation. 
 
916.   11.11.8R 
A CASS small debt management firm must undertake periodic checks 
of its internal accounts and records to ensure that the amount of 
money it holds in its client bank accounts is equal to the amount of 
client money that should be segregated under CASS 11.9. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
917.   11.11.9R 
In carrying out the checks required by CASS 11.11.8 R a CASS small 
debt management firm must use the values contained in its internal 
records and ledgers (for example, its cash book or other internal 
accounting records), rather than the values contained in the records it 
has obtained from approved banks with whom it has deposited client 
money (for example, bank statements). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
918.   11.11.10G 
The checks that a CASS small debt management firm is required to 
undertake under CASS 11.11.8 R include checking that its internal 
records and accounts accurately record the balances of client money 
held in respect of individual clients, and that the aggregate of those 
individual client money balances are equal to the total client money 
segregated in its client bank accounts. In undertaking the comparison 
between the internal records of balances of client money and the 
client money segregated in client bank accounts, a firm should use the 
previous day's closing client money balances and should compare 
those with other records relating to the same day. In determining an 
appropriate frequency for its record checks, a firm should consider the 
volume and frequency of transactions in its client bank accounts. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
919.   11.11.11G 
In seeking to comply with its obligation to carry out checks on its 
internal records and accounts, a CASS small debt management firm 
may choose to follow the steps specifically required of CASS large 
debt management firms in undertaking a CASS large debt 
management firm internal client money reconciliation and CASS 
large debt management firm external client money reconciliation. A 
CASS small debt management firm which follows that procedure is 
likely to be regarded by the FCA as having fulfilled its obligation 
under CASS 11.11.8 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
920.   CASS small debt management firms: remedying discrepancies 
11.11.12R 
Where the check of its internal records and accounts that a CASS 
small debt management firm is required to undertake under CASS 
11.11.8 R reveals a difference between the amount of money it holds 
in its client bank accounts and the amount of client money that should 
be held and segregated under CASS 11.9, a CASS small debt 
management firm must: 
 
(1) ensure that any shortfall in the amount held in its client bank 
accounts as compared to the amount that should be held there is made 
up by a prompt payment into the firm's client bank accounts; 
(2) ensure that any excess in the amount held in its client bank 
accounts as compared to the amount that should be held there is 
promptly withdrawn from its client bank accounts; and 
(3) ensure that any correction of a shortfall or excess of the kind 
referred to in (1) and (2) is carried out, at the latest, before the end of 
the business day following the day on which difference was 
discovered. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
921.   CASS large debt management firms internal client money 
reconciliation 
11.11.13R 
A CASS large debt management firm must, as regularly as is 
necessary, but no less often than every five business days, carry out a 
CASS large debt management firm internal client money 
reconciliation. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
922.   11.11.14R 
A CASS large debt management firm internal client money 
reconciliation requires a CASS large debt management firm to check 
whether its client money resource, as determined by CASS 11.11.16 
R, on the previous business day, was at least equal to the client money 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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requirement, as determined by CASS 11.11.17 R as at the close of 
business on that day. 
 
923.   11.11.15R 
In carrying out a CASS large debt management firm internal client 
money reconciliation, a CASS large debt management firm must use 
the values contained in its internal records and ledgers (for example, 
its cash book or other internal accounting records), rather than the 
values contained in the records it has obtained from approved banks 
with whom it has deposited client money (for example, bank 
statements). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
924.   Calculating the client money resource 
11.11.16R 
The client money resource for client money held in accordance with 
CASS 11.11.14 R is the aggregate of the balances on the firm's client 
bank accounts, as at the close of business on the previous business 
day. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
925.   Calculating the client money requirement 
11.11.17R 
(1) The client money requirement is the sum of: 
(a) the aggregate of all individual client balances calculated in 
accordance with CASS 11.11.21 R and CASS 11.11.22 R; 
(b) the amount of any unallocated client money under CASS 11.9.7 R; 
(c) the amount of any unidentified client money under CASS 11.9.8 
R; and 
(d) any other amounts of client money included in the calculation 
under (2). 
(2) For the purposes of (1)(d), the CASS debt management firm must 
consider whether there are amounts of client money, other than those 
in (1)(a) to (c), to which the requirement to segregate applies and that 
it is appropriate to include in the calculation of its client money 
requirement and, if so, adjust the calculation accordingly. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
926.   11.11.18G 
The client money requirement calculated in accordance with CASS 
11.11.17 R should represent the total amount of client money a CASS 
debt management firm is required to have segregated in client bank 
accounts under the debt management client money chapter. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
927.   11.11.19G 
Firms are reminded that, under CASS 11.4.3 R, if a firm has drawn 
any cheques, or other payable orders, to discharge its fiduciary duty to 
its clients (for example, to return client money to the client or 
distribute it to the client's creditors), the sum concerned must be 
included in the firm's calculation of its client money requirement until 
the cheque or order is presented and paid. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
928.   11.11.20G 
The following guidance applies where a CASS debt management firm 
receives client money in the form of cash, a cheque or other payable 
order: 
 
(1) In carrying out the calculation of the client money requirement, a 
CASS debt management firm may initially include the amount of 
client money received as cash, cheques or payment orders that has not 
yet been deposited in a client bank account in line with CASS 11.9.5 
R. If it does so, the firm should ensure, before finalising the 
calculation, that it deducts these amounts to avoid them giving rise to 
a difference between the firm's client money requirement and client 
money resource. 
(2) In carrying out the calculation of the client money requirement, a 
CASS debt management firm may alternatively exclude the amount of 
client money received as cash, cheques or payment orders that has not 
yet been deposited in a client bank account in line with CASS 11.9.5 
R. If it does so, the firm is reminded that it must separately record the 
receipt of the money in the firm's books and records under CASS 
11.9.5 R (3). 
(3) A CASS debt management firm that receives client money in the 
form of cash, a cheque or other payable order is reminded that it must 
pay that money into a client bank account promptly and no later than 
on the business day after it receives the money (see CASS 11.9.5 R). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
929.   11.11.21R 
The individual client balance for each client must be calculated as 
follows: 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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(1) the amount paid by the client to the CASS debt management firm; 
plus 
(2) the amount of any interest, and any other sums, due to the client; 
less: 
 
(3) the aggregate of the amount of money: 
(a) paid back to that client; and 
(b) due and payable by the client to the CASS debt management firm; 
and 
(c) paid out to a third party for, or on behalf of, that client. 
 
930.   11.11.22R 
Where the individual client balance calculated in respect of an 
individual client under CASS 11.11.21 R is a negative figure (because 
the amounts paid by or due to a client under CASS 11.11.21 R (1) and 
CASS 11.11.21 R (2) are less than the amounts paid out or due and 
payable by that client under CASS 11.11.21 R (3), that individual 
client balance should be treated as zero for the purposes of the 
calculation of the firm's client money requirement in CASS 11.11.17 
R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
931.   Large debt management firms: reconciliation differences and 
discrepancies 
11.11.23R 
When a CASS large debt management firm internal client money 
reconciliation reveals a difference between the client money resource 
and its client money requirement a CASS large debt management firm 
must: 
 
(1) identify the reason for the difference; 
(2) ensure that any shortfall in the amount of the client money 
resource as compared to the amount of the client money requirement 
is made up by a payment into the firm's client bank accounts by the 
end of the business day following the day on which difference was 
discovered; and 
(3) ensure that any excess in the amount of the client money resource 
as compared to the amount of the client money requirement is 
withdrawn from the firm's client bank accounts by the end of the 
business day following the day on which the difference was 
discovered. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
932.   CASS large debt management firm external client money 
reconciliation 
11.11.24G 
The purpose of the reconciliation process required by CASS 11.11.25 
R is to ensure the accuracy of a firm's internal accounts and records 
against those of any third parties by whom client money is held. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
933.   11.11.25R 
A CASS large debt management firm should perform a CASS large 
debt management firm external client money reconciliation: 
 
(1) as regularly as is necessary; and 
(2) no less frequently than the CASS large debt management firm 
internal client money reconciliations; and 
(3) as soon as reasonably practicable after the date to which the 
reconciliation relates; 
to ensure the accuracy of its internal accounts and records against 
those of approved banks with whom client money is deposited. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
934.   11.11.26R 
A CASS large debt management firm external client money 
reconciliation requires a CASS large debt management firm to 
conduct a reconciliation between its internal accounts and records and 
those of any approved banks by whom client money is held. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
935.   11.11.27G 
The FCA expects a CASS large debt management firm which carries 
out transactions for its clients on a daily basis to carry out a CASS 
large debt management firm external client money reconciliation on a 
daily basis. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
936.   11.11.28R 
When any discrepancy is revealed by a CASS large debt management 
firm external client money reconciliation, a CASS large debt 
management firm must identify the reason for the discrepancy and 
correct it as soon as possible, unless the discrepancy arises solely as a 
result of timing differences between the accounting systems of the 
party providing the statement or confirmation and that of the firm. 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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937.   11.11.29R 
While a CASS large debt management firm is unable to resolve a 
discrepancy arising from the CASS large debt management firm 
external client money reconciliation, and one record or a set of 
records examined by the firm during the reconciliation process 
indicates that there is a need to have greater amount of client money 
than is in fact the case, the firm must assume, until the matter is 
finally resolved, that the record or set of records is accurate and pay 
its own money into a relevant account. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
938.   Notification requirements 
11.11.30R 
A CASS debt management firm must inform the FCA in writing 
without delay if: 
 
(1) its internal records and accounts of client money are materially out 
of date or materially inaccurate so that the firm is no longer able to 
comply with the requirements in CASS 11.11.1 R to CASS 11.11.4 R; 
or 
(2) it becomes aware that, at any time in the preceding 12 months, the 
amount of client money segregated in its client bank accounts 
materially differed from the total aggregate amount of client money 
the firm was required to segregate in client bank accounts in 
accordance with the segregation requirements in CASS 11.9. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
939.   11.11.31R 
A CASS large debt management firm must inform the FCA in writing 
without delay if: 
 
(1) after having carried out a CASS large debt management firm 
internal client money reconciliation in accordance with CASS 
11.11.13 R it will be unable to, or materially fails to, pay any shortfall 
into (or withdraw any excess from) a client bank account so that the 
firm is unable to comply with CASS 11.11.23 R; 
(2) after having carried out a CASS large debt management firm 
external client money reconciliation in accordance with CASS 
11.11.25 R it will be unable to, or materially fails to, identify and 
correct any discrepancies in accordance with CASS 11.11.28 R; 
(3) it will be unable to or materially fails to conduct a CASS large 
debt management firm internal client money reconciliation in 
compliance with CASS 11.11.13 R; or 
(4) it will be unable to or materially fails to conduct a CASS large 
debt management firm external client money reconciliation in 
compliance with CASS 11.11.25 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
940.   11.11.32G 
CASS debt management firms are also reminded of their obligation to 
notify the appropriate regulator of a significant breach of a rule under 
SUP 15.3.11 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
941.   11.12 CASS 11 resolution pack 
 
11.12.1G 
The purpose of the CASS 11 resolution pack is to ensure that a firm 
maintains and is able to retrieve information that would, in the event 
of its insolvency, assist an insolvency practitioner in dealing with 
client money in a timely manner. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
942.   11.12.2R 
A CASS debt management firm which holds client money must 
maintain at all times and be able to retrieve, in the manner described 
in this section, a CASS 11 resolution pack. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
943.   11.12.3R 
A CASS debt management firm must include within its CASS 11 
resolution pack all those documents referred to in CASS 11.12.4 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
944.   11.12.4R 
The documents in CASS 11.12.3 R that a CASS debt management 
firm must include within its CASS 11 resolution pack are: 
 
(1) a master document containing information sufficient to retrieve 
each document in the firm's CASS 11 resolution pack; 
(2) a document which identifies all the approved banks with whom 
client money may be deposited; 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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(3) a document which identifies each appointed representative, field 
representative or other agent of the firm which may receive client 
money in its capacity as the firm's agent; 
(4) a document which identifies each senior manager and director and 
any other individual and the nature of their responsibility within the 
firm who is critical or important to the performance of operational 
functions related to any of the obligations imposed on the firm under 
the debt management client money rules; 
(5) for all approved banks identified in (2) the written client bank 
account acknowledgement letters sent and received in accordance 
with CASS 11.8.2 R; and 
(6) records relating to the internal and external client money checks it 
is required to carry out under CASS 11.11. 
 
945.   11.12.5R 
In relation to each document in a CASS debt management firm's 
CASS 11 resolution pack a firm must: 
 
(1) put in place adequate arrangements to ensure that an administrator, 
receiver, trustee, liquidator or analogous officer appointed in respect 
of it or any material part of its property is able to retrieve each 
document as soon as practicable and, in any event, within 48 hours of 
that officer’s appointment; and 
(2) ensure that it is able to retrieve each document as soon as 
practicable and, in any event, within 48 hours where it has taken a 
decision to do so or as a result of an FCA request. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
946.   11.12.6R 
(1) A CASS debt management firm must ensure that it reviews the 
content of its CASS 11 resolution pack on an ongoing basis to ensure 
that it remains accurate. 
(2) In relation to any change of circumstances that has the effect of 
rendering inaccurate, in any material respect, the content of a 
document specified in CASS 11.12.4 R, a firm must ensure that any 
inaccuracy is corrected promptly and in any event no more than five 
business days after the change of circumstances arose. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
947.   11.12.7R 
A CASS debt management firm must notify the FCA in writing 
immediately if it has not complied with, or is unable to comply with, 
CASS 11.12.2 R and CASS 11.12.6 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
948.   11.13 Client money distribution in the event of a failure of a firm or 
approved bank 
Application 
11.13.1R 
This section (the debt management client money distribution rules) 
applies to a CASS debt management firm that holds client money 
which is subject to the debt management client money rules when a 
primary pooling event or a secondary pooling event occurs. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
949.   Purpose 
11.13.2G 
The debt management client money distribution rules seek, in the 
event of the failure of a CASS debt management firm or of an 
approved bank at which the CASS debt management firm holds client 
money, to protect client money and to facilitate the timely payment of 
sums to creditors or the timely return of client money to clients. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
950.   Failure of a CASS debt management firm: primary pooling event 
11.13.3R 
A primary pooling event occurs: 
 
(1) on the failure of a CASS debt management firm; 
(2) on the vesting of assets in a trustee in accordance with an 'assets 
requirement' imposed under section 55P(1)(b) or (c) (as the case may 
be) of the Act where such a requirement is imposed in respect of all 
client money held by the firm. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
951.   Pooling and distribution after a primary pooling event 
11.13.4R 
If a primary pooling event occurs, then: 
(1) all client money: 
(a) held in the CASS debt management firm's client bank accounts; 
and 
(b) received by the CASS debt management firm on behalf of a client 
but not yet paid into the firm's client bank accounts; 
is treated as pooled together to form a notional pool; 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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(2) a CASS debt management firm must calculate the amount it 
should be holding on behalf of each individual client as at the time of 
the primary pooling event using the method of calculating individual 
client balance provided for by CASS 11.11.21 R; 
(3) a CASS debt management firm must decide whether it is in the 
best interests of its clients to transfer all its debt management activity 
business to another CASS debt management firm. 
 
952.   Distribution if client money not transferred to another firm 
11.13.5R 
Where a primary pooling event occurs and the client money is not 
transferred to another firm in accordance with CASS 11.13.4 R, a 
CASS debt management firm must distribute client money comprising 
the notional pool so that each client receives a sum that is rateable to 
their entitlement to the notional pool calculated in CASS 11.13.4 R 
(2). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
953.   Transfer of client money to another firm 
11.13.6G 
If in the event of a primary pooling event occurring the debt 
management activity business undertaken by a CASS debt 
management firm ("the transferor") is to be transferred to another 
CASS debt management firm ("the transferee"), then the transferor 
may also move the client money associated with that business to the 
transferee. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
954.   11.13.7R 
The remaining client money may be transferred under CASS 11.13.6 
G only if it will be held by the transferee in accordance with the debt 
management client money chapter, including the statutory trust in 
CASS 11.6.1 R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
955.   11.13.8R 
If there is a shortfall in the client money transferred under CASS 
11.13.6 G then the client money must be allocated to each of the 
clients for whom the client money was held so that each client is 
allocated a sum which is rateable to that client's client money 
entitlement in accordance with CASS 11.13.4 R (2). This calculation 
may be done by either transferor or transferee in accordance with the 
terms of any transfer. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
956.   11.13.9R 
The transferee must, within seven days after the transfer of client 
money under CASS 11.13.6 G notify clients that: 
 
(1) their money has been transferred to the transferee; and 
(2) they have the option of having client money returned to them or to 
their order by the transferee, otherwise the transferee will hold the 
client money for the clients and conduct debt management activities 
for those clients. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
957.   Failure of an approved bank: secondary pooling event 
11.13.10R 
A secondary pooling event occurs on the failure of an approved bank 
at which a CASS debt management firm holds client money in a client 
bank account. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
958.   11.13.11R 
(1) Subject to (2), if a secondary pooling event occurs as a result of 
the failure of an approved bank where one or more client bank 
accounts are held then in relation to every client bank account of the 
firm, the provisions of CASS 11.13.12 R (1), CASS 11.13.12 R (2) 
and CASS 11.13.12 R (3) will apply. 
(2) CASS 11.13.12 R does not apply if, on the failure of the approved 
bank, the CASS debt management firm pays to its clients, or pays into 
a client bank account at an unaffected approved bank, an amount 
equal to the amount of client money that would have been held if a 
shortfall had not occurred as a result of the failure. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
959.   11.13.12R 
Money held in each client bank account of the firm must be treated as 
pooled and: 
 
(1) any shortfall in client money held, or which should have been 
held, in client bank accounts, that has arisen as a result of the failure 
of the approved bank, must be borne by all clients whose client 
money is held in a client bank account of the firm, rateably in 
accordance with their entitlements to the pool; 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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(2) a new client money entitlement must be calculated for each client 
by the firm, to reflect the requirements in (1), and the firm's records 
must be amended to reflect the reduced client money entitlement; 
(3) the CASS debt management firm must make and retain a record of 
each client's share of the client money shortfall at the failed approved 
bank until the client is repaid; and 
(4) the firm must use the new client entitlements, calculated in 
accordance with (2), when performing the client money calculation in 
CASS 11.11.17 R. 
 
960.   11.13.13R 
The term 'which should have been held' is a reference to the failed 
approved bank's failure to hold the client money at the time of the 
pooling event. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
961.   11.13.14R 
Any interest earned on client money following a primary or secondary 
pooling event will be due to clients in accordance with CASS 11.9.11 
R (Interest). 
 
11 Annex 1 CASS debt management firm client bank account 
acknowledgement letter template 
[insert] 
 
11 Annex 2 guidance notes for client bank account acknowledgement 
letters (CASS 11.8.5G) 
[insert] 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
962.   CHAPTER 12 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Part 30 exemption 
order 
 
12.1 Application 
 
12.1.1R 
This chapter applies to a firm conducting business pursuant to the Part 
30 exemption order. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
963.   12.1.2G 
United States ('US') legislation restricts the ability of non-US firms to 
trade on behalf of customers resident in the US ('US customers') on 
non-US futures and options exchanges. The relevant US regulator (the 
CFTC) operates an exemption system for firms authorised under the 
Act. Under the Part 30 exemption order, eligible firms may apply for 
confirmation of exemptive relief from Part 30 of the General 
Regulations under the US Commodity Exchange Act. In line with this 
system, both the applicant firm and the FCA must make certain 
written representations to the CFTC. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
964.   12.2 Treatment of client money 
 
12.2.1G 
Under condition 2(g) of the Part 30 exemption order, a firm with 
exemptive relief represents to the CFTC that it consents to refuse to 
allow any US customer the option of not having its money treated as 
client money if it is held or received in respect of transactions on non-
US exchanges, unless that US customer is an "eligible contract 
participant" as defined in section 1a(18)of the Commodity Exchange 
Act, 7 U.S.C. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
965.   12.2.2G 
The FCA understands that in complying with condition 2(g) of the 
Part 30 exemption order, a firm is representing that it will not: 
 
(1) make use of the opt-out arrangements in CASS 7.10.9G to CASS 
7.10.13G; or 
(2) conduct business to which the client money rules do not apply 
because of the exemption for CRD credit institutions and approved 
banks in CASS 7.10.16R to CASS 7.10.24R; or 
(3) enter into any TTCA under CASS 7.11; 
in relation to business conducted pursuant to the Part 30 exemption 
order. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
966.   LME bond arrangements 
12.2.3G 
For firms with exemptive relief under the Part 30 exemption order, the 
CFTC has issued certain no-action letters which, on the FCA's 
understanding, would allow such firms to use an LME bond 
arrangement as an alternative to complying with condition 2(g) of the 
Part 30 exemption order. Under an LME bond arrangement, a firm 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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may arrange for a binding letter of credit to be issued to cover the 
'secured amount' (as defined by section 30.7 of the General 
Regulations under the US Commodity Exchange Act). The letter of 
credit must be drawn up in a pre-specified format and may be issued 
for either: 
 
(1) an omnibus account in favour of a specified trustee; or 
(2) a specified client who is the named beneficiary. 
 
967.   12.2.4R 
A firm must not reduce the amount of, or cancel a letter of credit 
issued under, an LME bond arrangement where this will cause the 
firm to be in breach of the conditions of the Part 30 exemption order. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
968.   12.2.5R 
A firm must notify the FCA immediately if it arranges the issue of a 
letter of credit for a specified client who is the named beneficiary 
under an LME bond arrangement. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
969.   12.2.6G 
A firm's use of an LME bond arrangement does not remove the need 
for the firm to act in accordance with the client money rules. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
970.   CHAPTER 13 
Claims management: client money 
 
13.1 Application 
 
13.1.1R 
This chapter applies to a firm that: 
(1) carries on a regulated claims management activity; and 
(2) receives or holds client money. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
971.   13.2 Organisational requirements and responsibility for CASS 
operational oversight 
 
13.2.1R 
A firm must, when holding client money, make adequate 
arrangements to safeguard the customer’s rights and prevent the use 
of client money for its own account. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
972.  Article 2(1)(f) Commission Delegated Directive 
 
Member States shall require that investment firms 
comply with the following requirements: 
 
(f)  
they must introduce adequate organisational 
arrangements to minimise the risk of the loss or 
diminution of client assets, or of rights in 
connection with those assets, as a result of misuse 
of the assets, fraud, poor administration, 
inadequate record-keeping or negligence. 
 
13.2.2R 
A firm must introduce adequate organisational arrangements to 
minimise the risk of the loss or diminution of client money, or of 
rights in connection with client money, as a result of misuse of client 
money, fraud, poor administration, inadequate record-keeping or 
negligence. 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
973.   13.2.3R 
A firm must allocate to a director or senior manager responsibility for: 
 
(1) oversight of the firm’s operational compliance with CASS 13; 
(2) reporting to the firm’s governing body in respect of that oversight; 
and 
(3) completing and submitting the client money parts of a CMC001 
return in accordance with SUP 16.25.3R to SUP 16.25.8R. 
 
14 Directors.  
 
See row 48 for text. 
  UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
974.   13.2.4R 
(1) A firm must make and retain an appropriate record of the person 
to whom responsibility is allocated in accordance with CASS 13.2.3R. 
(2) But a firm must make and retain such a record only where: 
(a) there is a person in that firm who performs the compliance 
oversight function; and 
(b) it allocates responsibility in accordance with CASS 13.2.3R to a 
person other than the person in that firm who performs the 
compliance oversight function. 
(3) A firm must ensure that a record made under this rule is retained 
for a period of five years after it is made. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
975.   13.3 Statutory trust 
 
13.3.1R 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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A firm receives and holds client money as trustee on the following 
terms: 
 
(1) for the purposes and on the terms of the claims management client 
money rules and the claims management client money distribution 
rules; 
(2) subject to (3), for the customers for whom that money is held, 
according to their respective interests in it; 
(3) on failure of the firm, for the payment of the costs properly 
attributable to the distribution of the client money in accordance with 
(2); and 
(4) after all valid claims and costs under (2) and (3) have been met, 
for the firm itself. 
 
976.   13.4 Selecting an approved bank at which to hold client money 
 
13.4.1G 
A firm owes a duty of care as a trustee to its clients in relation to 
client money and has to exercise that duty of care in deciding where 
to hold client money. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
977.   13.4.2R 
Before a firm opens a client bank account and as often as is 
appropriate on a continuing basis (such frequency being no less than 
once in each financial year) it must take reasonable steps to establish 
that it is appropriate for the firm to hold client money at the approved 
bank concerned. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
978.   13.4.3R 
A firm must consider the risks associated with holding all client 
money with one approved bank and should consider whether it would 
be appropriate to hold client money in client bank accounts at a 
number of different approved banks. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
979.   13.4.4G 
In complying with CASS 13.4.3R, a firm should consider as 
appropriate, together with any other relevant matters: 
 
(1) the amount of client money held by the firm; 
(2) the amount of client money the firm anticipates holding at the 
approved bank; and 
(3) the creditworthiness of the approved bank. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
980.   13.4.5G 
A firm can demonstrate compliance with CASS 13.4.2R by checking 
that the person it proposes to hold client money with is an approved 
bank and that nothing has come to the firm’s attention to cause it to 
believe that such person is not an appropriate place at which to hold 
client money. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
981.   13.5 Client bank account acknowledgement letters 
 
13.5.1G 
The main purposes of a client bank account acknowledgement letter 
are: 
 
(1) to put the approved bank on notice of a firm’s clients’ interests in 
client money that has been deposited with such person; 
(2) to ensure that the client bank account has been opened in 
accordance with CASS 13.6.3R, and is distinguished from any 
account containing money that belongs to the firm; and 
(3) to ensure that the approved bank understands and agrees that it 
will not have any recourse or right against money standing to the 
credit of the client bank account, in respect of any liability of the firm 
to such person (or person connected to such person). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
982.   Requirement for and content of client bank account 
acknowledgement letters 
13.5.2R 
(1) For each client bank account, a firm must, in accordance with 
CASS 13.5.4R, complete and sign a client bank account 
acknowledgement letter clearly identifying the client bank account, 
and send it to the approved bank with whom the client bank account 
is, or will be, opened, requesting the bank to acknowledge and agree 
to the terms of the letter by countersigning it and returning it to the 
firm. 
(2) Subject to CASS 13.5.6R, a firm must not hold or receive any 
client money in or into a client bank account unless it has received a 
duly countersigned client bank account acknowledgement letter from 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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the approved bank. The letter must not have been inappropriately 
redrafted and should clearly identify the client bank account. 
 
983.   13.5.3R 
In drafting client bank account acknowledgement letters under CASS 
13.5.2R a firm is required to use the relevant template in CASS 13 
Annex 1R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
984.   13.5.4R 
When completing a client bank account acknowledgement letter under 
CASS 13.5.2R(1) a firm: 
(1) must not amend any of the acknowledgement letter fixed text; 
(2) subject to (3), must ensure the acknowledgement letter variable 
text is removed, included or amended as appropriate; and 
(3) must not amend any of the acknowledgement letter variable text in 
a way that would alter or otherwise change the meaning of the 
acknowledgement letter fixed text. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
985.   13.5.5G 
CASS 13 Annex 2G contains guidance on using the template client 
bank account acknowledgement letters, including on when and how 
firms should amend the acknowledgement letter variable text that is in 
square brackets. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
986.   Countersignature by the bank 
13.5.6R 
(1) If, on countersigning and returning the client bank account 
acknowledgement letter to a firm, the relevant approved bank has 
also: 
(a) made amendments to any of the acknowledgement letter fixed 
text; or 
(b) made amendments to any of the acknowledgement letter variable 
text in a way that would alter or otherwise change the meaning of the 
acknowledgement letter fixed text; 
the client bank account acknowledgement letter will have been 
inappropriately redrafted for the purposes of CASS 13.5.2R(2). 
 
(2) Amendments made to the acknowledgement letter variable text, in 
the client bank account acknowledgement letter returned to a firm by 
the relevant approved bank, will not have the result that the letter has 
been inappropriately redrafted if those amendments: 
(a) do not affect the meaning of the acknowledgement letter fixed 
text; 
(b) have been specifically agreed with the firm; and 
(c) do not cause the client bank account acknowledgement letter to be 
inaccurate. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
987.   13.5.7R 
A firm must use reasonable endeavours to ensure that any individual 
that has countersigned a client bank account acknowledgement letter 
that has been returned to the firm was authorised to countersign the 
letter on behalf of the relevant approved bank. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
988.   Retention of client bank account acknowledgement letters 
13.5.8R 
A firm must retain each countersigned client bank account 
acknowledgement letter it receives from the date of receipt until the 
expiry of a period of five years starting on the date on which the last 
client bank account to which the acknowledgment letter relates is 
closed. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
989.   13.5.9R 
A firm must also retain any other documentation or evidence it 
believes is necessary to demonstrate that it has complied with each of 
the applicable requirements in this section (such as any evidence it 
has obtained to ensure that the individual that has countersigned a 
client bank account acknowledgement letter that has been returned to 
the firm was authorised to countersign the letter on behalf of the 
relevant approved bank). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
990.   Review and replacement of client bank account acknowledgement 
letters 
13.5.10R 
A firm must, periodically (at least annually, and whenever it becomes 
aware that something referred to in a client bank account 
acknowledgement letter has changed) review each of its 
countersigned client bank account acknowledgement letters to ensure 
that they remain accurate. 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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991.   13.5.11R 
Whenever a firm finds a countersigned client bank account 
acknowledgement letter to contain an inaccuracy, the firm must 
promptly draw up a new replacement client bank account 
acknowledgement letter under CASS 13.5.2R and ensure that the new 
client bank account acknowledgement letter is duly countersigned and 
returned by the relevant approved bank. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
992.   13.5.12G 
Under CASS 13.5.10R, a firm should obtain a replacement client 
bank account acknowledgement letter whenever: 
(1) there has been a change in any of the parties’ names or addresses 
or a change in any of the details of the relevant account(s) as set out in 
the letter; or 
(2) it becomes aware of an error or misspelling in the letter. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
993.   13.5.13R 
If a firm’s client bank account is transferred to another approved 
bank, the firm must promptly draw up a new client bank account 
acknowledgement letter under CASS 13.5.2R and ensure that the new 
client bank account acknowledgement letter is duly countersigned and 
returned by the relevant approved bank within 20 business days of the 
firm sending it to that person. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
994.   13.6 Segregation and the operation of client money accounts 
 
Requirement to segregate 
13.6.1R 
A firm must take all reasonable steps to ensure that all client money it 
receives is paid directly into a client bank account at an approved 
bank, rather than being first received into the firm’s own account and 
then segregated. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
995.   13.6.2G 
A firm should arrange for clients and third parties to make transfers 
and payments of any money which will be client money directly into 
the firm’s client bank accounts. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
996.   13.6.3R 
A firm must ensure that client money is held in a client bank account 
at one or more approved banks. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
997.   13.6.4R 
Cheques received by a firm, made out to the firm, representing client 
money or a mixed remittance must be treated as client money from 
receipt by the firm. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
998.   13.6.5R 
Where a firm receives client money in the form of cash, a cheque or 
other payable order, it must: 
 
(1) pay the money into a client bank account in accordance with 
CASS 13.6.1R promptly and no later than the business day after the 
day on which it receives the money; 
(2) if the firm holds the money overnight, hold it in a secure location 
in line with Principle 10; and 
(3) record the receipt of the money in the firm’s books and records 
under the applicable requirements of CASS 13.10 (Records, accounts 
and reconciliations). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
999.   13.6.6R 
If a firm receives money (either in a client bank account or an account 
of its own) which it is unable immediately to identify as client money 
or its own money, it must: 
 
(1) take all necessary steps to identify the money as either client 
money or its own money; and 
(2) if it considers it reasonably prudent to do so, given the risk that 
client money may not be adequately protected if it is not treated as 
such, treat the entire balance of money as client money and record the 
money in its books and records as “unidentified client money” while 
it performs the necessary steps under (1). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1000.   13.6.7G 
If a firm is unable to identify money that it has received as either 
client money or its own money under CASS 13.6.6R(1), it should 
consider whether it would be appropriate to return the money to the 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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person who sent it (or, if that is not possible, to the source from where 
it was received, for example, the bank). A firm should have regard to 
its fiduciary duties when considering such matters. 
 
1001.   13.6.8G 
A firm must ensure that client money received by its agents is: 
 
(1) received directly into a client bank account of the firm; or 
(2) if it is received in the form of a cheque or other payable order: 
(a) paid into a client bank account of the firm promptly and, in any 
event, no later than the next business day after receipt; or 
(b) forwarded to the firm promptly and, in any event, so that it is 
received by the firm no later than the close of the third business day 
following the receipt of the money from the customer; or 
(3) if it is received in the form of cash, paid into a client bank account 
of the firm promptly and, in any event, no later than the next business 
day after receipt. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1002.   Mixed remittance 
13.6.9R 
If a firm receives a mixed remittance it must: 
 
(1) pay the full sum into a client bank account promptly and in 
accordance with CASS 13.6.1R to 13.6.5R; and 
(2) no later than one business day after the payment of the mixed 
remittance into the client bank account has cleared, pay the money 
that is not client money out of the client bank account. 
 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1003.   Interest 
13.6.10R 
A firm must pay a client any interest earned on client money held for 
that client. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1004.   13.7 Money due and payable to the firm 
 
13.7.1R 
Money is not client money when it is or becomes properly due and 
payable to the firm for its own account. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1005.   13.7.2G 
(1) The circumstances in which money may be or become due and 
payable to the firm for its own account could include: 
(a) when fees and/or third party disbursements have become due and 
payable to the firm for its own account under the agreement between 
the customer and the firm; and 
(b) when money recovered for a customer or a sum in respect of 
damages, compensation or settlement of a claim is paid into a client 
bank account and the firm has agreed with the client that a proportion 
of the sum is to be paid to the firm for fees or in respect of liabilities 
the firm has incurred on behalf of the customer. 
(2) The circumstances in which money is due and payable will depend 
on the contractual arrangement between the firm and the client. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1006.   13.7.3G 
Firms are reminded that when entering into or varying contractual 
arrangements with customers regarding circumstances in which 
money becomes properly due and payable to the firm for its own 
account, firms should comply with any relevant obligations to 
customers including the client’s best interests rule and requirements 
under the Unfair Terms Regulations and the Consumer Rights Act 
2015. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1007.   13.8 Money due to a client or third party 
 
13.8.1R 
Client money in respect of money recovered for a customer or money 
in respect of damages, compensation or settlement of a claim received 
into a client bank account must be paid to the customer, or a duly 
authorised representative of the customer, as soon as reasonably 
practicable after receipt and, in any event, a firm must take steps 
within two business days of receipt to make such a payment. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1008.   13.8.2R 
Money received from a customer in respect of third party 
disbursements which is due and payable to the third party in 
accordance with the terms of the contractual arrangements between 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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the parties should be paid to the third party as soon as reasonably 
practicable after receipt. 
 
1009.   13.9 Discharge of fiduciary duty 
 
13.9.1G 
CASS 13 provides important safeguards for the protection of client 
money held by firms that sit alongside the fiduciary duty owed by 
firms in relation to client money. CASS 13.9.2R to 13.9.3R provide 
for when money ceases to be client money for the purposes of CASS 
13 and the fiduciary duty which firms owe to clients in relation to 
client money. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1010.   13.9.2R 
Money ceases to be client money if: 
(1) it is paid to the customer, or a duly authorised representative of the 
customer; or 
(2) it is: 
(a) paid to a third party on the instruction of the customer, or with the 
specific consent of the customer; or 
(b) paid to a third party further to an obligation on the firm under any 
applicable law; or 
(3) it is paid into an account of the customer (not being an account 
which is also in the name of the firm) on the instruction, or with the 
specific consent, of the customer; or 
(4) it is due and payable to the firm for its own account (see CASS 
13.7.1R to 13.7.2G); or 
(5) it is paid to the firm as an excess in the client bank account (see 
CASS 13.10.15R(3)). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1011.   13.9.3R 
When a firm draws a cheque or other payable order to discharge its 
fiduciary duty to the client, it must continue to treat the sum 
concerned as client money until the cheque or order is presented and 
paid. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1012.   13.10 Records, accounts and reconciliations 
 
Records and accounts 
13.10.1R 
(1) A firm must keep such records and accounts as are necessary to 
enable it, at any time and without delay, to distinguish client money 
held for one customer from client money held for any other customer, 
and from its own money. 
(2) A firm must allocate in its books and records any client money it 
receives to an individual customer promptly and, in any case, no later 
than two business days following the receipt. 
(3) Pending a firm’s allocation of a receipt of client money to an 
individual customer under (2), it must record the received client 
money in its books and records as “unallocated client money”. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1013.   13.10.2G 
In accordance with CASS 13.10.1R, a firm must maintain internal 
records and accounts of the client money it holds (for example, a cash 
book and client ledger accounts). These internal records are separate 
to any external records it has obtained from approved banks with 
whom it has deposited client money (for example, bank statements). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1014.   13.10.3R 
A firm must maintain its records and accounts in a way that ensures 
their accuracy and, in particular, their correspondence to the client 
money held for individual customers. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1015.   13.10.4R 
A firm must maintain up-to-date records that detail all payments 
received for, or on behalf of, customers and all payments to, from, or 
made on behalf of, customers. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1016.   Internal client money reconciliation 
13.10.5R 
A firm must carry out an internal client money reconciliation each 
business day. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1017.   13.10.6R 
An internal client money reconciliation requires a firm to check 
whether its client money resource, as determined by CASS 13.10.8R, 
on the previous business day, was at least equal to the client money 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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requirement, as determined by CASS 13.10.9R, as at the close of 
business on that day. 
 
1018.   13.10.7R 
In carrying out an internal client money reconciliation, a firm must 
use the values contained in its internal records and ledgers (for 
example, its cash book or other internal accounting records), rather 
than the values contained in the records it has obtained from approved 
banks with whom it has deposited client money (for example, bank 
statements). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1019.   Calculating the client money resource 
13.10.8R 
The client money resource for client money held in accordance with 
CASS 13.10.6R is the aggregate of the balances on the firm’s client 
bank accounts, as at the close of business on the previous business 
day. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1020.   Calculating the client money requirement 
13.10.9R 
(1) The client money requirement is the sum of: 
(a) the aggregate of all individual customer balances calculated in 
accordance with CASS 13.10.13R and CASS 13.10.14R; 
(b) the amount of any unallocated client money under CASS 
13.10.1R(3); 
(c) the amount of any unidentified client money under CASS 
13.6.6R(2)R; and 
(d) any other amounts of client money included in the calculation 
under (2). 
(2) For the purposes of (1)(d), the firm must consider whether there 
are amounts of client money, other than those in (1)(a) to (c), to which 
the requirement to segregate applies and that it is appropriate to 
include in the calculation of its client money requirement and, if so, 
adjust the calculation accordingly. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1021.   13.10.10G 
The client money requirement calculated in accordance with CASS 
13.10.9R should represent the total amount of client money a firm is 
required to have segregated in client bank accounts under CASS 13. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1022.   13.10.11G 
Firms are reminded that, under CASS 13.9.3R, if a firm has drawn 
any cheques, or other payable orders, to discharge its fiduciary duty to 
its clients (for example, to return client money to the client), the sum 
concerned must be included in the firm’s calculation of its client 
money requirement until the cheque or order is presented and paid. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1023.   13.10.12G 
(1) The following guidance applies where a firm receives client 
money in the form of cash, a cheque or other payable order. 
(2) In carrying out the calculation of the client money requirement, a 
firm may initially include the amount of client money received as 
cash, cheques or payment orders that has not yet been deposited in a 
client bank account in line with CASS 13.6.5R. If it does so, the firm 
should ensure, before finalising the calculation, that it deducts these 
amounts to avoid them giving rise to a difference between the firm’s 
client money requirement and client money resource. 
(3) In carrying out the calculation of the client money requirement, a 
firm may alternatively exclude the amount of client money received 
as cash, cheques or payment orders that has not yet been deposited in 
a client bank account in line with CASS 13.6.5R. If it does so, the 
firm is reminded that it must separately record the receipt of the 
money in the firm’s books and records under CASS 13.6.5R(3). 
(4) A firm that receives client money in the form of cash, a cheque or 
other payable order is reminded that it must pay that money into a 
client bank account promptly and no later than on the business day 
after it receives the money (see CASS 13.6.5R). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1024.   13.10.13R 
The individual customer balance for each client must be calculated as 
follows: 
 
(1) the amount received for or on behalf of the customer by the firm; 
plus 
(2) the amount of any interest, and any other sums, due from the firm 
to the customer; less: 
(3) the aggregate of the amount of money: 
(a) paid to that customer by the firm; and 
(b) due and payable by the customer to the firm; and 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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(c) due by the customer to a third party in accordance with the 
contractual arrangements in place between the firm and the customer. 
 
1025.   13.10.14R 
Where the individual customer balance calculated in respect of an 
individual client under CASS 13.10.13R is a negative figure (because 
the amounts received for or on behalf of, or due, to a client under 
CASS 13.10.13R(1) and CASS 13.10.13R(2) are less than the 
amounts paid by, or due and payable by, that customer under CASS 
13.10.13R(3), that individual customer balance should be treated as 
zero for the purposes of the calculation of the firm’s client money 
requirement in CASS 13.10.9R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1026.   Reconciliation differences and discrepancies 
13.10.15R 
When an internal client money reconciliation reveals a difference 
between the client money resource and its client money requirement a 
firm must: 
 
(1) identify the reason for the difference; 
(2) ensure that any shortfall in the amount of the client money 
resource as compared to the amount of the client money requirement 
is made up by a payment into the firm’s client bank accounts by the 
end of the business day following the day on which the difference was 
discovered; and 
(3) ensure that any excess in the amount of the client money resource 
as compared to the amount of the client money requirement is 
withdrawn from the firm’s client bank accounts by the end of the 
business day following the day on which the difference was 
discovered. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1027.   External client money reconciliation 
13.10.16G 
The purpose of the reconciliation process required by CASS 
13.10.17R is to ensure the accuracy of a firm’s internal accounts and 
records against those of any third parties by whom client money is 
held. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1028.   13.10.17R 
A firm must perform an external client money reconciliation: 
 
(1) each business day; and 
(2) as soon as reasonably practicable after the relevant internal client 
money reconciliation; 
to ensure the accuracy of its internal accounts and records by 
comparing its internal accounts records against those of approved 
banks with whom client money is deposited. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1029.   13.10.18G 
An external client money reconciliation requires a firm to conduct a 
reconciliation between its internal accounts and records and those of 
any approved banks by whom client money is held. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1030.   13.10.19R 
When any discrepancy is revealed by an external client money 
reconciliation, a firm must identify the reason for the discrepancy and 
correct it as soon as possible, unless the discrepancy arises solely as a 
result of timing differences between the accounting system of the 
party providing the statement or confirmation and that of the firm. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1031.   13.10.20R 
While a firm is unable to resolve a discrepancy arising from an 
external client money reconciliation, and one record or a set of 
records examined by the firm during the reconciliation process 
indicates that there is a need to have greater amount of client money 
than is in fact the case, the firm must assume, until the matter is 
finally resolved, that the record or set of records is accurate and pay 
its own money into a relevant client bank account. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1032.   Notification requirements 
13.10.21R 
A firm must inform the FCA in writing without delay if: 
 
(1) its internal records and accounts of client money are materially out 
of date or materially inaccurate so that the firm is no longer able to 
comply with the requirements in CASS 13.10.1R to CASS 13.10.4R; 
or 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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(2) it will be unable to or materially fails to conduct an internal client 
money reconciliation in compliance with CASS 13.10.5R; or 
(3) after having carried out an internal client money reconciliation in 
accordance with CASS 13.10.5R it will be unable to, or materially 
fails to, pay any shortfall into (or withdraw any excess from) a client 
bank account so that the firm is unable to comply with CASS 
13.10.15R; or 
(4) it will be unable to or materially fails to conduct an external client 
money reconciliation in compliance with CASS 13.10.17R; or 
(5) after having carried out an external client money reconciliation in 
accordance with CASS 13.10.17R it will be unable to, or materially 
fails to, identify the reason for any discrepancies and correct them in 
accordance with CASS 13.10.19R; or 
(6) it becomes aware that, at any time in the preceding 12 months, the 
amount of client money segregated in its client bank accounts 
materially differed from the total aggregate amount of client money 
the firm was required to segregate in client bank accounts in 
accordance with the segregation requirements in CASS 13.6. 
 
1033.   13.11 Client money distribution in the event of a failure of a firm or 
approved bank 
Application 
13.11.1R 
This section (the claims management client money distribution rules) 
applies to a firm that holds client money which is subject to the claims 
management client money rules when a primary pooling event or a 
secondary pooling event occurs. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1034.   Purpose 
13.11.2G 
The claims management client money distribution rules seek, in the 
event of the failure of a firm or of an approved bank at which the firm 
holds client money, to protect client money and to facilitate the timely 
return of client money to clients. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1035.   Failure of the authorised firm: primary pooling event 
13.11.3R 
A primary pooling event occurs: 
(1) on the failure of the firm; 
(2) on the vesting of assets in a trustee in accordance with an ‘assets 
requirement’ imposed under section 55P(1)(b) or (c) (as the case may 
be) of the Act; or 
(3) on the coming into force of a requirement or requirements which, 
either separately or in combination: 
(a) is or are for all client money held by the firm; and 
(b) require the firm to take steps to cease holding all client money. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1036.   Pooling and distribution after a primary pooling event 
13.11.4R 
If a primary pooling event occurs, then: 
(1) all client money: 
(a) held in the firm’s client bank accounts; and 
(b) any client money identifiable in any other account held by the firm 
into which client money has been received; 
is treated as pooled together to form a notional pool; and 
(2) a firm must calculate the amount it should be holding on behalf of 
each individual customer as at the time of the primary pooling event 
using the method of calculating individual customer balance provided 
for by CASS 13.10.13R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1037.   Distribution if client money not transferred to another firm 
13.11.5R 
Where a primary pooling event occurs and the client money pool is 
not transferred to another firm in accordance with CASS 13.11.6R, a 
firm must distribute client money comprising the notional pool so that 
each client receives a sum that is rateable to its entitlement to the 
notional pool calculated in accordance with CASS 13.11.4R(2). 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1038.   Transfer of client money to another firm 
13.11.6R 
If, in the event of a primary pooling event occurring, the regulated 
claims management activity business undertaken by a firm (“the 
transferor”) is to be transferred to another firm (“the transferee”), then 
the transferor may move the client money pool to the transferee. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1039.   13.11.7R 
If the transferor decides to move the client money pool to the 
transferee, the transferor must immediately on making the decision, 
and before the move takes place, notify the FCA in writing of: 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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(1) the proposed move, including the date of the proposed move if 
known at the time of the notification; and 
(2) the proposed transferee. 
 
1040.   13.11.8R 
The client money pool may be transferred under CASS 13.11.6R only 
if it will be held by the transferee in accordance with CASS 13, 
including the statutory trust in CASS 13.3.1R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1041.   13.11.9R 
If there is a shortfall in the client money transferred under CASS 
13.11.6R then the client money must be allocated to each of the 
customers for whom the client money was held so that each client is 
allocated a sum which is rateable to that customer’s client money 
entitlement in accordance with CASS 13.11.4R(2). This calculation 
may be done by either transferor or transferee in accordance with the 
terms of any transfer. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1042.   13.11.10R 
The transferee must, within seven days after the transfer of client 
money under CASS 13.11.6R notify customers that: 
(1) their money has been transferred to the transferee; and 
(2) they have the option of having client money returned to them or to 
their order by the transferee, otherwise the transferee will hold the 
client money for the customers and conduct regulated claims 
management activities for those customers. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1043.   Failure of an approved bank: secondary pooling event 
13.11.11R 
A secondary pooling event occurs on the failure of an approved bank 
at which a firm holds client money in a client bank account. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1044.   13.11.12R 
(1) Subject to (2), if a secondary pooling event occurs as a result of 
the failure of an approved bank where one or more client bank 
accounts are held then in relation to every client bank account of the 
firm, the provisions of CASS 13.11.13R(1), CASS 13.11.13R(2) and 
CASS 13.11.13R(3) will apply. 
(2) CASS 13.11.13R does not apply if, on the failure of the approved 
bank, the firm pays to its clients, or pays into a client bank account at 
an unaffected approved bank, an amount equal to the amount of client 
money that would have been held if a shortfall had not occurred as a 
result of the failure. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1045.   13.11.13R 
Money held in each client bank account of the firm must be treated as 
pooled and: 
(1) any shortfall in client money held, or which should have been 
held, in client bank accounts, that has arisen as a result of the failure 
of the approved bank, must be borne by all customers whose client 
money is held in a client bank account of the firm, rateably in 
accordance with their entitlements to the pool; 
(2) a new client money entitlement must be calculated for each 
customer by the firm, to reflect the requirements in (1), and the firm’s 
records must be amended to reflect the reduced client money 
entitlement; 
(3) the firm must make and retain a record of each client’s share of the 
client money shortfall at the failed approved bank until the client is 
repaid; and 
(4) the firm must use the new client entitlements, calculated in 
accordance with (2), when performing the client money calculation in 
CASS 13.10.9R. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1046.   13.11.14R 
The term “which should have been held” is a reference to the failed 
approved bank’s failure to hold the client money at the time of the 
pooling event. 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
1047.   13.11.15R 
Any interest earned on client money following a primary or secondary 
pooling event will be due to clients in accordance with CASS 
13.6.10R (Interest). 
 
13 Annex 1 CASS client bank account acknowledgement letter 
template 
[insert] 
 
   UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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13 Annex 2 Guidance notes for client bank account acknowledgement 
letters (CASS 13.5.5G) 
[insert] 
 
1048.  Applicable across all EU legislative instruments 
but not relevant for the purposes of this analysis. 
 
Transitional provisions and schedules    UK jurisdiction-specific rules that extends EU and UK-specific principles to 
these type of firms.  
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Endnotes to Annexes 1 and 2 
 
 
 
 
iii  Available here: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02002L0047-20140702&from=EN 
iv  Available here: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2003/3226/made  
v  Available here: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/2993/made 
vi  Available here:  http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2010/si/626/made/en/print  
vii  While cash does include reference to any currency it does not include, due to the drafting pre-dating the existence and strong growth in interest and volumes of 
transactions related to virtual currencies. Part of whether the EU-FCD ought to be extended to include virtual currencies is rooted in the question as to whether it 
is “money” inasmuch as whether crypto- or digital- assets more widely are “financial instruments” 
In the EU’s opinion (more correctly that of the ECJ) in relation to whether virtual currency is money and in the UK and Irish commentary in relation to whether 
instruments of money, or with “money-like” attributes are money means looking at its functions. Halsbury (5th Ed. Volume 49 para. 1276) considers money to 
have the primary function: “...to serve as a medium of exchange, and as such it is accepted without question in final discharge of debts or payment for goods or 
services. Money also serves -“as a common standard of value by reference to which comparative values of different commodities are ascertained, as a unit of 
account to which debts and liabilities are expressed, and as a store of value or purchasing power.” 
 
Moreover, money also operates on the essential premise that it operates as a currency or unit of account that is generally accepted, including by a central bank or 
monetary authority, in a relevant jurisdiction.  
 
 
viii While the EU rules apply to Gibraltar, Gibraltar is a British Overseas Territory with a separate legislature as well as the Gibraltar Financial Services Commission exercising competent jurisdiction in 
respect of the EU Rules as applied within the territory of Gibraltar and relevant firms. Matters of Gibraltar law and regulatory practice of the GFSC are beyond the scope of this paper.    
ix Regulation (EU) 600/2014 – Available here in its consolidated version as: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02014R0600-20160701&from=EN 
x Directive (EU) 2014/65/EU - Available here in its consolidated version as: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02014L0065-20181001&from=EN transposed in the:  
 
 UK inter alia by way of:  
o the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Markets in Financial Instruments) Regulations 2017;  
o the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2017;  
o the Markets and Organisational Requirements (MiFID 2) Instrument 2017;  
o the Conduct, Perimeter Guidance And Miscellaneous Provisions (MiFID 2) Instrument 2017; 
o the Glossary (MiFID 2) Instrument 2017; 
o the PRA Rulebook: CRR Firms: Internal Governance Instrument 2017; 
o the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Markets in Financial Instruments) Regulations 2017; 
o the Financial Services and Markets - the Data Reporting Services Regulation; 
o the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2017; and 
 
 in the Republic of Ireland by:  
o the European Union (Markets in Financial Instruments) Regulations 2017 and the latter being referred to in the IFR 2017 as the “MiFID Regulations” available here: 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2017/si/375/made/en/print   
xi Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 - Available here in its consolidated version as: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02017R0565-
20171214&from=EN, which is referred to in the FCA CASS text as the “MiFID Org Regulation”  and in the IFR 2017 as “25 April Commission Delegated Regulation” . 
xii Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 – Available here in its consolidated version as: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017L0593&from=en, which is 
referred to in the FCA CASS text as the “MiFID Delegated Directive” and was transposed into UK law by the MARKETS AND ORGANISATIONAL REQUIREMENTS (MiFID 2) 
INSTRUMENT 2017 and into Irish law by way of the S.I. No. 375/2017 - European Union (Markets in Financial Instruments) Regulations 2017.     
xiii Available here as viewed on 1 September 2019: https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/CASS.pdf  
xiv Available here as viewed on 1 September 2019: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2017/si/604/made/en/pdf  
xv Available here as viewed on 1 September 2019: https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/regulation/industry-market-sectors/funds-service-providers/regulatory-requirements-guidance/investor-
money-requirements-guidance_december-2018.pdf?sfvrsn=2 
xvi Available here as viewed on 1 September 2019: https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/regulation/industry-market-sectors/client-assets/guidance-on-client-asset-regulations-for-investment-
firms-march-2015.pdf?sfvrsn=2  
xvii Available here as viewed on 1 September 2019: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2017/si/60/made/en/print 
xviii Available here as viewed on 1 September 2019: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/si/105/made/en/print  
xix Available here as viewed on 1 September 2019: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/si/104/made/en/print 
                                                     
 
